# T. CAJEE v. U. JORMAKIK SIEM AKD ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1961] 1 S.C.R. 750
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960-04-19
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 394 of 1960
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, J. L. Kapur, P. B. Gajendraoadkar, K. SUBBA RAO e.nd K. N. W ANCHoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/t-cajee-v-u-jormakik-siem-akd-another-2222
- **Pages:** 20

## Headnote

Assam Tribal Areas, administration of-Rmwval of tribal
Chief-Whether permissi/fte by administrative action without making
of l«UJ-District Council-Executive Committee, powers of-Interim
suspension of Chief-Constitution of India, Sixth Schedule.
The respondent was Siem of Mylliem siemship in United
Khasi and Jamtia Hills District in the Tribal Areas of Assam,
having been elected as such by the Myntri electors according to
custom in l95r. In June, 1952, a District Council was constituted for the District under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution
and the siemship was brought under it. The rules in the Sixth
Schedule empowered the District Council to make laws with
respect to various matters regarding the administration of the
District including the appointment or succession of Chiefs and
Headmen.
No law was made regulating the appointment and
succession of Chiefs and Headmen. The Chief Executive Member of the Executive Committee of the District Council served
on the respondent a notice to show cause why he should not he
removed from his office and suspended him. The respondent
challenged the action on the grounds: (i) that he could not be
removed by administrative orders but only by making a law,
(ii) that the Executive Committee could not take any action in
this case, and (iii) that the order of suspension was ultra virt.;.
Held, that the District Council had the power to appoint or
remove administrative personnel under the general power of
administration vested in it by the Sixth Schedule. The District
Council was both an administrativeas well as a legislative body.
After a law was mad~ with respect to the appointment or
removal of administrative personnel the authority would be
bound to follow it; but until then it could exercise its administrative Powers. Since the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autono·
mous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Head
men) Act, 1959, had now come into force further action shouk
be taken in accordance with that Act.
The Executive Committee could, under r. 3o(a) of the Assam
Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules,
1951, act on behalf of the District Cou.ncil in cases o.f emergency
and it was not for the courts to go mto the question whether
there was an emergency or not. ln these circumstances the
action taken by the Executive Committee could not be
challenged.
An order of interim suspension could be passed against the
l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
751
respondent while inquiry was pending into his conduct even
z960
though there was no specific provision to that effect in his terms
of appointment. But he was entitled to his remuneration for
T. Cajee
the period of bis interim suspension as there was no statute or
v. .
.
rule existing under which it could be withheld.
U. fo•manik s .. m
The Management of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers: Union,
& Another
[r960] r S.C.R. 476, applied.
Per Sobba Rao, J.-It is very doubtful whether; when the
Constitution confers on an authority power to make Jaws· in respect of a specific subject matter, that authority can deal with
the same subject matter withont making such a Jaw in its administrative capacity.

## Text

_Characters 0–39,868 of 45,251. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39868 for what follows._

1960
Sepl1mbet- zo.
750
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
T. CAJEE
v.
U. JORMAKIK SIEM AKD ANOTHER.
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., J. L. KAPUR, P. B. GAJENDRAOADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO e.nd K. N. W ANCHoo, JJ.)
Assam Tribal Areas, administration of-Rmwval of tribal
Chief-Whether permissi/fte by administrative action without making
of l«UJ-District Council-Executive Committee, powers of-Interim
suspension of Chief-Constitution of India, Sixth Schedule.
The respondent was Siem of Mylliem siemship in United
Khasi and Jamtia Hills District in the Tribal Areas of Assam,
having been elected as such by the Myntri electors according to
custom in l95r. In June, 1952, a District Council was constituted for the District under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution
and the siemship was brought under it. The rules in the Sixth
Schedule empowered the District Council to make laws with
respect to various matters regarding the administration of the
District including the appointment or succession of Chiefs and
Headmen.
No law was made regulating the appointment and
succession of Chiefs and Headmen. The Chief Executive Member of the Executive Committee of the District Council served
on the respondent a notice to show cause why he should not he
removed from his office and suspended him. The respondent
challenged the action on the grounds: (i) that he could not be
removed by administrative orders but only by making a law,
(ii) that the Executive Committee could not take any action in
this case, and (iii) that the order of suspension was ultra virt.;.
Held, that the District Council had the power to appoint or
remove administrative personnel under the general power of
administration vested in it by the Sixth Schedule. The District
Council was both an administrativeas well as a legislative body.
After a law was mad~ with respect to the appointment or
removal of administrative personnel the authority would be
bound to follow it; but until then it could exercise its administrative Powers. Since the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autono·
mous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Head
men) Act, 1959, had now come into force further action shouk
be taken in accordance with that Act.
The Executive Committee could, under r. 3o(a) of the Assam
Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules,
1951, act on behalf of the District Cou.ncil in cases o.f emergency
and it was not for the courts to go mto the question whether
there was an emergency or not. ln these circumstances the
action taken by the Executive Committee could not be
challenged.
An order of interim suspension could be passed against the
l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
751
respondent while inquiry was pending into his conduct even
z960
though there was no specific provision to that effect in his terms
of appointment. But he was entitled to his remuneration for
T. Cajee
the period of bis interim suspension as there was no statute or
v. .
.
rule existing under which it could be withheld.
U. fo•manik s .. m
The Management of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers: Union,
& Another
[r960] r S.C.R. 476, applied.
Per Sobba Rao, J.-It is very doubtful whether; when the
Constitution confers on an authority power to make Jaws· in respect of a specific subject matter, that authority can deal with
the same subject matter withont making such a Jaw in its administrative capacity.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeal
No. 394 of 1960.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 19,
1960, of the Assam High Court in Civil Rule No.
69/1959.
O. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, A. V.
Viswanatha Sastri, Narendra Kumar Lahiri and
R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.
N. 0. Chatterjee and D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 1.
Naunit Lal, for respondent No. 2.
1960. September 20. The Judgment of Sinha, C. J.,
Kapur, Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo, JJ., was delivered by Wanchoo, J. Subba Rao, J., delivered a
separate Judgment.
WANCHOO J.-This appeal, on a certi5cate .granted
Wanchoo J.
under Art. 132 (I) of the Constitution by the Assam
High Court, raises questioqs regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the
Constitution. A writ petition was filed by U. Jormanik
Siem (hereinafter called the respondent) in the Assam
High Court against the Chief· Executive .Member of
the District Council (hereinafter called .the appellant).
United Khasi and J aintia Hills District (hereinafter
called the District). The case of the respondent was
that he was Siem of Mylliem siemship in the L'.~trict
and was elected as such by the Myntries anJ the
people according to custom in 1951. After the constitution of the District Council for the District, in
•
752
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
1960
June 1952, the siemRhip wa.s brought under it a.nd the
respondent continued to discharge the administrative
T. Ca;ee
v.
a.nd judicial functions, for which he wa.s remunerated
u. Jo•manik '''"'by a. Aha.re of the groRS income of the siemship. The
& Another
Siem once appointed could not be removed from his
office except through a. referendum of the people a.ccordWanchoo f.
ing to custom until such custom wa.s changed by
legislation passed by the District Council with the concurrence of the Governor.
Ko such legislation ha.d
however been passed till the writ petition wa.s ma.de
on July 8, 1959. But on account of political differences
between the respondent a.nd the then Chief E·xecutive
Member a.n attempt wa.s made after the Genera.I Elections of 1957 to ha.rm the respondent. In consequence
certain charges were levelled against the respondent
a.nd a. Durba.r wa.s ca.lied by the appellant for ,July 6,
1959, a.nd the respondent wa.s asked to be present a.t
the Durba.r to defend himself. It is not clear whether
the Durba.r wa.s held or no' 'mt a.n order wa.s issued
on July 7, 1959, by the appellant in which it wa.s said
that the charges age.inst the r1• ·pondent ha.d been
forwarded to him a.nd he ha.d been g11en a.n opportunity
to show ca.use on or before July 17, 1959, why he
•'iould not be removed from his office a.nd that he ba.d
failed to appear before the appellant on July 7 a.a
ordered. Therefore, the respondent wa.s suspended
from bis office from July 8, 1959, a.nd was required to
make over charge to the acting Siem on the ea.me da.y.
The respondent however filed the writ petition on
July 8, 1959, which wa.s admitted the same day and
notioe wa.s iBSued to the appellant to show ca.use why
the writ should not be granted. The High Court also
pa.BSed an order staying the operation of the order of
the appellant dated July 7, 1959.
The respondent
contended that he could not be removed from his
office or suspended by the Executive Committee of the
District Council a.nd that the order of the appellant
suspending him
was illegal and ultra viru being
against custom and usage relating to that matter.
Further the order of the appellant wa.s without jurisdiction as it wa.s pa.BSed without the approval of
the District Council and there was no emergency
•
:-
' i ...
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
753
justifying the order. The order was also mala fide and
1 960
was due to political animosity between the respondent
T. Cajee
and the Executive Committee.
v.
The petition was opposed on behalf of the appel- u. JormaAik Siem
!ant, and its main contention was that the Siem was
& Another
nominated by an electornl college consisting of the
representatives of several clans and that the people
Wanchoo J.
in general had nothing to do with _it and that the
nomination of the Siem by the electoral college was
subject to approval of the Goverriment. In accordance
with that custom, the respondent's nomi•1ation by the
Myntri-electors to the siemship of Mylliem was
approved by the Government and he was appointed
to the office of Siem subject to confirmation by the
District Council when that body came into existencA.
After the District Council was constituted in 1952, it
approved the provisional appointment made by the
Government and confirmed it on certain terms
mentioned in the letter .of April 9, 1953. Later these
terms were modified by the District Council in certain
particulars by letter da.ted August 9, 1955, and the
respondent had been working as Siem by virtue of
this confirmation by the District Council on the terms
conveyed to him in the two letters mentioned above.
There was no custom which required a referendum of
the people before the Siem of Mylliem could be remov-
. ed from office. On the other hand, the Siem being
appointed by the _Government formerly and now by
the District Council was liable to removal and or
suspension by the appointing authority in case he did
not act in arrcordance with the terms of his appointment and was guilty of oppression, misconduct or
dereliction of duty .. The charge of political animosity
against the then Chief Executive Member was denied
and attention was drawn to the respondent's conduct
in the discharge of his duties which showed- that he
. was unfit tO hold the office of Siem; consequently an
order was passed on Ju:ly 7, 1959, suspendhg him and
the order was legal, intra vires and in keepiug with
custom and usage of the land and it was not necessary
to obtain the approval of the District Council to the
passing of that order. which was in accordance with
754
SUPREME COGRT REPORTS
[1961]
r960
the terms of app.Jintment of the respondent. :Further
.
the Execut.ive Comrr.,.teo, considering all tho circumr. Ca1ee
stances oft ho ca:·;;, wa~ of the opinion that the matter
u. 10,,.:·.,k Si•m was .of emergency and therefore took action without
& Anothtt
gettmg the ord<'r approved by the Dist.riot Council.
The High Court did not go into the question wheWanchoo J.
ther there was any custom by which the Siem could
be removed only by a referendum. It held that after
the coming into force of the Constitution, the Khasi
States lost all exiHtence as separate entities except
in so far as their existence or authority was preserved
by the Constitution. It also held that the respondent
was appointed to the office of Siem by the Deputy
Commissioner on behalf of the Government with due
regard to the nomination made by the Myntri-electors
and this appointment wa.s subject to confirmation by
the District Council when that body wa.s constituted
a.nd that in fact the District CounJil confirmed the
appointment on April 9, 1953, on certain terms which
were revised in 1955. It also held that t be administration of the District vested in the District Council;
but it was of the view that the appointment a.nd
succession of Siems were never intended to be its
a.clministrative function a.ud therefore the District
Council could only a.ct in this matter by ma.king law
with the assent of the Governor and not by passing
orders in exercise of its administrative ·functions.
Therefore the power to appoint, even if it included the
power to dismiss, could be exercised by the District
Council onl.v by means of proper legislation. In the
result, the High Court allowed the petition and directed that the order of July 7, 1959, should not be given
effect to a.sit was not supported by law. Thereupon
the appellant applied for a.nd obtained a certificate
from the High Court under Art. 132 of the/ Constitution; and that is how the matter has come up before
us.
Before we deal with the ma.in point on the basis of
which the writ filed by the respondent in the High
Court has succeeded, it will be useful to consider what
the position of the Chiefs in the former Kha.si States
was before 194 7 a.nd how tha.t position was affected
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
755
by the coming into force of the Constitution in 1950.
x96o
It appears ·that before 1947 there were twenty-five
.
such Chiefs who had however very limited powers. In
T.v~"
1"
some of the States, the succession appears to have u. Jormanik s;,,,.
bee!! hereditary; but in most of them the Chief by
6- Another
whatever name he was known was elected either by
what was equivalent to an electoral college or by the
Wanchoo J.
people generally, the election in many cases being
confined to members of certain families known as the
Chiefs families.
But whether the succession was
hereditary or the Chief was elected by the electoral
college or by the people, the recognition of the British
Government-through the Crown representative was·
necessary before the Chief could exercise any powers
and this was conveyed by means of sanads granted to
the Chief. It further appears that the British Government through the Crown representative as paramount
. power, reserved to itself the right· to remove the Chief
in case of oppression, misconduct or dereliction of
duty, though before taking such action the prevalent
custom in the particular State regarding the ascertainment of the wishes of the electoral college or the
people was followed. The Chiefs were· also under the
control of the Deputy Commissioner of the district.
This was the position upto the 15th of August, 194 7,
when India became a Dominion.
Thereafter the
paramountcy of the British Government lapsed and
it appears that the twenty-five Chiefs established a
Federation. Thereafter a new relationship was established between these twenty-five Chiefs and the
Government of India by means of an Instrument of
Accession which was accepted by the Governor-General of India on August 17, 1948 .. By this Instrument,
the Chiefs individually as well as collectively as
members of the Federation acceded to the Dominion
of India by which all existing administrative arrangements between the Government of India and the
State of Assam on the one hand and the Khasi
States on the other were to continue in force until
new or modified arrangements were made subject to
C!lrtain exceptions as to judicial and administrative
powers. It is not necessary to set out these exceptions
756
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
i96o
except that so far a.a a.dministra.tive powers were
T c .
concerned, only excis<•, forests,
la.nd a.nd wa.ter
· v.a;ee
rights a.nd the revenue derived therefrom were exceptu. fonnanih Sitm ed a.nd all the rerqa.ining functions were to be common
6· Anoth"
with the Central or Sta.te Governmt1nt. Further in
the matter of legislation, the Dominion Legislature
Wauchoo f.
a.nd the Assam Legislature ha.d the power to pass
laws concerning subjects of common interest with the
proviso that some machinery should be devised for
representation in the Assam legislature.
This position continued till the Constitution ca.me
into force.
There wa.s no merger as such of the
twenty-five Kha.si States in India. before Ja.nua.ry 26,
1950.
But the Constitution, by the First Schedule in
which the territories of the Stat~ of Assam were
defined, merged the Kha.si. Sta.tea into· the State of
Assam, a.s tha.t State wa.s to consist of the territories
which immediately before the commencement of the
Constitution were comprised in the Province of
Assa.m, the Kha.si Sta.tea a.ud the Assam Triba.I Area.s
but excluding the territories specified in the Schedule
to the Assa.m (Alteration of Boundaries) Act, 1951.
Thus by the Constitution the Kha.si Sta.tea were
merged in the State of Assam a.nd a.ny power of the
Chiefs so fa.r a.s administration wa.s concerned came to
end.
By Art. 244(2) of the Constitution, however,
specia.l provisions contained in the Sixth Schedule
thereof were to a.pply to the administration of the
Tribal Area.a in the Sta.te of Assam. The position
therefore after the coming into force of the Constitu.
tion wa.s tha.t the Chiefs lost whatever ruling or administrative powers they had by the merger of these
twenty-five Sta.tea in ASBa.m a.nd the governance of
these States was to be carried on according to the
provisions of the Sixth Schedule.
This brings us to the Sixth Schedule, and we may
refer briefly to the provisions contained thecein with
respect. to the a.dministra.tion of the tribal a.rea.s in
Assam. By paras. I and 20 the whole triba.l area. is
divided into autonomous districts and two other
a.rea.s.
Autonomous districts can in turn be divided
into autonomous region!!.
Paragraphs 2 to 17 deal
l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
757
with the administration ~f autonomous districts and
'960
autonomous regions, while para. 18 provides for the
T c .
application by the Governor of the provisions of paras.
· v."J"
2 to 17 to the other two areas specified in para. 20. u. Jorinanik Siem
Pe.re.graph 19 deals with transitional provisions and
& Anothn
para. 21 with the amendment of the Schedule. It
may be mentioned that the United Khasi and Jaintia
Wan,hoo f.
Hills Diiltrict with which we are concerned in this
case is to comprise the territories which before the
commencement of the Constitution were known as the
Khasi- States and the Khasi and J aintia Hills Districts, excluding certain areas within the cantonment
and municipality of Shillong. District Councils and
Regional Councils are to be constituted under para. 2
and the Governor is given power to make rules
for the first constitution of District Councils and
Regional Councils in consultation with the existing
tribal councils and other representative tribal organisations within the districts or regions concerned and
the rules are to provide for the composition of the
councils, the delimitation of territorial constituencies,
the qualifications for voting at elections and the preparation of electoral rolls, the qualifications for being
elected as members of councils, the term of office of
the .members and any other matter relating to or
connected with elections or nominations to such
councils, the procedure and conduct of business in the
councils, and the appointmen't of officers and staff of
the councils. These very powers were conferred on
the District. or Regional Council after it came into
being along with certain other powers for the formation -of local Councils or Boards and their procedure
and the conduct of business, and generally all matters
relating to the transaction of business pertaining to
the administration of the district or region, ·as the
case may be. Further para. 2(4) provides that the
administration of autonomous district shall, in so far
as it is not vested under this Schedule 1n any Regional Council within such district, be vested in the
District Council for such district and the administration of an.autonomous region shall be vested in the
'¥/
758
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
'960
Regional Council for such region. Paragraph 3 gives
T. Cajee
power to the District and Regional Councils to make
v.
laws with respect to various matters including the
u. Jormanik Swnappointment or succession of Chiefs or Headmen, sub-
.s. Ano•h"
ject to .such law11 being submitted to the Governor
without whose assent they are not to come into force.
WancJioo ].
Paragraphs 4 and 5 deal with administration of
justice. Paragraph 6 gives powers to the District
Council to establish, construct or manage primary
schools, dispensaries, markets, cattle pounds, ferries,
fisheries, roa~s and waterways. Paragraphs 7, 8 and
9 deal with financial matters. Paragraph 10 gives
power to the District Councils to make regulations for
the control of money lending and trading by nontribals, which are to come into force on the aBSent of
the Governor. Paragraph 11 provides for publication
of laws, rules 11.nd regulation~ made under the Schedule.
Paragraph 12 deals with the application of
Acts of Parliament and the Legislature of the State to
autonomous districts and autonomous regions. Paragraph 13 deals with the budget while para.. 14 provides for the appointment of a. commiBBion by the
Governor at any time to inquire into and report on
the administration of autonomous districts and autonomous regions. Paragraph 15 gives power to the
Governor to annul or suspend any Act or regulation
of District and Regional Councils under certain contingencies and also gives him power to suspend the
Council and assume all or any of its powers to himself subject to Ruch order being placed before the
ASBam legislature. Paragraph 16 gives power to the
Governor to dissolve a District or Regional Council
on the recommendation of the Commission appointed
under para. 14 and order a. fresh election and in the
meantime to aBSume the administration of the &rea. to
himself subject to the previous approval of the Assam
legislature .. Para.graph 17 deals wi~h t~e forming of
constituenmes for the Assam Leg1sla.t1ve A.embly.
Then we come to para.. 19, which deals with transitional provisions and lays down that as soon as
poBBible after the commencement of the Constitution,
the Governor shall take steps for the constitution of
l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT .ttEPORTS
759
a District Council for each autonomous district in the
x96o
State under the Schedule and until a District Council
T. Cajee
is so constituted for an autonomous district, the
v.
administration of such district shall be vested in the u. Jormanik Siem
Governor. It also provides that no Act of Parliament
& Another
or of the Assam legislature shi.ll apply to any area
unless the Governor l:iy public notification so directs
Wanchoo f.
and the Governor in giving such direction with res.
pect to any Act may direct that the Act shall in its
application to tho area or to any specified part there.
of, have effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as he thinks fit.
The Governor is also given
power to make regulations for the peace and good
government of any area and any regulation so made
may repeal or amend any Act of Parliament or of the
Assam legislature or any existing Jaw which is for the
time being applicable to such area. The power to
make regulations is subject to the assent by the President.
It will thus be seen from the scheme of the Sixth
Schedule that the District Council is both an administrative as well as a legislative body. Further all the
:i.ciministrative and legislative powers were vested in
the Governor by para. 19 till the District Councils were
con;;tituted. The Governor framed Rules under para.
2 (6) in 1951 cailed the Assam Autonomous Districts
(Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951. The
Rules provide inter alia for an Executive Committee
with the Chief Executive Member as the head and
two other members to exercise the executive functions
of the District Council. The Rules also specify the
matttirs which are excepted from the purview of the
~xecutive Committee," though in an emergency, the
Executive Committee of some of the autonomous
districts is authorised to take such action with respect
to excepted matters as might be necessary ; but . every
such case has to be laid before the District Council at
its next session. In pursuance of these Rules, the
District Council fot t1\e District came into being from
June 1952.
We have already observed that the administrative.
powers of the Chiefs as they existed before January
760
SUPRE.'.IIE COURT REPORTS
[1961]
'960
26, 1950, came to an end with the coming into force of
the Constitution and during the tramitional period
T. Cajee
v.
all administrative powers vested in the Governor
1. Jo"nanik Siem which could be exercised by those appointed by him
.s. An:•tha
under his powers under para. 19 of the Sixth Schedule.
It is in this background that we have to consider the
wa"'""" J.
notification of .March 6, 1951. Tlmt notification notified for the general information of the subjects of
'.1.Iyllicm Siemship that Government after careful consideration of the nomination mr.de by the Myntri-clectors of the bUccessor to the Siemship of Myllicm and
also of the objections to this nomination, had appointed the respondent as Siem of l\Iylliem in place of late
U. Sati Raja subject to confirmation by the District
Council when that body was constituted. It was also
l)lltifmd that the respondent had taken over charge uf
the Siemship with effect from !t1arch 5, 1951. ·It is
clear from what·we have said above that the .'.11yntrielectorn in this particular case used to elect a person
an<l their election amounted to a nomination of that
person for the approval of the Governor to the Siemship of l\fyllicm; but until the Governor approved of
the nomination and appointed the person so nominated to the Siomship he could not hold oflice as Siem of
!lly lliem. Tho position therefore just after the coming
into frirc(' of the Constitution was that the Governor
waH chu.rgC'd with the administration of the autonou10118
di~trict8 till the District Council~ came into
cxist~nce aud that ca.rricd with it the po\\'er to appoint
officers to carry on the administration. The appointment therefore of the respondent as Siem of 11-lylliem
was wade by virtue of the Governor's power undur
p«ra. l\J and the ~~spondont dcri\'ed his power a.s
Siem frum that appointment and could not claim any
power outside that appointment. The Governor of
course made it clear that the appointment was subject
tu confirmation of the District Council when it ca.me
into being, fur the Governor's powers at the time of
tho appointment were derived from para. 19 and were
transitional only. That is why it was said that the
appointment was subject to confirmation by the
District Council. Therefore when the District Council
..
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
761
oame into existence in June 1952, it, in.due course, in
z96o
exercise of its administrative powers. under para. 2 .(4),
T. Ca Jee
considered the question of confirmation of the appomtv.
ment made by the Governor in 1951 and confirmed u. Jonnanik Siem
the respondent's appointment as Siem of Mylliem and
& Another
communicated it to him along with the terms on
Wanchoo ].
which the confirmation was made.
Besides the financial clauses, one of the terms provided that the Siem
shall be subject to the control of the District Council
and shall carry out all the orders issued to him from
time to time by the District Council or its officers
acting for and on behalf of the District Council. It
was also provided that the Siem shall conduct himself
in accordance with the established customs and
usages approved by the. District Council and in accordance with the rules, laws and regulations that the
District Council may issue from time to time, Another
term provided that the S_iem and others shall be liable
to removal from their offices by the order of the Dis-.
trict Council if that body was satisfied that any of
them did not discharge his du.ties properly or had been
acting in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the
Siemship or tho Diiltrict Council in general or had been
conducting himself with indecorum ; and such order
passed by the District Council would be final. Therefore, after April, 1953, the respondent continued in the
office of Siem by virtue of this confirmation by the
District Council.
In 1955, there was some modification of t.he terms
whioh was communicated to the respondent on August
9, 1955. The respondent was informed that he would
continue as Siem as long as he was not removed from
the Siemship by the order of the District Council for
any lapse on his part; he was to submit to tho directions of the District Council and to obey all · orders
issued by the Chief Executive Member or any officer
of the District Council empower.ed to act on behalf Of
the Chief Executive Member; the respondent was to
conduct the affairs of the Elaka according to the
existing customs and customary laws as approved by
the District Council and in accordance with the rules
and regulations w hioh the District Council had
762
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
1960
enforced or might enforce in future. Provision was also
T c .
made for the judicial powers of the Siem in accordance
· /
1"
with the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills
Autono~ous
u. Jonttanik Siem Distriot (AdminiMtration of Justice) Rules, 1953 .
.s. ,4ftoth"
Besides, there were certain other terms with respect to
financial matters. The consequence of these orders
wo,..loo J.
was that the respondent's term as Siem was to continue
aa long as he was not removed from that office fOr any
lapse on his part. The positfon therefore that emerges
on a consideration of the three orders of 1951, 1958
and 1955 is that the respondent was holding the
office of Siem by virtue of his appointment in the first
insia.nOll by the Governor and its later confirmation by
the District Council on terms which had been communicated to him and was thus no more than an
administrative officer appointed by the District
Council by virtue of its powers under para. 2 (4) of the
Schedule and working under its control
This position apparently continued till 1959 wnen
we come to the incidents which culminated in the
order ·of July 7, 1959. We a.re not concerned in this
appeal with the merits of the action taken aga.ii:st the
respondent; nor a.re we concerned with the question
whether there were sufficient reasons for the Executive Committoe to take the action which it did against
the respondeno. We are only concerned with the
power of the Executive Committee of the District
Council to take ar.y action at all in the matter of the
respondent's removal from the office of Siem. The
High Court has taken the view that the appointment
and succeSBion of a Siem was not an administrative
function of the District Council and that . the District
Council could only a.ct by ma.king a law with the
aSBent of the Governor so far as the appointment and
removal of a Siem was concerned. In this connection,
the High Court relied on para. 3(1Xg) of the Schedule,
which la.ye down that the District Council shall have
the power to make la.we with respect to the appointment and socceBBion ~f Chiefs and Headmen. The
High Court. seems to he of the view that until such a
law is ma<le there could be no power of appointment
of a Chief or Siem like the respondent and in
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
763
consequence there would be· no power of removal either.
' 960
With respect, it seems to us tba.t the High Court has
r. Cajee
read far more into para.. 3(l)(g) than is justified by its
v ...
language. Paragraph 3(1) is in fact something like au. Jormanih Siem ·
legislative list and enumerates the subjects on . which
'"'A"0'h"
the District Council is competent to make laws.
-·
wa ..
~oo ].
Under para. 3(l)(g) it has power to make laws with
respect to the appointment or succeBBion of Chiefs or
Headmen and. this would naturally include the .power
to remove them. But it does not follow from this
that the appointment or removal of a Chief is a legill·
lative act or that no appointment or removal can be
made without there being first a law to that effect.
The High Court also seems to have thought that as
there was no provision in the Sixth Schedule in terms
of Arts. 73 and 1162 .of the Cons.titution, the admini-
. strative power of the District Council .would not
extend to the subjects enumerated in para. 3(1). Now
para. 2(4) provides that the administration of an
autonomous district shall vest in the District Council
and this in our opinion is comprehensive enough to
include all such executive powers as are necessary to
be exercised for the purposes of the administration. of
the district. It is true that where executive power
impinges upon the rights of citizens it will have to be
backed by an appropriate law; but where executive
power is concerned only with the personnel of the
administration it is not necessary-even though it
may be desirable-that there must be laivs, rules.or
regulations governing the appointment of those who
would carry . on the administration · under the control
of the District Council. The Sixth Schedule vested
the administration of the autonomous distticts in the
Go*nor during the transitional period and thereafter
in the District Council. . The .admiri.istl'&tion could
only be carried on by officers like the Siem or Chief
and .others below him, and it seems to us quite clear,
if the administration was to be carried on, as it.must,
that the Governor in the first instance and the District Councils after they came iri.to existence, would
have power by· virtue of the administra.tion being
vested in them to appoiri.t o~rs and .. other11 to carry
·,,,._
764
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
1960
on the administration. Further once the power of
appointment falls within the power of administration
T. Cajre
v.
of the district the power of removal of officers and
u. Jonna,,ik Siem others so appointed would necessarily follow as n.
<'>- Anothn
corollary. The Constitution could not have inti>nded
that all administration in the autonomous districts
w ... ,hoo f·
should come to a stop till the Governor made
regulations under· para. 19(1Xb) or till the District
Council paSBed laws under para. 3(1Xg). The Gover.
nor in the first instance and the District Councils
thereafter were vested with the power to carry on the
administration and that in our opinion included the
power to appoint and remove the personnel for carrying on the administration.
Doubtless when regulations a.re ma.de under para. 19(l)(h) or laws a.re passed
under para. 3(1) with respect to the
1 appointment or
remove.I of the personnel of the administration, the
administrative authorities would be bound to follow
the regulations so ma.de or the laws so passed.
But
from this it does not follow that till the regulations
wore ma.de or tho laws were passed, there could be no
appointment or dismissal of the personnel of the
administration. In our opinion, the authorities concerned would at all relevant times have thepower
to appoint or remove administrative personnel under
the general power of administration vested in them
by the Sixth Schedule. The view therefore ta.ken by
the High Court that there could be no appointment
or removal hy the District Council without a law
having been first passed in that behalf under para.
3( l Xg) cannot be sustained.
In this case, the District Counoil when it oonfirmed
the appointment of the respondent laid down certain
terms by virtue of its power of administration and so
far as the respondent is concerned those terms would
govern the relations between him and the District
Council in respect of a.II matters inoluding his removal
from the offioe of Siem. As pointed out by this Court
in Parshotam Lal. Dhi'llfJf"a v. The Union of India('),
the conditions of servioe of a Government servant
appointed t.o a poet are regulated by the terms of the
\J) [19,&] 8.C.R. 828, 841.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
765
contract of employment, express or implied, and sub1960
ject thereto, by the rules applicable to the members of
T. CaJee
the particular service. In the absence of such genev.
ral rules, the particular·terms offered to a particular u. Jormanik Siem
officer on his appointment would govern the . relationo;. Another
ship between the appointing authority and the person
appointed in that particular case. It would therefore
Wanchoo J.
be wrong to hold that the respondent could not be
removed from his office after his appointment in
accordance with the terms on which he was appointed. On the view taken by the High Court, even the
appointment of the respondent would be illegal for
there was no law to support that appointment at the
relevant time. But as we have said above, the Governor and later the District Councils being vested with
the administration of the autonomous districts would
be entitled to appoint personnel for carrying on the
administration and the power to appoint would
include from its very nature, being inherent in it, the
power of removal, for it can hardly be contended that
though the appointment might be made, the authority
making the appointment would have no power to
remov_e a person once appointed. In this particular
cas~ there can be no difficulty whatsoever because
when the District Council confirmed the appointment
of the respondent it laid down the terms on· which the
appointment will be held as well as the terms on
which the respondent could be removed from the
office, in which he was being continued. Nor can it
be said that the appointment in this case was by the
Governor and therefore the Governor could alone
remove him, for the notification of March 1951 made
it clear that the appointment by the Governor was
provisional and was subject to confirmation by the
District Council when it came into existence. The
District Council in fact confirmed the appointment of
the respondent in April 1953 and so in law the
appointment of the respondent was by the District
Council and therefore it would have. the power to
remove him. Besides, if, as the High Court thought,
the appointment of the respondent was invalid, it
98
766
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
i96o
would inevitably follow tha.t he ha.d no right to a.sk
1 c .
for a. writ under Art. 226 ; if the appointment wa.s
· .• ~
1"
ba.d, he ha.d no legal right a.nd he ca.nnot oompla.in
u. Jorm•••k s;,,.. a.gs.inst his suspension. We a.re therefore of opinion
cSo A•olher
that the respondent being a.n officer appointed to
oa.rry on the administration by the District Council
w .. choo J.
could he removed by it in a.ccorda.nce. with the terms
a.nd conditions of his appointment.
The next question tha.t arises is whether the Executive Committee could ta.ke the a.ction which it did in
this ease. Ordinarily, the appointment being ma.de
by the District Council, the remove.I could (Jniy be by
it. The contention 1Jn hebe.If of. the respondent is
that even if the District Council ha.d the power to
remove in a.cC(Jrda.nce with the terms a.nd conditions
of the respondent's appointment tha.t power could
only be exercised by the District Council and not by
the Executive Committee. In this connection, rr. 28,
29 a.nd 30 of the ABSam Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951, a.re relevant.
Rule 28 vests the executive functions of the District
Council in the Executive Committee.
Rule 29 (I)
gives power to the Executive Committee to dispose of
a.II ma.tters fa.lling within its purview subject to certain exceptions mentioned in r. 29(2).
Ouo of these
exceptions 1s with respect to a.II important. appointments.
Assuming· that the uffice of siem is an important appointment, the Executive Committee could not
normally dee.I with it in view of the exceptions in
r. 29(2). But r. 30(a) la.ys down that where immediate
action in respect of a.ny of the excPpled matters is
necessary, the Executive Committee of a District
Council other tha.n tha.t of the Mikhir Hills or tho
North Ca.cha.r Hills, ma.y ta.ke such action thereon a.s
the emergency a.ppea.rs to it to requirn; but every
such ca.se shall ha.ve to· be laid before the District
Council a.tits next session. The order of July 7, 1959,
shows tha.t the Executive Committee took a.ction
under r. 30(a.) a.s it considered lhe matter to be one of
emergency. It is not for the courts to go into the
question whether there was emergency or not with
respect to excepted matters a.nd in (he circumstances
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
767
the action ta.ken by the Executive Committ.ee cannot
i96o
be challenged on the ground that it is beyond its
T. Caje.
power.
·
v.
The last point that has been urged is that in any u. Jorma11ik Siem
case the Executive Committee could not suspend the
&.Another
respondent, and reliance in this connection is placed
on The Management of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel WorkWanchoo f.,
era' .Union (1).
This Court held in that case as
under:-
" It was now well settled that the power to sus.
pend, .in the sense of a right to forbid a servant to
work, is not an implied term in an ordinary contract
between master. and servant, and that such a power
can only be the creature either of a statute governing.
the contract, or of an express term in the contra.ct itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such power
either as ·an express term in the contract or in the
rules framed under some statute would mean that the
master would. have no power to suspend a workman
and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the
employee to work, he will have to pay wages during
the so-called period of suspension.