# TAHSILDAR SINGH AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE O:F UTTAR PHADESH - **Citation:** [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 875 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1959 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 67of1958 - **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, Jafer Imam, J. L. Kapur, A. K. Sarkar, K. SuBBA RAo, M. HrnAYATULLAH - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/tahsildar-singh-and-another-v-the-state-o-f-uttar-phadesh-1690 - **Pages:** 49 ## Headnote Criminal Trial-Police Statements-Use of--Omission, when amounts to contradiction-Code of Criminal Procedure, I898 (V of I898), s. I62-Indian Evidence Act, I872 (I of I872), s. I45· A music performance attended by a large number of persons including two police informers Bankey and Asa Ram. was going on on a platform in front of the house of one Ram Saroop. At that time there was a full moon and the light of a gas lamp and several lanterns. The informers had placed their guns on a cot close to the platform and one Bharat Singh was sitting on that cot. The accused along with 15 or 20 persons suddenly arrived armed with fire arms to kill the informers and stood behind a well on the southern side, from where they shouted that no one should run away and advanced firing shots. Two persons were killed on the spot. Bharat Singh was hit and he ran northwards pursued by the culprits and was also shot dead. The culprits turned over the dead bodies and on seeing Bharat Singh's face they exclaimed that Asa Ram informer had been killed. They then passed in front of Ram Saroop's house and disappeared. While going they carried away Bankey's gun from the cot. The appellants and seven others were sent up for trial for this occurrence. At the trial the defence alleged that prosecution had developed its case. The police statements of the eye witness did not mention the facts regarding the scrutiny of the dead bodies and the presence of the gas lantern, and the defence counsel put the following two questions with respect to these omissions to the first eye witness produced:- 1. "Did you state to the Investigating Officer that the gang rolled the dead bodies of Nathi, Saktu and Bharat Singh and scrutinised them and did you tell him that the face of Asa Ram resembled with that of the deceased Bharat Singh?" 2. "Did you state to the Investigating Officer about the presence of the gas lantern ?" The Sessions Judge disallowed the questions and on account of this order similar questions were not put to the other eye witnesses. The Sessions Judge convicted the appellants under s. 302 Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to death. The appellants appealed to the High Court and made an application alleging that the Sessions Judge had not allowed the defence counsel to put omissions amounting to material contradictions to I959 May 5. 876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp· I959 Tahsildar Singh & Another the eye witnesses and prayed that the eye witnesses be summoned so that the questions disallowed may be put to them. Though the High Court held that the omissions amounted to contradictions and that the Sessions Judge had wrongly disallowed cross~examination \Vith respect thereto, it found that even after ignoring these t\VO circumstances there \Vere other facts which showed that the culprits had come close to the eye witnesses and that they had unmistaken opportunity of identifying the appellants in the light of the full moon and the lanterns. The High Court accordingly dismissed the application for summoning the eye witnesses holding that no prejudice had been caused to the appellants by the disallowance of the cross-examination in respect of omissions ;,ind also dismissed the appeals and confirmed the convictions and sentences of the appellants. v. The State of Vilar Pradesh Held, (Per SINHA, KAPUR, SARKAR and SuBBA RAO, JJ.) that the omissions did not amount to contradictions and that the Sessions Judge was right in disallowing cross-examination in respect thereof. A statement to the police could be used under s. 162 of the Code only for the purpose of contradicting a statement in the witness box under the second part of s. 1, Evidence Act, but it could not be used for the purpose of cross-examining the witness under the first part of s. 145· A statement made to the police but not reduced to writing, could not be used for any purpose, not even for contradiction. It \Vas incorrect to say that all omissions in regard to important features of the incident whi ## Text _Characters 0–39,920 of 109,976. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39920 for what follows._ (2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 875 TAHSILDAR SINGH AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE O:F UTTAR PHADESH (B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR, K. SuBBA RAo and M. HrnAYATULLAH, JJ.) Criminal Trial-Police Statements-Use of--Omission, when amounts to contradiction-Code of Criminal Procedure, I898 (V of I898), s. I62-Indian Evidence Act, I872 (I of I872), s. I45· A music performance attended by a large number of persons including two police informers Bankey and Asa Ram. was going on on a platform in front of the house of one Ram Saroop. At that time there was a full moon and the light of a gas lamp and several lanterns. The informers had placed their guns on a cot close to the platform and one Bharat Singh was sitting on that cot. The accused along with 15 or 20 persons suddenly arrived armed with fire arms to kill the informers and stood behind a well on the southern side, from where they shouted that no one should run away and advanced firing shots. Two persons were killed on the spot. Bharat Singh was hit and he ran northwards pursued by the culprits and was also shot dead. The culprits turned over the dead bodies and on seeing Bharat Singh's face they exclaimed that Asa Ram informer had been killed. They then passed in front of Ram Saroop's house and disappeared. While going they carried away Bankey's gun from the cot. The appellants and seven others were sent up for trial for this occurrence. At the trial the defence alleged that prosecution had developed its case. The police statements of the eye witness did not mention the facts regarding the scrutiny of the dead bodies and the presence of the gas lantern, and the defence counsel put the following two questions with respect to these omissions to the first eye witness produced:- 1. "Did you state to the Investigating Officer that the gang rolled the dead bodies of Nathi, Saktu and Bharat Singh and scrutinised them and did you tell him that the face of Asa Ram resembled with that of the deceased Bharat Singh?" 2. "Did you state to the Investigating Officer about the presence of the gas lantern ?" The Sessions Judge disallowed the questions and on account of this order similar questions were not put to the other eye witnesses. The Sessions Judge convicted the appellants under s. 302 Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to death. The appellants appealed to the High Court and made an application alleging that the Sessions Judge had not allowed the defence counsel to put omissions amounting to material contradictions to I959 May 5. 876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp· I959 Tahsildar Singh & Another the eye witnesses and prayed that the eye witnesses be summoned so that the questions disallowed may be put to them. Though the High Court held that the omissions amounted to contradictions and that the Sessions Judge had wrongly disallowed cross~examination \Vith respect thereto, it found that even after ignoring these t\VO circumstances there \Vere other facts which showed that the culprits had come close to the eye witnesses and that they had unmistaken opportunity of identifying the appellants in the light of the full moon and the lanterns. The High Court accordingly dismissed the application for summoning the eye witnesses holding that no prejudice had been caused to the appellants by the disallowance of the cross-examination in respect of omissions ;,ind also dismissed the appeals and confirmed the convictions and sentences of the appellants. v. The State of Vilar Pradesh Held, (Per SINHA, KAPUR, SARKAR and SuBBA RAO, JJ.) that the omissions did not amount to contradictions and that the Sessions Judge was right in disallowing cross-examination in respect thereof. A statement to the police could be used under s. 162 of the Code only for the purpose of contradicting a statement in the witness box under the second part of s. 1, Evidence Act, but it could not be used for the purpose of cross-examining the witness under the first part of s. 145· A statement made to the police but not reduced to writing, could not be used for any purpose, not even for contradiction. It \Vas incorrect to say that all omissions in regard to important features of the incident which were expected to be included in the statement made bef6re the police, should be treated as contradictions. An omission in the police statement could amount to a statement and be used as a contradiction only when (i) it was necessarily implied from the recital or recitals found in the statement, (ii) it was negative aspect of a positive recited in the statement or (iii) when the. statement before the police and that before the Court could not • stand together. It was for the the trial Judge to decide in each case, after comparing the part or parts of the statement recorded by the police with that made in the witness-box, whether the recital intended to be used for contradiction was one of the nature indicated above. In re Ponnusami Chetty, (1933) I.LR. 56 Mad. 475; In re Guruva Vannan, I.LR. (1944) Mad. 897; Ram Bali v. State, A.LR. 1952 All 289; Badri Chaudhry v. State, A.LR. 1926 Pat. 20, Sakhawat v. Crown, I.LR. (1937) Nag. 277, referred to. Rudder v. The State, A.LR. 1957 All. 239; Mohinder Singh t v. Emperor, A.LR. 1932 Lah. ro3; Yusuf Mia v. Emperor, A.LR. 1938 Pat. 579; State of M. P. v. Banshilal Behari, A.LR. 1958 M.P. 13, disapproved. Held, (Per IMAM and HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.) that the questions that were put by the defence counsel were properly ruled out by the Sessions Judge as they did not set up contradictions, !Jut attempted to obtain from the witnesses versions of what they ' / ,; (2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 877 had stated to the police which were then to be contradicted. r959 The reference to s. 145 Evidence Act ins. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure brings in the whole of the manner and machinery Talisildar Singh of s. 145 and not merely the second part. An accused is entitled &o Another to cross-examine the witness under the first part of s. 145 with v. respect to the police statement. Relevant and material omissions The State of amount to vital contradictions which can be established by crossUttar Pradesh examination and confronting the witness with his previous statement to the police. In the circumstances of the present case even if the defence had been allowed to put questions concerning the omissions, it would not have affected the credibility of the witnesses and no prejudice was caused to appellants by the disallowance of the questions. CRIMIN.AL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 67of1958. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 11, 1957, of the-Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1388 of 1956 and Referred Trial No. 133 of 1956, arising out of the judgment and order dated September 8, 1956, of the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge at Etawah in Sessions Trial Nos. 83 and 109 of 1955. Jai Gopal Sethi and R. L. Kohli, for the appellants. S. P. Sinha, G. G .. Mathur and G. N. Dikshit, for·the respondent. 195\:.l. May 5. The judgment of B. P. Sinha, J. L. Kapur, A. K. Sarkar and K. Subba Rao, JJ. was delivered by K. Subba Rao, J. and the judgment of Jafer Imam and M. Hidayatullah, JJ., was delivered by M. Hidayatullah, J. SuBB.A RAO, J.-This appeal by special leave raises Subba Rao J. the question of construction of s. 162, Code of Criminal Procedure. On June 16, 1954, one Ram Sanehi Mallah of Nayapura gave a dinner at his home and a large number of his friends attended it. After the dinner, at about 9 p. m., a music performance was given in front of the house of Ram Sanehi's neighbour, Ram Sarup. About 35 or 40 guests assembled in front of Ram Sarup's platform to hear the music. The prosecution case is that a large number of persons armed with fire-arms suddenly appeared near a well situated on the southern side of the house of Ram Sarup and r939 Tahsildar S'ingh & Another v. 1'he State of Uttar Pradesh Subbr' Rao f. 878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp. opened fire which resulted in the death of Natthi, Bharat Singh and Saktu, and injuries to six persons, namely, Hazari, Bankey, Khem Singh, Bal Kishan, Mizaji Lal and Nathu. The topography of the locality where the incident took place is given in the two site-plans, Ex. P-57 and Ex. P-128. It appears from the plans that the house of Ram Sarnp faces west, and directly in front of the main door of his house is a platform ; to the southwest of the platform, about 25 paces away, is a well with a platform of 3 feet in height and about 13 feet in width around it; and to the west of the platform in front of Ram Sarnp's house the audience were seated. The prosecution version of the sequence of events that took place on that fatal night is as follows: After the dinner, there was a music performance in front of the platform of Ram Sarup's house and a number of persons assembled there to hear the music. Saktu phyed on the Majeera while Nathu was singing. It was a full-moon night and there were also a gas lamp n,nd several lanterns. Bankey and Asa Ram placed their guns on n, cot close to the platform and Bharat Singh was sitting on that cot. "While Bankey was among the audience, Asa, Ram was still taking his dinner inside the house. At about 9 p. m., the accused n,long with 15 or 20 persons arrived from an eastern lane, stood behind the well, shouted that no one should run away and advanced northward from the well firing shots. Natthi and Saktu were hit and both of them died on the spot. Bharat Singh, who was also hit, ran northward and was pursued by some of the culprits and was shot dead in front of Bankey's house shown in the plan. Bankey, who was also shot at n,nd injured, took up Asa Ram's gun and went up to the roof of Ram Sarup's house wherefrom he fired shots at the dacoits, who were retreating. Asa Ram, who was luckily inside the house taking his dinner, ran np to the roof of Ram Sarup's house and saw the occurrence from over the parapet. The culprits turned over the dead-bodies of Saktu, N atthi and Bharat Singh and, on seeing Bharat Singh's face, they exclaimed that Asa Ram was killed. Thereafter, they (2) S.C.R. .SUPREME COURT REPORTS 879 proceeded northward, passed through the corner of I959 Ram Sarup's house and disappeared in the direction of Tahsil-;;;; Singh the Chambal. They also carried away Bankey's gun & Another which was on the cot. v. The motive for the offence is stated thus : The culThe State of prits were mem hers of a notorious gang called the Utta. Pradesh Man Singh's gang, who, it is alleged, were responsible Subba Rao J. for many murders and dacoities in and about the aforesaid locality. That gang was in league with another gang known as Charna's gang operating in the same region. Asa Ram and Bankey had acted as informers against Charna's gang, and this information led to the killing of Charna. · Man Singh's gang wanted to take vengeance on the said two persons; and, having got the information that the said two persons would be at the music party on that fateful night, they organized the raid with a view to do away with Asa Ram and Bankey. Out of the nine accused committed to the Sessions, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted seven, convicted Tahsildar Singh and Shyama Mallah under 14 charges and awarded them various sentences, including the sentence of death. Before the learned Sessions Judge, Tahsildar Singh took a palpably false plea that he was not Tahsildar Singh but was Bhanwar Singli, and much of the time of the learned Sessions Judge was taken to examine the case of the prosecution that the accused was really Tahsildar Singh, son of Man Singh. The other accused, Shyama Mallah, though made a statement before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate admitting some facts, which were only exculpatory in nature, denied the commission of the offence before the committing Magistrate and before the learned Sessions Judge. As many as eight eyewitnesses described the events in detail and clearly stated that both the accused took part in the incident. When one of the witnesses, Bankey (P. W. 30), was in the witness-box, the learned Counsel for. the accused put to him the following two questions in cross-examination: · 1. "Did you state to the investigating officer that the gang rolled the dead bodies of Natthi, Saktu and 880 SUPREME t:OURT REPORTS [1959] Supp. '959 Bharat Singh, and scrutinized them and did you tell Tahsilda, Singh him that the face of Asa Ram resembled that of the & Another deceased Bharat Singh ?" v. 2. "Did you state to the investigating officer The Stafo of about the presence of the gas lantern?" Uttar I'radesh In regard to the first question, the learned Sessions Subba Rao J. Judge made the following note: " The cross-examining Counsel was asked to show the'law which entitles him to put this qustion. He is unable to show any Jaw. I, therefore, do not permit the question to be put unless I am satisfied." In respect of the second question, the following note is niade: "He is also unable to show any law entitling him to put this question. I will permit him to put it if he satisfies me about it." It appears from the deposition that no other question on the basis of the statement made before the police was put to this witness. After his evidence was closed, the learned Judge delivered a considered order giving his reasons for disallowing the said two questions. The relevant part of the order reads: "Therefore if there is no contradiction between his evidence in Court and his recorded statement in the diary, the latter cannot be used at all. If a witness deposes in Court that a certain fact existed but had stated under section 161 Cr. P. C. t\,ither that that fact had not existed or that the reverse and irreconcilable fact had existed, it is a case of conflict between the deposition in the Court and the statement under section 161 Cr. P. 0. and the latter can be used to contradict the former. But if he had not stated under section 16I anything about the fact, there is no conflict and the statement cannot be used to contradict him. In some cases an omission in the statement under section 161 may amount to contradiction of the deposition in Court; they are the cases where what is actually stated is irreconcilable with what is omitted and impliedly negatives its existence." It is enough to notice at this stage that the learned Sessions Judge did not by the said order rule that no ( (2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 881 omission in the statement made under s. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be put to a witness, but stated that only an omission which is irreconcilable with what is stated in evidence can be put to a wit;ness. The said two omissions were not put to any of the other witnesses except to one to whom only one of the said omissions was put. No other omissions were put in the cross-examination either to P. W. 30 or to any other witness. The learned Sessions Judge on a consideration of the voluminous evidence in the case held that the guilt was brought home to the said two accused and convicted them as aforesaid. Tahsildar Singh and Shyama Mallah preferred two separate appeals to the High Court against their convictions and sentences. The two appeals were heard along with the reference made by the learned Sessions Judge under s. 374 of the Code of Crimina.I Procedure for the confirmation of the sentence of death awarded to the appellants. The learned Judges of the High Court, after reviewing the entire evidence over again, accepted the findings of the learned Sessions Judge and confirmed the convictions and se •. "Jences passed on the appellants. Before the High Court a petition was filed by the appellants alleging that the learned Sessions Judge did not allow the Counsel for defence to put omissions amounting to material contradictions to the eye-witnesses and therefore the said eye-witnesses should be summoned so that the said questions might be put to them. That petition was filed on May 1, 1957, and on July 30, 1957, after the argument in the appeals was closed, the petition was dismissed. Presumably, no attempt was made to press this application either before the appeals were taken up for argument or during the course of the argument; but the question raised in the petition was considered by the learned Judges of the High Court in their judgment. The judgment discloses that the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants argued before the High Court that the learned Sessions Judge wrongly disallowed the aforesaid two questions, and the learned Judges, conceding that those two questions should have been allowed, held that the accused III z959 Tahsildar Singh O> Another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh Subba Rao ]. '959 Tahsildar Singh 0- Another v. The Sl·de of Uttar PradBsh Su!Jba Rao ]: 882 SUPHEME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp. were not prejudiced by the said fact. They justified their conclusion by the following reasons: " We did so because among other reasons we decided to ignore these two circumstances and to base our findings on matters of greater certainty, namely, the fact of the miscreants firing while advancing, passing in front of Rn,m Swarup's platform and taking away Bankey's gun from the cot, movements which brought them close to the eye-witnesses and thereby gave the witnesses an unmistakable opportunity of seeing their faces in the light of the lanterns and tho full moon. These factors made recognition by witnesses indepen~ent of any gas lantern or any scrutiny of the dead bodies, so that these matters ceased to be of any ren,l consequence and therefore made the summoning of the eye-witnesses before us quite unnecessary". In the result, they dismissed the appeals. The present n,ppeal is by special leave filed against the judgment of the High Court. Learned Counsel for the appellants raised before us the following points : (1) (a). Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by its own operation attracts the provisions of s. 145 of the Evidence Act and under the latter section the whole vista of cross-examination on the basis of the previous statement in writing made by the witnesses before the police is open to the :wcused; to illustrate the contention: a witness can be asked whether he made a particular statement before the police officers; if he says "yes", the said assertion ~an be contradicated by putting to him an earlier statement which does not contain such a statement. (1) (b). The word "contradiction" is of such wide connotation that it takes in all material omissions and a Court can decide whether there is one such omission as to amount to contradiction only after the question is putJ answered and the relevant statement or part of it is marked, and, therefore, no attempt should be made to evolve a workable principle, but the question must be left at large to be decided by the Judge concerned on the facts of each case. (2) The High Court erred in holding that only two questions were intended to be put in cross-examination to the prosecution (2) S.C.R. SUPREME COUHT HEPORTS 883 witnesses whereas the Advocate for the accused intended to put to the witnesses many other omissions to establish that tll.ere was development in the prosecution case from time to time but refrained from doing so in obedience to the considered order made by the learned Sessions Judge. (3) Even if only two questions were illegally disalloweJ, as it was not possible to predicate the possible effect of t.he cross-examination of the witnesses on the basis of their answers to the said questions on their reliability, 'it should be held that the accused had no opportunity to have an effective cross-examination of the witnesses and therefore they had no fair trial. (4) The learned Judges committed an illegality in testing the credibility of the witnesses other than the witness who gave the first information report by the contents of the said report. The arguments of the learned Counsel for the rt>Rpondent in respect of each of the said contentions will be considered in their appropriate places. w·e shall proceed to consider the contentions of the learned Counsel fOl' the appellants in the order in which they were addressed: Re. (1) (a): Diverse and conflicting views werfl expressed by Courts on the interpretation of s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A hi::;toric retrospect of the sectfon will be useful to al:Jpreciate its content. The earliest Code is that of 1872 and tho latest amendment is that of 1955. Formerly Criminal Procedure Code for Courts in the Presidency towns and those in the mofussil were not the same. Criminal Procedure Co Another made s. 162 of the latter Act. There was not much v. difference between the third paragraph of s. 119 of The State of the Act of 1872 and s. 162 of the Act of 1882, except Uttar Pradesh that in the latter Act, it was made clear that the prohibition did not apply to a dying declaration or affect Subba Rao f. the provisions of s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Code of 1898 did not make any change in s. 161, nor did it introduce any substantial change in the body of s. 162 except taking away the exception in rE>gard to the dying declaration from it and putting it in the second clause of that section. Buts. 162 was amended by Act 5 of 1898 and the amended section read: "(l) No statement made by any person to a police-officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter shall, if taken down in writing, be signed by the person making it, nor shall such writing be used as evidence: Provided that, when any witness is called for the prosecution whose statement has been taken down in writing as aforesaid, the Court shall, on the request of the accused, refer to such writing, and may then, if the Court thinks it expedient in the interests of justice, direct that the accused be furnished with a copy thereof; and such statement may be used to impeach the credit of such witness in manner provided by the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any statement falling within the provisions of section 32, clause (1), of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872." For the first time the proviso to s. 162 introduced new elements, namely: (i) The right of the accused to request the Court to refer to the statement of a witness reduced to writing; (ii) a duty cast on the Court to refer to such writing; (iii) discretion conferred on the Court in the interests of justice to direct that the accused be furniahed with a copy of the statement; and (iv) demarcating the field within which such r959 Tah$ildar Singh & Another v. The Stale of Utfar Pradesh Subba Rao J. 886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp. statements can be used, namely, to impeach the credit of the witness in the manner provided by the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. From the standpoint of the accused, this was an improvement on the corresponding sections of the earlier Codes, for whereas the earlier Codes enacted a complete bar against the use of Ruch statements in evidence, this Code enabled the accused, subject to the limitations mentioned therein, to make use of then to impeach the credit of a witness in the manner provided by the Indian Evidence Act. On the basis of the terms of s. 162 of Act 5 of 1896, two rival contentions were ra.ised before the Courts. It was argued for the prosecution that on the strength of s. 157 of the Evidence Act, the right of.the prosecution to prove any oral statement to contradict the testimony of any wit.ness under that section was not taken away by s. 162 of tho Code of Criminal Procedure which only provided that the writing shall not be used as evidence. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the accused that when the statement of a witness was admittedly reduced into writing, it would be unreasonable to allow any oral evidence of the statement to be given when the writing containing the statement could not be proved. The judgment of Hosain, J., in the case of Rustam v. King-Emperor (1) and the decisions in Fanindra Nath Baneijee v. Emperor('), King-Emperor v. Nilakanta (3) and ilfuthukumaraswami Pillai v. King-Emperor(') represent one side of the question, and the judgment of Knox, J., in Rustam v. King-Emperor (1) and the observations of Beaman, J·., in Emperor v. Narayan(') represent the other side. A division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Hanmaraddi Bin Ramaraddi ('), after notieing the aforesaid decisions on the question, ruled that the police officer could be allowed to depose to what the witness had stated to him in the investigation for the purpose of corroborat,. ing what the witness had said at the trial. In that context, Shah, J., observed at p. 66: (I) ( section· and the proviso intended to serve primarily the same purpose, i.e., the interest of the accused. Braund, J., in Emperor v. Ajtab Mohd. Khan(') gave the purpose of s. 162 thus at p. 299: " As it seems to us it is to protect accused persons from being prejudiced by statements made to police officers who by reason of the fact that an investigation is known to be on foot at the time the statement is made, may be in a position to influence the maker of it and, on the other hand, to protect accused persons from the prejudice at the hands of persons who in the knowledge that an investigation has already started, are prepared to tell untruths. " A division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Baliram Tikaram Marathe v. Emperor (2) expressed a similar idea in rega.rd to the object underlying the section, at p. 5, thus : " The object of the section is to protect the accused both against over.zealous police officers and untruthful witnesses. " The Judicial Committee in Pakala Narayana Swami v. The King-Emperor(') found another object underlying the section when they said at p. 78 : "If one had to guess at the intention of the Legislature in framing a section in the words used, one would suppose that they had in mind to encourage the free disclosure of information or to protect the person making the statement from a supposed unreliability of police testimony as to alleged statements or both." Section 162 with its proviso, if construed in the (1) A.LR. 1940 All. 291. (2) A.LR. 1945 Nag. I. (3) (1939) L.R. 66 !. A. 66. ' (2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT ltEPOH,TS 891 manner which we will indicate at the later stage of the judgment, clearly achieves the said objects. The learned Counsel's first argument is based upon the words "in the manner provided by s. 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872" found in s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act, it is said, empowers the accused to put all relevant questions to a witness before his attention is . called to those parts of the writing with a view to contradict him. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in Bhagwan Singh v. The State of Punjab (1). Bose, J., describes the procedure to be followed to contradict a witness under s. 145 of the Evidence Act thus at p. 819: " H,esort to section 145 would only be necessary if the witness denies that he made the former statement. In that event, it would be necessary to prove that he did, and if the former statement was reduced to writing, then section ~45 requires that his attention must be drawn to those parts which are to be used for contradiction. But that position does not arise when the witness admits the former statement. In such a case all that is necessary is to look to the former statement of which no further proof is neces;;ary because of the admission that it was made." It is unnecessary to refer to other cases wherein a similar procedure is suggested for putting questions under s. 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, for the said decision of this Court and similar decisions were not considering the procedure in a case where the statement in writing was intended to be used for contradiction under s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is in two parts: the first part enables the accused to cross-examine a witness as to previous statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing to without such writing being shown to him; the second part deals with a situation where the cross.examination assumes the shape of contradiction : in other words, both parts deal with cross-examination; the first part with cross.examination other than by way of ·contradiction, and the (1) [1952] S.C.R. 812. r959 Tahsildar Singh & Another v. The Stale of Ullar Pradesh Subba Rao ]. r959 Tah5ildar Singlt &. AnotheT v. The State of UttaT Pradesh Subba Rao ]. 892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp. second with cross-examination by way of contradiction only. The procedure prescribed is that, if it is intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The proviso to s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only enables the accused to make use of such statement to contradict a witness in the manner provided by s. 145 of the Evidence Act. It would be doing violence to the language of the proviso if the said statement be allowed to be used for the purpose of cross-examining a witness within the meaning of the first part of s. 145 of the Evidence Act. Nor are we impressed by the argument that it would not be possible to invoke the second part of s.