# Tat.~ v. Stat• D/ BIMr Ga/endrogadkar c. 1

- **Citation:** [1964] 6 S.C.R. 903
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 507 of 1961
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, J. c. SHAH, N. Raiagopala Ayyangar, S. M. Sjkri
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/tat-v-stat-d-bimr-ga-endrogadkar-c-1-3229
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

/agirdar's Debt Reduction Act (Rajasthan Act 9 of 1931)-Mortgagtl
decree against tl·lagirdar-Whether <Jecutable-u. 2(e) and 7(2)
Validity of--Conttitutlon of India, Art. t•.
1961
Tat.~
v.
Stat• D/ B!Mr
Ga/endrogadkar
c. 1.
1961
February
26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
JHI
R .. polldcnt No. I obtained a mortiioge dccrcc for Rs. 1,14.581/14/6
,...., 6f Rttlast/um asaint one Rao Raja ID<ler Singh (the jndi!Dent debtor). The mo~
v.
money was advanced under three mortgages, and the mortgaaed properties
llabndi.,1d
coruistcd of Jagjrs an<! some non-Jagir immovable property. The latter
property ,..... sold in exe<:ution and Rs. 33,75-0/- paid to the dee,..
holder i1l pertial satisr.ction of the decree.
Then the decree bolder
filed an execution petition in the Court of the District Judge for the
balance amount i.e. Rs. 99,965/3/6, prayiog for
attachment
of
the
amount of compensation and rehabilitation grant which would be paid
to the jutlgmcnt debtor on account of resumption of his
Jagir. The
jadJ!llllmcnt debtor 1ubmittcd two applicationa in which be claimed relief
under '"· 5 and 7 of the Rajasthan Jagjrdan' Debt Reduction Act. The
decree holder, in bis reply. to thOBC petitions urged that the provisions
relied in were ultra vires the Constitution of India, being in contravention
of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Thereafter the decree holder
movecf a petition undeT Art. 228 of the Constitution before the Hi1rh Court,
praying that the execution cue pending in the Court of the District
Judge, be withdrawn from that court to the High Court. The Hisb
Court transferred the case to its file.
By its judgment the High Court
could held that apart from the later part of s. 2(e) excluding certain
debts and s. 7(2) of the Act, the rest of the Act was valid. The High
Cottrt granted a certificate under Art. 13 3 (I )( c) of the Constitution to
the Slate of Rajasthan to file an appeal to this
Court. Hence the
appeal:-
Held:-(i) That the' impugned part of s. 2(e) infringes Art. 14 of
the Constitution for the reason that no reasonable classification is disclosed for the pnrpooe at sustaining the impugned part of s. 2(e). It
is now well-settled that in order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (I) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentiation which distinguishes
persons or things that are to be put together from others left out of
the group. and (2) that the dilferential must have a rational relationship
to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The said
condition No. 2 above has clearly not been satisfied in this case. The
object sought to be achieved by the, Impugned Act was to reduce the
debts secured on the Jagir lands which had been resumea under the
provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs
Act. The fact that the debts are owed to a Government or local autho·
rity or other bodies mentioned in the
impugned part of s. (2}(e) has
no rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
Further, no intelligible principle underlies the exempted categories ol
debts. The reason why a debt advancetl on behalf of a person by the
Court of Wards is clubbed with a debt due to a State or a scheduled
bank and why a debt due to a non-scheduled bank is not excluded from
the purview of the Act is not discernible.
Manna Lal v. Collector of Iha/war. [1961] 2 $.C.R. 962, Nand Ram
ChhoteY Lal v. Kishore Raman
Singh, A.l.R.
(1962) All
521
and
'
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Jam11t1lal Ram/al Kimt<e v. Kish<ndas and State of Hyd<rabad,
A.LR.
(1955) Hyd. 194, distinguished.
1961
Stat1 of IIJJJlulM
(ii) Section 7(2) is valid as it impooes reasonable restrictions, in
Muk;.h•llll
the interests of general public. on the rishts of a secured creditor. This
sub·section has been designed with the object of rehabilitating a Jagirdar
whose Jagir prop<rties have been taken onr by the State for a public
purpose at a low valuation.

## Text

6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
cannot be combined as suggested by Mr. Palkhivala, but
must be asserted each in its own way and within its own
limits; the sweep of the several rights is no doubt wide, but
the combination of any of those two rights would not justify
a claim such as is made by Mr. Palkhivala in the present
petitions.
As soon as citizens form a company, the right
guaranteed to them by Art. 19 ( 1 )( c) has been exercised
and no restraint has been placed on that right and no
infringement of that right is made.
Once a company or a
corporation is formed, the business which is carried on by
the said company or corporation is the business of the
company or corporation and is not the business of the
citizens who get the company or corporation formed or
incorporated, and the rights of the incorporated body must
be judged on that footing and cannot be judged on the
assumption that they are the rights attributable to the
business of individual citizens.
Therefore, we are satisfied
that the argument based on the distinction between the two
rights guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (c) and (g) and the effect
of their combination cannot take the petitioners' case very
far when they seek to invoke the doctrine that the veil of
the corporation should be lifted. That is why we have come
to the conclusion that the petitions filed by the petitioners
are incompetent under Art. 32, even though in each of these
petitions one or two of the shareholders of the petitioning
companies or corporation have joined.
The result is, the second preliminary objection raised
by the respondents is upheld and the writ petitions are
dismissed as being incompetent under Art. 32 of the
Constitution. There would be no order as to costs.
Petitions dismissed.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN
v.
MUKANCHAND AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,
N. RAIAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SJKRI JJ.)
/agirdar's Debt Reduction Act (Rajasthan Act 9 of 1931)-Mortgagtl
decree against tl·lagirdar-Whether <Jecutable-u. 2(e) and 7(2)
Validity of--Conttitutlon of India, Art. t•.
1961
Tat.~
v.
Stat• D/ B!Mr
Ga/endrogadkar
c. 1.
1961
February
26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
JHI
R .. polldcnt No. I obtained a mortiioge dccrcc for Rs. 1,14.581/14/6
,...., 6f Rttlast/um asaint one Rao Raja ID<ler Singh (the jndi!Dent debtor). The mo~
v.
money was advanced under three mortgages, and the mortgaaed properties
llabndi.,1d
coruistcd of Jagjrs an<! some non-Jagir immovable property. The latter
property ,..... sold in exe<:ution and Rs. 33,75-0/- paid to the dee,..
holder i1l pertial satisr.ction of the decree.
Then the decree bolder
filed an execution petition in the Court of the District Judge for the
balance amount i.e. Rs. 99,965/3/6, prayiog for
attachment
of
the
amount of compensation and rehabilitation grant which would be paid
to the jutlgmcnt debtor on account of resumption of his
Jagir. The
jadJ!llllmcnt debtor 1ubmittcd two applicationa in which be claimed relief
under '"· 5 and 7 of the Rajasthan Jagjrdan' Debt Reduction Act. The
decree holder, in bis reply. to thOBC petitions urged that the provisions
relied in were ultra vires the Constitution of India, being in contravention
of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Thereafter the decree holder
movecf a petition undeT Art. 228 of the Constitution before the Hi1rh Court,
praying that the execution cue pending in the Court of the District
Judge, be withdrawn from that court to the High Court. The Hisb
Court transferred the case to its file.
By its judgment the High Court
could held that apart from the later part of s. 2(e) excluding certain
debts and s. 7(2) of the Act, the rest of the Act was valid. The High
Cottrt granted a certificate under Art. 13 3 (I )( c) of the Constitution to
the Slate of Rajasthan to file an appeal to this
Court. Hence the
appeal:-
Held:-(i) That the' impugned part of s. 2(e) infringes Art. 14 of
the Constitution for the reason that no reasonable classification is disclosed for the pnrpooe at sustaining the impugned part of s. 2(e). It
is now well-settled that in order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (I) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentiation which distinguishes
persons or things that are to be put together from others left out of
the group. and (2) that the dilferential must have a rational relationship
to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The said
condition No. 2 above has clearly not been satisfied in this case. The
object sought to be achieved by the, Impugned Act was to reduce the
debts secured on the Jagir lands which had been resumea under the
provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs
Act. The fact that the debts are owed to a Government or local autho·
rity or other bodies mentioned in the
impugned part of s. (2}(e) has
no rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
Further, no intelligible principle underlies the exempted categories ol
debts. The reason why a debt advancetl on behalf of a person by the
Court of Wards is clubbed with a debt due to a State or a scheduled
bank and why a debt due to a non-scheduled bank is not excluded from
the purview of the Act is not discernible.
Manna Lal v. Collector of Iha/war. [1961] 2 $.C.R. 962, Nand Ram
ChhoteY Lal v. Kishore Raman
Singh, A.l.R.
(1962) All
521
and
'
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Jam11t1lal Ram/al Kimt<e v. Kish<ndas and State of Hyd<rabad,
A.LR.
(1955) Hyd. 194, distinguished.
1961
Stat1 of IIJJJlulM
(ii) Section 7(2) is valid as it impooes reasonable restrictions, in
Muk;.h•llll
the interests of general public. on the rishts of a secured creditor. This
sub·section has been designed with the object of rehabilitating a Jagirdar
whose Jagir prop<rties have been taken onr by the State for a public
purpose at a low valuation. H this provision was not ~e, the Jogir~
dar would fiDI it dilfcult to start life afresh became his future income
and acquired properties would be liable to auachment and ·sale for lbe
purpose of satisfying the demands of such creditors.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 507
of 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 18,
1959 of the Rajasthan High Court in Civil Misc. Case No. 10
of 1959.
S. K. Kapur and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant.
The respondent did not appear.
February 26, 1964.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SIKRI J .-This is an appeal directed against the judgment
of the Rajasthan High Court, which granted a certificate
under Art. 133(l)(c).
One Mukanchand, respondent No. 1 in this appeal (hereinaner referred to as the decree-holder) obtained a mortgage
decree on February 12, 1954, for Rs. 1,14,581-14.6, with
future interest at 6 per cent per annum, against one Rao Raja
Inder Singh (hereinafter referred to as the judgment-debtor).
The mortgage money was advanced under three mortgages,
and the mortgaged properties consisted of 2 J agirs and some
nonrjagir immovable property. The latter property was sold
in execution and Rs. 33,750 /- paid to the decree-holder in
partial satisfaction of the decree. On December 14, 1956,
the decree-holder filed an execution petition in the Court
of the District Judge, Jodhpur, for Rs. 99,965·3-6, praying
for attachment of the amount of compensation and rehabilitation grant which would be paid to the judgment debtor on
account of resumption of his jagir. This case was registered
Sikri I
9o6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1g64)
1961
as Execution Case No. 12/57. On July 29; 1957, the judg·
,..,.. of EIJl/111tha11 ment-debtor made an application before the District Judge,
M,,,;;."411d
Jodhpur, to the effect that the decretal amount should be
reduced in accordance with s. 5 of the Rajas than J agirdars'
Debt Reduction Act (Rajasthan Act IX of 1957). On Jaly
31. 1957, the judgment-debtor submitted another application
claiming that only half of his total jagir compensation and
rehabilitation grant money was liable to attachment under
s. 7 of the said Act. The decree-holder, in his reply to those
petitions, urged that the provisions relied on were ultra vires
the Constitution of India, being in contravention of Arts. 14,
19 and 31 of the Constitution.
~II.
On December 3, 1957, the decree-holder filed a petition
under Art. 228 of the Constitution, praying that the execution
case No. 12 of 1957, pending in the Court of the District
Judge, Jodhpur, be withdrawn from that Court to the Rajasthan High Court The High Court transferred the case to
its file, and thereafter issued notice to the State of Rajasthan,
a5 the constitutionality of the said Act had been challenged.
By its judgment, the High Court held that apart from the
latter part of s. 2(e) excluding certain debts-hereinafter referred to as the impugned part and s. 7(2) of the Act, the rest
of the Act was valid. The State applied for leave to appeal
to the Supreme Court, and so did the decree-holder.
On the
certificates being granted, two appeals were filed in this Court.
The appeal of Mukhanchand (Civil Appeal No. 508/61) was,
by order dated April 23, 1962, of this Court, held to have
abated. Therefore, we are not concerned with the validity
of the other provisions of the Act
Although the validity of the other provisions is not now
in question, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions
of the Act, because they have a bearing on the question of
the validity of the impugned part of s. 2(e) ands. 7(2) of the
.Act; and these are reproduced below:
"Preamble-To provide for the scaling down of debts
of jagirdars whose jagir lands have been resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land
Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 .....
'
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S. 2(e)-"debt" means an advance in cash or in kind
1961
and includes any transaction which is in sub- stau of ,, • ..._
stance a debt but does not include an advance as
Y.
aforesaid
made on or after the first day of
Mukalle,,_
January, 1949 or a debt due to:-
Slbl I.
(ii the Central Government or Government of any
State;
(ii) a local authority;
(iii) a scheduled bank;
(iv) a co-operative society; and
(v) a waqf, trust or endowment for a charitable or
religious purpose only; or
(vi) a person, where the debt was advanced on hi&
behalf by the Court of Wards ...
S. 3. Reduction of secured debt at the time of passing
of decree.-(1) Nothwithstanding anything
in
any law, agreement or document, in any suit to
which this Act applies relating to a secured
debt, the court shall, after the amount due has
been ascertained, but before passing a decree,
proceed as hereinafter stated.
(2)(a) Where the mortgaged property consists exclu·
sively of jagir lands and such lands have been
resumed under the provisions of the Act, the
court shall first ascertain whether the mortgagor
had the right, under the jagir law in force at the
time the mortgage-deed was executed, to mortgage the jagir lands, or failing that, whether
specific permission for effecting the mortgage was
obtained from
the competent authority, and
whether the mortgage was validly subsisting on
the date of resumption of the jagir iands.
(b) if the mortgage was legally and properly made
and was validly subsisting on the aforesaid date,
the court shall reduce the amount due in accordance with the fonnula given in Schedule I.
1961
..., of Rfl/01ll111n
"·
Jl..t.ndialll/
lljft '·
908
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I 1964J
(3) Where the mortgaged property consists partly of
jagir lands as aforesaid and partly of property
other than such lands, the court shall after taking
action in accordance with the provisions of subclause (a) of sub-section (2), proceed to distribute
the amount due on the two properties separately
in accordance with the principles contained in
section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(IV of 1882) as if they had been properties belonging separately to two persons with separate
and distinct rights of ownership; and after the
amount due has been so distributed, reduce the
amount due on the jagir lands in accordance with
the formula given in Schedule I.
S. 4-Powers to reduce secured debt after passing of
decree.-
(1) Nothwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or any other Jaw,
the court which passed a decree to which this
Act applies relating to a secured debt shall, on
the application either of the decree-holder or
judgment-debtor, proceed as hereinafter stated.
<2) Where the mortgaged property charged under
the decree consists exclusively of jagir lands
and such lands have been resumed under the
provisions of the Act, the court shall reduce
the amount due in accordance with the formula
given in Schedule I.
13) Where the mortgaged property charged under
the decree consists partly of jagir lands and
partly of property other than jagir lands, the
court shall determine the amount due on the
first day of January, 1949, and distribute the
same on the
two properties separately
in
accordance with the principles contained in
section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882 (IV of 1882), as if they had been properties belonging to two persons with separate
and distinct rights of ownership and after tbe
~-
1
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
amount due as respect the jagir lands has been
Jffi
so calculated, reduce it in accordance with the Stat• 0'jR;j.,,,,_
formula given in Schedule I.
Mulc;,;.,ltlllltl
S. 6-Satisfaction of the decree-after the amount
due has been reduced under and in accordance
with the provisions of section 4, the decree shall,
to the extent of the reduction so effected, be
deemed, for all purposes and on all occasions,
to have been duly satisfied.
S. 7(2)-Notwithstanding anything in any law, the
reduced amount found in the case of a mortgagor
or judgment-debtor as the case may be, under
section 3 or section 4 as respects mortgaged jagir
lands shall not be legally recoverable otherwise
than out of the compensation and rehabilitation
grant payable to such mortgagor or judgment
debtor in respect of such jagir lands."
We may mention that respondent No. I has not entered
appearance in this Court. The learned counsel for the State,
Mr. S. K. Kapur, has urged that the High Court erred in
holding that these two provisions, i.e. impugned part of s. 2( e)
and s. 7(2), were void.
Regarding the impugned part of
s. 2(e), he contended that the debts mentioned in sub-els. (i)
to (vi) of s. 2(e) have been placed on a different footing from
debts due to other creditors, because the bodies and the authorities mentioned therein serve a public purpose or a public
cause. He urged that this provided a reasonable basis for
differentiating between private creditors and creditors mentioned in els. (i) to (vi) above. Regarding s. 7(2), he urged
that it imposed reasonable restrictions. in the interest of
general public, on the creditors.
Before examining the validity of the impugned provisions,
it is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act.
As the
preamble states in plain terms, the object of the Act is to
scale down debts of Jagirdars whose ;agir lands have been
resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms
and Resumption of Jagirs Act. Clause (e) of s. 2 defines
'debt' to mean an advance in cash or in kind. The definition
does not embrace dues of Government or a local authority
Sikrl I.
910
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
l!W
in respect of taxes, land revenue, etc. The definition then
St•i. of Rajasthan excludes from the purview of the Act debts due fo Central
Jl~hand Government and other authorities and bodies mentioned in
the clause. We shall advert to them later when discmsing
Slkri I.
the validity of this exclusion.
Section 3 provides for reduction of secured debts in
accordance with the formula given in Schedule I at the time
of passing a decree, and their apportionment where necessary,
between ;agir and non-;agir property. Section 4 provides for
reductjon of secured debts after a decree has been passed.
Section 5 directs a court to pass a fresh decree after reduction of the secured debts.
Section 6 provides that after
reduction of the secured debt in accordance with the provisions of s. 4, the decree shall, to the extent of the reduction
so effected, be deemed for all purposes and on all occasions
to have been duly satisfied. Clause (!) of s. 7 provides for
the execution of the decree against the compensation and
rehabilitation grant payable in respect of the ;agir lands of
the judgment-debtor.
Clause (2) of s. 7, which has been
struck riown by the High Court, prohibits the recovery of the
reduced amount with respect to jagir property from any pr~
perty other than the compensation and rehabilitation grant
payable to a ;agirdar. The effect of this provision is that
the other properties of the jagirdar, existing or which he
may acquire hereafter, are immune from being proceeded
against in execution or otherwise.
We think that the High Court was right in holding that
the impugned part of s. 2(e) infringes Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is now well-settled that in order to pass the test
of permissible classification, two c0nditions must be fulfilled,
namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentiation which
distinguishes persons
or
things that are to be put together from others left out of the
group, and (2) that the differentia must have a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the statuto
in question. In our opinion, condition No. 2 above has clearly not been satisfied in this case. The object sought to be
achieved by the impugned Act was to reduce the debts secured on ;agir lands which had been resumed under the prcmsions of the Ra jasthan Land Reforms and Resumptioa of
•
6 S.C.R.
SUPREM.2 COURT REPORTS
9II
Jagirs Act. The Jagirdar's capacity to pay debts had been
19M
reduced by the resumption of his lands and the object of the State of Rll/llllllM
Act was to ameliorate his condition. The fact that the debts
M k "·c1wtt1
are owed to a government or local authority or other bodies
" an
mentioned in the impugned part of s. 2(e) has no rational
Slkrl I.
relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the
Act. Further, no intelligible principle underlies the exempted categories of debts. The reason why a debt advanced on
behalf of a person by the Court of Wards is clubbed with a
debt due to a State or a scheduled bank and why a debt
due to a non-scheduled bank is not excluded from the purview
of the Act is not discernible.
In this connection, Mr. Kapur has relied on the decision
of this Court in Manna Lal vs. Collector of lhalwar ('). This
case is clearly distinguishable because there a law giving
special facility for the recovery of dues to a bank owned by
the Government was held not to offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is clear that the government can be legitimately
put in a separate category for the purpose of laying down
the procedure for the recovery of its dues. Mr. Kapur further
relied on Nand Ram Chhotey Lal vs.
Kishore
Raman
Singh (2). The judgment of the High Court undoubtedly
supports him, but, with respect, we are unable to agree with
the ratio of the case. The High Court was concerned with
the U.P, Zamindars Debt Reduction Act (U.P. Act XV of
1953), which is substantially similar to the impugned Act.
The ratio of the High Court is: "It appears to us that the
legislature had to make a distinction between debts due from
the ex-zamindars to private individuals and the debts due
to scheduled banks or to Government or semi-Government
authorities.
The obvious reason appears to be that the
private money-lenders were considered to be a bane to
rural economy and perpetrating agricultural indebtedness.
It was to save the cultivators from such unscrupulous moneylenders that such laws had to be enacted, the last in series
beirig the Zamindars Debt Reduction Act."
We consider
there is no force in these observations. No such reason is
apparent from the tenhs of the Act. Non-scheduled banks
·-.--------
(l) [1961) 2 S.C."R. 962.
<') AIR (1962) All. 521.
912
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[rg64J
19M
and all other private creditors cannot be said to be a bane
Stat• of Raiaotharz to rural economy.
Muka~clumd
The third case relied on by Mr. Kapur-Jamnalal
$ikri I.
Ramlal Kimtee v. Kishendas and State of Hyderabad(') d~
not contain any discussion.
The High Court supported the
exclusion on the ground that "exclusion of certain class of
debts under s. 3 of the impugned Act also is not without
substantial justification for public demands do not stand in
the same position as ordinary demands." Apart from the
fact that all the exempted categories are not public demands,
the High Court does not seem to have considered whether
the differentia had any rational relationship sought to be
achieved by the Act.
In conclusion, agreeing with the High Court, we hold
that no reasonable classification is disclosed for the purpose
of sustaining the impugned part of s. 2(e).
Now, coming to the question of the validity of s. 7(2).
we consider that this sub-section is valid as it imposes reasonable restrictions, in the interest of general public, on the
rights of a secured creditor. A secured creditor, when he
advanced money on the security of jagir property, primarily
looked to that property for the realisation of his dues. Further, this sub-section has been designed with the object of
rehabilitating a jagirdar whose jagir properties have been
taken over by the State for a public purpose at a low valuation.
If this provision was not made, the jagirdar would
find it difficult to start life afresh and look to other avocations, for not only his existing non-jagir property but his
future income and acquired properties would be liable to
attachment
and sale for the P\ITPOSe of satisfying
the
demands of such secured creditors.
Accordingly, we hold
that s. 7(2) imposes reasonable restrictions in the interest of
general public.
The appeal is accordingly partly accepted, the decision
of the High Court in regard to s. 2(e) is confirmed and that
in regard to s. 7(2) is reversed. As the respondent was not
represented and that appeal has only partly succeeded, we
-0rder the parties to bear theit own costs in this Court.
Appeal partly allowed.