# TATA moN AND STEEL co. LTD v. S. N. MODAK

- **Citation:** [1965] 3 S.C.R. 411
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-03-19
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/tata-mon-and-steel-co-ltd-v-s-n-modak-3499
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

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TATA moN AND STEEL co. LTD.
v.
S. N. MODAK
March 19, 1965
411
JP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO AND V. RAMASWAMI,
JJ.J
Industrial Disputes Act
1947 (14 of 1947\, s. 33-Application
pending industrial dispute-Industrial dispute finalty decided-If
appiicaLion survives.
The appel'ant applied under s. 33(2)(b) of the Ind.ustrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Industrial Tribunal for the Tribunal's approval of the order passed by the appellant discharging its employee
-the respondent. This ai:plication was made because certain industrial disputes were prnding hetween the appellant and its
employees, but when the matter came to be argued before the
Tribunal. the pending disputes had been disposed of. HYence, the
a;ipel!ant contended that the application made by it no longer survived, which the Tribunal rejected. In appeal by Special Leave.
HELD: The Tribunal was right in overruling the appellant's
contention. [419 E].
A proceeding validly commenced under s. 33(2)(bl would not
automatically come to an end merely because the main industrial
c!:spute had in the meanwhile been finally determined. [417 D-E].
The application of the appellant can 1in a sense, be treated as
an incidental proceeding; but it is a separate proceeding all the
same, and in that sense it will be governed by the provi:::ions of
s. 33(2)(b) as an independent' proceeding. It is not an interlocutory
proceeding properly so called in its full sense and significance; it
is a proceeding between the employer and his employee who was
no doubt concuned with the main industrial dispute along with
other employees; but it is nevertheless a proceeding between two
parties in res;o2ct of a matter not covered by the main dispute. [417
B-D].
The order being incomplete and inchoate until tile approval
is obtained, cannot effectively terminate the relationship of the
employer and the employee between the appellant and the respondent; and so even if the main industrial dispute was finally
dcc'dcc1. the qucs'.ion abcut the validity of the order· would still
have to be tried and if the appr·oval is not accorded by the Tribunal,
the employer would be bound to treat the respQndent: as its employee and pay him full wages for the period even though the
appellant may subsequently proceed to terminate th<;- respondent's
service. [ 418 C-El.
Besides, if it were held that with the final determination of
the main industrial dispute such application would autcmatically
come to an end, it would mean that s. 33-A under which a
complaint by the employee is treated as an independent proceedin!\,
would be rendered nugatory. [419 A].
Alkali and Chemical Corporation of India Ltd. v. Seventh
Industrial Tribunal. West Bengal and Ors. (1964) II L.L.J. 568, Mettur
Industries Ltd. v. Sundara Naidu and Anr. (1963) II L.L.J. 303 and
Shah (A.T.) v. State of Mysore and Ors
(1964) I L.L.J. 237, disapproved
Kannan Devan Hill Produce Company Ltd. Munnar v. Miss
Aleyamma Varughesa and Anr. (1962) II LL.J. 158, Om Prakash
Sharma v. Industrial Tribunal, Punjab and Anr. (1962\ II L.LJ.
272 and Amrit Bazar Patrika (Private) Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh State
Industrial Tribunal and Ors. (1964) II L.L.J. 53, approved.
412
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965] 3 8.C.R.
CrvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 422 of
A
1964.
Appeal by special leave from the order dated September 29,
1962, of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbact
in Application No. 45 of 1960 in Reference Nos. 40 and 34 of 1960.
S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-Genera/ and /. N. Shroff, for the appelB
!ant.
Jitendra Sharma and Janardan Sharma, for the respondent.

## Text

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TATA moN AND STEEL co. LTD.
v.
S. N. MODAK
March 19, 1965
411
JP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO AND V. RAMASWAMI,
JJ.J
Industrial Disputes Act
1947 (14 of 1947\, s. 33-Application
pending industrial dispute-Industrial dispute finalty decided-If
appiicaLion survives.
The appel'ant applied under s. 33(2)(b) of the Ind.ustrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Industrial Tribunal for the Tribunal's approval of the order passed by the appellant discharging its employee
-the respondent. This ai:plication was made because certain industrial disputes were prnding hetween the appellant and its
employees, but when the matter came to be argued before the
Tribunal. the pending disputes had been disposed of. HYence, the
a;ipel!ant contended that the application made by it no longer survived, which the Tribunal rejected. In appeal by Special Leave.
HELD: The Tribunal was right in overruling the appellant's
contention. [419 E].
A proceeding validly commenced under s. 33(2)(bl would not
automatically come to an end merely because the main industrial
c!:spute had in the meanwhile been finally determined. [417 D-E].
The application of the appellant can 1in a sense, be treated as
an incidental proceeding; but it is a separate proceeding all the
same, and in that sense it will be governed by the provi:::ions of
s. 33(2)(b) as an independent' proceeding. It is not an interlocutory
proceeding properly so called in its full sense and significance; it
is a proceeding between the employer and his employee who was
no doubt concuned with the main industrial dispute along with
other employees; but it is nevertheless a proceeding between two
parties in res;o2ct of a matter not covered by the main dispute. [417
B-D].
The order being incomplete and inchoate until tile approval
is obtained, cannot effectively terminate the relationship of the
employer and the employee between the appellant and the respondent; and so even if the main industrial dispute was finally
dcc'dcc1. the qucs'.ion abcut the validity of the order· would still
have to be tried and if the appr·oval is not accorded by the Tribunal,
the employer would be bound to treat the respQndent: as its employee and pay him full wages for the period even though the
appellant may subsequently proceed to terminate th<;- respondent's
service. [ 418 C-El.
Besides, if it were held that with the final determination of
the main industrial dispute such application would autcmatically
come to an end, it would mean that s. 33-A under which a
complaint by the employee is treated as an independent proceedin!\,
would be rendered nugatory. [419 A].
Alkali and Chemical Corporation of India Ltd. v. Seventh
Industrial Tribunal. West Bengal and Ors. (1964) II L.L.J. 568, Mettur
Industries Ltd. v. Sundara Naidu and Anr. (1963) II L.L.J. 303 and
Shah (A.T.) v. State of Mysore and Ors
(1964) I L.L.J. 237, disapproved
Kannan Devan Hill Produce Company Ltd. Munnar v. Miss
Aleyamma Varughesa and Anr. (1962) II LL.J. 158, Om Prakash
Sharma v. Industrial Tribunal, Punjab and Anr. (1962\ II L.LJ.
272 and Amrit Bazar Patrika (Private) Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh State
Industrial Tribunal and Ors. (1964) II L.L.J. 53, approved.
412
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965] 3 8.C.R.
CrvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 422 of
A
1964.
Appeal by special leave from the order dated September 29,
1962, of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbact
in Application No. 45 of 1960 in Reference Nos. 40 and 34 of 1960.
S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-Genera/ and /. N. Shroff, for the appelB
!ant.
Jitendra Sharma and Janardan Sharma, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Gajendragadkar, C.J. The short question of law which
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arises in this appeal relates to the scope and effect of the provisions
contained ins. 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 14
o[ 1947) (hereinafter called 'the Act'). The appellant, the Tata Iron
& Steel Co. Ltd., Jamadoba, applied before the Chairmun, Central
Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, (hereafter called "the
Tribunal") under s. 33(2)(b) of the Act for approval of the order
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passed by it discharging the respondent, its employee S. N. Modak.
from its service. In its application, the appellant alleged that the
respondent had been appointed as a Grade II Clerk in the Chief
Mining Engineer's Office at Jamadoba. One of the duties assigned
to the respondent was to check arithmatical calculations ''cconling
ro sanctioned rate of the bills coming from the Heads of Department.
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He was required to bring to the notice of the Deputy Chief Mining
Engineer cases of discrepancies or irregularities, and also cases where
additions or alterations in the bills had been made, but not initialled.
On re-checking of the bills which had been passed by the respondent. it was discovered that several additions and alterations made
in the bills were not noticed by him and were· not reported. This
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failure constituted misconduct under the Standing Orders of the
appeliant. For this misconduct, the respondent was charge-sheeted
(No. 51 dated I /5-10-1960); that led to a departmental enquiry; and
as a result of the report made by the Enquiry Officer, the appellant
passed an order on December 17, 1960, terminating the services of
the respondent as from December 24, 19o0. The present applicaG
ticn was drafted on the 17th December and it reached the Tribunal
on the 23rd December 1960. It appears that this applicction was
made by the appellant under s. 33(2)!b), because four industrial
disputes were pending between the aPpellant and its employees at
that time in References Nos. 27, 34, 40 & 49 of 1960.
After this application was filed, the
challenged the
propriety of the order passed by the appelknt for which <:pproval
was sought by it, and several contentions were raised by him in
support of his case that the enquiry held against him was invalid
and improper and the order of dism!ssal passed against him was
the result of ma/a fide.'. Evidence was led by the parties in support
of \heir respective plea'
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TATA IRON v. s. N. '10DAK (Gajendragadkar' C.J.)
When the matter came to be ai"gued before ·the Tribunal, it
was urged by the appellant that the application made by it no longer
because all the industrial disputes which were pending
between the appellant and its employees and as a result of the
pcndency of which it had made the application under s. 33(2)(b)
of the Act, had been decided by the Tribunal; Awards had been
made in all the said References and they had been published in the
Gazette. It does appear that the four References wl]ich we have
mentioned, ended in Awards made on 31-10-1960, 8· 11-1960,
14-4-1961, anj 22-9-1961 respectively. The award on the present
apo:;cation was made on 29-9-1962, and it is common grnund that
at the time when the appellant urged its contention that the 2pplication made by it did not survive any longer, all the four References
hal}, in fact, been disposed of. The plea thus raised by the
naturally raised the questicn as to what would be the effect of the
awards pronounced by the Tribunal on industrial disputes pending
before it at the time when the appellant moved the Tribunal under
s. 33(2)(b)? If, as a result. of the pendency of an industrial dispute
between an employer and his emplpyees, the employer is required
to apply for approval of the dismissal of his employee under s. 33
(2)(b), does such an application survive if the main industrial dispute
is me:mwhile finally decided and an award pronounced on it? That
is the question which this appeal raises for our decision, and the
answer to this question would depend upon a fair determination
of the true scope and effect of the provisions of s. 33(2)\b) of the
Act.
This question has been answered by the Tribunal against the
appellant. Having held that the application made by the appellant
survived the decision of the main industrial disputes, the Tribunaf
has considered the merits of the controversy between the parties.
After examining the evidence, the Tribunal has found that the enquiry made by the appellant before passing the impugned order of
discharge against the respondent. was invalid. It has pointed out
that the Enquiry Officer, Mr. Watcha, did not in fact record the
statement of any witnesses who gave evidence before him. and the
on! y record of the enquiry is the report made by Mr. Watcha. It
has also noticed that the enquiry in question suffered from the
serious infirmity that Mr. Watcha who acted as the· Enauiry Officer
himself gave evidence against the respondent, and the evidence which
was actually recorded in the case was taken not by Mr. Watcha, but
by
Paravatiyar. In the result, the conclusion of the Tribunal
on the merits was that the enquiry "was a farce, a mere eve-wash,
biased with pre-determined result, and entirely mq!a fide and not
at all fair". As a result of this conclusion, the Tribunal refused to
accord approval to the order of discharge passed by the appellant
agaimt the respondent. It is against this crder that the appellant has
corr'.e 1,1 this Court by special leave.
Rc•.erfo1g then to the question of construing s. 33 of the Act,.
we may refer to some genernl considerations at the outset. Broadly
411
SUPREME COUlt'l' REPORTS
[1965] 3 s.c.R.
Wtted, s. 33 provides that the conditioi;is of service, etc. should
·n:main unchanged under certain circumstances during the pendency
of industrial adjudication proceedings. It is unnecessa;y to refer to
the previous history of this !;ection. It has undergone many changes;
but for the purpose of the present appeal, we need not refer to the
said changes. We are concerned withs. 33 as it stands after its final
amendment in 1956. Section 33 consists of five sub-sections. For the
purpose of this appeal, it is necessary to read sub-sectio:;;s (I) &
(2) of s. 33 :-
. '
"(!) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal or National
Tribunal:.in ·n:spect of an industrial dispute, no employer
shall--
(a) in regard to any matter C;}nnected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service
applicable to them immdiately before the comme11cement of such proceedings; or
(b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute,
discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or
otherwise, any workmen concerned in such dispute save with the express permission ir1 writing
of the authority before which the proceeding is
pending.
(2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman
concerned in such dispute,-
(a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with
the dispute, the c6nditions of service applicable
to that workman immediately before the commencement of such prcceeding; or
(b) for
any misconduct not connected· with the
dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that worktm n:
Provided that no such workman shall be discharged
or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages
one month and an application has been made by
the employer to the authority befcre which the
proceeding is pending for approval of the <>ction
taken by the employer".
A reading of the above two sub-sections of s. 33 makes it clear that
'its provisions are intended to be applied during the pendency of any
i•roceeding either in the nature of ccnciliation proceeding or in the
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nature of proceeding by way of reference made under s. 10. The
pendency of the. relevant proceeding· is thus one of the conditions
prescribed for the application ofs. 33. Section 33(1) also shows that
the provisions of the said sub-secticn protect workmen concerned
in the main dispute which is pending, conciliation or acljudication.
effect of sub-s. (I) is that where the conditions precedent prescribed by it are satisfied, the employer is prohibited from taking
any action in regard to matters specified by clauses (a) & (b) against
employees concerned in such dispute without the preyious expfess
permission in writing of the authority before whjch the proceedmg
is pen:ling. In other words, in cases falling under sub-s. (!), before
any action can be taken by the employer to which reference is made
by clauses (a) & (b), he must obtain the express permission of the
specified authority. Section 33(2) proceeds to hy dowr. a similar
p;-ovision and the conditions precedent prescribed by it are the same
as those ccntained in s. 33(1). The proviso to s. 33(2) is important
for our purpose. This proviso shows that where action is intended
to be taken by an employer against any of his employees ·which falls
within the scope of cl. (b), he can do so, subject to the requirements
of the proviso. If the employee is il)tended to be discharged or dismissed, an order can be passed by the employer against him, provided he has paid such employee the wages for one month, a!'d
he has made an application to the authority before which the pro·
is pending for approval of the action taken by him. The
requirements o,f the pmviso have been frequently considered by
Industrial Tribunals and have been the subject-matter of• decisions
of this Court as well. It is now well-settled that the requirements of
the proviso have to be satisfied by the employer on the basis that
they form part of the same transaction; and stated generally, the
employer must either pay or offer the salary for one mcnth to the
empioyee before passing an order of his discharge or dismissal, and
must apply to the specified authority for approval of his action at
the same time, or within such reasonably short time thereafter as
to fcrm part of the same transaction. It is also settled that if approval is granted, it takes effect from the date of the order passed
by the employer for which approval was sought. If approval is not
granted, the order of dismissal or discharge passed by the employer
is wholly invalid or inoperative, and the employee can legitimately
claim to ccntinue to be in the employment of the employer notwithstandmg the order passed by him dismissing or discharging him. In
other words, approval by the prescribed authority makes the order
of discharge or dismissal effective; in the absence of
SUl'h
all order is invalid and inoperative in law.
Sub-sections (3) & (4) of s. 33 deal with cases of protected
workmen, but with the provisions contained in these two sub-sectiom
. .
we are not concerned m the present appeal. That leaves s. 33(3) to
be ccmsidrred. This sub-section requires th«! where an application
is made under the proviso to sub-s. (2), the specified authority has to
416
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965] 3 S.C.R.
dispose of lhe application without delay; and indeed, it expressly
ptescribes that the said proceedings must be dealt with as expeditiously as possible. This sub-section is naturally limited to' cases
falling under sub-s. (2). In regard· to cases falling under sub-s. (!),
the employer can act only with the previous express sanction of the
prescribed authority, and, therefore, there is no need to make any
provision in regard to an applicat_ion which the employer may make
under sub-s. (I) requiring that the said application should be dealt
with expediticusly. That is the general scheme of s. 33.
It is quite clear that s. 33 imposes a ban on the employer
exercising his common-law, statutory, or contractual right to terminate the services of his employee3 according to the contract or the
provisions of .law governing such service. In all cases where industrial disputes' are pending between the employers and their employees, it was thought necessary that such disputes should be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal in a peaceful atmosphere, undisturbed by any subsequent cause for bitterness or unpleasantness. It
was, however, realized that if the adjudication of such disputes takes
long the employers cannot be prevented absolutely from taking
action which is the subject matter of s. 33(1) and (2). The Legislature, therefore, devised a formula for reconciling the need of the
employer tc have liberty to take action against his employees, and
the necessity for keeping the atmosphere calm and peaceful pending
adjudication of industrial disputes. In regard to actions covered by
s. 33(1), previous permission has to be _obtained by the employer,
while in regard to actions falling under s. 33(2), he has to obtain
subsequent approval, subject to the conditions which we have already considered. In that sense, it would be correct to say that the
pendency of an industrial dispute is in the nature bf a condition
precedent for the applicability of s. 33(1) & {2). It would, prima facie,
seem to follow that as soon as the said condition precedent ceases
to exist, s. 33(1) and (2) should also cease to apply; and the learned
Solicitor-General for the appellant has naturally laid considerable
emphasis on this basic aspect of the matter.
It is also true that having regard to the conditions precedent
prescribed by s. 33(1) and (2), it may be possible to describe the
application made by the .employer either under s. 33(1) or under
s. 33(2) as incidental to the main industrial dispute pendin!! between
the parties. We have noticed that such applications have t;;- be made
before the specified authority which is dealing with the main industrial dispute; and so, the argument is that an incidental or an inter-
!ocutory application which arises from the pendency of the main
cannot survive the decision of the main dispute
itself: That is another aspect of the matter on which the learned
Sohc1to.r-c:;eneral. relit;s. He urges that it is during the pendency of
mam mdustnal distmte that s. 33 apphes; that it applies in relation to workmen concerned with such main dispute; and that the
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p iwer conferred by it has to be exercised by the authority before
\\ hich the main dispute is pending. These broad features of s. 33
impress upon the applications made under s. 33(1) and (2) the character of interlocutory proceedings, and thus considered, interlocutory
proceedings must be deemed to come to an end as soon as the main
dispute has been finally determined.
On the other band, there are several considerations which do
not support the argument of the appellant that as soon as the main
industrial dispute is decided, the application made by it for approval
under s. 33(2) should automatically come to an end. As we have
already indicated, the application of the appellant can, in a sense,
be treated as an incidental proceeding; but it is a separate proceeding
all the same, and in that sense, it will be governed by the provisions
of s. 33(2)(b) as an independent proceeding. It is not an interlocutory
proceeding properly so calle_d in its full sense and significance; it is
a proceeding between the employer and his employee who was no
doubt concerned with the main industrial dispute along with other
employees; but it is nevertheless a proceeding between two parties
in respect of a matter not covered by the said main dispute. It is.
therefore, difficult to accept the argument that a proceeding which
validly commences by way of an application made by the employer
under s. 33(2)(b) should automatically come to an end because the
main dispute has in the meanwhile been decided. What is the order
that should be passed in such a proceeding, is a question which
cannot be satisfactorily answered, unless it is held that the proceeding in question must proceed according to law and dealt with as
such.
In .this connection it is significant that though the Legislature
has specifically issued by s. 33(5) a directive to the specified auihorities to dispose of the applications without delay and_ act as expeditiously as possible, it has not made any provision indicating that if
the decision on the applications made under s. 33(2) is not reached
before the main dispute is decided no order should be passed on
such applications. There is little doubt that the Legislature intends
that applications made under s. 33(2) should be disposed of well
before the main dispute is determined; but failure to provide for
the automatic termination of such applications in case the main
dispute is decided before such applications are disposed of, indicates that the Legislature intends that the proceedings which begin
with an application properly made under s. 33(2) must run their
own course and must be dealt with in accordance with law. The
direction that the said proceeding should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible emphasises the fact that the legislature intended
that proper orders .should be passed on such applications without
delay, but according to law and on the merits of the applications
themselves.
It is, however, urged by the learned Solicitor-General that it
would be futile to allow the present application to proceed any
418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965] 3 S.C.R.
further. because the appellant can proceed to dismiss the respondent notwithstanding the fact that the Tribunal does not accord
its approval to its order in question. This argument, in our opinion,
is misconceived. It cannot be denied that with final determination
of the main dispute between the parties, the employer's right to
terminate the services of the respondent according to the terms of
service revives and the ban imoosed on the exerCise of the said
power i> lifted. But it cannot
overlooked that for the period
between the date on which the appellant passed its order in question ag2inst the respondent, and the date when the ban was lifted
by the final determination of the main dispute, the order cannot
be said to be valid unless it receives the approval of the Tribunal:.
In other words, the order being incomplete and inchoate until the
approval is obtained, cannot effectively terminate the relationship
of the employer and the employee between the appellant and the
respondent; and so, even if the main industrial dispute is finally
decided, the question about the validity of the order would stiT!
have to be tried and if the approval is not accorded by the
Tribunal, the employer would be bound to treat the respondent as
its employee and pay him his full wages for the period even though
the appellant may subsequently proceed to terminate the respondent's services. Thereilore, the argument that the proceedings if
continued beyond the date of the final decision cf the main industrial dispute would become futile and meaningless, cannot be
accepted.
There is another aspect of this matter to which reference must
be made. Section 33A makes a special provision for adjudication
as to whether any employer has contravened the provisions of s. 33.
This section has conferred on industrial employees a very valuable
right of seeking the protection of the Industrial Tribunal in case
their' rights have'been violated contrary to the provisions of s. 33.
Section 33-A provides that wherever an employee has a grievance
that he has been dismissed by his employer in contravention of
s. 33(2), he may make a complaint to the specified authorities and
such a complaint would" be tried as if it was an industrial dispute
referred to the Tribunal under s. 10 of the Act. In other words, the
complaint is treated as an independent industrial proceediHg ·and
an award has to be pronounced on it by the Tribunal concerned.
Now. take the present case and
how the acceptance of the
appellant's argument would work. As we have already pointed out,
in the present case the Tribunal has considered the merits of the
appellant's prayer that it should accord approval to tl:e proposed
dismissal of the respondent and it has come to the conclusion that
having regard to the relevant circumstances, ,the approval should
not be accorded. If the appellant's argument is accepted and it is
held that as soon as the main industrial disputes were finallv deter'
mined, the application made by the appellant under s. 33(2l automatically came to an end, the respondent would not be able tc
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TATA TRON v. s. N. MODAK (Gqjemlragadkar, C.J.)
get any relief against the appellant for the wrongful termination
of his services between the date of the impugned order and the
final disposal of the main industrial disputes; and this would mean
that in a case like the present, s: 33A would be rendered nugatory,
because the employer having duly applied under s. 33(2)(b), the
employee cannot complain that there has been a contravention of
s. 33 by the employer, even though on the merits the dismissal of
the employee may not be justified. That, in our opinion, could not
have been the intention of the Legislature. This aspect of the matter
supports the conclusion that a proceeding validly commenced
under s. 33(2)(b) would not automatically come to an end merely
because the main industrial dispute has in the meanwhile been
finally determined.
It is of course true that under s. 33 the authority to grant
permission or to accord approval in cases falling under s. 33(1)
and (2) respectively is vested in the. Tribunal, before which the
main industrial dispute is pending, but that is not an unqualified
or inflexible requirement, because s. 33B(2) seems to permit transfers of applications before one Tribunal to another, and in that
sense. the argument urged by .the appellant that the condition that
a specified Tribunal alone can deal with applications made to it
is an inflexible condition, cannot be accepted. We are, therefore,
satisfied that the Tribunal was right in over-ruling the contention
raised by the appellant that the application made by it for approval
under s. 33(2)(b) ceased to constitute a valid proceeding by reason
of the fact that the main industrial disputes, the pendency of which
had !llade the application necessary, had been finally decided.
This questk .1 has been consi'1ered by several High Courts in
this country. The High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Mysore have
taken the view for which the learned Solicitor-General has contended before us, vide Alkali and Chemical Corporation of India Ltd.
v. Seventh Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and Ors.('); Mettur
Industries Ltd. v. Sundara Naidu and Anr.;(') and Shah (A.T.) v.
State of Mysore and Ors.(') respectively. On the other hand, the
Kerala, the Punjab, and the Allahabad High Courts have taken the
view which we are inclined to adopt, vide Kannan Devan Hill Produce Company Ltd., Munnar v. Miss Aleyamma Varughese and
Anr.;(') Om Parkash Sharma v. Industrial Tribunal, Punjab and
Anr.;(') and Amrit Bazar Patrika (Private) Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh
State Industrial Tribunal and Ors.(') respectively. In our opinion,
the former view does not, while the latter does, eorrectly represent
the true legal position under s. 3J(2)(b).
That takes us to the merits of the findings recorded by the Tribunal in support of its final decision not to accord approval to the
(') [1964) II L.L.J. 568.
(1) [1964) I L.L.J. 237.
(1) [1962)'II L.L.J. 272.
(') [1963] II L.L.J. 3()3.
(1) [1962] II L.L.J. 158.
(') [1964] II L.L.J. 53.
'LI B(N)SBCI-14
120
SUPREME COURT REPORTI:
[1965] 3 s.c.R.
action proposed to be taken by the appellant against the respondent.
We have already indicated very briefly the nature and effect of the
said findings. The learned Solicitor-General no doubt wanted to
contend that the said findings were not justified on the evidence
adduced before the Tribunal. We did not, however, allow the learned
Solicitor-General to develop this point because, in our opinion, the
findings in question are based on the appreciation of oral evidence,
and it cannot be suggested that there is no legal evidence on the
record to support them. Usually, this Court does not under Art. 136
of the Constitution entertain a plea that the findings of fact recorded
by the Industrial Tribunal are erroneous on the ground that they
are based on a misappreciation of evidence. The propriety or the
correctness of the findings of fact is not ordinarily allowed to oe
challenged in such appeals.
The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
A
B
c