# TEK SINGH v. SHASHI VERMA AND ANR

- **Citation:** [2019] 3 S.C.R. 697
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2019-02-04
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1416 of 2019
- **Bench:** R. F. Nariman, Vineet Saran
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/tek-singh-v-shashi-verma-and-anr-33601
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
s. 115 proviso (As inserted by amendment in 1999) - Revisional
jurisdiction of High Court - Scope of - Held: In view of the proviso
revisional jurisdiction is not maintainable against interlocutory
orders - Scope of jurisdiction u/s. 115 is limited to rectify
jurisdictional errors only.
Or. XXXIX, r. 1 - Interlocutory mandatory injunction - Grant
of - Criteria - Held: When mandatory injunction is granted at interim
stage, much more than a prima facie case has to be made out.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The High Court set aside the concurrent findings
of fact and allowed a revision petition, without dealing with any of
the aspects set out by the first Appellate Court. The 1999
amendment to the CPC added a proviso Section 115 CPC. A
reading of this proviso will show that, after 1999, revision petitions
filed under Section 115 CPC are not maintainable against
interlocutory orders. Even otherwise, the revisional jurisdiction
under Section 115 CPC is to be exercised to correct jurisdictional
errors only. [Paras 5, 6 and 7][700-B, C, H]
D.L.F. Housing & Construction Company Private Ltd.,
New Delhi v. Sarup Singh and Others [1970] 2 SCR
368; Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden
and Others (1990) 2 SCC 117 : [1990] 1 SCR 332 -
relied on.
2. When a mandatory injunction is granted at the interim
stage, much more than a mere prima facie case has to be made
out. [Para 8][702-F]
[2019] 3 S.C.R. 697
697
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 3 S.C.R.
Case Law Reference
[1970] 2 SCR 368
relied on
Para 7
[1990] 1 SCR 332
relied on
Para 8

## Text

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697
TEK SINGH
v.
SHASHI VERMA AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 1416 of 2019)
FEBRUARY 04, 2019
 [R. F. NARIMAN AND VINEET SARAN, JJ.]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
s. 115 proviso (As inserted by amendment in 1999) - Revisional
jurisdiction of High Court - Scope of - Held: In view of the proviso
revisional jurisdiction is not maintainable against interlocutory
orders - Scope of jurisdiction u/s. 115 is limited to rectify
jurisdictional errors only.
Or. XXXIX, r. 1 - Interlocutory mandatory injunction - Grant
of - Criteria - Held: When mandatory injunction is granted at interim
stage, much more than a prima facie case has to be made out.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The High Court set aside the concurrent findings
of fact and allowed a revision petition, without dealing with any of
the aspects set out by the first Appellate Court. The 1999
amendment to the CPC added a proviso Section 115 CPC. A
reading of this proviso will show that, after 1999, revision petitions
filed under Section 115 CPC are not maintainable against
interlocutory orders. Even otherwise, the revisional jurisdiction
under Section 115 CPC is to be exercised to correct jurisdictional
errors only. [Paras 5, 6 and 7][700-B, C, H]
D.L.F. Housing & Construction Company Private Ltd.,
New Delhi v. Sarup Singh and Others [1970] 2 SCR
368; Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden
and Others (1990) 2 SCC 117 : [1990] 1 SCR 332 -
relied on.
2. When a mandatory injunction is granted at the interim
stage, much more than a mere prima facie case has to be made
out. [Para 8][702-F]
[2019] 3 S.C.R. 697
697
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[2019] 3 S.C.R.
Case Law Reference
[1970] 2 SCR 368
relied on
Para 7
[1990] 1 SCR 332
relied on
Para 8
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1416
of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.04.2018 of the High Court
of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in CMPMO No. 154 of 2017.
E. C. Agrawala, Rajesh Kumar, Ms. Prashi Tyagi, Advs. for the
Appellant.
B. S. Banthia, Adv. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. F. NARIMAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The Respondent No.1 filed a Civil Suit dated 05.03.2013 before
the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Solan under Section 6 of the Specific
Relief Act in which the following reliefs were claimed:
"(a) Declaring that the effect the plaintiff was running business in
Shop No. 3 in the name and style M/s Om Garments owned by
proforma Defendant No. 2 in Anand Complex, The Mall Solan
w.e.f. 28.01.2013 on the basis of partnership deed of the said
date with proforma Defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff has been
wrongly dispossessed by the Defendant No. 1 from the Shop No.
3 in the intervening night of 03.03.2013 - 04.03.2013 illegally,
wrongfully, without the consent of the plaintiff or proforma
Defendant No. 2.
(b) Decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the
Defendant No. 1 from causing any interference on any portion of
suit premises/Shop No. 3 mentioned above."
3. A written statement was filed by the appellant herein denying
the averments made in the Suit and stating that he has been in possession
since 2004 as a tenant of the landlady, who is Respondent No.2 before
us.
4. The landlady also filed a written statement dated 05.07.2013 in
which she stated that apart from the partnership entered into with
Respondent No.1, the petitioner was her tenant w.e.f. 2004. An Order
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39 Rule 1 application was filed which was dismissed by the learned
Single Judge on 21.04.2015 saying that the relief asked for could not be
granted at this stage as it would amount to decreeing the Suit itself. An
appeal filed before the Additional District Judge met with the same fate.
By the judgment dated 19.12.2016, the appellate Court held:
"However, when it is an admitted case of Defendant No. 2
admittedly land lady of the suit shop that she has rented the suit
shop to Defendant No. 1/Respondent and has set up counter
defence that in fact Defendant No. 1 has sublet the suit shop to
the plaintiff which is not at all the case of the plaintiff primafacie
it is clear on record that suit shop was rented by Defendant No. 2
to respondent/defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 1 has been
running suit shop since 17.09.2004 when both the Defendants
have also reduced rent agreement into writing, copy of which is
also available in the case file. As per rent agreement, the tenancy
had commenced w.e.f. 01.09.2004. Nothing has come on record,
if Defendant No. 1/respondent had ever vacated/surrendered the
possession of the shop in favour of landlady nor it is the case of
Defendant No. 2 that she ever sought eviction of Defendant No.
1 from the suit shop. It appears from the copy of partnership
deed having been relied upon by the applicant that both applicant
and Defendant No. 2 had connived with each other in order to
oust Respondent No. 1 who is tenant over the suit shop and filed
the suit as well as application for temporary and mandatory
injunction in the Court. Moreover, when the applicant herself has
come with the plea that she is out of possession of the suit shop
and she has prayed that possession in her favour be restored qua
the suit shop by way of temporary injunction and at the same time
the applicant has failed to prove on record that she has primafacie
case of balance of convenience lies in her favour or that she is
going to suffer irreparable loss as discussed above hence by
allowing of the application as prayed by applicant would amount
to decree of the suit in favour of the applicant without giving the
parties to prove their respective claims by leading evidence. Even
when it has come on record that Respondent No. 1 is in actual
possession of the suit property which was rented out to him by
Defendant No. 2 landlady in the year 2004 and nothing has come
on record that the Defendant No. 1 had ever been evicted from
the suit shop in accordance with law or he ever surrendered the
TEK SINGH v. SHASHI VERMA
[R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
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possession of the suit property in favour of defendant No. 2, it is
clear on record that Respondent No. 1 has primafacie case and
balance of convenience also lies in her favour."
5. By the impugned judgment dated 10.04.2018, a learned Single
Judge of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh set aside the concurrent
findings of fact and allowed a revision petition. This was done without
dealing with any of the aspects set out by the first Appellate Court.
From what one is able to gather, given the language used in the judgment,
it appears that the learned Judge was swayed by the fact that a police
compliant had been filed on 03.02.2013 in which dispossession was
acquiesced in.
6. We are constrained to observe that every legal canon has been
thrown to the winds by the impugned judgment. First and foremost, the
1999 amendment to the CPC added a proviso Section 115 which reads
as follows:
"115. Revision-(1) The High Court may call for the record of any
case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such
High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such
subordinate Court appears-
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with
material irregularity,
the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit:
Provided that the High Court shall not, under this Section, vary or
reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the
course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it
had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would
have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings.
Xxx xxx xxx
(3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding
before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is
stayed by the High Court.
A reading of this proviso will show that, after 1999, revision
petitions filed under Section 115 CPC are not maintainable against
interlocutory orders.
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7. Even otherwise, it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction
under Section 115 CPC is to be exercised to correct jurisdictional errors
only. This is well settled. In D.L.F. Housing & Construction Company
Private Ltd., New Delhi vs. Sarup Singh and Others(1970) 2 SCR
368 this Court held:
"The position thus seems to be firmly established that while
exercising the jurisdiction under Section 115, it is not competent
to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross or even
errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction
of the Court to try the dispute itself. Clauses (a) and (b) of this
section on their plain reading quite clearly do not cover the present
case. It was not contended, as indeed it was not possible to
contend, that the learned Additional District Judge had either
exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had failed to
exercise a jurisdiction so vested in him, in recording the order that
the proceedings under reference be stayed till the decision of the
appeal by the High Court in the proceedings for specific
performance of the agreement in question. Clause (c) also does
not seem to apply to the case in hand. The words "illegally" and
"with material irregularity" as used in this clause do not cover
either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision
arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The
errors contemplated by this clause may, in our view, relate either
to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of
procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either
of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have been
complied with. The High Court does not seem to have adverted
to the limitation imposed on its power under Section 115 of the
Code. Merely because the High Court would have felt inclined,
had it dealt with the matter initially, to come to a different
conclusion on the question of continuing stay of the reference
proceedings pending decision of the appeal, could hardly justify
interference on revision under Section 115 of the Code when there
was no illegality or material irregularity committed by the learned
Additional District Judge in his manner of dealing with this question.
It seems to us that in this matter the High Court treated the revision
virtually as if it was an appeal." at Pg.373.
8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents argued before
us and attempted to support the judgment. He cited the judgment of
TEK SINGH v. SHASHI VERMA
[R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
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Dorab Cawasji Wardenvs. Coomi Sorab Warden and Others (1990)
2 SCC 117. Para 16 of this judgment is set out hereinbelow:
"16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus
granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last
non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until
the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the
undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration
of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining.
But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or
would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice
or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or
alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would
succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm,
courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these
guidelines are:-
(1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of
a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required
for a prohibitory injunction.
(2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which
normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.
(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking
such relief."
This judgment also makes it clear that when a mandatory injunction
is granted at the interim stage much more than a mere prima facie case
has to be made out. None of the aforesaid statutory provisions or
judgments have either been adverted to or heeded by the impugned
judgment.
9. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and restore
the judgment of the Courts below.
10. Since the suit filed is a Section 6 suit which is a summary
proceeding in itself, the trial Court should endeavour to dispose of the
Suit itself within a period of six months from today.
11.,The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
Kalpana K. Tripathy
 Appeal allowed.