# THAKORE SOBHAG SINGH v. THAKUR JAi SINGH & ORS

- **Citation:** [1968] 2 S.C.R. 848
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-01-31
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 568 of 1965
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, V. Ramaswam!, V. Bhargava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/thakore-sobhag-singh-v-thakur-jai-singh-ors-4249
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Jaipur
Matmi
Rules,
1945-W/Je//Jer lun·e force of /c;n·-Adoption
prior to pron1ulga1ion of Rule~ l\·itliour sanction of Ru/er-Validity.
Board of Revenue, Rajas1han-Jurisdic1io11 10 decide q11es1io11.r of adop.
tion and succession to jagirs in Jaipur State.
A
B
The Board of Revenue, Rajasthan. 1,1,·i1hout recording a finding on the
C
factum of respondent's adoption to the last holder of the jagir, rejected
his claim to be r~cogniscd as the adopted son, on rhc ground that, under
the MaJ111i Rules, the adoprion, without lhc pr-evious sanct;on of the Ruler.
could not be recognised for the purpose of determining succession to the
jagir.
Jn the writ petition filed by him, the High Court dealt with lhe
dispute on merits and, holding (a) that the Jaipur Mar111i Rules had no
statutory force bccau'!le rhc Ruler had not given his assent to them; (b)
thar on lhe death of the last holder without any issue lhe jagir would v-.'5t
1)
in the respondent if it "'as proved that he v1as adopted in accordance
wilh the personal law of the las! 1agirdar; and (c) that rule 14(2) requiring the previous sanclion of the Government of the State to adopt
is
prospective and could have no applicatiori to ~n adoption made before th:
Rules "'-ere promulgated, dircc:ed the Qoard to drcide the case in accord·
ance with the law declared hv the High Courl.
The Board hold that the
respondent was proved to have been adopted by the
las1
jagirdar and
directed that he should be recognised as the jagii'dar.
E
In appeal 10 this Court. against the order of the Board er Revenue it
was contended by the appellant. \\'J10 claimed to have a preferential riaht
to !he jagir, that : ( 1) rhe Board ol
Revenue
had
no jurisdiction
10
decide the dtsput-~ relaring to ado;Jtion as it Yi:as triable by a civil court,
and (2) since the Jaipur MO/mi Rules (Validalion) Act, of 19&1, was
passed after the judgment of the High Court, the Board was bound lo dispose of the matter in the light of the Rules.
}'
HELD : ( l) Under the Rajasthan Jagir Decisions
and
Proceedin~s
(Validation) Act, 1955. the power to doal y,i1h and decide Jispules relaling to succession lo jagir·cstatcs
'"a~ vested.
in respect of procccdin~s
pending at the date of the Act and instituted thercaf:-:!r, in the Revenue
Courts.
Therefore. the Board of Revenue ~·as competent to decide the
question rrlating to the respondent's ad0ption. and its
decision·· on--~ .the
factum of adoption recorded on appreciation of evidenc·! ml.Jst be accepted.
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(2) It was not open 10 !he appellant lo con'end !hat the righl of the
respondenl.
a> lhe adopted son, to th~ iagir had
to
he decided by 1he
Roard on the basis of tl:c Mar111i Rules and not in accordance with the
personal law of the last jagirdar.
(a) Though the State legislature .,naclcd the Validation Acl, declaring
that the Ma1mi Rules 'shall have and shall be deemed always 10 have had,
ll
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the for~ of law and '>halt be treated as heing and as having been an existing jagir law within the meaning of s. 2(d) of the Rajasthan Laod Reforms and Resumplion of Jagirs Act. 1Q5T,
norwilhslanding
anyrhing
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SOBHAG SINGH V. JAi SINGH (Shah, J,)
849
contained in any Judgment of any court, the Act did not supersede the
judgment of tho High Court and therefore, the Board wa·s incompetent to
consider and decide the question .whether the Government mav. in the
absence of its previous sanC'tion, refuse to recognise the adoption of the
respondent on the basis of the Matmi Rules. [854 A-CJ
(b) Acco<ding to the personal Jaw applicable to the last jagirdar, the
respondent could have bee" adopted by him and the finding of the High
Court that the jagir would ve~t in the respondent as the adopted son in
accordance with such persl)!}al Jaw operated as res judicata and could not
be reopened before the Board of Revenue; and, it was not open to the
appeJlant to contend in the appeal to this Court that the deCision of the
High Court on qu·estions decided in the writ petition was erro

## Text

THAKORE SOBHAG SINGH
v.
THAKUR JAi SINGH & ORS.
January 31, 1968
[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAM! AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]
Jaipur
Matmi
Rules,
1945-W/Je//Jer lun·e force of /c;n·-Adoption
prior to pron1ulga1ion of Rule~ l\·itliour sanction of Ru/er-Validity.
Board of Revenue, Rajas1han-Jurisdic1io11 10 decide q11es1io11.r of adop.
tion and succession to jagirs in Jaipur State.
A
B
The Board of Revenue, Rajasthan. 1,1,·i1hout recording a finding on the
C
factum of respondent's adoption to the last holder of the jagir, rejected
his claim to be r~cogniscd as the adopted son, on rhc ground that, under
the MaJ111i Rules, the adoprion, without lhc pr-evious sanct;on of the Ruler.
could not be recognised for the purpose of determining succession to the
jagir.
Jn the writ petition filed by him, the High Court dealt with lhe
dispute on merits and, holding (a) that the Jaipur Mar111i Rules had no
statutory force bccau'!le rhc Ruler had not given his assent to them; (b)
thar on lhe death of the last holder without any issue lhe jagir would v-.'5t
1)
in the respondent if it "'as proved that he v1as adopted in accordance
wilh the personal law of the las! 1agirdar; and (c) that rule 14(2) requiring the previous sanclion of the Government of the State to adopt
is
prospective and could have no applicatiori to ~n adoption made before th:
Rules "'-ere promulgated, dircc:ed the Qoard to drcide the case in accord·
ance with the law declared hv the High Courl.
The Board hold that the
respondent was proved to have been adopted by the
las1
jagirdar and
directed that he should be recognised as the jagii'dar.
E
In appeal 10 this Court. against the order of the Board er Revenue it
was contended by the appellant. \\'J10 claimed to have a preferential riaht
to !he jagir, that : ( 1) rhe Board ol
Revenue
had
no jurisdiction
10
decide the dtsput-~ relaring to ado;Jtion as it Yi:as triable by a civil court,
and (2) since the Jaipur MO/mi Rules (Validalion) Act, of 19&1, was
passed after the judgment of the High Court, the Board was bound lo dispose of the matter in the light of the Rules.
}'
HELD : ( l) Under the Rajasthan Jagir Decisions
and
Proceedin~s
(Validation) Act, 1955. the power to doal y,i1h and decide Jispules relaling to succession lo jagir·cstatcs
'"a~ vested.
in respect of procccdin~s
pending at the date of the Act and instituted thercaf:-:!r, in the Revenue
Courts.
Therefore. the Board of Revenue ~·as competent to decide the
question rrlating to the respondent's ad0ption. and its
decision·· on--~ .the
factum of adoption recorded on appreciation of evidenc·! ml.Jst be accepted.
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(2) It was not open 10 !he appellant lo con'end !hat the righl of the
respondenl.
a> lhe adopted son, to th~ iagir had
to
he decided by 1he
Roard on the basis of tl:c Mar111i Rules and not in accordance with the
personal law of the last jagirdar.
(a) Though the State legislature .,naclcd the Validation Acl, declaring
that the Ma1mi Rules 'shall have and shall be deemed always 10 have had,
ll
..
the for~ of law and '>halt be treated as heing and as having been an existing jagir law within the meaning of s. 2(d) of the Rajasthan Laod Reforms and Resumplion of Jagirs Act. 1Q5T,
norwilhslanding
anyrhing
•
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B
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D
E
G
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SOBHAG SINGH V. JAi SINGH (Shah, J,)
849
contained in any Judgment of any court, the Act did not supersede the
judgment of tho High Court and therefore, the Board wa·s incompetent to
consider and decide the question .whether the Government mav. in the
absence of its previous sanC'tion, refuse to recognise the adoption of the
respondent on the basis of the Matmi Rules. [854 A-CJ
(b) Acco<ding to the personal Jaw applicable to the last jagirdar, the
respondent could have bee" adopted by him and the finding of the High
Court that the jagir would ve~t in the respondent as the adopted son in
accordance with such persl)!}al Jaw operated as res judicata and could not
be reopened before the Board of Revenue; and, it was not open to the
appeJlant to contend in the appeal to this Court that the deCision of the
High Court on qu·estions decided in the writ petition was erroneous. The
order of the High Court on the writ petition was not an interlocutory
order. [854 E-G]
(c) Rule 14(2) is on its terms prospective and the Validation Act
Joes not give retro~pective operation to the Matmi Rules. [853 FJ
(d) It could not be contended that the judgment of the H;igli Court
should not be treated as res judicata, on the ground that .if it was regarded
as binding between the parties, the equal protection clause of the Consti
4
tution would be violated if another person similarly situated were to be
differently treated by the Board of Revenue. [855 E-FJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 568 of
1965.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
October 23, 1962 of the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan at Ajmer
in Matmi Case No. 40 (Jhunjhunu) of 1961.
M. M. Tiwari, D. D. Varma and Ganpat Rai, for the app.ellants.
A. K. Sen, D. P. Gupta, Sobhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondent No. 1.
K. B. Mehta and Miss Indu Soni, for respondent Nos. 2 to 4.
T.he Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shah, J. This is an appeal brought with special leave against
the judgment dated October 23 1962 in Matmi Case No. 40 of
1961, of the file of the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan.
Thakur Sabha! Singh-. hereinafter called 'Sabhal Singh'-a
jagirdar of Thikana Jhakora in Shekhawati area in the former
Indian State of Jaipur applied on November 3, 1933 to recognize
Jai Singh-the first respondent in this appeal-as his adopted son
for succession to the Thikana.
On May 23, 1936, the Ruler of
Jaipur in Council ordered that he "saw no reason at the present
moment to recognize the adoption advocated by" Sabha! Singh,
and that the "alleged adoption of Jai Singh shall in no way be
deemed to be an adoption that will in any. sense bind the Darbar
as regards the question of succession". On June 16, 1947, Sabha!
Singh preferred another application to the Prime Minister of Jaipur
for recognizing the adoption of Jai Singh.
The application was
850
SUPRF.MP. COl!RT REPORTS
[1968] 2 S.CR.
sent to the Board of Revenue for enquiry and report under the
Jaipur Matmi Rules, 1945. The Board of Revenue rep8rted that
in view of the Council Resolution dated May 23, 1936, the application was not maintainable since Sabha! Singh was living at the
date of the application.
But before this application could be
finally disposed of by the Government of the State of Jaipur
Sabha! Singh died and the Prime Minister of Jaipur directed that
nccessai:""el)quiries be held under the Matmi Rules. and for that
purpose the record be sent to the Deputy Commissioner for taking
action according to the Rules.
The Nazim, Jhunihunu reld an
enquiry and reported that adoption of Jai Singh by Sabha! Singh
could not be recognized, for, under the Council Resolution dated
May 23, 1936, the Government had refused to ~rant any recognition to the adoption. In the view of the Nazim, the
adoption
of Jai Singh by Sabha! Singh without the previous sanction of the
Governinent was ihvalid, and evidence of the "factum of adoption"
was inadmissible, but that did not debar Jai Singh from setting up
a claim to succeed to the Thikana as a descendant in the senior
line of the original grantee. An appeal against that order to the
Deputy Commissioner was dismissed.
A second appeal was then
carried to the Board of Revenue. Jn the view of the Board. on
the terms of the Council Resolution dated May 23, 1936.
an
enquiry into the factum of adoption could not be shut out. The
Board accordingly called for a finding on the question, amongst
others. whether Jai Singh was formally adopted by Sabha! Singh
of Jhakora, and if so wherv?
The Nazim reported that the adoption of Jai Singh stood proved ~atisfactorily, but the adoption
could not be recognized because no previous sanction of the Ruler
had been obtained.
Since. however, Jai Singh was the senior-most
member of the senior line of descent from the original grantee.
he was entitled to succeed to the J!rant under r. 14(1) of the Jaipur
Matmi Rules. 1945. in preference to any other claimant.
The
papers were then submitted
to the Collector, Jhunjhunu.
The
Collector confirmed the finding of the Nazim that Jai Singh wa~
adopted by Sabha! Singh. but in the absence of previous sanction
of the Ruler the adoption co"Jd not be recognized.
The Collector
did not, however. agree with the Nazim that Jai Singh was the
senior member of the senior line of the original grantee : he held
that Sobhag Singh-appellant in this appeal-was
the
senior
member of the senior line of the original grantee and recommended
that "the Matmi be granted in favour of Sobhag Singh."
Th~
Roard of Revenue agreed with the Collector that Jai SinJ?h wa'
not the senior member of the senior line of the ori~inal grantee
of the j!rant in question. and that the appellant Sobhag Sin.gh had
a preferential claim to the grant of Matmi. The Board without
recording a finding on the issue of adoption accepted the recommendation of the Collector.
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SOllHAG SINGH v. JAi SINGH (Shah, J.)
851
Jai Singh then moved a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Rajasthan. The High Court
quashed the decision of the Boatd of Revenue and directed the
Board "to decide the case ih accordance with law in the light of
observations made" in the judgment. In the opinion of the High
Court, the Jagir devolved according to the personal law applicable
to the last holder, and the personal law included the custom or
usage relating to the particular Jagir; that the custom or usage
applicable to the Jagir in question was that the adopted son must
be a direct male lineal descendant of the original granite, and
that Nahar Singh was the original grantee of the Jagir in question
and Jai Singh as a descendant of Nahar Singh was entitled to take
the Jagir if it was proved that the adoption had been made in
accordance with the personal Jaw, that the Matmi Rules had no
statutory force because it was not proved that assent of the Ruler
of Jaipur had been given thereto, and that even assuming that rhe
Rules were "existing Jagir Jaw" they did not govern adoptions
made before they were brought into force.
An application for
certificate to appeal to this Court against the judgment of the High
Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution was rejected on the
ground that the dispute had not been finally decided, and a number
of issues remained to be decided.
The Board of Revenue held, on a re-hearing of the appeal,
that Jai Singh was proved to have been adopted by Sabha) Singh.
The Board accordingly directed that by virtue of the adoption
of Jai Singh by Sabha! Singh, Jai Singh be shown in the revenue
records as the Jagirdar of Jhakora on the ·demise of Sabha! Singh.
Against that order, Sobhag Singh who claimed to have a preferential right to the Jagir of Jhakora has appealed to this Court.
A large number of grounds were canvassed at the Bar in support of this appeal : they fall into three broad divisions :
( 1) That the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction
to decide a dispute relating to adoption which
dispute was triable by the Civil Court alone;
(2) Since the Jaipur Matmi Rules had been validated
bv the Jaipur Matmi Rules (Validation) Act.
1961 (Act 21of1961), the Board was bound
to decide the appeal in the light of the Rules;
and
( 3) That on the evidence it is not proved that Jai
Singh was in fact adopted by Sabha! Singh as
his son on Karlik Sudi 13 Samvat Year 1987.
· "
The first and the third grounds Present no difficulty. The Raiasthan Legislature enacted the Rajasthan Jagir Decisions and ProCl'edings (Validation) Act 18 of 1955 to validate certain decisions
852
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l 968] 2 S.C.R.
given, and proceedings taken, in respect of matters relating to the
resumption of Jagirs in the covenanting States of Rajasthan, and
the recognition according to the law of succession to the rights and
titles of Jagirda"' therein, and to provide the forum for the disposal of such cases and proceedings.
The State of Jaipur was one
'of the covenanting States. Bys. 3 of it.at Act it was provided that
all decisions of the various grades of Revenue Courts or officer,,
in cases or proceedings arising out of, or under, the laws of the
covenanting · States
providing
for
the
resumption
of
jagirs in 'those States and
the
recognition
of succession to
the rights and titles of jagirdars therein shall be valid and shall be
deemed always to have been valid and shall not be liable to b~
called in question in any Civil Court.
Section 4 provided ~or
continuance of pending cases and pro~eedings before the Revenue
Courts as .f they were properly instituted. Section 5 provided that
all cases·or proceedings of the nature referred to in s. 3 may after
the Act be instituted in the Court of the Collector exercising
jurisdiction in the area within which the subject-matter of the case
or proceeding is situate. Provision was made for appeals from
the orders of the Revenue Courts by s. 8, and by s. 12 the order
of the Board of Revenue was declared final.
The jurisdiction of
the civil court to entertain suits or proceedings referred to In s. 5
was expressly excluded by s. 13.
The power to deal with and
decide disputes relating to succession to jagir estates was therefore vested in respect of proceedings pending at the date of the
Act and instituted thereafter, in the Revenue Courts. The Board
of Revenue was, therefore, competent to decide the question relating to the adoption of J ai Singh by Sabha! Singh.
There is overwhelming evidence on the record in support of
the case that Jai Singh was adopted on Karlik Sudi 13 Samvat
Year 1987 by Sabha! Singh with the requisite ceremonies according to the personal law.
Every authority or Tribunal which had
occasion to deal with this quc;5tion was of the opinion that Sabha!
Singh and adopted Jai Singh on Karlik Sudi 13 Samvat Year 1987
according to the custom of the Jagir.
Apart from the oral evidence, there is the deed of adoption, a copy of an invitation sent to
an invitee to attend the adoption ceremony and the recitals in the
application submitted by Sabha! Singh requesting recognition of
the adoption of Jai Singh. The Board of Revenue in the judgment
under appeal has carefully analysed the evidence, and we see no
reason to enter upon a reappraisal of the evidence in this appeal
with special leave.
The view recorded by the ~oard of Revenue
on appreciation of evidence that Jai Singh was adopted as a son
by Sabhal Singh must be accepted.
The second contention may now be considered.
In 1945 the
Jaipur Matmi Rules were published in the State
Government
Gazette.
By r. 3 all existing orders, rules and hidayats which
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SOBHAG SINGH v. JAi SINGH (Shah, /,)
853
A .were inconsistent with the Matmi Rules were repealed.
Rule 4
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sub-r. (3) defined "Matmi" as meaning mutation of the name of
the successor to a State grant on the death of the last holder. By
r. 5 it was provided that all State grants shall be subject to matmi
with certain exceptions not relevant in this
case.
Rule
14
provided:
" ( 1) Subject to the provisions of rule 13, succession
in the absence of a direct male lineal descendant of the
last holder shall be restricted to the lineal male-descendants of the original grantee, preference being given to
the senior member of the· senior line :
Provided, firstly, that in tht; case of a grant for the
maintenance of a temple, mosque or other religious
place, other than a Jain temple, it shall be within the
discretion of Government to select as successor any one
of the male lineal descendants of the original grantee,
with due regard to his suitability for the perfomiance
of worship; and
Provided, secondly,
(2) No adoption shall be recognised for the purpose of succession to a State grant unless a holder has
obtained the previous sanction
of the Government to
adopt, such sanction being given only in favour of a
direct male !in.ea! descendant of the original grantee :
Provided, firstly,
Provided, secondly,
"
That rule is plainly prospective, and can have no application to
an adoption !nade. before the Rules were promulgated. Previous
sanction to adopt is not a condition of the grant of recognition
for the purpose of succession to a State grant in respect of a person
who is adopted by the holder of a I agir before the date of the
promulgation of the Rules.
That was the view taken by the High
Court in the writ petition filed by Jai Singh against the order of
the Board of Revenue. The High Court also held that the Matmi
Rules were not sanctioned by the Government, and had not the
force of >aw.
It is true that the State Legislature has enacted Act
21 of 1961-called 'The Jaipur Matmi Rules (Validation) Act
1961 '.
By s. 2 of that Act it is provided that "notwithstanding
anything contained in the Jaipur General Clauses Act, 1944, or
any other Jaw or in any rule of interpretation or in any judgment
decision, decree or order of any court, notwithstanding any omission or defect of form or procedure or .want of any competent
sanction or approval, it. is hereby declared that the Jaipur Matmi
Rules, 1945, published in the Jaipur Gazette, Extraordinary, dated
854
SUPREME COURT RF.PORTS
[I 968) 2 S.C.R.
the 8th December. 1945. under Revenue Branch Notification No.
15941 /Rev., dated 24th November, 1945, shall have, and shall
be deemed always to have had, the force of law
and shall be
treated as being and as having been an 'existing Jagir law' within
the meaning of clause ( d) of section 2 of the Rajasthan Land
Refonns and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (Rajasthan Act 6 of
1952) for the purpose of that Act as we)) as of the Rajasthan
Jagir Decisions and Proceedings (Validation) Act, 1955 (Raiasthan Act 18 of I 955). and any other law relatnip; to "Jagirs or
Jagirdars."
But the Act did not supersede the judgement of the
High Court. The Board of Revenue was
therefore incompetent
to consider and decide the question whether the GovernmCilt may
in the absence of the previous sanction of the Government refuse
to recognize the adoption of Jai Singh.
The Act again merely
declares that the Matmi Rules shall be deemed always to have the
force of law and shall be treated as being "cxistin)l Jagir law"
within the meaning of cl. (d) of s. 2 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jaj!irs Act 6 of 1952 and Rajas1han
Act 18 of 1955. But the Act docs not purport to give retrospective operation to the Jaipur Matmi Rules. It is futile then t.1
contend that the Board of Revenue before determining the quc ;.
tion as to the factum of adoplion of Jai Sin~h was required t l
consider wnether the adoption was invalid. because sanction of th~
Ruler of Jaipur was not previously obtained by Sahhal Singh bcrorc
taking Jai Singh in adoption.
The High Court had also held in the writ petition that on the
death of the holder of the Ja~ir without having any issue the Jagir
will vest in his adopted son in accordance wi1h the personal law.
That findinj! is now res j11dicafa and is bindin~ upon the parties.
Counsel for the appellant contended that the order passed by the
Hi!!h Court was an interlocutory order remanding the proceeding
to the Board of Revenue, and on that account the decision of the
High Court will not operate as res j11dicata either before the Board
of Revenue or in this Court.
We are unable to accept that contention.
Against the order or"the Board of Revenue rejectin~ the
claim of Jai Singh to be recOgQized as the adootcd son of Sabha!
Singh a writ petition was moved in the Hioh Court and a prayer
for ouashing that order was made.
The Hi2h Court dealt with
the dispute on merits and held that the order of the Board of
Revenue holdine that because of the Matmi Rules the adoption of
Jai Sineh by Sabhal Singh without the previous sanction of the
Ruler could not be recognized for the purome of detenninine the
succession to the Jagir was erroneous.
The Hi2h Court did in
making the final order direct the Tribunal to decide the case 'in
accordance with the law and in the light of the observations made
in the· judement. but the direction was.
in our judgment. a surplusa,ee.
The Hi.eh Court is<:i?ed a writ in the nature of certiorari
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SOBHAG SINGH v. JAi SINGH (Shah, /.)
855
quashing the order of the Tribunal.
It was unnecessary thereafter
to direct or advise the Board of Revenue lo perform its statutory
duty to decide the dispute according to law. The Board of Revenue had to decide the dispute in accordance with the law declared
by the High Court.
All questions which had been expressly
decided by the High Court on contest between the parties and
other questions which must be deemed by necessary implication
to have been decided were res judicata and could not be re-opened
before the Board of Revenue.
In this appeal it is therefore,not
open to the appellant to contend that the decision of the High
Court on the questions decided in the writ pctttion was erroneous.
It is unfortunate that the application for certificate to appeal
to this Court filed by Sobhag Singh was erroneously rejected by
the High Court.
But that does not affect the binding character
of the judgment of the High Court between the parties. Unless
the decision of the High Court on those questions was set aside by
appropriate proceeding in this Court, the judgment must be held
binding
between the parties.
It is, therefore. not open to the
appellant to contend. that the right of Jai Singh as the adopted son
to the I agir had to be .decided otherwise than in accordance with
the personal law of Sabha! Singh. It is undisputed that accordin.g
to the personal law applicable to Sabha! Singh, Jai Singh could
have been adopted by him.
It was somewhat faintly contended by counsel for the appellant that if the judgment of the High Court is regarded as bindin~
between the parties, the equal protection claus~ of the Constitution
would be violated, and on that account also the judgment must be
held invalid.
The argument needs no serious consideration. It
is difficult to appreciate the contention that two persons similarly
situate were or co~d be differently treated by the judgment of the
Board of Revenue. because the decision of the High Court operate>
as res judicata between the parties in one case. By the application
of the rule of res judicata the appellant was not singled out for
special or prejudicial treatment.
It may suffice to observe that
all adoptions according to the personal law in the State of Jaipur
made by Jagirdars before the p•omulgation of the Matmi Rule~
are valid, even if no sanction of the Ruler was. obtained to the
adoptions.
That rule applies to all adoptions by /agi•dars in the
State of Jaipur.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs in favour of the
first respondent.
H
V.P.S.
A ppea/ dismissed.