# THAKUR RAGHUBIR SINGH v. COURT OF WARDS, AJMER, AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1953] 1 S.C.R. 1049
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1952-09-18
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/thakur-raghubir-singh-v-court-of-wards-ajmer-and-another-94
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
THAKUR RAGHUBIR SINGH
v.
COURT OF WARDS, AJMER,
AND ANOTHER.
1049
[MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, MDKHERJEA, GHULAM
HASAN, BHAGWATI and JAGANNADHADAsJJ.]
Oonstitzdion of India, 1950, a1'ls. 19(1) (J), 19(5), 31-A-Ajmer
Revenue and Land Records Act (XLII of I950) s. 112-Ajmer
Gm>ernment Wards Regulation (I of 1888), ss. 6, 7-Law declaring
landlords who habitually infringe the rights of a tenant to be disqualified prop1'ieto1's and empoweri1zg Court of Wa,.ds to assume
management of their lands - Validity-Infringement of fundamental
right-Reasonableness-Scope of article 31-A-" Modifioation of
rights," meaning of.
Section 112 of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act
(XLII of 1950) provided that "if a landlord l1abitually infringes
the rights of a tenant under this Act, he shall, notwithstanding
anything in section 7 of the ~-'\jmer Governu1ent Wards Regulation,
1888 (I of 1888) be deemed to be a 'landlord who is disqualified to
manage bis own property' 'vithin the meaning 0£ section 6 of the
said Regulation and his property shall be liable to be taken under
the superintendence of the Court of W .rds." Section 6 of Regulation I of 1888 provided that the Court of Wards may, with the
previous sanction of the Chief Corr1missioner, assume the superin~
tendence of the property of any landholder who is disqualified to
manage his property. The petitioner, whose estate was taken over
by the Court of Wards under the above-mentioned provisions of
law, applied for relief under art. 32 of the Constitution for restoration of his estate and other appropriate reliefs:
Held, (i) that the result of the combined operation of s. 112
of Act XLII of 1950 and the provisions of ss. 6 and 7 of Regulation I of 1888 was that the Court of Wards could in its own discretion and on its subjective determination assume the superinten.
dance of the property of a landlord who habitually infringed the
rights of his tenants, and the exercise of .the discretion of the
Court of Wards cannot be questioned in a civil court: s. 112 of
Act XLII of 1950 read with the provisions of Regulation I of
1888 therefore infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioner
guaranteed by art. 19 (1) of the Constitution and was to that
extent void;
(ii) the provisions of s. 112 cannot be regarded as a "reasonable" restriction imposed in the interests of the general public on
the exercise of the right conferred by art. 19 (1) (f), because they
completely negatived the right by making its enjoyment depend
on the mere discretion of the executive;
136
•
1953
May 15.
•
1050
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
1953
(iii) that s. 112 was not validated by art. 31-A of the ConstiThalmr
tntiou as it was not "a law providing for the acquisition by the
Raghubir Singh State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinction
v
·
or modification of any such rights" within the meaning of art.
The o~url of 31-A.
The word "modification" in the context of art. 31-A only
Wrtrds, AjJner, 1neans a modfication of the proprietary right of a citi.zen like
and Another
an extingnishn1ent of thttt right anCT cannot include within its
ambit a mere suspension of the right of inanagernent of the estate
for a time, definite or indefinite.
Mahajan .l.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 29 of l!l53.
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India
praying that the Court of \Vards, Ajmer, be ordered to
forbear from carrying on the superintendence of the
istimrari estate and other properties of the petitioner
and for restoration of possession and management of
the said estate and properties.
J. B. Dadachan,ii and H. C. Sogain for the
appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (Bhava
Datta Sharma, with him) for the respondents.
1953.
May 15. The ,Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MAHAJAN J.-This is a petition under article 32 of
the Constitution seeking relief against alleged infringement of certain fundamental rights of the petitioner
and arises in these circumstances.
The pe

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
THAKUR RAGHUBIR SINGH
v.
COURT OF WARDS, AJMER,
AND ANOTHER.
1049
[MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, MDKHERJEA, GHULAM
HASAN, BHAGWATI and JAGANNADHADAsJJ.]
Oonstitzdion of India, 1950, a1'ls. 19(1) (J), 19(5), 31-A-Ajmer
Revenue and Land Records Act (XLII of I950) s. 112-Ajmer
Gm>ernment Wards Regulation (I of 1888), ss. 6, 7-Law declaring
landlords who habitually infringe the rights of a tenant to be disqualified prop1'ieto1's and empoweri1zg Court of Wa,.ds to assume
management of their lands - Validity-Infringement of fundamental
right-Reasonableness-Scope of article 31-A-" Modifioation of
rights," meaning of.
Section 112 of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act
(XLII of 1950) provided that "if a landlord l1abitually infringes
the rights of a tenant under this Act, he shall, notwithstanding
anything in section 7 of the ~-'\jmer Governu1ent Wards Regulation,
1888 (I of 1888) be deemed to be a 'landlord who is disqualified to
manage bis own property' 'vithin the meaning 0£ section 6 of the
said Regulation and his property shall be liable to be taken under
the superintendence of the Court of W .rds." Section 6 of Regulation I of 1888 provided that the Court of Wards may, with the
previous sanction of the Chief Corr1missioner, assume the superin~
tendence of the property of any landholder who is disqualified to
manage his property. The petitioner, whose estate was taken over
by the Court of Wards under the above-mentioned provisions of
law, applied for relief under art. 32 of the Constitution for restoration of his estate and other appropriate reliefs:
Held, (i) that the result of the combined operation of s. 112
of Act XLII of 1950 and the provisions of ss. 6 and 7 of Regulation I of 1888 was that the Court of Wards could in its own discretion and on its subjective determination assume the superinten.
dance of the property of a landlord who habitually infringed the
rights of his tenants, and the exercise of .the discretion of the
Court of Wards cannot be questioned in a civil court: s. 112 of
Act XLII of 1950 read with the provisions of Regulation I of
1888 therefore infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioner
guaranteed by art. 19 (1) of the Constitution and was to that
extent void;
(ii) the provisions of s. 112 cannot be regarded as a "reasonable" restriction imposed in the interests of the general public on
the exercise of the right conferred by art. 19 (1) (f), because they
completely negatived the right by making its enjoyment depend
on the mere discretion of the executive;
136
•
1953
May 15.
•
1050
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
1953
(iii) that s. 112 was not validated by art. 31-A of the ConstiThalmr
tntiou as it was not "a law providing for the acquisition by the
Raghubir Singh State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinction
v
·
or modification of any such rights" within the meaning of art.
The o~url of 31-A.
The word "modification" in the context of art. 31-A only
Wrtrds, AjJner, 1neans a modfication of the proprietary right of a citi.zen like
and Another
an extingnishn1ent of thttt right anCT cannot include within its
ambit a mere suspension of the right of inanagernent of the estate
for a time, definite or indefinite.
Mahajan .l.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 29 of l!l53.
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India
praying that the Court of \Vards, Ajmer, be ordered to
forbear from carrying on the superintendence of the
istimrari estate and other properties of the petitioner
and for restoration of possession and management of
the said estate and properties.
J. B. Dadachan,ii and H. C. Sogain for the
appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (Bhava
Datta Sharma, with him) for the respondents.
1953.
May 15. The ,Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MAHAJAN J.-This is a petition under article 32 of
the Constitution seeking relief against alleged infringement of certain fundamental rights of the petitioner
and arises in these circumstances.
The petitioner owns an "istimrari estate" in the
State of Ajmer under an istimraii sanad granted to his
ancestor in the year 1875. He enjoys therein a life
interest with an obligation to perform certain duties as
prescribed by the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation (II of 1877).
The Deputy Commissioner of Ajmer, who is the Court
of Wards constituted under the Ajmer Government
\Yards Regulation (I of 1888), took over possession
and assumed superintendence of the said estate on the
18th September, 1952, purporting to act under sections 6 and 7 of the Regulation read with section 112
of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, 1950
(XLII of 1950), and hence this petition for a writ of
mandamus or one in the nature thereof, or for the issue
'
s.c.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1051
of a direction to the Court of Wards for restoration of
19s3
possession of tlle estate and for an order directing it tu
Tl k
forbear from carrying on the superintendence of the Rayhu~:;;ingh
estate.
v.
The order made by the Court of Wards on the 7'he Oourt of
18th September, 1952, is impuaned as being void and Ward.<, Ajmer,
'-'
and Another
of no effect whatever, because it is alleged that the
statutory provisions under which it is purported to
Mahajan J.
have been made contravene the provisions of Part III
of the Constitution and take away and abridge the
petitioner's rights guaranteed by article 19 (1) (f) of
the Constitution.
Section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 is one of a group of
7 sections in Chapter X of the Act which deals with the
subject of" Compensation and Penalties''. The section
prescribes penalties for habitual infringement of rights
of tenants and reads thus:-
"If a landlord habitually infringes the rights of a
tenant under this Act, he shall, notwithstanding anything in section 7 of the Ajmer Government Wards
Regulation, 1888 (I of 1888), be deemed to be a" landlord who is disqualified to manage his own property"
within the meaning of section 6 of the said Regula ti on
ttnd his property shall be liable to be taken under the
superintendence of the Court of Wards ".
The preceding section 110 is in these terms:-
" If a landholder or his agent collects from a
tenant any lag or neg, he shall be deemed to have committed an offence of extortion within the meaning of
the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) ".
Just as section 110 declares an illegal exaction by a
landlord to be an offence under the Indian Penal Code,
in like manner, section 112 declares a landlord who
habitually infringes the rights of a tenant "a person
disqualified to manage his own property" within the
meaning of section 6 of Regulation I of 1888, the consequence being that his property becomes liable to be
taken over by the Court of Wards. The section is an
ingenious and novel device to punish landlords who
habitually infringe the rights of tenants. It authorizes
•
i052
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1953
the use for punitive purposes of the machinery of Regulation I of 1888 enacted to make better. provision for
2'ha.kur.
the superintendence of Government Wards in AjmerRaghubir Singh
B "'
f h d 1
·
·
t•
112 f
v.
Merwara.
y iorce o t e ec arat10n m sec 10n
· o
The court of the Act, landlords who habitually infringe the rights
Ward•, Ajmer, of the tenants fall within the category of persons inand Another
capable of managing their own property and come
within the ambit of section 6 of the Regulation, which
MahajanJ:
is in these terms :-
"The Court of Wards may, with the previous
sanction of the Chief Commissioner, assume the superintendence of the property of any landholder who is
rusqualified to manage his own property ".
The result therefore of the combined operation of section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 and of the provisions of
Regulation I of 1888, is that the Court of Wards can in
its own discretion and on its subjective determination,
assume the superintendence of the property of a landlord who habitually infringes the rights of his tenants.
The condition precedent to such assumption of superintendence is the previous sanction of the Chief Commissioner, the giving of which is also a matter entirely
resting on his discretion. Section 27 of Regulation I
of 1888 provides that "the exercise of any discretion
conferred on the Court of vVards or the Chief Commissioner by this Regulation shall not be called in question
in any civil court ". It was conceded by the learned
Attorney-General appearing for the State of Ajmer,
that there was nothing in the contents of either Act
XLII of 1950 or Itegulation I of 1888 which provided
a machinery for determining the question whether a
certain landlord was a .person who was habitually infringing the rights of his tenants. Under Regulation I
of 1888, the assumption by the Court of Wards of the
superintendence of the property of a disqualified proprietor depends merely on the subjective determination of the Deputy Commissioner or the Commissioner
or of the Chief Commissioner, and the exercise of this
discretion cannot be questioned in any manner in a
civil court. Act XLII of 1950 says nothing whatsoever
on this subject.
•
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1053
The contention that the provisions of section 112 of
1953
Act XLII of 1950 read with the provisions of Hegulation I of 1888 infringe the fundamental right of the R ;'hbakur .
't'
d b
. 1
f) f
ay,m ir Singh
pet1 10ner guarantee
y art1c e 19 ( l) (
o the Conv.
stitution, is, in our opinion, well-founded and does not
The court of
require any elaborate discussion. The petitioner's right Ward•, Ajmer,
to hold the istimrari estate and his power of disposal
and Anather
over it stand abridged by the act of the Court ofWards
authorized by these provisions. His right to manage the
Mahajan J.
estate and enjoy possession thereof stands suspended
indefinitely and until the time that the Court ofWards
chooses to withdraw its superintendence of the property of the petitioner. During this period, he can
only receive such sums of money for his expenses as
the Court of Wards decides in its discretion to
allow. Thus, the provisions of section 112 of Act XLII
of HJ50 clearly abridge the fundamental right of the
petitioner under article 19 (1) (f) and are to that extent
void.
The learned Attorney-General canvassed for the
validity of the provisions of section 112 on three
grounds. He contended that the determination of the
question whether a certain landholder was a person who
habitually infringed the rights of his tenants did not
depend on the opinion of the Court of Wards, but was
a matter that could be agitated and canvassed in a civil
court. It was said that there were no words in the
section from which it could be inferred that the determination of this fact depended on the subjective
determination of the Court of Wards. It was emphasized that the section had not used the familiar language "in its opinion" or words like that, which are
usually employed to indicate whether a matter
depends on the subjective determination of an authority or whether it can be agitated in a civil court. This
contention, in our opinion, is not well-founded. As already pointed out, Act XLII of 1950 has prescribed no
machinery for the determination of the question whether a landlord is guilty of habitually infringing the
rights of his tenants, and rightly so, because section 112
of the Act is mere! y of a dcclara tory charatl er and
•
.
.
.
1054
SUPREME COURT REPOl~TS
[1953]
1953
declares such a landlord as being under a disability
Thakur
and suffering from an infirmity. This declaration beRaghubir Sinyh comes operative and effective only when the Court of
v.
Wards in its discretion decides to assume superintendTh• Oaurt af ence of the property of such a proprietor. In other
Wards, Ajmer, words, when the Deputy Commissioner or the Comand Another missioner or the Chief Commissioner is of the opinion
Mahajan J.
that such a proprietor should be deprived of possession
of his property, this determination then operates to the
prejudice of the landlord, but he cannot challenge the
exercise of the discretion by these officers in view of
the provisions of section 27 of Regulation I of 1888.
The result then is that by the subjective determination
of the Court ofWards, both the questions whether a
particular person habitually infringes the rights of his
tenants and whether his property should be taken
over by the Court of Wards, stand settled and the
landlord cannot have recourse to a civil court on these
questions. The learned Attorney-General was not able
to draw our attention to any provision in the Comt
of Wards Act or in Act XLII of 1950 which enabled
the landlord, held to be a habitual infringer of the
rights of his tenants, to have recourse to a civil court
to test the conectness of the determination made by
the Court of\Vards. The provisions of Regulation I
of 1888 clearly indicate the contrary.
Next, it was argued that the provisions of section
112 amount to reasonable restrictions on the exercise
of the right confened by article 19 ( 1) ( f) of the Constitution on a citizen, and these restrictions are in the
interests of the general public. In our judgment, this
argument also is not sound. As indicated above, the
provisions of section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 are penal
in nature and are intended by way of punishment of
a landlord who habitually infringes the rights of his
tenants. He is punished by being placed at the mercy
of the Court of Wards and by being made subject to the
stringent provisions of Regulation I of 1888. An enactment which prescribes a punishment or penalty for
bad behaviour or for misconduct of a landlord cannot
possibly be regarded as restriction on a fundamental
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1055
right. Indeeq, a punishment is not a restriction. This
1953
was frankly conceded by the learned Attorney-General.
Th k
It is still more difficult to regard such a provision as a Raghub:,.";ingh
reasonable restriction on the fundamental right.
v.
'Vhen a law deprives a person of possession of his proThe Court of
perty for an indefinite period of time merely on the Wards, Ajme•,
subjective determination of an executive officer, such
and Another
a law can, on no construction of the word "reasonable"
MahajanJ.
be described as corning within that expression, because
it completely negatives the fundamental right by
making its enjoyment depend on the mere pleasure
and discretion of the executive, the citizen affected
having no right to have recourse for establishing the
contrary in a civil court. Section 112 of Act XLII of
1950 cannot therefore be held valid as coming within
the scope of article 19 (5) of the Constitution.
'
Lastly, it was contended by the learned Attorney.
General that section 112 was valid by reason of the
curative provisions of article 31-A of the Constitution.
That article validates laws which would otherwise
contravene the fundamental right in article 31(2) of
the Constitution, but its operation is restricted to laws
providing for acquisition of estates etc.
It runs as
follows:-
" Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, no law providing for the acquisition
by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or
for the extinguishment or modification of any such
rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that
it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any
of the rights conferred by any provisions of this
Part ...... "
Section 112 of Act XLII of 1950, intended to regulate
the rights of landlords and tenants, is obviously not a
law providing for "the acquisition by the State" of the
estates of the landlords, or of any rights in those
estates. It is also not a law providing for the extinguishrnent or modification of any such rights. The
learned Attorney-General laid emphasis on the word
"modification" used in article 31-A.
That word in
1056
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1953
the context of the article only means a.modification of
Thakur
the proprietary right of a citizen like an extinguishRaghubfr Sin[lh ment of that right and cannot include within its ambit
v.
a mere suspension of the right of management of estate
The Oourt of for a time, definite or indefinite. Historically speakIVards, Apn,,·, ing, article 31-A which has relation to article 31(2) of
and A11oth~1· the Constitution, has no relevancy whatsoever to the
Mahajan J. law enacted in section 112 of the Act XLII of 1950.
]for the reasons given above, we are of the opinion
that the law enacted in section 112 of Act XLII of
1950 is not saved either by clause (5) of article 19 or
by article 31-A of the Constitution. It manifestly infringes the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed by article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. That
being so, the petitioner is entitled to a direction that
possession of his estnte be restored to him. We accordingly direct the Court of vVards, Ajmer-l\forwara,
constituted under the Ajmer Government Wa,ds Regulation, I of 1888, to forbear from carrying on superintendence of the petitioner's istimrari estate and the
other properties taken possession of, and to restore
their possession to the petitioner. The petitioner will
have the costs of this petition.
Petition allowed.
Agent for the petitioner : J. N. Shroff.
Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.