# Thakur Raghubir Singh v. State of A }mer

- **Citation:** [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959
- **Bench:** S. R. Das, N. H. Bhagwati, B. P. Sinha, K. SuBBA RAO, K. N. W Anchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/thakur-raghubir-singh-v-state-of-a-mer-1562
- **Pages:** 39

## Headnote

Land Ref arm-Distribution of ownership and control of agricultural land--Purchase by tenants-Validity of enactmcnt-Dombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956 (llom.
XIII of 1956), ss. 32 to 32R-C?nstitution of India, Arts. r4, r9,
:JI, 3rA, Entry r8, List II, Seventh Schedule.
The petitions challenged the constitutional validity of the
Bomhay Tenancy and Agricultural lands (Amendment) Act, 1956
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 3•>J.
62
Thakur Raghubir
Singh
v.
State of A }mer
Wanc/wo j.
November rB.
Sri R1ini R11111
Na,ain l\fedhi
v.
Th~ Slate of
Bombay
490
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
(Born. XIII of 1956) which. in further amending the Bombay
Tenancy an<l Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bom. LXVll of
1948), sought to distribute the ownership and control of agricultural lands in implementation of the directive principles of
State policy laid down by Arts. 38 and 39 of the Constitutio11.
The impugned Act sought to distribute e•1uitably the lands
bet\vcen the landholders and the. tenants, except \Vhcre the landholder required the same for cultivation by himself, by way of
compulsmy purchase of all surplus lands by tenants in possession
thereof with effect from Aprill, 1957, called the 'tiller's day'.
The basic idea underlying the Act was to prevent concentration
of agricultural lands in the hands of the landholders. The Act
thus, being a legislation in respect of rights in and over land,
affected the relation between landlord and tenant and provided
for the transfer and alienation of agricultural lands.
The petitioners, who were landholders as defined by s. 2(9) of the Act
contended that (r) the impugned legislation was beyond the
competence of the State Legislature, (2) that, not being protected
by Art. 31A, of the Constitution, it infringed Arts. 14, 19 and :Jr
of the Constitution am! (3) that it was a piece of colourable legislation vitiated in part by excessive delegation of legislative
power to the State. On behalf of the respondent it was urged
that the impugned legislation fell within Entry 18 in List 11 of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, that it 'provided for
the extinguishment or 1nodification of rights to estates and was
as such protected by Art. 31A of the Constitution and that there
was no excessive delegation of legislative power.
Held, that it was well settled that the heads of legislation
specified in Entry 18 in List 11 of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution should not be construed in a narrow and pedantic
sense but should be given a large and liberal interpretation.
There could, therefore, be no doubt that the impugned Act fell
within the purview of Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution and the plea of legislative incompetence must fail.
British Coal Corporation v. The King, (1935) A.C. 500; Unit<"d
Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, [1940] F.C.1{. 110 and Na11inchandra
Mafailal v. The Commissioner of Jnco1ne-tax, J)oinbay City, [1955]
I S.C.R. 829, relied on.
There could be no doubt that the Bombay Land Revepuc
Code, 1879, was the existing la\v relating to land tenures in force
in the State of Bombay within the meaning of Art. 31A(2)(a) of
the Constitution and the word '.estate' as deiinc<l bys. 2(5) of the
Code clearly applied not only to lands held by the various
tenure·holders of alienated lands but also to lanrl-holdcrs anrl
occupants of unalienated lands.
1~here was no an1higuity in that
definition and, therefore, no justification for putting a narro\ver
construction on that word so as to mean the land-holders of the
former category alone and not of the latter; even if there was
auy, the wider meaning of the w·.Jrd \Vas tl11~ orF~ to be adopted
in the context of the objective of the Act.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOU,TS
491
Case-law discussed.
The word 'lanclholrler' as defined in s. 2(9) of the Act also
made no distinction between alienated and unalienatetl lands
and showed that the interest of such a landholder. fell within
the definition of 'estate' contained in

## Text

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(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT HEPORTS
489
No. 33 of 1956 is the holder of the jagir-estate and
therefore his entire interest in the estate is liable to
resumption under the Act. In the Ajmer Regulations,
(Vol. H to I,) at pp. 564-6, these two estates have been
considered and their history is given, and they are
called jagirs. The history of jagirs in Rajasthan was
considered by this Court in Thakur Amarsinghji v.
State of Rajasthan (1), at p. 330 onwards, and the word
'jagir' was held to connote all grants which conferred
on the grantees rights in respect of land revenue. In
the case of these two jagirs also, as annexures B and
C show, land revenue was remitted and they were
granted as estates for particular purposes. They arc,
therefore, clearly estates in view of the origin of the
title of 'the holder of these estates who is called a
jagirdar and therefore the State could take them over
under s. 4 of the Act.
There is no force in any of the points raised on behalf
of the petitioners, and the petitions fail and are hereby
dismissed with one set of costs to the contesting
rer:!pondcnt.
Petitions dismisser!.
SRI RAM RAM NARAIN MEDHI
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
(and connected petition)
(S. R. DAS, c. J., N. H. BHAGWATI, 'B. P. SINHA,
K. SuBBA RAO and K. N. W ANCHOO, JJ.)
Land Ref arm-Distribution of ownership and control of agricultural land--Purchase by tenants-Validity of enactmcnt-Dombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956 (llom.
XIII of 1956), ss. 32 to 32R-C?nstitution of India, Arts. r4, r9,
:JI, 3rA, Entry r8, List II, Seventh Schedule.
The petitions challenged the constitutional validity of the
Bomhay Tenancy and Agricultural lands (Amendment) Act, 1956
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 3•>J.
62
Thakur Raghubir
Singh
v.
State of A }mer
Wanc/wo j.
November rB.
Sri R1ini R11111
Na,ain l\fedhi
v.
Th~ Slate of
Bombay
490
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
(Born. XIII of 1956) which. in further amending the Bombay
Tenancy an<l Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bom. LXVll of
1948), sought to distribute the ownership and control of agricultural lands in implementation of the directive principles of
State policy laid down by Arts. 38 and 39 of the Constitutio11.
The impugned Act sought to distribute e•1uitably the lands
bet\vcen the landholders and the. tenants, except \Vhcre the landholder required the same for cultivation by himself, by way of
compulsmy purchase of all surplus lands by tenants in possession
thereof with effect from Aprill, 1957, called the 'tiller's day'.
The basic idea underlying the Act was to prevent concentration
of agricultural lands in the hands of the landholders. The Act
thus, being a legislation in respect of rights in and over land,
affected the relation between landlord and tenant and provided
for the transfer and alienation of agricultural lands.
The petitioners, who were landholders as defined by s. 2(9) of the Act
contended that (r) the impugned legislation was beyond the
competence of the State Legislature, (2) that, not being protected
by Art. 31A, of the Constitution, it infringed Arts. 14, 19 and :Jr
of the Constitution am! (3) that it was a piece of colourable legislation vitiated in part by excessive delegation of legislative
power to the State. On behalf of the respondent it was urged
that the impugned legislation fell within Entry 18 in List 11 of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, that it 'provided for
the extinguishment or 1nodification of rights to estates and was
as such protected by Art. 31A of the Constitution and that there
was no excessive delegation of legislative power.
Held, that it was well settled that the heads of legislation
specified in Entry 18 in List 11 of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution should not be construed in a narrow and pedantic
sense but should be given a large and liberal interpretation.
There could, therefore, be no doubt that the impugned Act fell
within the purview of Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution and the plea of legislative incompetence must fail.
British Coal Corporation v. The King, (1935) A.C. 500; Unit<"d
Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, [1940] F.C.1{. 110 and Na11inchandra
Mafailal v. The Commissioner of Jnco1ne-tax, J)oinbay City, [1955]
I S.C.R. 829, relied on.
There could be no doubt that the Bombay Land Revepuc
Code, 1879, was the existing la\v relating to land tenures in force
in the State of Bombay within the meaning of Art. 31A(2)(a) of
the Constitution and the word '.estate' as deiinc<l bys. 2(5) of the
Code clearly applied not only to lands held by the various
tenure·holders of alienated lands but also to lanrl-holdcrs anrl
occupants of unalienated lands.
1~here was no an1higuity in that
definition and, therefore, no justification for putting a narro\ver
construction on that word so as to mean the land-holders of the
former category alone and not of the latter; even if there was
auy, the wider meaning of the w·.Jrd \Vas tl11~ orF~ to be adopted
in the context of the objective of the Act.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOU,TS
491
Case-law discussed.
The word 'lanclholrler' as defined in s. 2(9) of the Act also
made no distinction between alienated and unalienatetl lands
and showed that the interest of such a landholder. fell within
the definition of 'estate' contained ins. 2(5) of the Code.
There was nu warrant for the proposition that extinguishment or motliiication of any rights in estates as contemplated by
Art. 31A(1)(a} of the Constitution must mean only what happcnell in the prncess of acquisition of any estate or of any rights
therein by the State. The language of. the Article was clca1· amt
unambiguous and showed that it treated the two concepts as
distinct and different from each other.
Sections 32 to 32R of the impugned Act clearly con temp lated tlte vesting of the title in the tenure on the tiller's day, dcfoasible only on certain specified cont.ingencies. They were designed to bring about an extinguishment, or in any event a mollification of the landlord's rights in the estate within the meaning of
Art. 31A(1)(a} of the Constitution. The impugned Act, therefore,
was not vulnerable as being violative of Arts.14, 19 and 31 of the
Constitution. It would not be correct to contend that the sections
merely contemplated a suspension of the landholders' right anti
not their extinguishment.
Thalmr Raghubir Singh v. Court of Warils, Ajmer, [1953]
S.C.R. 104c), held inapplicable.
Where the Legislature settled the policy and broad principles
of the legislation, there could be no bar against leaving matters
of detail to be fixed by the executive and such delegation of
power could not vitiate the enactment. In the instant case, sinr.e
the Legislature had laid down the policy of the Act in the
preamble, enunciated the broad principles in ss. 5 and h arnl
iixecl the four criteria in s. 7 itself, the last of which had necessarily to be read efusdcm · generis with the others, it was not
correct to .say that the impugned Act by s. 7 had conferred uncontrolled power on the State Government to vary the ceiling
area or the economic holding or that s. 7 was vitiated by an
excessive delegation of legislative power to the State.
Parshram Damodhar v. State of Bombay, A.LR 1957 llom.
257, disapproved.
Dr. N. B. Khare v. The Staie of Delhi, [1950] S.C. R. 519; The
Staie of West JJengal v. Anff•ar Ali Sarkar, [1952] S.C.R. 284 a11d
Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, [1957] S.C.H .. 233, referred
to.
ORIGINAL
JuRISDIC'l'ION:
Potitions Nos. 13 & 3841 of 57 and 55 of 1958.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Const,itution of
India for the enforcement of Fundamental right!!.
V. M. Limaye and S.S. Shukla, for the petitioners
(In .Petitions Nos. 13. 38- 41/57).
Sri /lam lta•n
N tirain ill edhi
v.
The ::>tale of
IJ0111bay
Sri Ram Ram
Narain Medhi
v.
Th• State of
Bombay
Bha.gwali J.
492
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
Pur8hottam Tricum<la8 and J.B. Dadachanji, for
the pe~itioner (In Petition No. 55/58).
H. N. Banyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
H. J. Umrigar, K. L. Hathi and R. H. Dhebar, for the
respondent.
1958. November 18. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
BHAGWATI, J.-These six petitions under Art. 32 of
the Constitution challenge the vires of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act,
1956 (Born. XIII of 1956) (hereinafter referred to as
the " impugned Act "). It was an Act further to amend
the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1948 (Born. LXVII of 1948) (hereinafter called the
" 1948 Act ").
The petitioners are citizens of India and landholders
within the meaning of the 1948 Act holding several
acres of land within the State of Bombay out of which
a few acres are under their own cultivation, the bulk
of the lands being under the cultivation of tenantsexcept in the case of the petitioners in Petition No. 58
of 1958 where the whole of the lands are under the
cultivation of tenants.
The 1948 Act had been passed by the State Legislature as a measure of agrarian reform on December 28,
1948, with a view to amend the law relating to tenancies of agricultural lands and to make certain other
provisions in regard to those lands and the objectives
sought to be achieved were thus set out in the second
paragraph of the preamble:-
" AND WHEREAS on account of the neglect of
a landholder or disputes between a landholder and his
tenants, the cultivation of his estate has seriously
suffered, or for the purpose of improving the economic
and social conditions of peasants er ensuring the full
and efficient use ofland for agricultural purposes, it is
expedient to assume management of estates held by
landholders and to regulate and impose restrictions on
the transfer of agricultural lands, dwelling houses,
sites and lands appurtenant thereto belonging to or
occupied by agriculturists, agricultural labourers and
' '•
(1) S.C.R. SUPHEME COUH,'f REPORTS
493
artisans in the Province of Bombay and to make pro·
visions for certain other purposes hereinafter appearing
"
Section 2(8) of the said Act defined " Land " to
mean:
"(a) land which is used for agricultural purposes,
and includes-
(a) the sites of farm buildings appurtenant to such
laud ; and used for agricultural purposes; and
(b) ............................................................. .
(i) the sites of dwelling houses occupied by agriculturists, agricultural labourers or. artisans and land
appurtenant to such dwelling houses.
(")
"
11 .......................................................... ..
" Landholder" was defined in s. 2(9) of the said
Act to mean :-
"a zamindar, jagi'rdar, saranjandar, inamdar,
talukdar, malik or a khot or any person not herein before specified who is a holder of land or who is interested in land, and whom the State Government has
declared on account of the extent and the value of the
land or his interests therein to be a land-holder for
the purposes of this Act."
Under s. 2(21) of the said Act the words and expressions used in the Act but not defined were to have the
. meaning assigned to them in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, and the Transfer of Property Act,
1882, as the case may be.
With a view to achieve the objective of establishing
a socialistic pattern of society in the State within the
meaning of Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution, a
further measure of agrarian reform was enacted by the
State Legislature, being the impugned Act, hereinbefore referred to, which was designed to bring about
such distribution of the ownership and control of
agricultural lands as best to subserve the common
good thus eliminating concentration of wealth and
means of production to the common detriment.
The
said Act received the assent of the President on March
16, 1956, was published in the Bombay Government
Sri Uani Ha1n
Narain Medhi
v.
The Stale of
Bombay
Bhagwali ].
Sti RanJ R"'"
Naraiti ll.icdhi
v.
The SJale of
Botnbay
IJhagwati ].
494
SUPltEME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
Gazette on March 29, 1956, and came into. force throughout the State on August 1, 1956.
In about November, 1956, certain landholders from
Kolhapur and Sholapur districts in the State of Bombay
filed petitions in the Bombay High Court under Art.
226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutionu.-
lity of the impugned Act on various grounds. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pronounced its
judgment on :February 21, 1957, dismissing those petitions with costs except in regard to a declaration as
regards the invalidity of section 88D of the Act.
Tho
petitioners herein thereupon filed these petitions under
Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the vires of the
impugned Act and praying for a writ of mandamus
against the State of Bombay ordering them to forbear
from enforcing or ta.king any steps in enforcement of
the Act, costs and further reliefs.
Petition No. 13 of 1957 appears to have been filed
on December 3, 1956, but effective steps therein were
taken only when an application for stay with a prayer
. for an ex-pa.rte order being C.M.P. No. 359 of 1957 was
filed herein on March 21, 1957. Petitions Nos. 38 to
41 of 1957 were filed on March 21, 1957, and Petition
No. 55 of 1958 was filed on March 19, 1958.
All these petitions followed a common pattern and
the main grounds of attack were : that the State Ll'gislature was not competent to pass the said Act, the
topic of legislation not being covered by any entry in
the State List ; that the said Act was beyond the ambit of Art. 31-A of the Constitution and was therefore
vulnerable as infringing the fundamental rights enshrined in Arts. 14, 19 and 31 thereof; that the provisions of the said Act in fact infringed the fundamental
rights of the petitioners conferred upon them by
Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution; that the said
Act was a piece of colourable legislation and in any
event a part of the provisions thereof suffered from
the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power.
The answer of the State was that the impugned Act
was covered by Entry No. 18 in List lI of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution, that it was a piece of
legislation for the extinguishment or modification of
(l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
495
rights in relation to estates within the definition thereof in Art. 31-A of the Constitution and that therefore
it was not open to cha.Benge uudei· Arts. 14, 19 and 31
thereof and that it was neither a. piece of colourable
legislation nor did any part thereof come within the
mischief of excessive delegation.
As to the legislative competence of the State Legislature to pass the impugned Act the question lies within a very narrow compass.
As already stated, the
impugned Act was a further measure of agrarian reform enacted with a view to further a.mend the 1948
Act a.ml the ohject of the enactment was to bring_
about such distribution of the ownership and control
of agricultural lands as best to subserve the common
good. This object was sought to be achieved by fixing
ceiling areas of lands which could be held by a person
and by prescribing what was an economic holding. It
sought to equitably distribute the lands between the
landholders and the tenants and except in those cases
where the landholder wanted the land for cultivating
the same personally for which due provision was made
in the Act, transferred by way of compulsory purchase
all the other lands to tenants in possession of the
same with effect from April 1, 1957, which was called
thP- "tillers day". Provision was also made for disposal of balance of lands after purchase by tenants
and the basic idea underlying the provisions of the
impugned Act was to prevent the concentration of
agricultural lands in the hands of landholders to the
common detriment. The tiller or the cultivator was
brought into direct contact with the State eliminating
thereby the landholders who were in the position of
intermediaries. The enactment thus affected the relation between landlord and tenant, provided for the
transfer and alienation of agricultural lands, aimed at
land improvement and was broadly stated a legislation in regard to the rights in or over land :-categories specifically referred to in Entry 18 in List II of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which specifies the head of legislation as " land, that is to say,
rightR in or over land, land tenures including the rela.-
tio11 of landlord and tenant, and the collection of
Sri Rani Ram
Narain 11il'dhi
v.
The Stale nf
Romliay
Sri Ram Nam
Narain i'vledhi
v.
The St11tr. of
Bomh.-iy
496
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
rents; transfer· and alienation of agricultural land ;
land improvement and agricultural loans; coloniza.
tion ".
It is well settled that these heads of legislation
should not be construed in a narrow and pedantic
sense but should be given a large and liberal interpretation.
As was observnd by the ,Judicial Committee
of tho Privy Council in British Coal Corporation v.
'l'lte King('):-
"Indeed, in interpreting a constituent or organic
statute such as the Act, that construction most i.,.,neficial to the widest possible amplitude of its powers
must be adopted."
The :Federal Court also in the United Provinces v.
Atiqa Begum (2) pointed out that none of the items in
the Lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense
and that each general word should be held to extend
to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly
and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. This
Court in N avincltandra M afatlal v. 'l'he Commissioner
of Income-tax, Bombay City (') also expressed the same
opinion and stated :-
" The cardinal rule of interpretation, however, is
that words should be read in their ordinary, natural
and grammatical meaning subject to this rider, that in
construing words in a constitutional enactment conferring legislative power the most liberal construction
should be put .upon words so that the same may have
effect in their widest amplitude." (See also 'l'hakur
A mar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (') ).
Having regard to the princip_le of construction
enunciated above it is clear that the impugned Act is
covered by Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and is a legislation with reference to "land" and this plea of legislative incompetence of the State Legislature to enact the impugned ·
Act therefore fails.
If, then, the State Legislature was competent to
cm;tct the impugned Act, is the Act ultra vires the
Constitution as infringing any of the fundamental
(1) [1935] A.C. 500, _518.
(2) [1940] F.C.R. IIO, 134.
· (3) [1955] I S.C.R. 829. 836, 837.
(4) [1955] 2 S.C.R 303, 329.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
497
rights conferred upon the petitioners ? In the course
of the arguments before us learned counse.l for the
petitioners confined their attack only to the constitutionality of ss. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17A, 31A to 31D and 32
to 32R of the impugned Act as violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(l)(g) of the
Constitution. The first question to consider in this
context however is whether the impugned Act is protected by Art. 31-A of the Constitution because if it is
so protected, no challenge on the score of the provisions thereof violating Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution would be available to the petitioners.
The relevant portions of Art. 31-A which fall to be
considered here read as follows :-
" (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
Art. 13, no law providing for:-
(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate
or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or
modification of any such rights .................. shall be
deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or a.bridges any of the rights
conferred by article 14, article 19 or article 31.
Provided that where such law is a law made by the
Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article
shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been
reserved for the consideration of the President, has
received his assent .............. .
(2) In this article,-
(a) the expression "estate" shall, in relation to
any-local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law
relating to land tenures in force in that area, and,shall
also include any jagir, inam, or mua.fi or other similar
grant and in the States of Madras and Trava.ncoreCochin any janmam rights. ·
(b) the expression "rights" in relation to an
estate, shall include any rights vesting in a. proprietor,
sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat,
63
Sri Ram Ram
Narain ·Medhi
v.
The Stat• of
Bombay
B11agwati ].
Sri Ram Ram
Narain M edhi
v.
Tla6 State of
Bombay
BAagwati j.
498
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or
privileges in respect of land revenue." ·
The question which we have to address ourselves
initially is whether the lands held by the petitioners,
who are admittedly landholders within the definition
of the term contained in s. 2(9) of the 1948 Act, are
"estates" within the meaning of Art. 31-A of the
Constitution.
Before we launch upon that enquiry it would perhaps be of help to note how the various land tenures
originated. Baden-Powell in his Land-SyRtems of
British India (1892 Ed.), Vol. 1, dealing with the general view of land tenures traced the origin and growth
of different tenures in the manner following at pp. 9799 (Chapter IV):-
" 4. Effects of Land-Revenue Admini&tration and
Revenue-farming.
Then again, the greater Oriental
governments which preceded ours, have always, in one
form or another, derived the bulk of their State-revenues and Royal property from the land. In one
system known to us, " Royal lands " were allotted in
the principal villages, and this fact may have suggested to the Mughals their plan of allotting special farms
and villages to furnish the privy purse, and has had
other survivals. But, speaking generally, the universal plan of taking revenue was by taking a share of
the actual grain heap on the threshing-floor from each
holding. Afterwards this was commuted for a money
payment levied on each estate or each field as the
case might be ............... To collect this revenue, the
ruler appointed or recognized not only a headman and
accountant in ea.ch village, but also a hierarchy of
graded officials in districts and minor divisions of
territory formed for administrative purposes. These
officers were often remunerated by holdings of land,
and a class of land-tenures will be found in some parts
of India owning its origin to these hereditary official
holdings. Not only so, but during the decline which
Oriental governments have usually undergone, the
Revenue officials have been commonly found to merge
in, or be superseded, by revenue-farmers-persons who
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
499
contracted for a certain sum ofrevenue to be pa.id into
the Treasury from a given area., as representing the
State dues exigihle from the land-holdings within that
area. Such revenue-farmers, or officials, whatever
their origin, have always tended to absorb the interests
of the land-holders and to become in time the virtual
Ja.ndlords over them.
Nor is it only that landlord tenures a.rise in this
way.
No sooner docs the superior right take shape
than we find many curious new tenures created by the
landlord or arising out of his attempts to conciliate or
provide for certain eminent claims in the grade below
him.
S. 5. Effects of Assignment or Remission of LandRevenue.
Yet another class of tenures arises in connection
with the State Revenue-administration; and that is
when the ruler either excuses an existing land-holder
from paying his revenue, either wholly or in part; or
"alienates " or assigns the revenue of a. certain estate
or tract of country in favour of some chief, or other
person of importance, or to provide funds for some
special objects, or to serve as a recompense for services
to be rendered.
At first such grants are carefully regulated, are for
life only, and strictly kept to their purpose, and to the
amount fixed.
But as matters go on, and the ruler is
a had or unscrupulous one, his treasury is empty, and
he makes such grants to avoid the difficulty of finding
a cash salary.
The grants become permanent and
hereditary; they arc also issued by officials who have
no right to make them; and not only do they then
result in landlord tenures and other curious rights, but
are a burden to after times, and have furnished a
most troublesome legacy to our own Government
when it found the revenues eaten up by grantees
whose titles were invalid, and whose pretensions,
though grown old in times of disorder, were inadmissible.
Such grants may ha.ve begun with no title to the
land but only a right to the revenue, but want of
Sri Ram Ram
Narain Medhi
v.
The Slate of
Bombay
Bhagwati j.
Sri Ra,.,, Ratn
Narain ltf edhi
v.
The State of
Honibay
BhagwaJi j.
500
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp~
supervision and control has resulted in the grantee
seizing the landed right also. "
Here we find the distinction between the State owned lands which are unalienated where the tenures
arise out of the exigencies of revenue collection and
alienated lands the revenue whereof is remitted either
wholly or in part or in other words "alienated" or
assigned to grantees for various purposes.
Various land tenures thus developed and series of
proprietorships came into existence. The main teimres which the British found when they came into
power comprised: (I) the Khas or tenure by Government; (2) the Raiyatwari tenure; (3) the Zamindari
or landlord tenure and (4) the Taluqdari or <louble
tenure.
It is interesting to note in this connection that in
the table compiled by Baden-Powell in Vol. Ill of his
Book at p. 142 giving some idea of the distribution of
the different classes of landed estates in Madras the
different classes of landed estates described therein
included not only Zamindaris but also "estates " held
by Raiyats paying diverse sums as and by way of
land revenue.
So far as the area within the State of Bombay was
concerned the position is thus summed up in Dttndekar's Law of Land Tenures, Vol. l at p. 12 :-
Section III. Classification of land accordiny to the
interest of the holder:
" Land is either Government land or not Government land; that is, it is either unalicnated or alienated.
The expression for unalienated land is khalsa or
ryatawari in some parts as opposed to dumala or inam
lands, that is, alienated lands. In Gujrat Government
lands are called "sarkari" as opposed to "baharkhali " lands meaning alienated lands-lauds the
produce of which had not to be brought to the common threshing ground. In some parts of Gujrat there
are, "talpad" (Government) lands as opposed to
"iVanta " lands. In old Regulations two kinds of
land have been referred to, namely, malguzarry land
and lakhiraj land. Tho former meant land paying
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
501
assessment to Government, whereas the latter meant
land free from payment of assmismcnt.
Khalsa land
in the permanent occupation of holders was denominated, before the survey-settlements, in the different
parts of the Presidency by the expressions mirasi,
dhara, suti and muli. Government arable land not in
the permanent occupation of an occupant was and is
described by the name sheri. In alienated villages,
lands corresponding to Government " sheri " lands are
denominated by the expressions " sheri" " Khas
Karnath" and" Ghar Khedu ". Lands in leasehold or
farmed villages are called khoti lands. Lands which
are given under leases and the assessment of which is
regulated by the terms thereof are called kauli lands."
It will be observed that Mirasi, Dhara, Suti and
Muli were all tenures in regard to unalienated lands,
the tenure-holders being permanent holders of land
having hereditary interests in their holdings.
The
Khoti tenures in the Konkan and the Bhagdari and
Narvadari tenures in some parts of Gujrat were also
tenures in regard to unalienated lands, the revenue
being assessed on those lands on entire villages and
not on specific pieces of land either in lump or on the
basis of a fixed Bighoti assessment on each field and
the tenure-holders being responsible for the payment
of the sum in certain specified modes.
The general
prevailing tenure, however, was the Baiyatwari tenure
where the Raiyat or the tenant had the right of an
occupant in his holding. The right of an occupant
was a heritable right and on the death of a registered
occupant the name of his heir was entered in his place.
All these were land tenures in respect of unalienated
lands and the Bombay Survey and Settlement Act
(Born. 1 of 1865) passed in 1865 applied generally to
the same. There were of course certain Acts which
dealt with specific tenures mentioned above, e.g.,
Bhagdari and Narvadari Tenures Act (Born. V of
1862), and Khoti Settlement Act (Born. 1 of 1880); but
by and large they were tenures in regard to unalienated lands and were governed by the Bombay Survey
and Settlement Act, 1865. In 1879 the State Legislature
Sri Ram Ram
Narain M edhi
v.
The Stale of
Bombay
Bhagwati .f.
Sri Ram flam
Narain Medhi
v.
The Slate of
Bombay
Bhagwati ].
502
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
enacted the Bombay Land Hevcuun Code (Born.
V of 1879) with a view to consolidate and amend the
law relating to Revenue Officers, to the assessment
and recovery ofland revenue and to other matters con-
. nected with land revenue administration.
This Act
extended to the whole of theState of Bombay excluding
the City of Bombay and certain other areas therein mentioned.
\Ve shall have occasion to refer to
certain provisions of this Act hereafter.
Turning now to alienated lands in which category
were comprised lands not belonging to government
and lands not paying revenue to government which
were exceptions to the principles of State proprietorship and of liability of land-holders to pay land
revenue to government we find that the alienations
were classified as: (l) political tenures such as Jagirs
and Saranjams; (2) Service Inams ; (3) Personal Inams
and ( 4) Religious endowments. The principal alienations
were Inams, Jagirs or Saranjams and Watans.
Each
of them was considered as a tenure, had got its own
history, its own features and peculiarities.
Summary
settlements were effected by the government with
these tenure-holders and their rights as such recognized. There were Taluqdari tenures or estates in Gujrat
which also came under this category and it may be
noted that several pieces of legislation were passed by
the State Legislature in regard to those several tenures
of alienated lands, e. g., Titles to Rent-Free Estates
Act (Born. XI of 1852) ; Ahmedaba<l Taluqdar's Act
(Born. VI of 1862); Bombay Hereditary Offices Act
(Born. III of 1874); Broach and Kaira Encumbered
Estates Act (Born. XIV of 1877); Broach and Kaira
Encumbered Estates Act (Born. XXI of 1881); J\llatadars Act (Born. VI of 1887) and Gujrat Talnqdars Act
(Born. VI of 1888). Our attention was also drawn in
this connection to the various Acts passed by the State
Legislature (between 1949 and 1955) abolishing the
several land tenures in Bombay where the government
was not in direct contact with the tiller of the soil but
there was an interposition of intermediaries between
them, the intermediaries having leased out parts of
(I) S.C.R. 8UPRBD OOURT REPORTS
503
the lands to the tenants who actually cultivated the
soil and it was urged that the inrerests of these intermediaries were estates properly so called.
It is to be noticed, however, that the several land
tenures which were thus abolished we~e not only tenures in respect of alienated lands but also comprised
unalienated lands, e.g., the Bombay Bhagdari and
Narvadari Tenures Abolition Act, 1949 (Born. XXXII
of 1949); The Bombay Khoti Abolition Act, 1949
(Bom. VI of 1950) and the Bombay Merged Territories
(Janjira and Bhor) Khoti Tenure Abolition Act, 1953
(Born. LXXI of 1953). There was no distinction made
thus between land tenures in regard to alienated lands
and those in regard to unalienated lands. It may also
be noted that all these Acts followed a common
pattern, viz., the abolition of these land tenures, award
of compensation to the tenure holders whose tenures
were thus abolished and the establishment of direct
relations between the government on the one hand and
the tenure-holders cultivating the lands personally and
the tenants cultivating the soil on the other. All
these persons, thus cultivating the soil were given the
status of occupants and direct relationship was thus
established between the government and them. These
Acts so far as our present . purpose is concerned are
only mentioned to show the different types of land
tenures which existed in the State of Bombay prior to
their abolition as aforesaid.
These were the various land tenures known in the
State. of Bombay and we may at this stage appropriately refer to the statistics (1886-87) of these tenures
given by Ba.den-Powell in Vol. III of his said Book at
p. 251 :-
Sri Ram Ram
Narain M edhi
v.
The State of
Bombay
Bhagwati j.
"'
"l
<: "'
••
""
... . ..
~
~""
~-
::;;i
...
[ls.~~~~1~
....
~~
~~
Oa
'-....,
c
!t i:I
.
"'
;: .i
Tenure
Number ofNumber ofArea in
Remarks.
C;
-
0
estates or
villages
....
acres
holdings.
17.l
Village land1284,238
30,118!
28,475,016
I have added together. c1
"'='
holders:
(occupied
these paying ·at full rates
~
Raiyatwari
land only)
and the much smaller numtz:J
villages
her paying at privileged
=:::
tz:J
rates, the latter are 213,405,
a
and how far these repre0
Overlord
sent bhagda.r, etc., etc., I
Cl
tenures
530!
530!
1,419,397
have no means of telling.
~
~
Taluqdari
(gross area)
~
Mewasi
41
41
79334
tz:J
Udhad Jam123
123
194,830
~
ban di
Khot
1732'!;
1732!
2160,517
~
~
Isa fat
7
7
36Q8
17.l
Revenue-free
2165£
2165~
4483,343
These refer to whole vii-
.-.
i.e. inam &
lages or estates not to re-
....
'°
Jagir
venue privileges on indi-
°' '°
vidual fields, etc., which
.......
17.l
are
included in
village =
""
land-holdings.
~
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
505
It is to be noted that the holdings of the landholders in Hyatwari villages apart from others were
also sty led therein as estates or holdings.
It was vehemently urged before us by learned counsel for the petitioners that the expression " estate "
aptly applied only to lands held by the various tenure
holders of alienated lands above referred to, and that
it could not apply to the holdings of occupants who
had merely a right of occupancy in specific pieces of
unalienated lands. The word "estate" had been defined in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, in
s. 2(5) to mean : "any interest in lands and the aggregate of such interests vested in a person or aggregate
of persons capable of holding the same," and would
prima facie cover not only an interest in alienated
lands but also in unalienated lands. It was however
urged that the expression "estate " should be construed in a narrower sense having regard to the legislative
history and particularly to the fact that the lands held
by the tenure holders of alienated lands only had prior
to 1879 been recognized as estates and the holding of
an occupant was not treated as such. The distinction
thus sought to be made between holders. of unalienated
lands and holders of alienated lands is not of much
consequence because even in regard to unalienated
lands besides the occupants there were tenure holders
called Bhagdars and Narwadars and Khotes who had
interests in lands held by them under those several
tenures which lands were unalienated lands.
The
interests which theflP. tenure holders enjoyed in the
lands held by them were "estates " and it could not
therefore be predicated of the expression "estate" that
it could only be used in connection with alienated
lands. If this distinction was therefore of no avail,
we have only got to consider if there is·any reason
why a narrow interpretation should be put upon the
expression "estate" as suggested by the petitioners.
Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the
petitioners on a decision of this Court in Hariprasad
Skivshankar Shukla v. A. D. Divikar(1) where the word
"retrenchment" as defined in s. 2(oo) and the word
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 121, 132.
64
I958
Sri Ram Ram
Narain Medhi
v.
The State of
Bombay
Bhagwali ].
Sri Ra,n Rani
Narain Medhi
v.
Tho State of
Botnl)(iy
lJlkigwali j.
506
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
" retrenchment" in s. 25F of the Industrial DispntcR
Act, 194 7, as amended by Act XLIII of 1953 were hold
to have no wider meaning than the ordinary accept.cd
connotation of those words and were hold to mean tho
discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer
for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishments inflicted by way of disciplinary action, and did
not include termination of services of all workmen on
a bona fide closure of industry or on change of ownership or management thereof.
Even though the word
"retrenchment" was defined as meaning the termination of services by an employer of the workmen for
any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punish.
ment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, which
words were capable of includiug within their scope the
termination of services of all workmen on a bona fide
closure of industry or on change. of ownership or
management thereof, the word " retrenchment" Was
construed in a narrow sense because the word " retrenchment" connoted in its ordinary acceptance that
the bu8iness itself was being conducted and a portion
of the staff or labour force was discharged as surplusage. 'fhis Court obi!ervetl in the course of the
judgment at page 132 :-
" In the absence of any compelling words to
indicate that the intention was even to inoludu a. bona
fide closure of the whole business, it would, we think,
be divorcing the expression altogether from its coutext
to give it suoh a. wide meaning as is contended for by
learned counsel for the respondent. What is being
defined is retrenchment, and that is the context of the
definition. It is truo that an artificial definition may
include a meaning different from or in excess of the
ordinary aceeptatiou of the word which is the subject
of definition ; but there must then be compelling
words to show that such a meaning different from or
in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended. Where,
within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of
the word, every single requirement of the definition
clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word
defined."
(1) s.nR. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
Reliance was also placed on a. decision of the Court of
Appeal in England in Re The Vexatious Actions Act,
1896, In re Bernard Boaler (1) where the words "legal
proceedings " were held not to include criminal proceedings, in spite of the words being prima facie capable of including the same. Kennedy, C. J., expressed
his view at page 32 that it was impossible to say that
the meaning of the expression " legal proceedings "
was in itself and by itself clear and unambiguous and
followed the dictum of Lord Esher in Rex v. City of
London Court (2) :-
"If the words of an Act admit of two interpretations then they are not clear ; and if one interpretation leads to an absurdity and the other does not, the
Court will conclude that the Legislature did not intend
to lead to an absurdity, and will adopt the other interpretation. "
8crutton, J., also expressed the same opinion at
p. 41 :-
" I find general words used in the Act capable of
two meanings, a wider and a narrower one. On the
whole I think the language i1:1 more suited to tho
narrower than the wider meaning.
The narrower
meaning will affect the liberties of the subject to some
extent; the wider meaning will most seriously affoct
the liberties of the subject in a matter, his personal
liberty and safety, which I sec no reason in the Act, to
believe was in t.he contemplation of the Legislature.