# THAKUR SANJEEVAN RAO v. JAIDRATH AND ANR

- **Citation:** [1973] 2 S.C.R. 103
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1972-09-06
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1060 of 1967
- **Bench:** A. N. Ray, I. D. Dua, K. K. Mathew
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/thakur-sanjeevan-rao-v-jaidrath-and-anr-5757
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

The Hyderabad Tena11cy and Agrk~l:ural Lands Act (21 o! 1950),
rs. 28(2), 32(2) and 44 and the Hyderabad Abolition of fnams Act (8
of 1955). s. 3(1)-Scope of.
The respondents were tenants under the
appellant
who
was
the
inarndar.
On the allegations that the)'. were in arrears of rent for three
consecutive years 1957 to 1960, the appellant terminated their tenancy
by giving them not.Ce on June 18, 1960 and on August 4, 1960, filed
an app ication under ss. 28(2) and 32(2) o'f the Hyderabad Tenancy
and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950.. The application was allowed and the
possession
of
the
lands
was
directed
to
be
restored
to
the appellant under s. 32(2).
The order was confirmed
in
appeal.
On revision, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribun&l held :-(i) that the
.tenants were in arrears of rent, (ii) that all rights and interests with
respect to the inarn lands had vested absolutely in lhe State with effect
from July 20, 1955, (iii) under s. 3(1) of tile Hyderabad Abolition
of :;.1ams Act, 1955, that the landlord was therefore
dis-entitled
to
possession of the inam lands uPder s .. 32(2) of the Tena"CY Act, a"d
(iv) that occupancy rights had been conferred on the respondents under
the Abolition Act. The H gh Court on being approached under Art. 227
of the Constitution, confirmed the order of the Tribunal on different
grounds relying upon the dec'sion of the Bombay High Court in Dattatraya Sadashiv v. Ganavati Raghu, (67 Born L.R. 521). These ~rounds
were, that where. the inam was abolished with effect from
July
20,
1955 under the Abolition Act, the relationship of landlord and tenant
__ continued to subsist till July I, 1960; but since the appellant in this
case only g«ve a notiee to the tenants to quit and had not apolied for
pcissession under s. 32 of the Tenancy Act before that date, the an.,ellantlandlord was not entitled to claim ]l06session pursuant to that notice.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD :
( 1) The dec'sion in Datraraya Sadashiv's case is not a
bind~ng precedent for the decision of the present c'ase.
That case is
a. direct authority only for a situa:tion where an application is made
by a
landlord under s .. 44 of th~ Tenancy Act.
Reference to ss. 19
and 25 was made in that case by the High Court only for the purpose
of fortifying its view of s. 44 bv contrasting the kinds of cases dealt
with by the Tenancy Act.
section 44 deals with a landlord's right to
t.orminate protected tenancy where he requfres the land for cultivating
it personally.
(109F-H]
·
(2) In tho State of Maharashtra v. Laxn1tUi Ambaji, (Al.'R. 1971
S.C. 1859) this Court, while considering certain provisions of the Tenancy
Act observed, that the relationshio of landlord and tenant under the
Abolition Act ceased on July I, 1960, that if a tenant prior to that date.
•urrendered possession and the inamdar had accepted such surrender and
remained in possession, he would be entitled to the grant of occupancy
'
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 2 s.c.R.
rights but that i[ the tenant claimed to be in possession on that da.te the
Gove;nment \Vould have to ascertain who was in· lawful possession on
July !, J 960 for the purprn;e of grant of occupancy rights. But these decisions do not deal with the effect of the absolute vesting m the State under
s. 3 of the Abolition Act of a,'l rights and interests with respect to inam
land with effect from July 20, !955, and the question whether the vesting
could be sa.id to have become ineffectual by reason of the mere continuation of the relationship of landlord and tenant up to July I, 1960.
Therefore the order of the High Court should be set aside and th<
case remiited to it for re-decision after considering the distinction pointed
out in Dattaraya Sadashiv's case and in the light of .the decision o'f thi'i
Court in Laxman Ambali's case. [109H; !IOA-D; 113B]
(3) The finding of the Tribunal that occupancy rights
had
been
conferred under the Abolition Act on the respondents has also io be
considered by the High Court. [112E-F]

## Text

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103
THAKUR SANJEEVAN RAO
v.
JAIDRATH AND ANR.
September 6, 1972
[A. N. RAY, I. D. DUA AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ. J
The Hyderabad Tena11cy and Agrk~l:ural Lands Act (21 o! 1950),
rs. 28(2), 32(2) and 44 and the Hyderabad Abolition of fnams Act (8
of 1955). s. 3(1)-Scope of.
The respondents were tenants under the
appellant
who
was
the
inarndar.
On the allegations that the)'. were in arrears of rent for three
consecutive years 1957 to 1960, the appellant terminated their tenancy
by giving them not.Ce on June 18, 1960 and on August 4, 1960, filed
an app ication under ss. 28(2) and 32(2) o'f the Hyderabad Tenancy
and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950.. The application was allowed and the
possession
of
the
lands
was
directed
to
be
restored
to
the appellant under s. 32(2).
The order was confirmed
in
appeal.
On revision, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribun&l held :-(i) that the
.tenants were in arrears of rent, (ii) that all rights and interests with
respect to the inarn lands had vested absolutely in lhe State with effect
from July 20, 1955, (iii) under s. 3(1) of tile Hyderabad Abolition
of :;.1ams Act, 1955, that the landlord was therefore
dis-entitled
to
possession of the inam lands uPder s .. 32(2) of the Tena"CY Act, a"d
(iv) that occupancy rights had been conferred on the respondents under
the Abolition Act. The H gh Court on being approached under Art. 227
of the Constitution, confirmed the order of the Tribunal on different
grounds relying upon the dec'sion of the Bombay High Court in Dattatraya Sadashiv v. Ganavati Raghu, (67 Born L.R. 521). These ~rounds
were, that where. the inam was abolished with effect from
July
20,
1955 under the Abolition Act, the relationship of landlord and tenant
__ continued to subsist till July I, 1960; but since the appellant in this
case only g«ve a notiee to the tenants to quit and had not apolied for
pcissession under s. 32 of the Tenancy Act before that date, the an.,ellantlandlord was not entitled to claim ]l06session pursuant to that notice.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD :
( 1) The dec'sion in Datraraya Sadashiv's case is not a
bind~ng precedent for the decision of the present c'ase.
That case is
a. direct authority only for a situa:tion where an application is made
by a
landlord under s .. 44 of th~ Tenancy Act.
Reference to ss. 19
and 25 was made in that case by the High Court only for the purpose
of fortifying its view of s. 44 bv contrasting the kinds of cases dealt
with by the Tenancy Act.
section 44 deals with a landlord's right to
t.orminate protected tenancy where he requfres the land for cultivating
it personally.
(109F-H]
·
(2) In tho State of Maharashtra v. Laxn1tUi Ambaji, (Al.'R. 1971
S.C. 1859) this Court, while considering certain provisions of the Tenancy
Act observed, that the relationshio of landlord and tenant under the
Abolition Act ceased on July I, 1960, that if a tenant prior to that date.
•urrendered possession and the inamdar had accepted such surrender and
remained in possession, he would be entitled to the grant of occupancy
'
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 2 s.c.R.
rights but that i[ the tenant claimed to be in possession on that da.te the
Gove;nment \Vould have to ascertain who was in· lawful possession on
July !, J 960 for the purprn;e of grant of occupancy rights. But these decisions do not deal with the effect of the absolute vesting m the State under
s. 3 of the Abolition Act of a,'l rights and interests with respect to inam
land with effect from July 20, !955, and the question whether the vesting
could be sa.id to have become ineffectual by reason of the mere continuation of the relationship of landlord and tenant up to July I, 1960.
Therefore the order of the High Court should be set aside and th<
case remiited to it for re-decision after considering the distinction pointed
out in Dattaraya Sadashiv's case and in the light of .the decision o'f thi'i
Court in Laxman Ambali's case. [109H; !IOA-D; 113B]
(3) The finding of the Tribunal that occupancy rights
had
been
conferred under the Abolition Act on the respondents has also io be
considered by the High Court. [112E-F]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1060 of
1967.
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Appeal by special leave from the judglllent and order dated
September l 4. 1966 of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 926
of 1965.
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W. S. //ar/ingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant.
Respondent did not appear.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DuA, J. This is a landlord's appeal by special
le<>:ve . ·and is
directed against the judglllent of a learned single Judge of the
Bombay High Court, disallowing the appellant's application under
Art. 227 of the Constitution challenging the order ot the Miih.a~
rashtra Revenue Tribunal dated March 26, 1965 partly allowing
the revision of Jaidrath and VittaJ, tenants (respondents in this
Court) presented in the Tribunal under ss, 28(2) and 32(2) of
the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands' Act, 21 of 1950
(hereinafter called the Act).
Jaidrath and Vittal were tenants under the appellant
(who
was inamdar) and according to the appellant's allegations the
tenants were in arrears of rent for three consecutive years, 195758, 1958-59 and 1959-60. On June 18, 1960 the appellant terminated the respondent's tenancy by giving the necessary statutory
notice.
On August 4, 1960 an application was presented by the
appellant to the Tehsiidar, Nillam, under ss. 28(2) and 32f2) of
the Act praying for arrears of rent amounting 1o Rs. 1,200 and
for possession of the la.nd on the ground that their tenancy had
~!1 lawfully terminated. lhis application was heard by the
Naib Tahsildar who allowed it and ordered the tenants to pay the
rent amounting to Rs. 925.77 np to the landlord (Inamdar) and
also held that the tenancy had been terminated.
As a result of
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T. s. RAO v. JAIDRATH (Dua, J.)
105
this conclusion the possession of the land was directed to be restored to the landlord under s. 32(2). This order was made on
November 28, 1963. An appeal preferred to the Deputy Collector
by Jaidrath and Vittal was dismissed on August 31, 1964. A revision under s. 91 of the Act was taken by the tenants 10 the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Aurangabad which was allowed in part.
The Tribunal affim1ed the concurrent findings of the Naib Tehsildar and Deputy Collector that the tenants were in arrears of rent.
In regard to the claim for possession ·the Tribunal held that under
s. 3 (1) of the Hyderabad Abolition of Jnams AC't, VlU of 1955
(hereinafter called the. Abolition Act), all rights and interests
with respect to the inam lands vesting in the lnamdar had ceased.
and had vested absolutely in the State with effect
from
July
20, 1955. On this reasoning the landlord was held disentitled to
claim possession of the inam land under s, 32(2) of the Act. The
Tribunal further held on the evidence led by the tenants that ilie
occupancy rights had been conferred on and given to the tenant
under the provisions of the Abolition Act. The Tribbnal, referring to 1he facts of the case observed in its order :
" .... on 7-10-1961 the tenant Jaidrath submitted
an application before the Tehsildar in which he alleged
that the lands in dispute were Inam lands and thus Inarn
lands vested in the State from the date of enforcement of
the Hyderabad Abolition of Inams and Cash Grants Act,
1954 and the petitioner was declared as the occupant of
the said lands from 27th July, J 955.
In view of this
fact the said tenant pleaded that tht: landholder was not
entitled to recover possession of the said lands from the
tenants. In support of his allegation he filed a notice
he received from the Tehsil Office for
depositing 1he
price of occupancy rights. In response to the notice it
seems that he deposited Rs. 75/- in Treasury Office on
30-6-1961. The original chaJlan has also been filed by
Jaidrath .... "
Dealing with this part of the case, the Tribunal added a little
lower down :-
"As regards the second relief sought by the landholder I wish to point out tha\ both the lower courts
failed to give correct decision. The tenant in •the lower
court submitted the notice received from
the
Teh~il
office and the challan b~ which the price of occupancy
rights was deposited by the tenant in the Government
Treasury under the provisions of the Hyderabad Abolition of Inams and Cash Grants Act. The revision netitioners had raised the plea before the trial court that the
106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 2 s.c.x.
suit lands were inani lands the occupancy rights of which
were given 10 the tenants and hence the landholder was
n01. entitled to recover possession of the said lands.
There was great force in this plea. The dpcwnents filed
by the tenants in the lower court clearly show that S. No.
273 and 260 situated at Massa are inam lands. Jaidrath was given the price of occupancy rights by the
notice issued on 3-9-61. Thus we find the lands in dispute
were inam lands.
Under section 3 sut•section 1 of
the Hyderabad Abolition of Jnams Act all rights and interests vesting in the Inamdar in respect to the. Jnam
lands ceased and vested absolutely in the State. The
date of vesting is 20th July, 1955, hence the landholder
has lost his right to recover possession of the lands from
the date of the enforcement of the Hyderabad Abolition
of' Inam Act. It is not correct to say that the landholder
cannot be deprived of the rights accrued to him prior to
the enforcement of the said Act. Both the lower courts
have wrongly held that the subsequent change in the law
will not deprive person of the rights which accrued to
him before the new law was enforced. So far as the
claim ot' rent is concerned I 1hink that the Inamdar was
entitled to recover the amount of rent. But he cannot
be given possession of the lands under section 32(2) of
the Hyderabad Tenancy Act when it is found t!:at all
rjgh1s pertaining to inam vested in the Government from
20th July, 1955. Moreover the occupancy rights have
also been conferred and given to the tenant under the
provisions of 1he Hyderabd Abolition. of lnams Act.
In view of these facts the respondent was not entitled to
recover possession of the inam lands."
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The order of 1he Deputy Collector confirming that of the F
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Naib Tehsildar directin~ possession to be given to the landlord
\
was accordingly set aside.
The High Court on being approached under Art. 227 of the
Constitution confirmed the final order of the Tribunal but on
different grounds. According 'lo the High Court where the inam
was abolished with effect from July 20, 1955 under the Abolition
Act the relationship of landlord and tenant continued to subsist
till July I, I 96Q, and the provisions of the Act, therefore, conti-
. nued to apply to the land. But as in this case the landlord had
on.June 18, 1960 given to the tenants only to a notice to-quit and
pad not apnlied for possession under s. 32 of the Act the relationship of landlord and tenant continued to sub<:ist un to July 1. 1960
when this relationship came to an end.
Thereafter the landlord
was not entitled to claim possession pursuant to 1he notice to quit.
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T. s. RAO v. JAIDRATH (Dua, !.)
107
The learned single Judge took Ibis view following the Full Bench
decision of the Bombay High Court in Dattatrava Sadashiv v.
Ganapati Raglzu ( 1). This view of the High Court is challenged
in the present appeal by Dr. Bar!ingay, who11ppeared in this Court
in support of the appeal.
Unfortunately there is no appearance
on behalf of the respondents with the result that we did not have
the benefit of the arguments in support of the opposite point of
view.
Before us Dr. Barlingay contended that the High Court was in
error in following the Full Bench decision in the case of Dattatrava
Sadashiv (supra) because that case was concerned with the landlord's claim for possession under s. 44(2) of the Act, which is not
the case before us.
Section 44(2) of the Act, according to Dr.
Barlingay's submission,. deals with a different situation and that
section is inapplicable to the case in hand.
The pn:sent case,
according to the iearned advocate, has to be decided in the light of
ss. 19, 28 and 32 and not s. 44(2) of the Act.
According to
s. 19(2) the landholder is entitled to terminate a tenancy on the
ground inter alia tha1 the tenant had failed to pay in any year rent
for that year, within fitteen days from the day fixed under the ·
l;and Revenue Act for the payment of the last instalment of land
revenue due for the land concerned in that year.
Section 28
which provides for relief against termination of tenancy for nonpayment of rent lays down that where a tenancy of any land held
QY a tenant is terminated for non-payment of rent and the landholder files any proceeding to eject the tepant, the Tehsi'dar shall
call upon the tenant to 1ender to the landholder the rent in arrears
together with the cost of proceeding within ninety days from the
date of the Qider and if the tenant complies with such order, pass
an order directing that the tenancy has not been terminated, and
thereupon the tenant shall hold the land as if the tenancy had
not been tel'lninated. According to the proviso to sub-s. ( 1), however, this relief against termination is not admissible to a tenant
whos.e. tenancy has been terminated for non-payment ot rent if he
has t.a1led for any three years to pay rent within the period specified m .s. 19(2) (~). Section 32 which prescribes the procedure
for taking possess10n lays down that no landholder shall obtain
P?ssession ~f any land ~tc., held by a tenant excep1 under an order
0r the Tahstldar for which he shall apply in the prescribed form.
pr. Barlingay pointed. out by referring us to the Full Bench
dec1s.1on of the Bombay High Court in Dattatraya Sadasliiv (supra
that m that case the landlord's claim again~t the tenant was g"verned bys .. 44(2) of the Act. Section 44 deals with a landlord's right
to tem1111ate protected tenancy where he requires if for cultivating
II) 67 Bom L.R. 521.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 2 S.C.R.
it personally. In such a case, according, to the submission,
othe
tenancy is tenninated only by virtue of an order of the revenue
authorities. Our attention was invited to the following observation
of the Bombay High Court in Dattatraya Sadashiv (supra) :-
In regard to the second question, sub-s. (1) of 44
of the Tenancy Act provides that a landholder may
after giving notice to the tenant and making an application for possession as provided in sub-s. (2) terminate
the tenancy of any land, if the landholder boira fide
requires the land for cultivating it personaliy.
Subsection ( 2) states that the notice required to be given
unde~ sub-s. ( 1 ) shall be _in writing and shall state t<1e
purpose for which •the landholder requires the land and
that an application for possession under s. 32 shall be
made to the Tehsildar.
Two things are,
therefore,
necessary for terminating a tenancy under sub-s. ( 1 ) :
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( 1) a notice must be given to the tenant stating that
the landholder requires the land for cultivating
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it personally, and
(2) the landholder must make an application for pJssession to the Tehsildar under s. 32 of the Act.
If these requirements are complied with, the tenancy
stands tenninated.
Sub-section ( 2) of section 3 2 provides that no landholder shall obtain possession of any
land or dwelling house held by a tenant except under
an order of the Tehsildar, for which he shall apply in
the prescribed form. A tenant is, therefore, enti!tled to
continue in possession of the land until the Tehsildar
has made an order for possession being restored to the
landholder. It has, therefore, been urged that he continues to be a tenant until the Tehsildar bas made his
order. The manner in which a •tenancy is to be terminated is, however laid-down in s. 44. Under this section
the tenancy terminates when after giving the requisite
notice the landholder makes an application for possession 10 the Tehsildar. Thereafter the tenants's possession
is not unlawful, but it is not held by him as a tenant. He
has an eatste in possession, which he will lose if the
Tehsildar makes an order in favour of the landholder.
If, however, the Tehsildar rejects the application of the
landholder the termination of tenancy by the landholder
will becom'e ineffective. The tenancy will revive and the
tenant will continue in possession as if his tenancy had
.not been terminated."
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T. s. RAO v. JA!DRATH (Dua, J.)
After so observing the High Court compared the case of termination of tenancy under s. 44 of the Act with the case governed
by ss. 19 and 28. In its view, according to s. 19 which provide'
for termination of a tenancy inter alia on the ground of failure to
pay rent within the prescribed time, the tenancy shall not be ter-·
minated unless the landholder gives silt months' notice in writing
intimating his intention to terminate the tenancy and also the
ground of such termination.
The High Court then referred to
s. 28(1) and observed :
"The opening words of this sub-sec1ion make it clear
that a proceeding to eject a tenant can ~ instituted
after the tenancy has been terminated, that is to say, an
applica·tion for possession can be made to the Tehsildar
under s. 32 only after the tenancy has been terminated.
A tenancy is, therefore, 1erminated by the notice given
under sub-s. (2) of s. 19 and an order of the Tehsildar
is not required for this purpose. In fact until the tenancy
is terminated, the landholder does not get a right to possession of the land. The words 'as it' the tenancy had
not been terminated' at the end of the sub-section also
imply that the tenancy had previously been terminated.
Section 28, therefore, also shows that a tenancy is terminated by giving a notice to the tenant and that it does
not continue until the Tehsildar has made an order for
possession of the land."
Relying on these observations Ur. Barlingay submitt(~d that the·
decision in Dattatraya Sadashiv (supra) has been wrongly considered as an authority for the case in hand.
prima facie Dr. Barlingay's submission seems to possess merit
and ~he High ·Court appears to us to be not quite right in relying
on Dattatraya SadaShiv (supra) as a binding precedent for the
present case.
Unfortunately, as already observed, we did not
have the benefit of the opposite view, or of the arguments sup-·
porting the view taken by the Tribunal or supporting the conclusion of the 'High Court on grounds other than those staed by it
in the impugned judgment, because the respondents were unrepresented in this Court and this appeal was heard ex parte.
Dattatraya Sadashiv (supra) no doubt is a direct authority only
for a case where an application is made by a landlord under s. 44·
of the Act and the reference to ss. 19 and 28 was made apparenty for the purpose of fortifying its view of s. 44 by contrasting the two kinds of cases dealt with by the Act.
lncidentlly we may point out that in the State of Maharashtra
v. Laxman Ambajl(1) this Court, while considering certain pro-·
(l) A.l.R.1971S.C.1859.
110
SUPREME COURT REPORl'S
[1973] 2 S.C.R.
visions of the Act, observed that the relationship of landlord and
,tenant under the Abolition Act ceased on July 1, 1960 and if a
~
enalit had prior to that date surrendered possession and the
namdar had accepted such surrender and hac remained in pos-
.session on July 1, 1960, he would be entitled •to the grant of occupancy rights. If, however, the tenant claimed to be in possession
on that date the Government will have to ascertain as to who was
in lawful possession on July 1, 1960 for the purpose of grant of
occupancy rights.
In the course of the judgmell't ~eference was
made to the Full Bench decision in Dattatraya Sadashiv (supra)
and that decision was approved on the point that the relationship
of landlord and tenant continued up to July 1, 1960. These
decisions do not deal with the effect of the absolute vesting in
the State of all rights and interests with respect to the inam lands
with effect from July 20, 1955. Again, can it be said that this
vesting became ineffectual by reason of mere continuation
Of
the relationship of landlord and tenant
up to July 1, 1960 ?
Uncier s. 1 (3} of the Abolition Act which had been published
in th" Hyderabad Gazette Extraordinary on July
20,
1955
inter,alia, s. 3, except els. (d), (g), (h) and (i) of sub-s. (2)
of s. ~ came into force on
July 20,
1955.
Section 3 provides :-
"3. Abolition and vestjng of inams and the consequences thereof :-
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrnry con-
. tained in any
usage,
settlement,
contract,
grant,
sanad, order or other instrument,
Act,
regulation,
rules or order having the force . of law and
notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of a Civil,
Revenue or Atiyat Court, and with effect from the date
of vesting, all inams to which this Act is made applicable under sub-secti<,n (2) of section 1 of this Act
shall be deemed to have been abolished and shall rest
ill. the State.
(2) Save as expressly provided by or under the
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provisions of this Act and with effect from the date
G
of vesting, the following consequences shall ensue,
namely
(a) the provisions of the Land Revenue Act, 131 7
Fasli r~lating to inams, and the
provisions of the
Hyderabad Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952 and other enactments, rules, regulations and circulars in force in
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respect of Atiyat grants shall. to the extent, they are
repugnant, to the provisions of this Act, not apply and
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T. s. RAO i'. JAIDRATH (Dua, J.)
l 11
the provisions of the Land Revenue Act. 1317 Fasli
relating to unalienated' lands for purposes of land revenue, shall apply to the said inams;
( b) all rights, title and
interest vesting in the
inamdar, kabiz-e-kadim, permanent tenant, protected
tenant and non-protected tenant in respect of the inam
land, other than the interests· expressly saved by or
under provisions of this Act and including those in all
communal lands. cultivated and
uncultivated lands
(whether assess~d or not), waste lands, pasture lands,
forests, mines
and
minerals,
quarries,
rivers and
streams, tanks and irrigation works, fisheries and ferries,
shall cease and be vested absolutely in the State free
from all encumberances;
( c) all suc.h inam lands shall be liable to payment
of land revenue;
Id) all rents and land revenue inculding cesse:s and
royalties, accruing in respect of such inam lands, on or
after the date of vesting, shall be payable to the State
and not to the inamdar, and any payment made in contravention of this clause shall not be valid;
(e) all arrears of revenue, whether as judi, quitrent or other cess, remaining lawfully due on the date
of vesting in respect of any such inam shall, after such
date, continue to be recoverable from the inamdar by
whom they were payable and may, without prejudice
thereof from the compensation amount payable to him
to any other mode of recovery be realised by deduction
under this Act;
( f) no such inam shall be liable to. attachment or
sale in execution of any decree or other· process of any
Court and any attachment existing on the date of
vei;ting or any order for attachment passed before such
date' in respect of such inam, shall, subject to the provisions of section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act,
I 882, cease to be in force;
( g) the inamdar and any other person whose lights
have vested in the State under clause (b) shall be
en-titled only to compensation from the Government as
provided for in this Act;
112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 2 S.C.R.
(h) the relationship with regard to inam land as
between the inamdar and kabiz-e-kadim, pe1manent
tenant, protected tenant or non-protected tenant shall
be extinguished;
(i) the inamdar, kabiz-e-kadim, permanent tenant,
protcted tenant, and a non-protected tenant of inam
lands, and any person holding under them and a holder
of an inam, shall as against the Government, be entitled
only to such rights and privileges and be subject io
such conditions as are provided for under this Act aitd
any other rights and privileges which may have accrued
to any of them in the inam before the date of vesting
again'! the inamdar shall cease and shall not be enforc~able against the Government or the inamdar.
( 3) Nothing contained in sub-sections
( 1)
and
( 2) shall operate as bar to the recovery by the inamdar
of any sum which becomes due to him before the date
of vesting by virtue of his rights as inamdar and any
such sum shall be recoverable by him by any process of
law. which, but for this Act, would be available to
him."
B
c
IJ
We have reproduced this section for showing that the effect E
of these provisions on the facts of the present case would have to
be. considered before grantin,g the appellant's prayer for possession. The other question which also requires consideration is the
respondent's contention upheld by the Tribunal that the occupancy
rights under the Aboliiion Act had already been conferred on fhe•
tenants.
The entire record not being before us and the tenants
1,
not being represented in this Court we are unable to deal with
this important point.
After considering all the implications of the appellant's arguments as suggested by Dr. Barlingay we consider it proper to set
aside the order of the High Court and send the case back to it for
G
a re-decision after considering the distinction pointed out by the
Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Dattatray(l Sadashiv
(Supra) and in the light of this Court's decision
in
Laxman
Ambaji (supra).
As just pointed out, we did not have the advantage even of going through the relevant record of the case as
it was not got printed by the appellant.
Jn the circumstances,
this j~d¥'11en~ should not be const;ued to contain any expression
H
Qf optmon either way on the ments of the controversy exhaustively discussed by the Tribunal in its order dated March 26, 1965.
A
B
T. s. RAO V. JAIDRATH (Dua, J.)
113
Our decision is limited only to the point that Dattatraya Sadashiv
(supra) is not a binding precedent for the decision of the case in
h~nd.
The order of the High Court is accordingly quashed and the
case remitted back to the High Court for a fresh decision of the
application under Art. 227 of the Constitution in accordance with
law and in the light of the observations made above.
As there
was no representation on behalf of the respondents there will be
no order as to costs.
V.P.S.
9-L348 Sup. Cl/73