# THAROO MAL v. PURAN CHAND PANDEY & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1978] 2 S.C.R. 254
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977-11-29
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1201 of 1977
- **Bench:** M. H. Beg, P. N. Bhagwati
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/tharoo-mal-v-puran-chand-pandey-others-7373
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, s. 132(1) vis-a-vis LiJnitation Act, s. 28;_
Section 132(4), whether confined to objections considered by Municipal BoGrd
-Section 135(3), scope.
The Municipal Board of Pilibhit passed a resolution under the Municipalities
Act, imposing a theatre tax of Rs. 25/- per show. The resolution was duly
published on 16-5-1972 and objections were invited, but
s_ip.ce
Ilo objections
were received within the time prescribed u/s. 132(1) of the Act,
prelun.inary
proposals were framed and submitted to the prescribed authority, the commissioner of Rohilkhand Division. The proposals were returned to tfie Board tor
reconsideration on the ground that the proposed rate of the theatre tax a•ppearea
to be too high, and on 28-8-1972 the Board reduced the rate to Rs. 15/- per
show, though the publication of the resolution reducing the rates was dispensed
with under the proviso to s. 132(2).
On
16-9-1972, the petitioner and some
other owners of cinema houses, sent their objections to the initial resolution, but
as these objections had not been presented for consideration when
the two
resolutions were passed, the Board refrained from
submitting them
with the
modified proposals to the prescribed authority u/s. 132(4) of the Act.
The
mcx:lified proposals were sanctioned on 31-10-1972 and were duly converted into
rules, published in the Gazette dated 14-4-1973. The appellant moved the High
Court; but failed.
Dismissing the appeal the Court,
HELD : (i) There is a distinction between the period given for tiling objections u/s. 132(1) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, and the pericxl of limitation
prescribed for proceedings before a court or a quasi-judicial authority, \vh.ich
on the expiry of the period, confers some rights upon parties not proceeded
against, so that the expiry of the prescribed time bars claims against them. · l "he
procedure under s. 132(1) is legislative and not quasi-judicial and if the objector does not file his objections within a fortnight, he may lose his nght to
object, but his objections will not be invalidated.
It is
not Jike s. 28 of the
Limitation Act operating to extinguish any legal right. [256E, G, H, 257A]
Niranjan Lal Bhargava v. State of U.P. 1969 A.L.J. 295, referred to.
(2) Section 132(4) covers any objections whatsoever, \Vhether made within
a fortnight or beyond a fortnight, provided they are sent in before the matter
is submitted to the prescribed authority.
In fact,
there is no statutory bar
against the 'Prescribed authority itself considering the objections which inay be
filed before it if the interests of justice so require. [259B-C]
(3) The effect of the proviso to s. 132(2) added in 1964, is that, by cl1sp.:nsing with even the publication of the mcxlified proposals, no such right ot the
appellant is violated as could be considered a condition precedent to the val1d1ty
of the proceedings. Nevertheless, if patent injustice has resulted fro1n
an
irregularity, in the imposition of a tax, s. 135(3) may not cure the irregularity.
f259G-H, 260AJ
Buland Sugar v. Municipal Board [1965] 1 SCR 970, distinguished.

## Text

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254
THAROO MAL
v.
PURAN CHAND PANDEY & OTHERS
November 29, 1977
[M. H. BEG, c. J. and P. N. BHAGWATI, J.]
U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, s. 132(1) vis-a-vis LiJnitation Act, s. 28;_
Section 132(4), whether confined to objections considered by Municipal BoGrd
-Section 135(3), scope.
The Municipal Board of Pilibhit passed a resolution under the Municipalities
Act, imposing a theatre tax of Rs. 25/- per show. The resolution was duly
published on 16-5-1972 and objections were invited, but
s_ip.ce
Ilo objections
were received within the time prescribed u/s. 132(1) of the Act,
prelun.inary
proposals were framed and submitted to the prescribed authority, the commissioner of Rohilkhand Division. The proposals were returned to tfie Board tor
reconsideration on the ground that the proposed rate of the theatre tax a•ppearea
to be too high, and on 28-8-1972 the Board reduced the rate to Rs. 15/- per
show, though the publication of the resolution reducing the rates was dispensed
with under the proviso to s. 132(2).
On
16-9-1972, the petitioner and some
other owners of cinema houses, sent their objections to the initial resolution, but
as these objections had not been presented for consideration when
the two
resolutions were passed, the Board refrained from
submitting them
with the
modified proposals to the prescribed authority u/s. 132(4) of the Act.
The
mcx:lified proposals were sanctioned on 31-10-1972 and were duly converted into
rules, published in the Gazette dated 14-4-1973. The appellant moved the High
Court; but failed.
Dismissing the appeal the Court,
HELD : (i) There is a distinction between the period given for tiling objections u/s. 132(1) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, and the pericxl of limitation
prescribed for proceedings before a court or a quasi-judicial authority, \vh.ich
on the expiry of the period, confers some rights upon parties not proceeded
against, so that the expiry of the prescribed time bars claims against them. · l "he
procedure under s. 132(1) is legislative and not quasi-judicial and if the objector does not file his objections within a fortnight, he may lose his nght to
object, but his objections will not be invalidated.
It is
not Jike s. 28 of the
Limitation Act operating to extinguish any legal right. [256E, G, H, 257A]
Niranjan Lal Bhargava v. State of U.P. 1969 A.L.J. 295, referred to.
(2) Section 132(4) covers any objections whatsoever, \Vhether made within
a fortnight or beyond a fortnight, provided they are sent in before the matter
is submitted to the prescribed authority.
In fact,
there is no statutory bar
against the 'Prescribed authority itself considering the objections which inay be
filed before it if the interests of justice so require. [259B-C]
(3) The effect of the proviso to s. 132(2) added in 1964, is that, by cl1sp.:nsing with even the publication of the mcxlified proposals, no such right ot the
appellant is violated as could be considered a condition precedent to the val1d1ty
of the proceedings. Nevertheless, if patent injustice has resulted fro1n
an
irregularity, in the imposition of a tax, s. 135(3) may not cure the irregularity.
f259G-H, 260AJ
Buland Sugar v. Municipal Board [1965] 1 SCR 970, distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil
Appeal
No.
1201 of
1977.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated
1-12-76 of the High Court of Allahabad at Allahabad in Civil Misc.
Writ No. 3090/93.
_,,.
I
THAROO MAL v. PUUN CHAND (Beg, C.J.)
255
Y. S. Chitale and K. J. John for the Appellant.
Yogeshwar Prasad, Rani Arora and Meera Bali for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the court was delivered by :
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BEG, C. J.-The appellaint before us by grant of special leave
under Article 13 6 of the Constitution is a partner in a firm carrying on
B
the business of running a cinema house called "Jai Talkies" in the
town of Pilibhit iu · Uttar Pradesh.
The municipal Board of Pilibhit
passed a resolution on 11th of April, 1971, imposing a theatre tax
,,
of Rs. 25/- per show under section 128(1) (iii-a) read with sections
296 and 299 of the Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the
Act). The resolution wa·s duly published in a Hindi newspaper on
16 May, 1972, as required by section 94(3) read with section c
131(1) (a) of the Act.
The preliminary proposals for imposition of
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a tax were framed under section 131 of the Act which reads as
follows :
"131. Framing of preliminary proposals :-
(1) Where a board desires to impose a tax, it &hall, by
special resolution, frame proposals specifying :-
(a) the tax, being one of the taxes described in sub-section (1) of section 128, which it desires to impose;
(b) the persons or class of persons to be made liable,
and the description of property or other taxable
thing or circumstances in respect of which they are
to be made liable, except where and in &o far as any
such class or description
is
already
snfficiently
defined nnder cfanse (a) or by this Act;
( c) the amount or rate !eviable from each such person
or class of persons;
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(d) any other matter referred to in section 153, which
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the State Government requires by rule to be specified.
· ( 2) The board shall also prepare a draft of the rules
which it desires the State Government to make in respect of
the matters, referred to in section 15 3.
(3) The board shall, thereupon publish in the manner
prescribed in section 94 the proposals framed under subsection ( 1) and the draft rules framed under sub:section
(2) along with a notice in the form set forth in Schedule
III."
Section 132 of the Act then lays down :
"132. Procedure subsequent to framing proposals :-
( 1) Any inhabitant of the municipality may, within a
fortnight from the publication of the said notice, submit to
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256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
the bo'ard an objection in writing to all or any of the proposals framed under the preceding section, and the board
shall take any objection so submitted into consideration and
pass orders thereon by special resolution.
(2) If the board decides to modify its proposals or any
of them, it shall publish modified proposals and (if necessary) revised draft rules 'along with a notice indicating that
the proposals and rules (if any) are in modification of proposals and rules previously published for objection :
Provided that no snch publication shall be necessary
where the modification is confined to reduction in the
amount or rate of the tax originally proposed.
(3) Any objections which may be received to the modified propo~als shall be dealt with in the manner prescribed
in sub-section (1).
( 4) When the board has finally settled its proposals, it
shall submit them along with the objection (if any) made
in connection therewith to the prescribed authority."
It is evident from section 132 ( 1) of the Act that the time given
to the residents within the municipal limits to tile their objections is
a fortnight from the publication of the resolution, as required by section 94(1) of the Act.
Apparently, a fortnight
is
considered
a
reasonable time so that objections may be submitted for consideration
to the Municipal Board.
As was pointed out by one of us (Beg,
C.J.) in Niranjan Lal Bhargava v. State of U.P.,(') with regard to
almost identically framed provisions of sections 199 to 203 of the U .P.
Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, the procednre for the imposition
of the tax is legislative and not quasi-judicial.
Hence, there seems
to ns nothing to prevent the Municipal Board from considering any
objections which may have been filed even after a fortnight, a period
which may, at the most, be construed as a reasonable limit fmm the
publication of the notification after which the persons deemed to be
notified could not reasonably complain of want of
opportunity to
object.
The right to object, however, seems to be given at the stage
of proposals of the tax only as a concession to requirements of fairness even though the procedure is legislative and not quasi-judicial.
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There seems to us to be a distinction between the period given for
filing objections of the kind with which we are concerned here and the
period of limitation prescribed for proceedings before a Court or
a
quasi-judicial authority, which, on the expiry of the period, confers
some rights upon parties not proceeded against so that the expiry
of
the prescribed time bars claims against them.
The procedure being
legislative here, the obiector could not complain that he did not have
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an opportunity to object if he did not file his obiections within a fortfl
night.
This i~ all that sections 131 and 132 seem to do so far
as
(I) 1969 A.L.J. 295.
THAROO MAL v. PURAN CHAND (Beg, C.J.)
257
the rights of the objectors are concerned.
They do not seem to us to
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invalidate his objections although he may lose his right to object. There
is nothing here like section 28 of the Limitation Act operating to e:xtinguish any legal rights.
In the case before us, the appe1lant did not put forward any objections to the proposals.
.The proposals were submitted to the Prescrib1 -
. ed Authority, the Conunissiouer of Rohilkhand Division, under section
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132( 4) of the Act. It appears that the Commissioner of Rohilkhand
Division returned the proposals for reconsideration on the ground that
the proposed rate of the theatre tax appeared to be too high.
On
the 28th of August, 1972, the Municipal Board reduced the rate to
Rs. 15/- per show but did not publish its resolution reducing
the
rate.
The reduced rate of theatre tax was not published as the proviso
to section 132(2), added by the U.P. Act No. 27 of 1964, dispenses
with the need to publish the reduced rate of tax.
Nevertheless,
it
still gives persons who object, if any do so at all, the right to have the
objections dealt with in the manner prescribed in section 132(1). The
only manner in which they can be "dealt with" under section 132 ( 1)
is. that these objections have to be considered by the Board
before
passing its resolution.
If, however, the objections are received when
the Board has, after waiting for a fortnight, duly passed a final special
rei;olution, these objections can certainly not be considered by
the
Board as they were not before it to be considered at all when
it
passed its resolution.
If the proposals, as initially framed, had been
accepted by the Prescribed Authority no further opportunity for objecting before the resolution imposing the tax could have arisen.
The petitioner and some other owners of cinema houses woke up
rather late.
On 16 September, 1972, they sent in their objections to
the imposition of such tax.
By that time, the Board had
also
reconsidered its initial resolution, as a result of such advice as
was
given by the Prescribed Authority to the Board, and reduced the
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theatre tax to Rs. 15/- per show.
Again, the objections could not
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have been considered even if they were to be deemed to be objections to
the reduced rate of Rs. 15 /- per show because they were not
there
at all for consideration before the Board when it passed its special resolution reducing the rate on 28 August, 1972.
No doubt, its modified proposal of Rs. 151- per show was not published.
But, this was
not done because the Board, quite rightly, considered itself protested
by the clear provisions of the proviso to section 132 (2) of the Act.
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On 18 September, 1972, although the revised proposal to tax cinema
shows at the rate of Rs. 15/- per show was sent by the
Municipal
Board to the Prescribed Authority. yet, it did not forward the obiections
of the petitioner to the Prescribed Authority.
Perhaps it did
not
forward these obiections because they could not be taken into account
by the Board itself either before or at the time of framing the modified
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pronosal of Rs. 15 /- per show as they were not there at alL
The Prescribed Authority sanctioned the modified proposal on 31
October,
1972, without taking into account the objections of the appellant
as
258
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 s.c.R.
A
they were not before it.
But, the draft ml.es were published
on
H\ November, 1972, and objections invited to them within 30 days.
Objections to the draft rules were filed on 15 December, 1972, and
the rules were sanctioned under section 134 of the Act after considering these objections.
The tax was imposed with effect from
16
April, 1973, after a gaz~te notification on 14 April, 1973.
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It is difficult to understand why, when the appellant applied
for
copies of the Municipal Board resolution, the copies were refused. A
delegation of the cinema owners went to the Commissioner on
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May, ·1973, and was told that the Commissioner had not received any
of the objections from the Municipal Board before sanctioning
the
modified tax.
Apparently, the Municipal Board took the view that
they were irrelevant when it did not consider them.
It, however,
seems to have overlooked the fact that the Prescribed Authorily may
have taken a different view.
On the facts stated above, Mr. Y. S. Chitale, appearing for
the
appellant, has advanced two ingenious arguments : firstly, he contends
that the objections,. being there before the revised proposal was
sent
to the Prescribed Authority on 18 September, 1972, ought to
have
been forwarded to the Prescribed Authority for consideration because
they had to be "dealt with" in the manner prescribed in section 132 ( 1) ;
and secondly, that, in any case, when the proposal was sent,
the
Board was bound to forward to the Prescribed Authority any
objections it had in its possession and could not withhold them.
It was
urged that this part of the duty was certainly not carried out by
the
Board.
As regards the first contention, ·we find it difficult to permit
the
appellant to advance it here for the first time.
It is not found
in
his writ petition.
It was not advanced in that form before the High
Court.
It is not even found in the special leave petition in this particular form.
However, even if we were to allow this question to be
argued, we find that the objections filed by the petitioner on 16 September, 1972, were really objections to the original proposal and l).Ot to
the modified proposal at all.
Section 132(3) gives a right only
to
actual objectors to the modified proposals to have their objections dealt
with under section 132(1) of the Act.
This necessarily means that
the objections should be at least before the Bo~rd when it passes the
resolution on modified proposals.
After all, all that section 132 ( l)
indicates about the manner in which the objections are be dealt with
is that they •hould be considered before the passing of the special resolution.
Now, if the objections are not there at all when the initial
special resolution is passed or even when the modified proposals were
passed, it is impossible for the Board to deal with them in the manner
prescribed by section 132 (I) of the Act. Since the duty to send objections could arise only subsequent to the procedure prescribed
by
section J 32 (I) of the Act the contention that the objections shOuld
have been sent to the Prescribed Authority to be considered because
of any mandatory duty resulting from the provisions of section 132(1)
and ( 3) of the Act must fail. It may be mentioned that we are not f
TIIAROO MAL V. PURAN CHAND (Beg, C.J.)
259
-concerned here with the validity of any of the provisions on the ground
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-0f their reasonableuess or otherwise. No such question has been
argued before us.
We have, therefore, to proceed on the assumption
1hat the provisions of the Act are valid.
So far as section 132(4) is concerned, it may be possible to so interpret the provisions as to confine objections to be sent to the Prescribed Authority to only those which the Board took into consideraB
tion.
Nevertheless, when we examine the wide language in
which
section 132(4) is couched conferring a right to object, without
any
restriction, we find it difficult to exclude the right of the petitioner to
have his objections sent to the Prescribed Authority.
Apparently, ·
section 132 ( 4) covers any objections whatsoever, whether made within a fortnight or beyond a fortnight, provided they are sent in before
the matter is submitted to the Prescribed Authority.
Indeed,
we
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find no statutory bar against the Prescribed Authority itself c.-.nsidering the objections which may be filed before it if the interests of justice
so require.
But, the question which arises before us is whether the
non-observance by the Board of a duty to send the. appellant's objections to the Prescribed Authority, assuming it is there, would invalidate
the imposition of the modified tax.
This, we think, would
depend
upon whether we interpret provisions of section 132 ( 4) as mandatory
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or as directory so far as submission of objections, not submitted within
sufficient time so as to be considered by the Board, are concerned.
As we have already observed, no provision of the Act bas
been
-challenged.
Section 135(3) of the Act reads as follows:
"135. Imposition of tax.-( I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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(2) ..................................... .
(3) A notification of the imposition of a tax under subsection (2) shall be conclusive proof that the tax has
been
imposed in accordance. with the provisions of this Act.''
It is true that, if there is such a gross breach of the rules that the
1Jroposal sanctioned could not be deemed to be ''imposition of a tav"
at all, section 135(3) may not bar the cons;deration of such basic
infirmity in the proceedings which make them no proceedings at all
in the eyes of the law.
This is the most that can be said
on
the
strength of Buland Sugar v.
Municipal Board,(') which is strongly
relied upon by Mr. Chi tale.
Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad, appearing on behalf of the
Municipal
Board, however, pointed out that the Buland Sugar case was decided before the proviso to section 132 (2) was added in 1964.
It
does appear to us that the effect of the proviso is that, by dispensing
with even the publication of the modified proposals, no such right of
the appelfant is violated as could be considered a condition preceden~
to the validity of the proceedings.
Nevertheless, if the
petitioner
-could have made out a case of such injustice due to some irregularity
(!\ (IO~<]!!lS.C.R.970.
4- I 114SCI/77
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978] 2 S.C.Jll.
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tha: we should deem the imposition of the tax to be vitiated by
the.
non-consideration of a vital matter, we could have taken the view that
section 135(3) will not bar consideration of a vital infirmity, in
as
much patent injustice has resulted from it, in the imposition of a tax.
If it could be argued that there is no imposition of the tax at all
as
contemplated by Iaw, section 135(3) may not have cured the irregularity.
But, no such infirmity has been pointed out to us.
The result
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is that, whatever irregularity there may be in not forwarding
the
objections of the appellant to the Prescribed Authority, as the Board
should have done under section 132(4) of the Act, the irregularity
seems to be cured by an application of the provisions of section 135(3)
of the Act as the Government had notified the imposition of the lax.
It may perhaps also be pointed out that, if the incidence of a tax
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is unfair, a representation can be made to the Government under section 137 of the Act even after the imposition.
Therefore, if there is
any gross injustice, which the petitioner has not been able to make out
before us he can still approach the Government for relief in case he
can make out a case for relief under section 13 7 of the Act.
For the reasons given above, we uphold the judgment of the AllahaD
bad High Court and dismiss the appeal.
However, in the circnmstan-·
ces of the case, the parties w111 bear their own costs.
M. R.
Appeal dismissed.
,