# The Aidomobile l'roducts of - India Ltd v. Rukmaji B:?la and ot:iers

- **Citation:** [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1241
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1954-11-18
- **Bench:** S. R. DAs, BnAGWATI, SYED JAFER I~tAM
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-aidomobile-l-roducts-of-india-ltd-v-rukmaji-b-la-and-ot-iers-329
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) ti.ct, 1950 (XLVJII
of 1950), s. 22-Whether Labour Appellate Tribunal has iurisdic·
tion to impose conditions when granting pe1·mission-Industrial Di~
putes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), s. 83 and lndustrial Disputes (Ap·
pellate Tribunal) Act, 19.50-S. 23-Jurisdiction of authority not
only to decide whether there has been failure to· obtain permission but
also to give decision on the merits of an industrial dispute-Indus-
·trial Disputes Act, 1947 (as amended), s. 88 and s. 88·A-Ind1istrial
Disputes ·(Appellate Tribunal) Act--Ss. 22 and 28-Meaning and
scope of.
Held, (i) that the ordinary and primary jurisdiction of the .
Labour Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes ·
(Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 is appellate; (ii) that s. 22 of the Act
confers on the appellate tribunal a special jurisdiction which is in the
nature of original jurisdiction; (iii) that s. 23 also vests in the
tribunal an additional jurisdiction to decide the complaint as if it
were an appeal pending before it; and (iv) that s. 23 confers on the
'.
' ··-
1955
February 3
1935
The Aidomobile
l'roducts of
- India Ltd.
v.
Rukmaji B:?la
and ot:iers
1242
SUPREJ\IE COURT REPORTS
(1955]
workmen an additional remedy wliich ·they did not have under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7. ·
The t~o new ss. 33 and 33-A inserted in the Industrial Disputes Act 194 7 (XIV of 194 7) by Act XLVIII of 1950 confer dis·
-~ tinct benefits on the workmen and give some additional jurisdiction
and power to the authorities mentioned therein.
Section 33-A en·
joins the Tribunal b
decide the complaint "aSif it were a dispute
referred to or pending before it" and to submit· its award to the ap-.
propriate Government and provides that the provisions of the Act
shall apply to the awaaj. · The provisions of these two new ss. 33
and 33· A 'of the 194 7 Act correspond to and are in pari materia
with the provisions of ss. 22 and 23 of the 1950 Act and are more
Or less in similar terms.
·
A ban has been put by s. 22 of 1950 Act and. s. 33 of the 194 7 ·
Act upon the ordinary right, which the employer has under the
ordinary law governing a contract of employment with a view to
protect the workmen against victimisation by the employer and tO
ensure the termination of the proceedings in connection with indus"'
trial disputes in a peaceful atmosphere and the only thing that the
authority is called upon to do is to grant or withhold the permission
i.e. to lift or maintain the ban. These sections do not confer any
power on the authorities to adjudicate upon any other dispute.
Under s: 22 olthelndustrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act,
1950 (XLVIII of 1950) the Labour Appellate Tribunal has no juris·
diction to impose conditions as a pre-requisite for granting permission to the employer to retre_nch its workmen.
Under s. 33·A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 ands. 23 of
the 1950 Act the jurisdiction of the authority is not only to decide
whether there has been a failure on the part of the employer to
obtain the permission of the authority before taking action but also
to give a decision on the merits of an industrial dispute and grant
appropriate relief which when published by the appropriate Govern·
ment will become enforceable uncler the respective Acts.
Serampore Belting Mazdoor Union v. Serampo1'e Belting Co.,
Ltd. ([1951] 1 Lab. L.J. 341), · Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat BorO'U!Jh
Municipality ([1952] 54 Bom. L.R. 922), Raj Narain v. Employers'
Association of Northern India ([1952] 1 Lab. L.J. 381), The Queen v.
County Council of West Riding of Yorkshire ([1896] 1 Q.B. 386), ·
Carlsbad Mineral Works Co., Ltd. v. Their Workmen ([1953] 1 Lab.
L.J. 85), Atherton West cf Co., Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union
([1953] S.C.R. 780) and Bhattacharji v. Parry cf Co., Ltd., Calcutta -
([1954] 2 Lab. L.J. 635), referred to.
CIVIL· APPELLATE
Ju~ISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 2 and 4 of 1955.
.
·
Appeal by Special Leave from the· Order. dated
the 18th day o

## Text

_Characters 0–39,675 of 40,616. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39675 for what follows._

S.C.R.
SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS
1241
I think it right to add that the question as to the
1955
existence or admissibility of the concept of regional
D. P.Joshi ·
domicile as distinguished from Indian domicile and as
v.
to the bearing of this on the meaning of the concerned
The state of
rule \vere not canvassed or suggested at the hearing
~Iadhya Bharat
before us and that the Court has not had the benefit
and another
of arguments on these and the connected matters. If, J "
-;;;; a J
therefore, I have ventured to differ, notwithstanding a.anna a as •
my respect for the views of the majority and potwithstanding the absence of assistance from the Bar, it is
out of the conviction that the recognition, express or
implied, of regional domicile by a decision ()f this
Court would be contrary to the intendment of the·
Constitution.
BY CoURT.::.:..In accordance with the opinion of the
majority, the Petition is dismissed without costs.
Petition dismissed.
THE AUTO~IOBILE PRODUCTS OF INDIA LTD.
v . .
RUKl\IAJI BALA AND OTHERS
(And connected Appeal)
[S. R. DAs, BnAGWATI and SYED JAFER I~tAM JJ.]
Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) ti.ct, 1950 (XLVJII
of 1950), s. 22-Whether Labour Appellate Tribunal has iurisdic·
tion to impose conditions when granting pe1·mission-Industrial Di~
putes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), s. 83 and lndustrial Disputes (Ap·
pellate Tribunal) Act, 19.50-S. 23-Jurisdiction of authority not
only to decide whether there has been failure to· obtain permission but
also to give decision on the merits of an industrial dispute-Indus-
·trial Disputes Act, 1947 (as amended), s. 88 and s. 88·A-Ind1istrial
Disputes ·(Appellate Tribunal) Act--Ss. 22 and 28-Meaning and
scope of.
Held, (i) that the ordinary and primary jurisdiction of the .
Labour Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes ·
(Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 is appellate; (ii) that s. 22 of the Act
confers on the appellate tribunal a special jurisdiction which is in the
nature of original jurisdiction; (iii) that s. 23 also vests in the
tribunal an additional jurisdiction to decide the complaint as if it
were an appeal pending before it; and (iv) that s. 23 confers on the
'.
' ··-
1955
February 3
1935
The Aidomobile
l'roducts of
- India Ltd.
v.
Rukmaji B:?la
and ot:iers
1242
SUPREJ\IE COURT REPORTS
(1955]
workmen an additional remedy wliich ·they did not have under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7. ·
The t~o new ss. 33 and 33-A inserted in the Industrial Disputes Act 194 7 (XIV of 194 7) by Act XLVIII of 1950 confer dis·
-~ tinct benefits on the workmen and give some additional jurisdiction
and power to the authorities mentioned therein.
Section 33-A en·
joins the Tribunal b
decide the complaint "aSif it were a dispute
referred to or pending before it" and to submit· its award to the ap-.
propriate Government and provides that the provisions of the Act
shall apply to the awaaj. · The provisions of these two new ss. 33
and 33· A 'of the 194 7 Act correspond to and are in pari materia
with the provisions of ss. 22 and 23 of the 1950 Act and are more
Or less in similar terms.
·
A ban has been put by s. 22 of 1950 Act and. s. 33 of the 194 7 ·
Act upon the ordinary right, which the employer has under the
ordinary law governing a contract of employment with a view to
protect the workmen against victimisation by the employer and tO
ensure the termination of the proceedings in connection with indus"'
trial disputes in a peaceful atmosphere and the only thing that the
authority is called upon to do is to grant or withhold the permission
i.e. to lift or maintain the ban. These sections do not confer any
power on the authorities to adjudicate upon any other dispute.
Under s: 22 olthelndustrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act,
1950 (XLVIII of 1950) the Labour Appellate Tribunal has no juris·
diction to impose conditions as a pre-requisite for granting permission to the employer to retre_nch its workmen.
Under s. 33·A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 ands. 23 of
the 1950 Act the jurisdiction of the authority is not only to decide
whether there has been a failure on the part of the employer to
obtain the permission of the authority before taking action but also
to give a decision on the merits of an industrial dispute and grant
appropriate relief which when published by the appropriate Govern·
ment will become enforceable uncler the respective Acts.
Serampore Belting Mazdoor Union v. Serampo1'e Belting Co.,
Ltd. ([1951] 1 Lab. L.J. 341), · Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat BorO'U!Jh
Municipality ([1952] 54 Bom. L.R. 922), Raj Narain v. Employers'
Association of Northern India ([1952] 1 Lab. L.J. 381), The Queen v.
County Council of West Riding of Yorkshire ([1896] 1 Q.B. 386), ·
Carlsbad Mineral Works Co., Ltd. v. Their Workmen ([1953] 1 Lab.
L.J. 85), Atherton West cf Co., Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union
([1953] S.C.R. 780) and Bhattacharji v. Parry cf Co., Ltd., Calcutta -
([1954] 2 Lab. L.J. 635), referred to.
CIVIL· APPELLATE
Ju~ISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 2 and 4 of 1955.
.
·
Appeal by Special Leave from the· Order. dated
the 18th day of November 1954 of the ·Labour Appel-
i
'
..
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1243
late Tribunal of India, Bombay in Application (Misc.)
Bombay No. 773 of 1954.
II. M.
Seervai, /. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder
Narain, for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2 of
1955 and respondent in Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1955.
D. H. Buch and /. N. Shroff, for the respondents
· ,.
in Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1955 and appellants in Civil
tAppeal No. 4 of 1955.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.
Joshi and- P. G. Gokhale with him), for the Intervener
(Union of India) .
~
1955. February 3. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
DAs J.-This is an appeal by special leave from
the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Bombay
Bench, dated the 18th November 1954 which was
made on an application made by the appellant company on the 6th September 1954 under section 22 of
the Industrial
Disputes
(Appellate
Tribunal)
Act,
1950 (Act XLVIII of 1950) which is hereinafter referred to as the 1950 Act.
The appellant company carries on business as assemblers of motor vehicles from "completely knocked
tlown" assemblies imported
into India.
There was
some appeal
pending before the Labour Appellate
Tribunal arising out of disputes between the appellant
company and its workmen.
It is alleged that the
name of the appellant company had been removed by
the Government of India from the list of approved
manufacturers maintained by them and that, in the
result, it had been unable to secure further import
licenses for the import of completely knocked down
assemblies of motor vehicles and that consequently
on and from the 1st November 1953 the company had
to lay off a number of its workmen, for it had to operate the various departments of its factory at greatly
reduced strength. As the appellant company saw no
prospect of · any increase in the scope of its present
operation which would provide employment for the
workmen who had been laid off, it had become necesJ955
The Automobile .
Products oj
India Ltd.
v.
Rukmqji Bala
and others
1955
The Automobile ·
Pr0ducts ·of
India Ltd.
v.
Rukmaji Bala
and others
Das).
1244
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
,[1955]
sary to retrench the wrokmen named in Annexure
A to the application. As those workmen were concerned with the appeal pending before the Labour
Appellate Tribunal the company applied to the Appellate Tribunal under section 22 of the 1950' Act for permission to retrench them.
The respondents through their Union, the Auto.:
mobile
Manufacturers'
Empfoyees' Association, Bombay, filed a written statement on the 1st November
1954 making diverse allegations against the company
and contending that the company had itself to blame
for having brought about the lay off. It was con:
tended that there was no immediate cause for making
the application, that the company was motivated by
ulterior motives to deprive the workmen of their dues
which even according to the company would become
due and payable to the workmen on the expiry of the
one year of the said lay off period. It was further
alleged that in or about April 1954 the company recalled some of the workmen out of those who had
been laid off since November 1953 · violating all princic
pies on which a recall should have been made ·and
that by such arbitrary and unscientific recall the company had imposed disproportionate work loads on the
recalled
workmen, thereby altering their conditions
of service to their prejudice. The resp0ndents maintained that the application was not maintainable in
law, was mala fide and should be dismissed. In the
penultimate paragraph of
the
written statement it
was submitted that in the event of the Labour Appellate Tribunal granting the permission in. whole or in
part such permission should be granted subject to the
following conditions :-
( 1) Payment of full wages with dearness allowance for the entire period of lay off;
(2) Payment of one month's notice pay and retrenchment compensation at the rate of one month's
wages including dearness allowance for every completed year of service and part thereof in addition to
the gratuity as per the scheme in force in the company;
(3) Alternatively to (2) above and in case the
Labour Appellate Tribunal took
the view that the
' .
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I
•· ..
t
-
-
\
S.C.R ..
SUPRf.ME COURT REPORTS
1245
lay. off was governed by section 25-C of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, payment of
compens~tion at 50
per cent. of their wages plus dearness allowance for
the entire period of lay off to the date of discharge
in addition to the notice pay and gratuity as claimed
in (2) above; and
( 4) Payment of leave wages as per existing rules,
· taking the entire period of lay off· as sei:vice.
A number of documents were filed in support of the
respective contentions.
The Labour Appellate Tribunal at the very outset
of its judgment under appeal states its finding . on the
merits of the action proposed to be taken by the come
pany as follows:-
"There can be little doubt that the retrenchment
has been occasioned by the failure of the concern to
secure sufficient work owing to absence of licenses
from Government and, therefore, retrenchment must
be regarded as inevitable and the application before
us bona fide. Permission to retrench cannot be refused
but for the reasons that we shall state hereafter we
make that permission conditional upon the fulfilment
of certain terms by the concern".
The company contended before the Labour Appellate
Tribunal that its function, while dealing wit}l an application under section 22 of the 1950 Act, was only
to give or withhold permission.
This contention was
rejected by the Appellate Tribunal with the following
observation:-
"That view is quite
untenable
as
has
be~n repeatedly held by this Tribunal.· We are the authority tO whom an application has· to be made for permission to retrench, and when such an application is
made we must of necessity exercise our ju<;lgment and
discretion and satisfy ourselves that
when
the
company retrenches it does justice by its. employees".
The Labour Appellate Tribunal was clearly influenced
by the consideration which, stated in its own words
was as follows:-
·
-
"'
.
"We do not think that we will-~~ advaμclng -th~
mterest of the employees or of the concern by refusing
5-90 S.C. India/59
1955
The Automobile
Products of
India Ltd.
Y.¥'
Rukmaji Bala
-and others
Das J.
. ;1955
The Automobile~
Products of
India Ltd.
v.
Rukmaji Bala
and others
1246
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
retrenchment because . the case for retrenchment has
been
established,
and the
sooner the
workmen are
allowed to leave and find for themselves ·other em·
ployment
the better for
them.
But in order
to
assure ourselves that on
retrenchment the . employees
receive what in justice they
should
have,
we
have
decided to give permission to retrench subject to certain conditions which m our view are inherent under
the Act, and which apart from the Act we consider
to be just and
equitable
m the
particular
c!fcumstances of this case".
In this view of
the
matter
the
Labour · Appellate
Tribunal definitely declined "to leave over the question of compensation for lay
off as a legacy
of
the
present troubles; the employees to be retrenched have
enough to worry them without having to make claims
and have them decided after contest before a Tribunal".
In the
result, the Labour
Appellat~ Tribunal
gave the appellant company
perm1ss1on
to
retrench
"subject to the terms and conditions of Act XLIII of
1953, provided that each workman is paid at the rate
of half basic wages
and dearness
allowance
for the
whole period from the date of lay off up to thf date
of retrenchmen~ (less sums already received as lay off
compensation)".
Liberty
was given to the company
to set off the lay off
compensation pro tanto against
the retrenchment relief given by the Act.
Aggrieved by this decision the appellant · companv
applied for and obtained from this Court special leave
to appeal
against this order.
The
respondents
subsequently filed an application for special leave to appeal against this
decision . in so far
·as the
Labour
Appellate Tribunal had not allowed their full claim as
summarised above and m so far as the ·names of l 7
persons had. been struck off on the allegation of the
company . that
they were not workmen.
This application of the respondents was also acceded to and the
two appeals have been heard together.
The Union of
India asked for leave to intervene as important questions of construction of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred· to as the
l947 Act) ·and the
1950 Act
were
involved.
Such
. ..-
..
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1247
leave was granted and we have heard learned counsel
for the Union of India along with learned counsel for
the parties.
·
The question as to the. propriety of permitting the
names of 17 workmen to be struck off from the application has not been seriously pressed before us.· Only
two questions
have been canvassed at some length
before us, namely:-
•
·
(1) Whether under section 22 of the 1950 Act the
Tribunal has jurisdiction to impose conditions when
granting the permission asked for; and
(2) Whether the conditions imposed in this case
are in conformity with law.
It is plain, however, that in case the ·first question is
answered in the negative,. the second question will
not call for any decision on the present occasion.
In order to correctly answer the questions it will be
necessary to bear in mind the general scheme of the
two · Acts. · The purpose of the 1947 Act is, inter alia,
to make provision for
the
investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. In order to achieve this
avowed
object different authorities have been constituted under this Act. Thus section 3 provides for the
constitution of Works Committee whose dutv is
to
promote measures for securing and preserving amity
and good relations between the employers and workmen.
The appropriate Government
is authorised by
section 4 to appoint conciliation officers charged with
the duty . of mediating irt and promoting . the settlement of industrial disputes and by section 5 to constitute a Board of Conciliation for promoting the · settlement • of industrial
disputes.
Section 6 · empowers
the appropriate Government to · constitute a Court of
Inquiry for enquiring into any matter appearing to
be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute.
Finally, section 7 provides
for
the
constitution
of
fndustrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial
disputes in
accordance with the provisions of the
Act. Section · 10 of this Act provides for reference of
disputes to a Board, Court or Tribunal. It will be
·noticed that under this section it is the
appropriate
T ht Automobile
Products of
ltidia Lid.
v.
Rukmqji Bala
and ofhers
DasJ
1955
Th"e Automobile
Products, of
India Ltd ..
y;
Rukmaji Bala
·and others
Das•]f •
1248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Government which alone can make the reference and
set the authority in motion. The procedure, powers
and duties of conciliation officers, Boards, Courts and
Tribunals are elaborately prescribed and
defined in
sections 11 to 15. It is to be noted that the conciliation· officer, Board, and Court are required to make a
report to the appropriate Government while the Tribunal is
enjoined to • submit its award to the appropriate Government.
The report · of a Board or
Court and the award of a Tribunal .are under section 17
to be published by the . appropriate .Government within a month from the date of their receipt. Section
17-A provides that the . award of a Tribunal shall become enforceable on the expiry of 30 . days from the
date of its publication and, subject to the provisions
of sub-section (1) shall come into operation from such
date as may be specified therein and if no date is so
specified from the date when the award becomes enforceable as aforesaid. Section 19 prescribes the period
of operation of settlements· and awards.
Chapter V
deals with strikes · and lock-outs. Sections 26 · to 31
which are grouped together under the· heading "Penalties"
prescribe
punishments.
Section 31(1) provides
that any employer who contravenes the provisions of
section 33 shall be punishable with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to 6 .months ·or with fine
which may extend to Rs. 1,000 or with both. Section
33, a contravention of which is made· punishable by
section 31, as it stood before 1950, · forbade an employer, during the pendency of any conciliation proceedirigs or proceedings before a Tribunal,. to alter, ·to the
prejudice of the workmen concerned . in tl1e dispute,
the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before such· proceedings, nor, save with the express ·permission: of the conciliation officer, ·Board or
Tribunal, as the· case may be, to. discharge, dismiss or
otherwise punish duririg the pendency of the proceedings any workman, except for ·misconduct not connected with the dispute; It may be noted that ·under
this section the .ban on the alteration · of the· conditions of service was absolute and that permission was
necessary only iri case of discharge or dismissal or
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. ,..
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·s.c:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1249
· punishment · and · even in · such case no permission was
necessary when the
workman· was guilty ·of misconduct not concerned with. the· pending dispute.
The
only deterrent against a contravention by an emplo-
· yer of the provisions ·of section 33 · was the prosecution
of . the employer under section 31. This was hardly
any consolation for the workmen, for if ·an employer
took the risk of a prosecution and acted in contravention of section 33 the workmen could only raise an
industrial dispute and ask the appropriate Government
to refer· the same to a Tribunal but if the Government declined to accede to. their prayer the· workmen
were
without · any
remedy. This . was · the position
under the 1947 Act before it 'was amended in 1950.
The 19;50 "_Act was enacted for establishing an Appellate • Tribunal . in relation. to
industrial . disputes.
Chapter II of the Act deals
with the constitution,
composition. and functions of the ·appellate tribunal.
Section 7 .formulates the jutisdictiori · of the , appellai:e
tribunal. Section 9 confers
on
the
appeljate
tribunal all. the powers which are vested . in a Civil Court
when hearing_ an appeal under the Code· of Civii Procedure,
1908. . Section 10 prescribes
the
.period
of
limitation within which appeals are. to ·be
brought
before the appellate
tribunal.·
Under · section 15 ·the
decision of. the appellate. tribunal becomes enforceable
on. t}ie . expiry of 30 days from the date of its pronouncement,.
provided
that
where . the
appropriate
Government is of opinion that it would be inexpedient,
on public grounds, to "give effect to the whole or . any
part. of the decision the appropriate Government may;
before the expiry of the said. period of 30 'days, by
order in the Official Gazette either reject the decision
or modify it.
Section 22. of. this Act provide.s:
·
"22. During the . period . of thirty days allowed
for the .filing of an appeal under section 10 or during
the pendency of any appeal under this Act, no .employer shall-
.
. (a.)
alter,
to
the
prejudice . of
.the
workmen
concerned in such appeal, the .conditions
of . service
applicable to them
immediately
before. the ·filing of
such appeal, or
'1955
TM Automobile
['roducts of
India Ltd.
.Y·
Rukmaji Bala
aTUi others
D~s J.
19,55
The Automobile
Products of
India Ltd.
·v.
Rukmaji Baia
and others
·Da;J.
1250
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
( b) discharge or · punish,
whether by· dismissal
or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such appeal,
save with the express permission
in writing
of
the
Appellate Tribunal".
Section 23, on which
reliance is
counsel for the respondents and
reads as follows:-
placed
by
learned
for
the
intervener,
"23.
Where an employer contravenes the provi-
·sions of section 22 during the pendency of proceedings
before ·the Appellate Tribunal, any employee aggrieved
by · such contravention,
may
make · a
complaint
in
·writing, · in the prescribed manner to such Appellate
Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint, the Appellate Tribunal shall
decide the
complaint
as
if it
were an appeal
pending
before
it,
in
accordance
with the . provi5ions of this Act and shall pronounce
its decision thereon · and the
provisions of
this Act
.shall apply accordingly".
Section 29 of .this Act provides for penalty for contravention of the
provisions of
section 22, namely,
imprisonment. for . a term which may extend to six
months,. or with fine which may extend to one thousand
rupees, .or with both.
From what has been stated so
far four things are to be noted,
namely, (i) that the
ordinary and primary
jurisdiction
of
the
appellate
tribunal is appellate, (ii) that section 22 of this Act
confers· on the appellate tribunal a special jurisdiction which is in the nature of original jurisdiction,
(iii) that . section 23 also· vests in
the
tribunal
and
additional
jurisdiction to
decide
the complaint as
if it were an appeal pending before. it; and (iv) that
sei:tion 23 confers on
the workmen an additional
remedy which they did not have
under
the
1947
Act.
To fill up the lacuna in the 1947 Act section 34 of
the 1950 . A.ct provided for certain amendments of the
1947 Act.
Amongst other things, it substituted a new
section for the old section 33 ·of
the 1947
Act. The
new ·section 33 runs as follows:-
"33.
During the
pendency of
any
conciliation
proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal in respect
of any industrial dispute, no employer shall-
-
-
. ...
..
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1251
(a) alter, to the prejudice .of the
w~rkmen concerned in such
dispute,
the
conditions
of
service
applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or
.
·
( b) discharge or punish,
whether
by
dismissal
or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute,
save with the express permission in writing of the
conciliation officer, Board or Tribunal, as the case
may be".
It will be noticed that this section has made several
changes.
Thus under this section provision is made
for obtaining permission as . a condition
precedent
both for altering the conditions of service and for discharging or punishing the workmen and no exception
is made for a case of misconduct unconnected with
the pending dispute. Besides this,, the following new
section was added to the 1947 Act as section 33-A :
".33-A.
Where an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 during the pendency of proceedings before a Tribunal, any employee aggrieved by,
such contravention, may make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed manner to such · Tribunal and
on receipt · of ·such complaint that Tribunal shall
adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute
referred to or pending before it, in accordance with
the provisioris of this Act and shall submit its award
to the appropriate Government and the provisions· of
of this Act shall apply accordingly".
It may be pointed out that the new sections 33 and
33-A thus inserted into the 1947 Act confer distinct
benefits
on. the
worki:nen and give some additional
jurisdiction and power to the authorities mentioned
therein.
Section 33-A ·enjoins the Tribunal to decide
the complaint '.'as . if it were a dispute referred to
or pending before it" and to submit its award to
the appropriate Government and provides that the
provisions of the Act shall apply to the award. It
is quite clear that the provisions of these two· new
sections 33 and 33-A of the 1947 Act correspond to
and. are in pari materia with the provisions of sections 22 and 23 of the. 1950 Act and are more or
less. in similar terms. The question for our coriside-
•.955
The
Automobile
Products of
India Ltd.
v.
Rukmaji Bala
and others
Das J.
1955
--·-
The Automobile
Products· of
India
Ltd.
v.
Rukmaji Bala
and· others
Das].
i252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
ration is : . What are . the meaning, scope and effect of
these sections.
A cursory perusal of section 33-A of the 1947 Act
as well as section 23 of the 1950 Act will at once show
that it is the contravention by the employer of the
provisions of . section 33 .in. the first case and of section
22 in the second case that gives rise to. a cause of action in favour of the workmen to approach and move
the respective authority named in the section and
this contravention is . the condition precedent to the
exercise · by the authority concerned of the additional
ju~isdiction and powers conferred on it by the sections.
The authority referred to in the sections · is, as we have
seen, a Court of limited jurisdiction and must accordillgly be strictly confined to the exercise of· the func;
tions and powers actually conferred ori it by the Act
which constinited it. What, then, are the scope ·and
ambit of the functions and powers with which it has
been vested- by these sections? .
When an employer contravenes the provisions of
section 33 of the 1947 Act or of section 22 of the 1950
.Act the workmen affected thereby .. obviously have a
grievance.
That grievance is two-fold.
In the
first
place· it is that -the employer has taken a prejudicial
action against them without theexpress
permission
in writing -of the · authority concerned
and . thereby
deprived· them of the salutary safeguard which
the
legislature has provided . for their protection against
victimisation. In the second place, and . apart from the
first grievance which may be called the statutory grievance; the workmen -may also have a grievance on merits·
which may be of much more seriousness and gravity for.
them; namely, that in point of fact they have been un-.
fairly dealt with in that their interest has actually been
prejudicially affected -by the highhanded act of. -the .employer. These . sections give the workmen -the right to
move· the authority by lodging a complaint befor.e it ..
This is a distinct 'benefit. given to them, for, as we have
seen,-· apart from these sections, the. workmen have. no
right to refer. any dispute. for adjudication. This complaint · is required ·to be made in the prescribed manner..
Form DD ·prescribed. by ·rule 51-A -of
the .Industrial:
-
0
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1253
Disputes (Central) Rules, 1947, framed 'under section
38 of die 1947 Act, like Form E prescribed under sectiop 35 of the 1950 Act, requires the complaining.work-
-men -to show ui their petition of complaint not only
the
manner
m
which
the
alleged
contravention
has
taken place but also
the grounds on which
the order or the act of the · management is challenged.
This clearly
indicates · that the authority
to whom
the complaint is made is to decide both the issues,
~amely (1) the fact of contravention and (2) the merits
of the act or order of the employer. It is also clear that
under section 33-A of the 1947 ·Act the authority is to
adjudicate upon the complaint "as if it· were a dispute referred to or pending before it" and under section 23 of the 1950 Act the · authority is to decide the
complaint "as if it were an appeal pending before it".
These· provisions quite dearly indicate that the jurisdiction of the authority is ,not only to decide whether
there has. been a, 'failure on the part of the employer
to obtain the permission of the authority before taking action but also to go into the merits 6,£ the complaint and grant
appropriate . reliefs. The
ext_reme
contention that .under section 33-A of the 1947, Act,
on a hnding that there has been 'a contravention of
t_he provisions of section 33, the Tiibunal's duty is
~mly to make a declaration · to that effect, leaving the
workmen to take such steps under the Act as they
may be advised to do, . has beeri negatived by 'the
Labour Appellate Tribunal in Serampore Belting Mazdoor Union v. Serampore Belting Co:, Ltd.(1 ) and by
the Bombay· High Court in Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat
lforough Municipality( i ). The same principle has been
accepted and . applied by a Full Bench of the Labour
Appellate Tribunal' to a case under section 23 of the
1950 Act in Raj Narain v. Employers' Association of
Northern India( 3 ). We find· ourselves in agreemeni:
with . the construction placed upon section '33-A of the
}947 Act and section 23 of the 1950 . Act by these decisions. ln our view the scope and ambit of. the· juris~
diction conferred on the authority ' named ill those
(I) [i95J] 2 L~·b.L.J. 341.
,
(2)
[1952] 54 Bom. L. R; 922;
(3) [l!l,52] I Lab. L.J. 381.
1955
The Automobile
Products of
India Ltd.
.v.
Rukrnaji Bala
and others
Das J.
.1955
ThtJ Automo'bile
· Products ef
India Lid.
v.
Ru!maji Bala
and others
·Das].
1254
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
[1955]
sections is wider than that conferred ·on the Criminal
Court by section 31 of the 1947 Act and section 29 of
the 1950 Act. The Criminal Court under the two last
mentioned 5ections is only concerned with the first
issue hereinbefore
mentioned, namely, yea or nay
whether there has been a ·contravention of the respective provisions of the sections mentioned therein, b11t
the
authority exercising
jurisdiction
under
section
33-A of the 1947 Act and se-ction 23 of the 1950 Act
is to· adjudicate upon or decide the: complaint "as if
it were a dispute referred to or pending before it"· in
the first case ·or "as if it were an appeal pending before it" in the second case. The authority is, therefore, enjoined to go into the merits of the act complained of under section · 33-A of the 1947 Act and
section 23 of. the 1950 Act. In this sense the jurisdiction of the authority nanied in these two sections is
certainly wider than that of the Criminal Court exercising jurisdiction under the penal sections . referred
to above. Having regard to the scope of the enquiry
under section 33-A of the 1947 Act and section 23 of
the 1950 Act it must follow that the power of the
authority to grant relief must be c<>oextensive with its
power to grant relief on a reference made to it ar .on
an appeal brought before it, as . the case may be. The
provision that the authority concerned must submit
its award to the appropriate Government and that
the provisions . of the respective Acts would be applicable thereto also support the view that the decision
of the authority is to partake of the nature of a decision on the merits . of an
industrial dispute which
when published by the apprnpriate Government will
become enforceable · under · the
respective
Acts.
It
follows, therefore, that the authority referred to in
these sections. must have jurisdiction to do complete
justice between the parties relating. to the matters in
dispute and must have. power to give such relief as
the nature of. the case may require and as is also
indicated by the prayer clause mentioned. in the tw'o
Forms DD and E referred w above. In short, these
two sections give to the workmen a direct right to
approach the Tribunal or Appellate Tribun.al for the
.
~
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1255
redress ·of their grievance without the intervention · of
the appropriate Government which they did· not possess before 1950 and they provide for speedy determination of disputes and avoid multiplicity of proceedings by giving complete relief to the workmen in relation to their grievances arising out of the action taken
by the employer in contravention · of the provisions of
the relevant sections. It is significant that this jurisdiction or powers has been vested in the. Tribunal or
Appellate Tribunal whose normal duty ·is to decide or
adjudicate upon industrial disputes and not · on any
conciliation officer or Board who are normally charged
with the duty of bringing about settlement of· disputes.
·It is submitted by learned counsel for the Respondents and of the intervener that the scope of section
33 of the 1947 Act and of section 22 of the 1950 Act
is precisely the same as that of section 33-A of the
1947 Act .and . section 23 of the 1950 Act. The argument is that the two last mentioned sections were enacted only in order to afford an opportunity to the
workmen to . do what they had beei;i. prevented from
doing at the earlier stage by reason of the · employer
taking the law into his own hands and taking action
against them without previously obtaining the sanction of the appropriate authority to do so.. If the
law permits the workmen to ventilate their grievances
at a later stage under section 33-A of the 1947 Act
and sectio.n 23 of the 1950 Act there can be no logical reason why the law should not permit them to do
so at the earlier stage under section 33 of the 1947
Act and section 22 of the 1950 Act. It is submitted
that the purpose of labour legislation being to maintain industrial . peace and restore amity and goodwill
between the employer and his workmen, it should be
the attempt of the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribu-·
nal at every stage to try to resolve all disputes which
are connected with the matter which is brought before it. Finally, it is urged that whenever an authority is . vested with the power· to do pr not to do an
act it must be regarded as having , a discretion and
1955
The Automobile
.Products of
India Ltd •.
v.
Rukmaji Bala
and others
Das].
19_5.5
The Automobile
Products of
India Ltd.
.v.
Ru.kmaji Bala
ana .others
Das J.
1256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
·that iri exercise of such ·discretion · the ·authority must
be presumed to be ve·sted with power to impose suitable· coriditions.
Reliance· is placed· on the decision in
The Queen v. · Couilty Council of West Riding of' Yorkshire( 1 ). The argument ·is
that the authority con'
cerried rriay under section 33 of the 1947 Act and section 22 · of the· 1950 Act grant by· way of imposing
conditions the same relief which it can grant to the
workmen under section 33-A of the 1947 ·Act and section 23 of the 1950 Act. We are unable to accept
this contention as correi:t for" reasons which we now
proceed to state.
The object of section 22 of· the 1950 Act like that
of section 33 of the 1947 Act as amended is to protect
the workmen concerned . in disputes which form the
subject-matter of pendin_g proceedil}gs against victimisation by t!ie employer .on account - of. t1ieir having
ra.ised industrial . disputes or. their. contim/ing .th~ pend~
ing proceedings. It . is further the object of the two ·sections to ensure th~t proceedings: in . connecri~n "'.ith in'.
dustrial disputes already . pending sjiould . be_ bro.ught
to a termination· in. a. peacef!-11 atmosphere and . that
no employer, should during the pendency of those proceedings take any action of the kind mentioned in
the sections . which,' may give ' rise to fresh. disputes
likely to further exacerbate the already strained relation between the employer and the
workmen.
To.
achieve· this. object.· a. ban ,has been imp9sed. upon the.
ordinary right which the employer has under the
ordinary
,l~w governing' a 'contract ' of . employment.
Section 22 of the 1950 Act and section 33 of the
1947. Act "'.hich impose the ban also provide for the
removal of that ban bl;' the granting of express per:
mission in writing in appropriate cases by tlie authority . mentioned therein. The : purpose · of . the.se . t:Wo
sectiOD.s heirig to determine 'whether • the
ban should·
be removed. O( not, , all that is . required , of the authO:.
r!tj · exercising furisdiction under these sections. is to
accord . or withhold .. permission. And . so . it has. been
held-we .. think . rightly-by
the
Labour . Appellate
Tribunal in Carlsbad Mineral _Works .·co. Ltd . .v. T,heir
(I)
[1896) 2 Q.B. 386.
•
-
'
.,..
-
s.c.R ..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1257
Workmen (1) which was a case under section. 33 of the
1947 A~i:. Even a cursory persual of section 33 of the
1947 Act will make · it clear that the purpose of that
section was not to confer any. general power of adjudication of. disputes. It will be noticed that under section 33 of the 1947 Act the authority invested with
the power of granting or withholding permission is the
conciliation
officer,
Board or Tribunal. The . conciliation officer or the Board normally has no power,
under the 1947 Act, to de~ide any industrial:· dispute
but is only charged with the duty of bringing about
a
settlement of
dispute. It is
only the Tribunal
which can by its award decide a dispute referred .to it;
Section 33 by the same language confers . jurisdiction
and power on all the three authorities. Power being
thus conferred by . one and the same section,· it cannot
mean one thing in relation to the conciliation officer
or the Board and a different and larger thing in relation to the Tribunal. There is
no reason to think
that the legislature, by a side wind as it' were, vested
in the conciliation officer· and the Board the jurisdiction and power of adjudicating upon · disputes
which
they normally do not possess and
whfrh they
may
not be competent or qualified to exercise. Further, if
the purpose of the section was to invest all the
authorities named therein with power to 'decide industrial disputes. one . would have . expected . some provision enabling them to make and submit an award to
which the provisions of the Act would apply such as
is provided ·in · ~ection 33-A of the 1947' Act or section
23 of the 1950 Act. There is no machinery provided
in section 33 of the 1947 Act or section 23 of the 1950
Act for enforcing the decision of the authority named
in those sections. This also indicates that those sections only impose a ban on the right of the employer
and the only thing that the authority is called upon
to do is to grant or withhold the permission, i.e. to
lift or maintain the ban. And so it has been held by
this Court in Atherton West & Co., Ltd. v. Suti Mzll
Mazdoor Union( 2 ) which was a case under clause 23 of
the U. P. Government Notification quoted on p. 785.
(1) [1953] 1 Lab. L.J. 85.
(2) [1953] s.c.R .. 780, 786-7.
1955
The Automo~ile
-Products of
India Ltd.
v:
Rukmaji Bala
and others
Dat"J.
1955
T lit Autrnnobi/e
· Produ;IJ, of
India Ltd.
v.
Rukmaji Bala
and othtrs
Pas J•
1258
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
Section 22 of the 1950 Act is in pari materia with section 33 of the 1947 Act and the above clause . 23 of the
U. P. Government Notification and most of .the considerations noted above. in connection with these pr°"
visions apply mutatis mutandis to .section 22 of the
1950· Act. Imposition of conditions is wholly collateral
to this purpose and ·the authority cannot impose any
condition. And it has been so held-we think correctly-in G.
C. Bhattacharji v. Parry & Co., Ltd.,
Calcutta(.'). In view of the scheme of these Acts summarised above and the. language of these sections the
general principle laid down in the case of The Queen
v.