# THE ATLAS CYCLE INDUSTRIES, LTD., SONEPAT v. THEIR WORKMEN

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 89
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959-09-11
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, K. Subba Rao, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. R. MuDHOLKAR, T. L. Venkatarama Aiyar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-atlas-cycle-industries-ltd-sonepat-v-their-workmen-2510
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

Industrial Dispute-Constitution
of Tribunal-Qualifications of members-"(,!ua/ified for appointment as a Judge
of a High Court''. meaning of-Validity of Reference-Industrial Dispute., (Punjab Amendment) Act, l!J57(Punj.8 of 1957),
s. 3-Industriat Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), s. 7 (3) (c)-
Constitution of India, Arts.14, 165,217.
On Iiebruary 14, 1955, the Government of Punjab referred certain disputes between the appellant company and its
workmen to the Industrial Tribunal which had been constituted on August 29, 1953, by a notification issued under s. 7
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by which G, an Advocate, was appointed as the Industrial Tribunal for Punjab.
When the reference was pending the Act was amended.
The
Amendment Act inter alia repealed s. 7 of the principal Act
and replaced it by ss. 7A, 7B and 7C, and bys. 30 provided
for a saving clause in respect of the proceedings pending
before the Tribunal constituted under the
principal
Act.
On April 19, 1957, the Punjab Government issued a notification under s. 7 of the Act and s. 30 of the Amendment Act
extending the life of the Tribunal constituted under the
repealed s. 7 and also extending the term of G as the member.
On the same date another notification was issued under s. 7A
of the Act constituting a new Tribunal and appointing G as
the Presiding Officer up to June 3, 1957.
Under s. 7C (b)
the age of retirement for members '\Vas fixed at sixty five and
under that provision G would have to retire by June 3, 1957.
The Punjab Government intervened and passed the Industrial Disputes (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1957, raising the
age of retirement of members to sixty
seven years.
Af:er G
had retired on June 3; 1959, the Punjab Government issued
a notification appointing another person as
the Presiding
Officer of the Industrial Tribunal.
The appellant challenged the legality of the reference
on the grounds, inter alia, ( l) that G was not qualified to be
appointed to the Tribunal under s. 7 (3) (c) of the Act, as he
was over sixty years and, therefore, the reference to him dated
19~!
February.!.
1962
Tht Af/a_1 C11clt
lt:d1otrif.1, ltd.,
So11tpat
v.
J l1eir M'orAmen
Venkalaroma
AV·ar J.
90
SUPREME CO"CH'J. Rl!,l'ORTS [1962]. St:PP.
l;cbruary 14, 1955, \\'as iucon1petcnt, and :2) that the Indusu·ial Disputes (Punjab A1ne11drnent) Acl, 19j7, \vas passed
\\'llh a view to ·)cnclit a single individual, G, an<l, therefore,
\Vas void as offeatiing Art. l•t of the Constitution of India.
He/cl, (I) s. 7(3)(c) of the Industrial
Dispute; Act,
1~17, did not irnport any qualification based on the age of the
periOJl to be appointc<l, and that the appointrnent of(} on
J\ugust 2~, l ~j~., \Vas valid under that section.
On the true constn1ction of 1\rt. 217 of the Constitution of India, the prescription of age therein is a condition
attached to the duration of the office and not a "qualifica·
tiou-'' fOr appoi11tn1cnt to it.
G.D. Karkare v. 1'.L. Shevd., LL.IL [ 19'J2j :"lag. 409 and
l'mbhudayal v. State of Punjab, A. I. R. 1959 Punj. 460,
approved.
(2) the Industrial Disputes (Punjab Amendment) Act,
I Y5 7, did not contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution, because
though the occassion \\.'hich inspired the cuar.tment of the
statute might he: to benefit an individual, it was of g~ncral
application and could not therefore be held to be discriminatory.
Ameeruni8'a v ... M ehboob,[ 19531 S.C.R. ·10.J., distinguished.
Crvn, APPELLATE J umsmcTrox: Civil Appeal
Xo. 188 of J 961.
A1,peal by special lea\'e from the judgment
and order dated Septemher IJ,19.'i!l, of tho Industrial 'l'ribnnal, Punjab, Patiala in Reference No.
30 of 195i. ·
G. S. Pathak, J.B. 1Jarlacha11ji, 0. C .. Mathur
and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants.
Bawa Shivcharan Singh and Jam1rdan Sharma,
for tho respondents.
1962. l!'ebruary 8. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
VENKATAHAMA AIYAR, .J.-This is an appeal
by special lenve against the Order of the Industrial
Tribunal, Punjab, dated September 11, 1959, in
Refe

## Text

3 S.C.R.
S.UPREME COUB,T REPORTS
89
THE ATLAS
CYCLE INDUSTRIES, LTD.,
SONEPAT
.
v.
THEIR WORKMEN
(B. P. SINHA, C .. J., K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR, J. R. MuDHOLKAR and
T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Constitution
of Tribunal-Qualifications of members-"(,!ua/ified for appointment as a Judge
of a High Court''. meaning of-Validity of Reference-Industrial Dispute., (Punjab Amendment) Act, l!J57(Punj.8 of 1957),
s. 3-Industriat Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), s. 7 (3) (c)-
Constitution of India, Arts.14, 165,217.
On Iiebruary 14, 1955, the Government of Punjab referred certain disputes between the appellant company and its
workmen to the Industrial Tribunal which had been constituted on August 29, 1953, by a notification issued under s. 7
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by which G, an Advocate, was appointed as the Industrial Tribunal for Punjab.
When the reference was pending the Act was amended.
The
Amendment Act inter alia repealed s. 7 of the principal Act
and replaced it by ss. 7A, 7B and 7C, and bys. 30 provided
for a saving clause in respect of the proceedings pending
before the Tribunal constituted under the
principal
Act.
On April 19, 1957, the Punjab Government issued a notification under s. 7 of the Act and s. 30 of the Amendment Act
extending the life of the Tribunal constituted under the
repealed s. 7 and also extending the term of G as the member.
On the same date another notification was issued under s. 7A
of the Act constituting a new Tribunal and appointing G as
the Presiding Officer up to June 3, 1957.
Under s. 7C (b)
the age of retirement for members '\Vas fixed at sixty five and
under that provision G would have to retire by June 3, 1957.
The Punjab Government intervened and passed the Industrial Disputes (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1957, raising the
age of retirement of members to sixty
seven years.
Af:er G
had retired on June 3; 1959, the Punjab Government issued
a notification appointing another person as
the Presiding
Officer of the Industrial Tribunal.
The appellant challenged the legality of the reference
on the grounds, inter alia, ( l) that G was not qualified to be
appointed to the Tribunal under s. 7 (3) (c) of the Act, as he
was over sixty years and, therefore, the reference to him dated
19~!
February.!.
1962
Tht Af/a_1 C11clt
lt:d1otrif.1, ltd.,
So11tpat
v.
J l1eir M'orAmen
Venkalaroma
AV·ar J.
90
SUPREME CO"CH'J. Rl!,l'ORTS [1962]. St:PP.
l;cbruary 14, 1955, \\'as iucon1petcnt, and :2) that the Indusu·ial Disputes (Punjab A1ne11drnent) Acl, 19j7, \vas passed
\\'llh a view to ·)cnclit a single individual, G, an<l, therefore,
\Vas void as offeatiing Art. l•t of the Constitution of India.
He/cl, (I) s. 7(3)(c) of the Industrial
Dispute; Act,
1~17, did not irnport any qualification based on the age of the
periOJl to be appointc<l, and that the appointrnent of(} on
J\ugust 2~, l ~j~., \Vas valid under that section.
On the true constn1ction of 1\rt. 217 of the Constitution of India, the prescription of age therein is a condition
attached to the duration of the office and not a "qualifica·
tiou-'' fOr appoi11tn1cnt to it.
G.D. Karkare v. 1'.L. Shevd., LL.IL [ 19'J2j :"lag. 409 and
l'mbhudayal v. State of Punjab, A. I. R. 1959 Punj. 460,
approved.
(2) the Industrial Disputes (Punjab Amendment) Act,
I Y5 7, did not contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution, because
though the occassion \\.'hich inspired the cuar.tment of the
statute might he: to benefit an individual, it was of g~ncral
application and could not therefore be held to be discriminatory.
Ameeruni8'a v ... M ehboob,[ 19531 S.C.R. ·10.J., distinguished.
Crvn, APPELLATE J umsmcTrox: Civil Appeal
Xo. 188 of J 961.
A1,peal by special lea\'e from the judgment
and order dated Septemher IJ,19.'i!l, of tho Industrial 'l'ribnnal, Punjab, Patiala in Reference No.
30 of 195i. ·
G. S. Pathak, J.B. 1Jarlacha11ji, 0. C .. Mathur
and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants.
Bawa Shivcharan Singh and Jam1rdan Sharma,
for tho respondents.
1962. l!'ebruary 8. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
VENKATAHAMA AIYAR, .J.-This is an appeal
by special lenve against the Order of the Industrial
Tribunal, Punjab, dated September 11, 1959, in
Reference No. ::lO of 1957, overruling certain preliminary objections raised by the appellant to the
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
91
- jurisidiction of the Tribunal to hear the reference.
The facts are that on February 14, 1955, the Government of Punjab referred under s. lO(l)(c) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, i947, hereinafter referred
to as "the Act", certain disputes between the appellant and the respondents to the Industrial Tribunal.
Punjab, Jullundur, for adjudication. That was numbered as lieforence No. 3 of 1955. This Tribunal
had been constituted on August 29; 1953, by
a Notification issued by the Government of Punjab,
which is as follows :-
"In exercise of the powers conferred under
section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
·(Act XIV of 1947), the Governor of Punjab, in
consultation with the Punjab High Court, is
pleased to appoint i:lhri Avtar Narain Gujral
Advocate, as Industrial Tribunal for Punjab."
The ma.in contention pressed before us on behalf of
the appellant is that Shri A.N. Gujral was not qualified under s. 7(3)(c) of the Act under which the
Notification was issued to be appointed as Tribunal
on August 29, 1953, as he was over sixty years of
age on that dat'l, having been born on June 4, 1892,
and that there was therefore no Tribunal validly
constituted in existence, and that in consequence the
reference to that so-called Tribunal on February 14,
1955, was wholly inoperative.
While Reference No. 3 of 1955 was pending
before the Tribunal, the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, were amended by the Industrial
Dispute (Amendment iind Miscellaneous Provi~ions)
Act, UJ56 (Act No. 36 of 1956), which came into
. force on March 10, 1957.
This Amendment Act
repealed s. 7 of the principal Act, and replaced it
by ss. 7A, 7B and 70. Section 30 of the Amendment Act contains a saving as regards proceedings
in relation to any industrial dispute which had
been pending before a Tribunal constituted under
the ·principal Aot.
Acting under this section, the
1962
1 he At/as Cycle
lndustrie-~, Ltd.,
Sonepat
v.
Their Workmen
Venkataram1J
AQ•ar J.
196B
I ht A.•las C;-cl1
!11dustriu, I~td.,
Sontpat
v.
1·hei1 W orktntn
Venkalarama
AijarJ,
92 SuPREJIE COlJRT REPORTS ll962] SOPP.
Punjab Government issued on April 19, Hl5i, the
following N" otilication :-
" Xo. -ll!l-1-C. Lab-57/652-l{A-In continuation of Punjab Governmont :IIemorandum
Xo. :lOi8-C-Lab-5i/4224, dated the lstjllth
,'\fopch, Ul:)i, and in exercise of the powers
conferred by section 7 of the Industrial Disputt>S Act, HJ47, as in force before the commen·
cement. of the ludustrial Disputes (Amendment and '.\Iiscellaneous Provisions) Act, l !J5ti,
read with Section 30 of the latter Act and
all other powNs enabliug him in this behalf
the Governor of Punjab is pleased tu extend-
(a)
the period for which the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, Jullundur, is const i 1,11 ted, and
(h) the term of appointment of the
Sole Member thereof.
HJ> to the last day of October, I !J5i, or
such date as the proceedings in relation
to industrial disputes pending in the said
Tribunal immediately before the I 0th
l\farch, l!J57, are diaposPd of, whichever
is earlier."
To put it briefly, this Xotification extended tho life
of the Tribunal constituted under the repealed s. 7,
for the period spocifi~d therein, and it also continued the term of Shri A.N. Gujral, as a :\Iember thereof, for the said period.
The contention of the appellant with reference to th is Notification is that s. ;lO of A ct 36 of
l!:J5G does not authoritte tho appointment of a
)!ember to the Tribunal constituted under s. 7, and
that the Not,ification in so far as it continued Shri A.N.
Gujral. as a l\Iembcr of tho Tribunal after his term
of office had expired on Mach IO, 1957, was unauthorised· and void.
-
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
93
On the same date on which the above Notification was i"su~d, t,hat is on April 19, 1957, the
Government of Punjab issued a Notification under
s. 7 A of the Act of which the relevant portion is as
follows:-
"No. 4194-C'.-Lab-57 /66 l-RA-In exercise
of the powers conferred by Section 7 A of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 19!7, as inserted by
section 4
of
the
Industrial
Disputes
(Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act, 1956, (No. 36
of 1956),
and all
other powers enabling him in this behalf, the
Governor of Punjab is pleased to constitute
an Industrial Tribunal with Headquarters at
Jullundur and to appoint Shri Avtar Narain
Gujral, B.A., LL.B., as its Presiding Officer
with effect from the date of the publication of
this notification in the Official Gazette up to
3rd June, l!l57."'
It will be noticed that this Notification firstly
constituted a new Tribunal being the Industrial
Tribunal, Jullundur, and secondly it appointed
8hri A. N. Gnjral as its Presiding Officer np to
June 3, 1957. The significance of that date is that,
under s. 70 (b) enacted by the Amendment Act, 1956,
the age of retirement fur members was fix<•d at
sixty-five, and under that provision, Shri A .N. Gujral
would have to retire on June 3, 1957.
Tne Punjah
Legislature intervened at this stage and enacted
two statutes which are material for the ·present
dispute. One of them was the Industrial Disputes
(Punjab Amendment) Act 8 of Ul57.
Section 3
of this Act amended s. 70 (b) of the principal
Act
by substituting
for the words "he has
attained the age of sixty-five years'', tho words "he
has attained the the age of sixty-seven years".
Thus the age of retirement was raised to sixLy-seven
years. By the operation of this Act, the tenure of
Shri A. N. Gujral could
be
extended
from
1962
The Atlas Cycle
Industries, Ltd. 1
Sonepat
v.
Their Workmen
V tnkatarama
Al)ar J.
i9ti2
Tht Atltu Cycl1
In du,<trit •, lld.,
So,,,pnt
..
ThP.ir l1'orl.mt11
Ve!!katarama
Aiyar J.
•
94 SUPRE:lfE COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP .
.
Juno 3, 1057 to .June 3, 1959, and that in fact was
<lono by a number of~ otifications issue<l from time
to timo.
The -ippellant cont<mds that this legislation wa,~ inten<led to benefit a single individ1ial
Shri A.X. Gujral, and is therefore void as offending
A rt. 14 of the Constitution. Tho result, accor<ling
to tho appellant, is that aft.er June 3, IP57, there
wae no one validly holding the office of i\fombr,r of
the Industrial Tribnnal.
The second statute t>nacted by the Punjab
Governmf'nt is the Industrial Disputes (Amendment
an<l :IIiscc!lancous Provisions) (Punjab Amendment.)
Act 9 of 1957. It introduced in s. 30 of the Amendment Act, 1956, a new subs. (2) conferring on tho
State Government 1iuthority to re.const.it.ute Tribunal
established under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
where those TriburnLls had come to an end anrl there
were matters pending before thPm for adjudication.
Going haek to the Tribunal which was constituted
under tho r<'pealed s. 7 of the Act it will be r<'ml'mbcred t h:i.t a ~ ot ifir.atinn ha<l been i~sue.cl 0n April
19, 1957 un<ler H. !lO of the Amendment Act, l 95fl,
keeping it alivr until the pending matters were disposed of or until Oct.nber !ll, 1957, whichevn was
earlin. The expectation that the proeeedingR before
that Tribunal would be complek<l hy that <late was
however, not realised and therefore >ict.ing 1111drr R.
3:~B (I) oft.he Art, and A. :lO of th" Amendment Act
19:i6, ns further amended by Punjnh Art, 9of19fl7.
thP Government. of P1injab issne<l ;m October !l l, l!l57
a N'ntificr.tion tr~nsferrin.g the matter" pcnrling hefuro
the old Trihnn:d l'0nstit.i1kd nn<lcr "· 7 to thn new
Tribunal cnnstitnto<l on April Hl, 1!157, unclPr H. 7A.
In accnnlancc with thiR '.'<ot.ific:ttion. R"fcr<'11ce No. 3
of l !Ii),) waR transferre<l t.o the new Tribunal and was
renumbf•r<'<I n.s 30 of Hl57.
The contentions urg<>d
by t.he appellant against this or<ler of transfer arc,
firstly, that the Tribunal to which the transfrr had
been made was not, 'for tho rea..•ons already given,
validly constituted :ind had no legal existence, and,
-
-
..
..,.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
95
secondly, that the new provision introduced by the
Punjab Act 9 of 1957 has no retrospective operation
and that, in consequence, the proceedings which had
been pending before the old Tribunal on March 10,
1957, could not be transferred to the new Tribunal
under this section.
T_he present reference 30 of 1957 was pending
till June 3, 1959, when Shri A.N. Gujral retired. The
Punjab ·Government then issued a Notification
appointing Sri Kesho Ram Passey. retired Judge of
the Punjab High Court !IS the Presiding; Officer of the
Industrial Tribunal, Jullundur. Before him, the present appellant filed an application on September 4,
1959, raising a number of preliminary objections to
the hearing of the reference.
By its Order dated
September 11, 1959, the Tribunal overruled these
objeotions and posted the matter for hearing on the
merits. It is the correctnesR of this Order that is
now challenged before us in this Appeal.
Though a number of objections were raised to
the hearing of the reference before the Tribunal, the
contentions advanced before us for the appellant are
the following :-
( 1)
Shri A. N. Gujral was not qualified to be
appointed to the Tribun~l under s. 7(3)(c) ofthi> Act
that, in consequence, the reference to him dated
Febr.uary 14, 1965, was incompetent;
(2) that the Notification
of the Punjab
Government d1tted April. Hl, 19ii7, appointing Shri
A. N. Gujral as a Member of the Industri1tl Tribunal,
Jullundur, and the sub~equent Notifications extendin~ his tenure of office are unauthorised and
inoperative;
(3) that
the
Notification
of the Punj1tb
Government dated October 3 /, 1957, tmnsf,,rring the
proceedings pending before the old Tribunal to the
new Tribunal was inoperative, because (i) the Punjab
Act 8 of I 967 ·is void being repugnant to Art. 14
of the Constitution and the appointment of Shri
A. N. Gujral as Member under that Act is also void;
1962
The Atlas Cyclt
lndustr1:es, Ltd.,
Stmepat
v.
Their Vlorkmeti
VenkatMama
A(var J.
19G2
The Atlas Cyclt
lrl'luslriu, 1.td.,
v.
Their Worl;mtn
Venlcularama
:liya•, .!,
96 Sl"PREl\IE COCRT REPORTS [1962] SL"PP.
and (ii) s. 30[2) enitcted by Punjab Act 9 of 1957
under whieh the transfer was made, did not authoriso
transfer of proceedings, .which had Loen pending on
or before :lfarch 10, I !J57.
(I) Taking up fil'llt the cont-0ntion that Shri.
A. N. Gujral was not <]nalified to he appoinU,d to th~
Trihunal on August 29, l!J53, by reason of the fact
that he was over sixty years of age, the question is
one of interpretation of the language of s. i ( 3)( c) of
the Act.
Section 7, in so far as it is material for the
present purpose, is as folloirn:-
"7.
lnd1utrial Trilrunals.-(I) The appropriate Go-vPrnment m"v con~titute one or more
Tn1!ustrial Tribunals for thA adju<lirMion of
indtmtrial disputes in accordance with tho provisions of this Act..
(2)
A Trihunal shall consist of such number of independent mcmhers ru; tho appropriato
Government may think fit to appoint, and
where the Tribunal consists of two or more
men: hers, one of them shall be appointed as
the Chairman thereof.
(3) Where :t Trihunal consists of one
member onlv, that memh..r, and where it con·
Rists of two ·or more mcmbern, the Chairman of
the 'rrihunal, shall be a person who-
·
(a)
is or has.hccn a Judgo of a High
Court; or
(bl
is or haA been a Di3trict .Judge: or
(cl
is qualified for appointment as a
Judgo of a High Court;
Provided that no appointment under this
sub·•ection to a Tribunal Ahall he made of any
person not qualified undrr clause(~) or (bl cx-
~opt with the itpproval of the High Court of
\
' ,,
,_ ,\
-
l
.ssc.R.
sbPREME CbUR'.r i1EPORT~
97
the State in which the
Tribunal has, or is
intended to have its usual ~mt."
Shri A. N. Gujral was appointed under s. 7(3)( c) being an Advocate. The question is, whether he was
then qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High
Court under that clause. The Constitutional provi·
sion hearing on this point is Art. 217, which in so far
as it is material is as follows :-
''217.
(1) Every Judge· of a High Court
shall be appointed by the President by warrant
under his hand and seal after consultation with
the Chief Justice of India, the Governer of the
State, and, in the case of appointment of a
Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief
Justice of the High Court, and shall hold office
in the case of an additional or acting Judge, as.
provided in article 224, and in any other case
until he attains the age of sixty years;
Provided that .............. .
(2)
A person shall not be qualified for
appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless
he is citizen d India and-
( a) · has foi: at'least ten years held an
Judicial office in the territory of India, or
(b)
has for at least ten years been a
l}dvocate of a High Court or of two or
more such Courts in succession.
Explanation ...... "
While Art. 217 ( 2) prescribes the qualifications for
appointment as a Judge, Art. 217(1) lays down that
the Judge shall hold office until he attains the age
of sixty years. The whole of the controversy before
us is as to the inter-relation between these two
clauses. The contention of Mr. Pathak, learned
counsel for the appellant, is that though Art. 217
( 1)
refers,
in terms, to the termination
of
the office of Judge, in substance, it lays down a
1962
Thi Atlas Cycle
Industries, Lid .•
8onepat
v,
Their Workmen
Venkatarams
Aiyar J_,
1962
Th Atlas Cycle
Indu8b/es, Ltd.,
Sonepat
Thtir Wo,kme11
V enkaJaramtJ
A1.1•r J.
98 Sl'PREl\IE coeRT REPOR'J s [1962) SUPP.
qualification for appointment,' because the appointment of a person over sixty as a.Judge would clearly
be repugnant to Art. 21 i(I) even though he might
satisfy all the requirements of Art. 21 i(2). It
'is accordingly argued that it is r.n implied qualification for appointment as a ,Judge under Art. 217
that the pernon should not have attained thP
age of sixty at tlw time of the appointment.
We agree that there is implicit in Art. 217(1)
a prohibition against. appointment as a Judge of a
person who has attained the age of sixty years.
But in our view, that is in tho nature of a condition
governing the a ppointm!'nt to the office-not a
qualification with reference to a person who is to be
appointed th!•rcto.
There is manifost on tlw terms
and on the scheme of the "rticle a clear distinction
between requirements a8 to the age of a person who
could he appointed as a Judge and hiH fitn .. ~s based
on experience and ability to fill the office. Art. 217(1)
deals with the former, and, in form, it has reference to the termination of the office and can tb<?rcfore be properly read only as imposing, by implication a restriction on making the appointment, In
strong contrast to thi~ is Art. 217(2} which expressly
refers to thn qualifications of the person to be
appointed such as his having held a judicial post or
having been an Advocate for a period of not less
than ten years. Wt• think that on a true construction oftbe article the prescription as to age is a concli.
, tion attached to the duration of the offic., and not a
qualification for appointment to it.
_\fr. Pathak also relied on Arts. '224 and 316
as lending support to his cont•mtion that age is to he
regarded as an impliecl qualification under Art. 21 i,
Art, 22·1 rclates tot.he appointment of additional and
!~cting Judges and it is provided in ck ( !) :md (2)
that th~ pt>rson to bo appointed as additional or
ading ,Judge by the
Pr~si<lent ~hould be a duly
qualified person.
There is nothing about the age
of the perwn to be appointe<I in
these~ clauses.
'
-
3 S.C. R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
99
That is provided in Art. 224(3) when enacts that
"no person appointed as an additional or acting
Jndge of a High Court shall hold office after attaining the age of sixty years." This article is also
framed on the same lines as Art. 217 and does not
crtrry the matter further. Nor is there anything
in Art. 376 which throws any further light on this
point. It has reference to persons who were Judges
in the High Courts of the States specified in part B
of the First Schedule at the time when the Constitution came into force, and provides that they
shall become Judges of the High Courts in those
States under the Constitution, an.d then enacts a
special provision that they "shall notwithstanding
anything in clauses (ll and (2) of article 217 but
subject to the proviso to clause (1) of that article,
continue to hold office until the expiration of such
period as the President may by order determine."
We see nothing in the terms of this article which
lends any support to the contention that age is to
be regarded as a qualification.
More to the point
under consideration iR
Art. 165 ( 1) that the "Governor of each State shall
appoint a person who is qualified to be appointed
as a Judge of a High Court to be Advocate-General
for the State."
The question has been discussed
whether on the terms of this article, a person who
has attained the age of sixty could be appointed as
an Advocate-General. If the age of a person is to
be regarded as one of his qualifirations, then
he could not be. The point arose for decisi6n in
G. D. Karkare v. T. L. Shevde (1), where a Judge
who had retired at the age of sixty had been appointed as Advocate-General.
The validity of
the appointment was challenged on the ground that
he was disqualified by reason of his age. The
learned Judges of the Nagpur High Court held
that cl. (1) of Art. 217 of the Constitution prescribed only the duration of the appointment of a
Judge of the High Court and could not be construed
(I) I. L.R. (1952] Nag. 409.
1962
The Atlas Cycle
Industries, Lti.,
Sonepat
••
Their Workmen
Venkataramc
Aiyar J.
1962
1'/u AU'" C;·rl ,
lndwhits l..ld . .
Sonepal
v.
Their iVorkmt.
Venkatarama
A.fyar J.
ioo SUPRE~IE COUltT REPORT.:; [1962) stJpi>.
as prescribing a qualification for his appointment. It
is argued for tho :tppcllant that the appointment of
an AdvoC<tk-General under Art. W5 might stand on
a different footing from that of a Judge under
Art. 217. because of the special provision
in
Art. 165(3) that the Ach·ocatc-Gcneral is to hold office.
at pleasure, whereas a ,Judge holds office during good
bohaviour. But this difference bears only on the
power of the appropriate authority to terminate
the appointment and not on the qualifieation of
the person to be appointed to the office.
In our
view, the interpretation put upon
Art. 21 i in
G.D. Karkare's caoe (1) iH correct.
Though the true meaning of Art. 217 has
figured largely in the argument before us, it is to
be noted that we
ar~ primarily concerned in this
appeal with the interpretation of s. 7(31( e) of the
Act, and that must ultimately tum on its own
context. Section i(3)(a} provides for the appointment of a High Court Judge, sitting or retired, as
a Member of the Tribunal.
Age is clearly not
a qualification under thiH sub-clause, as tho age
for retirement for a .Ju<liie of the High Court is
sixty. Likewise, cl. (b) providt'S for the appointment
of a District ,Judgo, setting or retired, as a Member.
A retired District .T udge who is aged over sixty
will be eligible for appointment under this subelause. Thus the age of a person does not eute·r
into his qualific>Ltions under sub-els. (a) and (b).
It would therefore be legitimate to constme sub-el.
(c} as not. importing any qualification on the
ground of age. But it iH said t.hat sub-els. (a) and {h)
form a distinct group having reference to judicial
officers, whereas,
cl. (c) is confined to Advocates,
who form a distinct category by themselves, and
that in view of this difference, considerations as to
age applicable to cl. (a) and (b) need not be applicable t<J cl. ( e).
There is undoubtedly a distinction
{I) !. L. R. [1952) Nag. 409.
38.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
101
between els. (a) and (b) on the one hand and cl. (c)
on the other.
But the question is whether this
has any reasonable relation to the difference whiuh
is sou~ht to be made between the two classes with
reference to the age of appointment. If a retired
Judge of the age of sixty can fittingly fill the
office of a Member of· the Tribunal under s. 7, an
Advocate of that age can likewise do so.
In our
view, there is no ground for importing in,s. 7(3)(c)
an implied qualification as to age, which is not
applicable to cl. 7(3)(a! and (b).
This question was considered by a Bench of
the Punjab High Court in Prabhudayal v. State of
Punjab (I). There the validity of the appointment
of Shri A. N. Gujral under the notification dated
August 29, 1953, which is the very point now under
debate, was challenged on the ground that as he
was over sixty on that date, he was not qualified
to be appointed under s. 7(3)(c).
The Court held
approving of the decision in G. D. Karkare's case('),
that the prescription as to age in Art. 217 (l) was
not a qualification to the office of a Judge under
Art. 217(2), and that a person who was more than
sixty was qualified for appointment under s. 7(3)( c).
Reliance is placed for the appellant on the
terms of s. 70 which was substituted by the Amendment Act 36 of 1956 in the place of s. 7 as supporting the contention that age ie a qualifiration
for appointment under s. 7(3) (c).
Section 7C is as follows :-
"No person shall be appointed to, c r
continue in, the office of the presiding offic< r
of a Labour CJurt, 'l'ribunal or National Tribunal, if-
( a) he is not an independent person ;
or
(1)
A. J. R (1959) Pun.i. 460.
(2) J.L.R. [19!'2] Na~. 409,
1962
· The Atlas Cycl1
Industries, Ltd.,
Sonepat
••
Pheir Workmen
Venkatarama
Atvar J.
1962
TJ11 Arla (,'ycl1
lntiuslrUe, Ltd.,
Sff'tP•I
v.
r luir W.' ., kmen
Ytnk1larama
Aiμr J,
102 SUPRE:\IE COURT REPORTS [19Ci2] SUPP.
(b) he has attained the age of sixty-fivo
years."
The marginal note t(> that section which was also
relied on is as follows :-
"Disqualifications for the presiding officers
of Labour Courts, Trilmnals and National
Tribunals."
The argument of the appellant is that, in prescribing the age as a qualification under s. 7C, the Legislature only made cxplioit what was implicit in
8. i(3)(e), and that therefore the qualification on
the basis of age should also
be imported in
s. 7(3)(c).
This inforenco does not, in our opinion,
follow.
The insertion of age qualification in s. iC
is more consistent with an intention on the part of
the Legislature tu add, in the light of the working
of the repealed s. i, a new provision prescribing
the age of retirement for i\lcmbers.
We ;~greo with
the decision of the Punjab High Court in Prabhu-
<.Wyals case(I) and hold that s.i(3)lc) docs not import
any qualification based on the age of the person
to be appointed, am! that the appointment. of Shri
A. N. Gujral on Augui;t 29, 1953, wao valid under
s. 7(3)(c).
(2) The next contention advanced for the
appellant is that tho Notification dated April 19,
11157, appointing Shri A. N. Gujral as a llfembcr
of the Tribunal issued under s. 30 of the Amendment Act 36 of 1956 was not authorised by thu
terms of that section and that therefore there was
no validly constituted Tribunal from that date.
Section 3U is as follows :-
"Savings as to proceedings pending before
Tribunals : If immediately
before
the commencement of thi~ Act there is pending any proceeding in relation to an Industrial dispute before a Tribunal oonstituted
(1) A. I. R. [1959] Puoj. 460.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
103
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14
of 1947), as in force before such commencement, the dispute may be adjudicated and
the proceeding disposed of by that Tribun'11
after such commencement, as if this Act had
not been passed."
The contention urged before us is that s. 7 under
which Shri · A. N. Gujral had been constituted
Tribunal was repealed on March 10, 1957, the
notification dated April 19, 1957, appointing him
as a Member of the Tribunal is void.
There is
no substance in this contention.
Section 30 expressly provides for the life of the Tribunal being
extended for the period specified therein, and that
necessarily implies a power to continue Shri A. N.
Gujral as the Tribunal, and we should add that
in view of our decision on point No. 3 this objection
is practically of no importance.
(3)
Lastly, it is contended that the transfer
of the proceedings pending before the old Tribunal to the new Tribunal under the Notification
dated October :n, 1957, was invalid and inoperative.
Two grounds were urged in support of
this contention. One is that Shri A.N. Gujral attained the age of sixty-five on June 4, 1957, and his
term of office would have then expired under s. 7C.
,
Then the Punjab Legislature enacted Act 8 of 1957
raising the age of retirement under s. 7C(b) from sixty- ·
five to sixty-seven. That was with 9, view to continue
Shri A.N. Gujral in office. And this legislation came
into force only on June 3, 1957. This Act,' it is
said offends Art. 14 as its object was to benefit a
particular individual, Shri A.N. Gujral, and reference was made to a decision of this Court in
Ameeroonissa v. Mehboob (1) as supporting this contention. There is no foree in this contention.
There the legislation related to the estate of one
(1) [1953) S.C.R· 404.
1962
Tiu Atlas Cycle
Industries, ltd.,
Sunepat •
v.
Thefr Workmen
Venkatarama
.A.tyar J.
1962
Ttu Atla1 Cyclt
lwlwtr;tI, ltd.,
•
Soritf'aC
...
Thtir W orkmtn
Vtnk1itcrema
Aiyar .. ,
104 SCPREJIE COCRT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Nawab 'Waliu<ldoula,
and it provided th,it the
claims of llfahLoob Begum and Kadiran Begum,
who claimed as ht:i1 s stood dismissed thereby and
could not b1' called in question in any court of law.
And this Court held th:1t it wa-; repugnant to Art. 14,
as it singled out individuals and denied them the
right which other citizens have of resort to a court
of law.
But the impugned Act, 8 of l 9i>7 is of
gem ral application, the age being raiRcd to sixty·
seven with refer<'nce to all per8ons holding tho ofiice
under that oection. The occasion which inspired
the enactment of the statute might he t.bc impen·
ding retirem1·nt of Siu i A. !\. Gujral.
But that is
not a ground for holding tltat it is discrimim1tory
and contravenes .l\rt. I~, when it is, on its terms, of
general application.
The second ground of attack against. the order
of transfer i' that it is not competP11t under s.:l0(2)
of the Ami n<lment
Act :{fl of l 9ii6 as furthor
amended by the Punjab Act 9 of l!l5i.
Section
:J0(2) is a~ follows : -
"'[f .immediately before the rommencc·-
m!•nt of thiR Act. there was pPnding any proCPcdin!! in relation to an indm1fl'ial dispute
brfcH c· n Tribunal const itut.!'d under the Indus.
trial Disput~s Act, 1947, as in force hefore such
commencement and such prnrPcding could not
he disposed of by that Tribunal due to the
Tribunal ha\·;ng come to an
cnrl on the
expiry of th" prriorl for which it wa" constituted, the State Government mav r<>·conRti·
t.utn that Tribunal for adjudieatin°q that dispute and dispo;ing of that proci>edin6 after
Hn<'h commence nwnt as if this Act. bad not
b1,..·n pa;sed, and the proceeding may be eontinunl by that Tribunal from tlw stage at
wjiieh it Wall left,"
3 S.C.R.
. SU~REME COURT REPORTS
105
The contention urged before us is that this provision has no retrospective operation· and that in
consequence t.he proceedings which had been pending before the old Tribunal on March 10, 1957,
could not be transferred to the new Tribunal under
thi" section. This content.ion is clearly untenable,
because the whole object of s.30(2) is to provide
for the hearing of disputes which were pending
before the old Tribunal, and its operation is
entirely retrospective. This contention must therefore be rejected.
In the result, the repeal fails and is dismissed
with costs.
"
A ppe,al dismissed.
SRI SATYA NARAIN SINGH
v.
DISTRICT ENGINEER, P.W.D. AND ANOTHEli
(B. P. SINHA, J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH,
J. C. SHAH and J, R. M:uDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Pu.blic ferry--Toll-Right to
coUe<t from Governrnent
Roadway JJuses-Co nmercial undertaking by Government, if
public service-Hotijication No 252/IX-209/ (10) dated March.
JG, 1925-Northern India Ferries Act, 1878 (XVII of 1878)
• 15.
The appellant being the highest bidder at a public auc·
tion got the right to collect the toll in respect of ferry for
crossing the river of Piprighat for the year 1954. The'practice
upto 1954 wa.• to allow the licensee to collect the toll from
every stage carriage bus.
Till March of the year 1954 only
privately owned stage carriage buses used to ply on the route.
Thereafter the route \\'as taken over by the Roadways
department of the State of Uttar Pradesh. The applicant
was informed 1'.nter alia that no toll \vas leviablc on the Roadways Vehicles and was asked to pay the monthly instalments
of the 1ictnse fee without making any deduction therefor
consequent upon the exemption of the Roadways buses from
tolls. The point for consideration foter alia is whether tii~
1962
Thi Atlus Cycl1
lndnJtries. Ltd,,
Sonepat
v.
Their Workmen
Venkatarama
Aiyar J.
1962.
Februaty II.