# THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME·TAX, MADRAS v. A. GAJAPATHY NAIDU

- **Citation:** [1964] 7 S.C.R. 767
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-04-16
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 617 of 1963
- **Bench:** K. Subba Rao, J. C. Shah, S. M. Sikri
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-commissioner-of-income-tax-madras-v-a-gajapathy-naidu-3118
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Indian Incometax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 4(1)(b)(ii)-
Construction of-Analogy from English Statuaes-"Accrue" or
"arise", meaning of-Income arising out of earlier :transactionProper year of assessment.
A certain sum of money was received by the assessee as
payment of compensation for the loss sustained by him in respect of a supply during the previous accounting year.
The
Income-tax Officer included the amount in the assessment year
it was received. Appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and to the Income-tax Tribunal were unsuccessful. But
on a reference, the High Court held that though in fact the
right to receive the amount did not accrue during the accounting year of the contract, it should be deemed to have related
to the year of contract in respect whereof the amount was paid.
On appeal by certificate,
Held: (i) The decision of the High Court was deflected by
its reliance on English decisions delivered under circumstances
peculiar to that country and on the construction of provisions
which were not in pari materia with the provisions obtaining
in India.
The provisions of the Indian
Income-tax Act shall be
construed on their own terms without drawing any analogy
from English statutes whose terms may superficially appear to
be similar but on a deeper scrutiny may reveal differences not
only in the wording but also in the meaning a particular expression has acquired in the context of the development of law in
that country.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vazir Sultan & Sons, [i959]
Supp, 2 S.C.R., 375, followed;.
(ii) under the definition accepted by this Court of the
word "accrue" or "arise" in s. 4(1)(b)(i) of the Indian Income--
tax Act. an income accrues or arises when the assessee acquires
a right to receive the same.
S. D. Sassoon and Co. Ud. v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bombay City, [1955) 1 S.C.R. 313, followed.
Rogers Pyatt She!lack. & Co. v. Secretary of State for India.
(1925) IL.R. 52 Cal. 1, approved.
When an Income-tax Officer proceeds to include a particular
income in the assessment, he should ask himself, inter alia, two
queshons, namely (i) what is . the system of accountancy
adopted by the assessee? and (ii) it it is mercantile system of
accountancy, subject to the deemed provisions when has the
right to receive that amount accrued? If he comes to the conclusion that such a right accrued or arose to the assessee in a
particular accounting year, he shali include the said income in
the assessment of the succeeding assessment year. No power
is conferred on the Income-tax Officer under the Act, to relate
1984
April 16
768
SUPREME_ COURT REPORTS
(1964}
1964
back an income that accrued or arose in a later year to an earlier
f'At~ofyear on _the ground that the said income arose out of an earlier
I"""""·taz, MOllrM transaction.
. v.
'.d
(iii) The meaning of the word "accrue" or "arise" in s. 4(1)-
.A.Gajapalhy Na• u (b)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act cannot be extended so as to
-
take in amounts received by the assessee in a later year, though
the receipt was not on the basis of the right accrued in the
earlier year. Such amounts are in law received by the assessee
only in the year when they are paid.
Bub/JG Rao, J.
J. P. Hall & Co. v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, (1921)
12 T. C. 382 and Severns (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Dadawa!l, (1954), 35 T. C. 649, referred to.
Commissioner of Income-tax. U.P. v. P. V. Kalichara.oi
Jagannath, [1961] 41 I.T.R. 40, approved.

## Text

7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
767
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME·TAX, MADRAS
v.
A. GAJAPATHY NAIDU
(K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.]
Indian Incometax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 4(1)(b)(ii)-
Construction of-Analogy from English Statuaes-"Accrue" or
"arise", meaning of-Income arising out of earlier :transactionProper year of assessment.
A certain sum of money was received by the assessee as
payment of compensation for the loss sustained by him in respect of a supply during the previous accounting year.
The
Income-tax Officer included the amount in the assessment year
it was received. Appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and to the Income-tax Tribunal were unsuccessful. But
on a reference, the High Court held that though in fact the
right to receive the amount did not accrue during the accounting year of the contract, it should be deemed to have related
to the year of contract in respect whereof the amount was paid.
On appeal by certificate,
Held: (i) The decision of the High Court was deflected by
its reliance on English decisions delivered under circumstances
peculiar to that country and on the construction of provisions
which were not in pari materia with the provisions obtaining
in India.
The provisions of the Indian
Income-tax Act shall be
construed on their own terms without drawing any analogy
from English statutes whose terms may superficially appear to
be similar but on a deeper scrutiny may reveal differences not
only in the wording but also in the meaning a particular expression has acquired in the context of the development of law in
that country.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vazir Sultan & Sons, [i959]
Supp, 2 S.C.R., 375, followed;.
(ii) under the definition accepted by this Court of the
word "accrue" or "arise" in s. 4(1)(b)(i) of the Indian Income--
tax Act. an income accrues or arises when the assessee acquires
a right to receive the same.
S. D. Sassoon and Co. Ud. v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bombay City, [1955) 1 S.C.R. 313, followed.
Rogers Pyatt She!lack. & Co. v. Secretary of State for India.
(1925) IL.R. 52 Cal. 1, approved.
When an Income-tax Officer proceeds to include a particular
income in the assessment, he should ask himself, inter alia, two
queshons, namely (i) what is . the system of accountancy
adopted by the assessee? and (ii) it it is mercantile system of
accountancy, subject to the deemed provisions when has the
right to receive that amount accrued? If he comes to the conclusion that such a right accrued or arose to the assessee in a
particular accounting year, he shali include the said income in
the assessment of the succeeding assessment year. No power
is conferred on the Income-tax Officer under the Act, to relate
1984
April 16
768
SUPREME_ COURT REPORTS
(1964}
1964
back an income that accrued or arose in a later year to an earlier
f'At~ofyear on _the ground that the said income arose out of an earlier
I"""""·taz, MOllrM transaction.
. v.
'.d
(iii) The meaning of the word "accrue" or "arise" in s. 4(1)-
.A.Gajapalhy Na• u (b)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act cannot be extended so as to
-
take in amounts received by the assessee in a later year, though
the receipt was not on the basis of the right accrued in the
earlier year. Such amounts are in law received by the assessee
only in the year when they are paid.
Bub/JG Rao, J.
J. P. Hall & Co. v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, (1921)
12 T. C. 382 and Severns (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Dadawa!l, (1954), 35 T. C. 649, referred to.
Commissioner of Income-tax. U.P. v. P. V. Kalichara.oi
Jagannath, [1961] 41 I.T.R. 40, approved.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 617
of 1963. Appeal from the judgment and order, dated March
15, 1960, of the Madras High Court in Case referred No. 87
of 1955.
Gopal Singh and R.N. Sachthey, for the appellant.
K. Rajinder Chaudhuri and K.R. Chaudhuri, for the respondent.
April 16, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SuBBA RAo, J.-This appeal by certificate is preferred
against the order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras
holding that a sum of Rs. 12,447 /- received by the respondent
from the Government during the accounting year 1950-51 was
not assessable to tax for the asses;:ment year 1951-52.
Gajapathy Naidu, the respondent, was supplying provisions to the Government
Stanley Hospital, Royapuram,
Madras. During the financial year April 1, 1948 to March 31,
1949, he entered into a contract with the Government for the
supply of bread to the said hospital at the rate of Rs. 0-4-6 per
lb. As the respondent was maintaining his accounts on mercantile basis, it is common case that the amount due from the
Government under the terms of the said contract was credited in the accounts of the respondent for that year. For the assessment year 1949-50 the Income-tax Officer assessed the respondent to income-tax on the basis of the accounts so·made. It
appears that some time after March 31, 1949, representations
were made to the Government for relieving the respondent
from the loss sustained in the supply of bread to the hospital.
The Government by its order dated November 24, 1950, directed payment of compensation for the loss sustained by the respondent in respect of the supply of bread to the hospital during
the year 1948-49 under the said contract. The respondent re1
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
769
ceived on that account payment of Rs. 12.447 /- during the
1964
year of account 1950-51. In the assessment year 1951-52 theTkeCommiasionuo/
Income-tax Officer included the said amount in the assess- Income-tax, Madr.,
ment of that year. The assessee, inter alia, contended that he A.Ga~yNaid•
received the said sum in respect of the contract that was enter-
-
ed into by him with the Government during the accounting
BubbaRao,J.
year 1948-49 and, therefore, it could not be included in the assessment year 1951-52. This contention was rejected by the
Income-tax Officer and, on appeal, by the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner and also, on further appeal, by the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal. But the contention received favour with
the High Court on a reference made to it under s. 66(1) of the
Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act. The
following two questions were referred to the High Court :
"l. Whether the sum of Rs. 12.447 /- is assessable to
income-tax?"
"2. If so, whether it has been rightly assessed in the assessment year 1951-52."
On the first question the High Court held that the said
amount was directly related to the business of the assessee
and, therefore, was taxable as a trade receipt. It answered the
first question in the affirmative. No argument was raised before
us on the question of the correctness of this finding. Therefore,
nothing further need be said about it.
The High Court answered the second question in the negative. Its conclusion is based upon the following three steps:
1. "The only right of the assessee on the date, when he
supplied the bread, was to debit the Government
the contract rate. He was entitled to nothing
further. The Government Order which raised the
rates, came into existence long after , payment
thereunder was e;ic gratia, and not on the basis
of a right. Therefore, the amount of Rs. 12,447
was not, and indeed could not have been debited
in the books of the assessee for the year, when the
supply of bread was made to the hospital, namely,
1948-49. Those accounts have been closed."
2. But where a receipt is correlated to and arises out of
a commercial transaction between the parties, the
right or liability should be deemed to have been
established in the past accounting period.
That
principle is based not only on any theory of accrual, because ·there was no legal right existing
then; but being correlated to the transaction, it
L/P(D)ISCI-~5
770
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1964
TkCo mtlli#ioatr of
J~IQ,Jlaj)u
should properly belong to it, and the account
should be re-opened when the payment came in.
J. "Being a receipt of an earlier year, the amount could
not be included in the assessment for the year
1951-52."
•.
A. GajapalAy .1.Vaid•
On the said reasoning the High Court held that though in fact
the right to receive the amount did not accrue during the accounting year 1948-49, it should be deemed to have related to
the year of contract in respect whereof the amount was paid.
The Commissioner of Income-tax has preferred the present appeal against the said order of the High Court.
Learned counsel for the Revenue contended that the
High Court misdirected itself on the basis of English decisions
and that on its finding that the amount accrued to the assessee
only during the accounting year 1949-50 it should have held
that the Income-tax Officer had correctly included it in the
assessee's income for the year 1950-51. Learned cqunsel for
1 the respi>ndent argued that the said amount was paid in respect of the contract entered into between the assessee and the
Government and, therefore, the said amount should properly
belong to the accounting year 1948-49, and should not have
been included in the assessment of the year 1951-52. To rnstain his argument he relied upon certain English decisions referred to by the High Court which held that in such circumstances the relevant account of the year when the amount was
due under the contract could be reopened and the additional
amount, though an ex gratia payment, could be included
therein.
·
With great respect to the learned Judges of the High
Court we must point out that the decision of the High Court
is deflected by its reliance on English decisions delivered
under circumstances peculiar to that country and on the construction of provisions which are not in pari materia with the
provisions obtaining in India. Th cobservaticns made by this
Court in Commi5sioner of Income-tax v. Vazir Sultan &
Sons(') may usefully be restated:-
"While considering the case law it is necessary to bear
in mind that the Indian Income-tax Act is not in
pari materia with the British income-tax statutes. it
is less elaborate in many ways, subject to fewer refinements and in arrangement and language it
differs greatly from the provisions with which the
courts in England have had to deal. Little help
can therefore be gained by attempting to construe
(') [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 375.
...
-
I
'"'
...
-·
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
771
the Indian In.x>me-tax Act in the light of deci-
~
sions bearing upon the meaning of the income-taxTA<CoO..;,.;._q(
legislation in England. But on analogous provi-1""°"''"'""· Jl.W..
sions, fundamental concepts and general principle .l. Gaja;;,., Naid-o
unaffected by the specialities of the English incometax statutes, English authorities may be useful
Sr.IJbaIW>,J.
guides."
The cauticn administered by this Court shall always be
borne in mind in construing the provisions of the Indian
statute. The provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act shall be
construed on their own terms without drawing any analogy
from Englisl1 statutes whose terms may superficially appear to
be similar but on a deeper scrutiny may reveal differences not
only in the wording but also in the meaning a particular expression has acquired in the context of the development of
law in that country.
The problem raised before us can only be answered on
the true meaning of the express words used in s. 4 (l)(b)\i) of
the Act. 1t reads:-
"Subject to the provisions of this Act, the total income
of any previous year of any person includes all
income, profits and gains from whatever source
derived whichif such person is resident in the taxable territories during such year.-
accrue or arise' or are deemed to accrue or
arise to him in the taxable territories during such
year.''
We are not concerned in this case with the expression
"deemed to accrue or arise to him", as that expressfon refers
to cases set out in the statute itself introducing a fiction in respect of certain incomes. In regard to the question when and
whether an income accrues or arises within the meaning of the
first part of the said clause, we have a decision of this Court
which has clearly enunciated the principles underlying the said
expression: that is the decision in E. D. Sassoon and Company, Ltd., v. The Commissioner of lnrome-tax, Bombay
City('). In that decision this Court accepted the definition
given to the words "accrue" and "arise" by Mukerji, J., in
Roger.f Pyatt She1/ack &: Co. v. Secretary of State for
lndiaf), which is as follows: -
•
". . . . . . . . . . . . both the words are used in contradistinction to the word "receive" and indicate a right to
(') [1955] 1 S.C.R. 313, 342:(1954) 26 LT.R. Ti 50
(') (1925) 1 I.T.C. 363, 371:(1925) LI.R 52 ea't 1:
L!P(D)i8Cl-20(a)
11161
Tic 0-Uaiarlff of
l nco.....W .Madrat1
v.
.t. IJajapatig Nails
BllM>a 1/ao, J.
772
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
receive. They represent a stage anterior to the point
of time when the income becomes receivable and
connote a character of the income which is more
or less inchoate."
Under this definition accepted by this Court, an income
accrues or arises when the assessee acquires a right to receive
the same. It is common place that there are two principal
methods of accounting for the income, profits and gains of a
business; one is the cash basis and the other, the mercantile
basis. The latter system of accountancy "brings into credit
what is due immediately it becomes legally due and before it
is actually received; and it brings into debit expenditure the
amount for which a legal liability has been incurred before it
is actually disbursed." The book profits are taken for the purpose of assessment of tax, though the credit amount is not
realized or the debit amount is not actually disbursed. If an
income accrues within a particular year, it is liable to be assessed ·in the succeeding year. When does the right to receive
an amount under a contract accrue or arise to the assessee i.e.,
come into existence? That depends upon the terms of a particular contract No other relevant provision of the Act has been
brought to our notice-for there is none-which provides an
exception that though an assessee does not acquire a right to
receive an income under a contract in a particular accounting
year, by
some fiction the amount received by him in a
subsequent year in connection with the contract, though not
arising out of a right accrued to him in the earlier year, could
be related back to the earlier year and made taxable along
with the income of that year. But that legal position is sought
to be reached by a process of reasoning found favour with
English courts. It is said that on the basis of proper commercial accounting practice, if a transaction takes place in a parti·
cular year, all that has accrued in respect of it, irrespective of
the year when it accrues, should belong to the year of transaction and for the purpose of reaching that result closed accounts could be reopened. Whether this principle is justified
in the English law. it has no pla~ under the Indian Incometax Act. When an Income-tax Officer proceeds to include a
particular income in the assessment. he should ask himself
inter alia, two questions, namely. (i) what is the system of accountancy adopted by the assessee? and (ii) if it is mercantile
system of accountancy, subject tO the deemed provisions, when
has the right to recei~ that amount accrued? If he comes to
the conclusion that such a right accrued or arose to the
assessee in a particular accounting year. he shall include the
said income in the assessment of the succeeding assessment
year. No power is conferred on the Income-tax Officer under
the Act, to relate back an income that accrued or arose in a
•-
<
-
•
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
773
subsequent year to another earlier year on the ground that the
1964
said income arose out of an earlier transaction. Nor is the The Commis.!ioner of
question of reopening of accounts relevant in the matter of _as-foe"""-""'· Madraa
certaining when a particular income accrued or arose. Section , a .,,.:;, N ,,
.".1,
O.J~r-11Y al(l•
34 of the Act empowers the Income-tax Officer to assess the
-
income which escaped assessment or was under-assessed in the
Sr/Jba Rao, J.
relevant assessment year. Subject to the provisions of the section and following the procedure prescribed thereunder, he
can include the escaped income and re-assess the asscssee on
the basis of which the earlier assessment was made. So too,
under s. 35 of the Act the officers mentioned therein can
rectify mistakes either of their own motion or when such mistakes are brought to their notice by a party to the proceedings,
For that purpose the correct item may be taken into consideration in the matter of assessment. But strictly speaking even in
those cases there is no reopening of the accounts of the asscssee. but a re-assessment is made or the rnistake ts corrected
on the basis of the actual income accrued or received by the
assessee. We do not see any relevancy of the question of reopening of accounts in considering the question when an assessee
acquired a right to receive an amount.
We shall now proceed to notice some of the decisions
cited at the Bar. J.P. Hall & Co. v. Commissioner of Inland
Revem1e\ ') is a decision of the Court of Appeal under s. 38 of
the Finance \No. 2) Act, 1915 (5 & 6 Geo. V, c. 89) dealing
with excess profits duty. There it was held that for the purpose
of Excess Profits Duty, the profits from the contracts for the
purchase and sale of the control gear arose to the appellantcompany in the accounting years in which the gear was actually delivered and not in the pre-war period ending the 30th
June, 1914, in which the contracts were made. The price of
the control gear in that case was increased later without there
being any contractual obligation but purely by a voluntary act
of the purchaser. Though the additional amounts accrued to
the assessee in a later year, it was regarded as analogous to a
trade debt due in respect of the trading operation of the earlier
year. On that principle the accounts were reopened in order
to bring the increase into profits of the assessce in the year of
transaction. This decision was accepted and extended in
Severns (H.M. lrlspector of Taxes) v. Dad.swell(')_ As this decision i~ the basis fo_r the High Court's view we shall give its
facts m s0me detul. The respondent therein was !!ranted a
licence to mill flour in October. 1941. and carried on-the trade
of flour milling until September, 1945. As he had not been a
(') (1921) 12 T.C. 382.
(') (1954) 35 T.C. 649.
774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l!lM}
11114
miller at the outbreak: of war, he was not entitled to the benefit
n. a..-..- .,of a remuneration agreement whereby millers were compensat-
,,_, , raz, JLailrru ed by the Ministry of Food for losses incurred under warbme
La.;;,,. NOW. arrangements for the purchase of wheat and sale of flour.
_!
•Having, however, been informed by the Ministry in 1943 and
&Ma Jrao, J.
twice later that the remuneration of millers who bad begun
milling during the period of control was under consideration.
be made a claim in 1949 on the same basis as that laid down
in the remuneration agreement and received
payments
in settlement. The respondent contended that the sums received in 1949 were not trading receipts but ex gratia payments,
and alternatively, that they were received after the cessation of
his trade and that if there was a debt arising to the trade at the
date of cessation its value at that date was nil. The Court held
that the said payments were ex gratia; and it further held that.
if on the discontinuam;e of a trade payment for work already
done in a year had nOt been finaDy settled, accounts for that
year could be reopened so as to bring in a gratuitous payment
for such work made in a subsequent year. This judgment certainly supports the respondent. Though it could be distinguished on the ground in that case it was found that the payment for
the work already done had not been finally settled whereas in
the present case there is nothing on the record to disclose that it
was not finally settled. We would prefer to base our conclusion on the ground that we cannot extend the meaning of the
word "accrue" or "arise" in s. 4(1)(b)(i) of the Act so as' to
take in amounts received by the assessee in a later year,
though the receipt was not on the basis nf the right accrued
in the earlier year. Such amounts are in law received by the
a'lSeSSeC only in the year when they are paid. We cannot
apply the English decisions in the matter of construction of_
the provisions of the Indian Act, particularly when they have
received an authoritative interpretation from this Court, in
this view, it is not necessary to consider further English decisions cited by learned counsel for the respondent in support
of his contention. Before a Division Bench of the Allahabad
High Court in Commissioner of Income tax, U.P. v. Kalicharan
Jagannath('), when a similar question arose, learned counsel
appearing for the Revenue relied upon the said English decisions. but the High Court, rightly, refused to act on them on
the ground that they were not relevant in interpreting s. 4 of
the Indian Income-tax Act. It further n•ade an attempt to distinguish those decisions on grounds based upon the alleged
difference in the scope of the provisions nf the respective
countries. It was said that under the relevant English Act the
excess profits duty was payable on computation of profits
arising from a trade or business in different chargeable accounting periods and, therefore, the emphasis there was more
(') {1961) 41 1.T.R 40.
-
-
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
775
upon the carrying on of the trade within the chargeable
19"
period than on the income accruing during that period. But Tl.<lo•..U.W- af
we do not propose to express our view on this aspect of the 1.,,,..,.,_, Madra
question, as the relevant sections of the English Acts have A a,;,...::;, ..,,
not been placed before us. The learned Judges, after having · '
4,..,...-_1 B
rightly refused to rely upon the English decisions, construed
s.ua &w, J.
the provisions of the Indian statute. There. during the accounting period April I, 1945 to March 31, 1946, the assessee eatered into a contract with and supplied fruits and bullock carts to. the military authorities at two different places
at rates fixed by the agreement. The assessee incurred a loss
and he submitted a petition for review under the terms of the
agreement. On November 6, 1947, the military authorities
sanctioned the payment of an additional sum which was
paid to the assessee on February 17 and 24, 1948. The Income-tax Department sought to include this additional sum
in the assessment for the accounting year 1945-46. The High
Court held that until the order of review the only right that
the assessee had was to claim the money payable at the rates
laid down in the agreement
itself and that the additional
amount became payable to the assessee not by virtue of any
right conferred by the agreement, but because of the order
passed in review directing the payment of the amount and
thus creating a right to this amount in favour of the assessee.
As the right to receive the payment of the additional sum
arose after the closing of the accounting year 1945-46. the
High Court proceeded to hold that the income did not accrue
or arise to the assessee in the accounting yi:ar. It may be
pointed out that in that case the original agreement gave a
right to apply for review and notwithstanding that fact the
court held that the additional payment could not be held to
have accrued during the accounting year. For the reasons already stated by us, we are entirely in agreement with the view
e•pressed by the Allahabad High Court.
In the result. we hold that the High Court in the present
case should have answered the second question referred to
it in the affirmative. The order of lhe High Court is set aside
and the appeal is allowed with costs.
Appeal allowed.