# THE CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA - ' v. SM. PADMA DEBI AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1962] 3 S.C.R. 49
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 268 of 1958
- **Bench:** B.P. Sinha, K. SuBBA RAO, Raghubar Dayal, J. R. MuDHOLKAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-corporation-of-calcutta-v-sm-padma-debi-and-others-2457
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Assessment-Determining annual value of property-Basis
of-If could be increased above standard rent-" At the time of
assessment'', Meaning of-Hypothetical rent-Open market, if
includes 'black market'-'Black market' Meaning of-West Bengal
Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 (W. B.
XVII of 1950), ss. 2(10) (b), 33 (a)-Calcu/la Municipal Act,
1923 (Ben, 3 of 1923), ss. 127 (a), 131, UO.
The Calcutta Corporation in fixing the annual valuation
of the respondents premises took as basis Rs. 1,450/- as the
monthly value of the premises. The respondent filed objection
to the said assessment under s. 139 of the Calcutta Municipal
Act, 1923. Meanwhile, under the West Bengal Premises Rent
Control (Temporary Provision) Act, 1950, the standard rent
of the said premises was fixed by the Rent Controller at
Rs. 632/8;- per month, with effect from August 1951.
One of
the objections raised was that the Corporation had no power
to fix the annual valua\ion at a figure higher than the standard
rent.
The objection was disallowed and the assessment was
confirmed. On appeal the Small Causes Court fixed the annual
valuation for the purpose of assessrnent on the basis of the
standard rent. Corporation went up in appeal to the High
Court which was dismissed. Thereafter the Corporation came
up in appeal by special leave.
The Corporation contended that under s. 127 (a) of the
Actj the (Jorporati0n has to ascertain only the hypothetical rent
realisable from a hypothetical tenant at the time of the assessment and not the actual rent payable at the time by any tenant,
and therefore it is not bound to take into consideration the
standard rent fixed under Rent Control Act. Corporation also
raised a subsidiary point as to the precise meaning of the
phrase "at the time of assessment"
occurring in the said
section.
Held, that on a fair reading of the express provisions of
s. 127 (a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, the rental value
,..
cannot be fixed higher than the standard rent under the Rent
Control Act.
Held, further, that the words 'gross annual rent at which
the land or building mi~ht at the time of a~sessment re11~on11bly
1961
Auguat 8.
1961
The Co1poratitn1
of Caleulta
v.
Sn1. Pad1na Debi
50
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
[1962]
be expected to let from year to year' in s. 127 (a) of the Act
implies that the rent which the landlord might realise if the
house was let is the basis for fixing the annual value of the
building. The criterion is the rent realisable by the landlord
and not the value of the holding in the hands of the trnant.
The value of the property to the own.r is the 'tandard in
making the assessment.
The word 'reasonably' is not capable of precise ddinition;
in ultimate analysis it is a question of fact. Whether a particular
act is rca.sonable or not depends on the circumstances in a given
situation. A bargain lxt\\'CCn a \villing lessor and a 'Y•il!ing
lessee uninfluenced by any extraneous circumstances may nfl'ord
a guiding test of reasonableness.
A law of the land with its penal consequences cannot be
ignored in ascertaining the reasonable expectation of a landlord
in the 1natter of rent, and must necessarily be taken as one of
the circun1stanccs obtaining in the open market placing an
upper limit on the rate of rent for which a building can reasonably be expected to be let.
In the situation, a statutory limitation of rent circumscribes the scope of the bargain in the
market. In no circumstances the hypothetical rent can exceed
the limit.
The phrase 'at the time of assessment' means that the
asses!lment commences with the making of the valuation under
s. 131 of the Act and ends with the determination of the
objection under s. 140 thereof. An event which takes place
during thfa period may be relied upon for assessing the annual
value under s. 127 (a) of the Act.
In the present case as the Rem Control .Act, 1950, came
into force before assessment was finally determmed the Corporation had no power to fix the annual value of the

## Text

3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
49
- ..
THE CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA
-
'
......
v.
SM. PADMA DEBI AND OTHERS
(B.P. SINHA, C.J., K. SuBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL
and J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Assessment-Determining annual value of property-Basis
of-If could be increased above standard rent-" At the time of
assessment'', Meaning of-Hypothetical rent-Open market, if
includes 'black market'-'Black market' Meaning of-West Bengal
Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 (W. B.
XVII of 1950), ss. 2(10) (b), 33 (a)-Calcu/la Municipal Act,
1923 (Ben, 3 of 1923), ss. 127 (a), 131, UO.
The Calcutta Corporation in fixing the annual valuation
of the respondents premises took as basis Rs. 1,450/- as the
monthly value of the premises. The respondent filed objection
to the said assessment under s. 139 of the Calcutta Municipal
Act, 1923. Meanwhile, under the West Bengal Premises Rent
Control (Temporary Provision) Act, 1950, the standard rent
of the said premises was fixed by the Rent Controller at
Rs. 632/8;- per month, with effect from August 1951.
One of
the objections raised was that the Corporation had no power
to fix the annual valua\ion at a figure higher than the standard
rent.
The objection was disallowed and the assessment was
confirmed. On appeal the Small Causes Court fixed the annual
valuation for the purpose of assessrnent on the basis of the
standard rent. Corporation went up in appeal to the High
Court which was dismissed. Thereafter the Corporation came
up in appeal by special leave.
The Corporation contended that under s. 127 (a) of the
Actj the (Jorporati0n has to ascertain only the hypothetical rent
realisable from a hypothetical tenant at the time of the assessment and not the actual rent payable at the time by any tenant,
and therefore it is not bound to take into consideration the
standard rent fixed under Rent Control Act. Corporation also
raised a subsidiary point as to the precise meaning of the
phrase "at the time of assessment"
occurring in the said
section.
Held, that on a fair reading of the express provisions of
s. 127 (a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, the rental value
,..
cannot be fixed higher than the standard rent under the Rent
Control Act.
Held, further, that the words 'gross annual rent at which
the land or building mi~ht at the time of a~sessment re11~on11bly
1961
Auguat 8.
1961
The Co1poratitn1
of Caleulta
v.
Sn1. Pad1na Debi
50
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
[1962]
be expected to let from year to year' in s. 127 (a) of the Act
implies that the rent which the landlord might realise if the
house was let is the basis for fixing the annual value of the
building. The criterion is the rent realisable by the landlord
and not the value of the holding in the hands of the trnant.
The value of the property to the own.r is the 'tandard in
making the assessment.
The word 'reasonably' is not capable of precise ddinition;
in ultimate analysis it is a question of fact. Whether a particular
act is rca.sonable or not depends on the circumstances in a given
situation. A bargain lxt\\'CCn a \villing lessor and a 'Y•il!ing
lessee uninfluenced by any extraneous circumstances may nfl'ord
a guiding test of reasonableness.
A law of the land with its penal consequences cannot be
ignored in ascertaining the reasonable expectation of a landlord
in the 1natter of rent, and must necessarily be taken as one of
the circun1stanccs obtaining in the open market placing an
upper limit on the rate of rent for which a building can reasonably be expected to be let.
In the situation, a statutory limitation of rent circumscribes the scope of the bargain in the
market. In no circumstances the hypothetical rent can exceed
the limit.
The phrase 'at the time of assessment' means that the
asses!lment commences with the making of the valuation under
s. 131 of the Act and ends with the determination of the
objection under s. 140 thereof. An event which takes place
during thfa period may be relied upon for assessing the annual
value under s. 127 (a) of the Act.
In the present case as the Rem Control .Act, 1950, came
into force before assessment was finally determmed the Corporation had no power to fix the annual value of the premises
higher than the standard rent.
Corporation of Calcutta v. AshutOlh Deo (1927) 31 C.W.N.
864 and The Municipal Corporation of the City of Rangoon v.
The Surati Bara Bazzar Company Mmite.d. ( 1923) I. L. R.
1 Rang.
668 and Be11gal l>:agpur Railu:ay Company Limited
v. Corporation of"Calcufta ( 1946) I.. R. 74 I. A. 1, approved.
Secrtfary of ,,late v. Madras Mu1ticipality, (1886) I. L. R.
l 0 Mad. 38, Poplar As,.s.sment Comt1Httee v. RolH!rta, (J 922)
~A. C. 93, MonglU1ramJiwandaa v. Municipal Corporation of
the City of Bomliay, I. L. R. (1951) Born. 713 and The Madurai
Municipality v. Kamakahiaundaram CM.tfiar, (1955) II M. L.J.
399, referred 19.
..
-
•
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
51
<-
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 268 of 1958,
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
June 15, 1956, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal
from Original order No. 349 of 1953.
N. C. Chatterjee and S. Ghose, for the .'\ppel-
• !ant.
,
B. P. Maheshwari, for respondents Nos. 1, 2
and 4.
1961. August 8. The .Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
SuBBA RAO, J.-This appeal by CX'rtificate
from the order of the High Court at Calcutta raises
the question of the true interpretation of the
provisions of s. 127(a.) of the Calcutta Municipal
Act, 1923 (hereinafter called the Act).
The respondents are the owners of premises No. 296, Bowbazaar Street, Calcutta. The
Corporation
of
Calcutta
fixed the
annual
~ valuation of the said premises at a sum of
Ha. 14,093 and directed the same to take effect
from the second quarter of I 950-51. In fixing the
annual valuation, the said Corporation took as
basis Rs. 1,450 as the monthly rental value of the
premises. On June 20, 1950, notice of the assessment based on the said annual valuation was
~ servud on the respondents. Respondent No. 1 filed
objections to the said assessment under s.139 of
the Act.
Meanwhile under the West Bengal
Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provision) Act,
1950 (W.B. XVII of 1950), (hereinafter called the
Rent Control Act), the standard rent of the said
premises was fixed by the Rent Controller: the rent
was fixed at Rs. 550 per month with effect from
;.April, 1951, and at Rs, 632-8-0 per month with
effect from August, 195 I. One of the objections
raised was that the Corporation had no power to
1961
The Corporation
of Calcutta
v.
Sm. PC«Zma Debi
Sul1l11r Rao J.
1961
TM Corporation
oJ Calcutta
v.
Sm. Pad ma Debi
Sul>ba Raa J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
(lll62]
fix the annual valuation at a figure higher than .•
the standard rent. The Special Officer disallowed
all the objections and confirmed the assessment.
Being aggrieved by the said order, respondent
No. I filed an appeal in the Court of Small Causes,
Calcutta, and the learned Small Causes Judge
allowed tho appeal and fixed the annm1l valuation,
for the purpose of assessment, at Rs. 6,831.
That
was on the basis of the standard rent of Rs. 632-8-0
per month. The Corporation of Calcutta questioned
the correctness of the said J udgmcnt by preferring an
appeal to the High Court at Calcutta. The High Court
by a majority agreed with the Small Causes Judge and
dismissed the appeal. H<'nce the present appeal.
The main contention of Mr. K. C. Chatterjee,
learnt>d counsel for the appellant Corporation, is
that under s. 12i(a) of the Act the Corporation
has to aacertain only the hypothetical rent realisable from a hypothetical tenant at the time of
assessment and not tho actual rent payable at
that time by any tenant, and therefore it is not
bound to take into consideration the standard
rent fixed under the Rent Control Act.
A subsidiary point raised in the appeal is
as to the precise meaning of the phrase "at the
time of assessment" occurring in s.127(a) of the
Act.
•
The problem presented depends for
its
solution on the interpretation of the provisions of
!
1.127(a.) of the Act.
The said section reads:
"the annual value of land, and the
annual value of any building erect€d for
lotting purposes or ordinarily let, shall be
deemed to be the gross annual rent at which
the land or building might at the time of
assessment reasonably be expected to let
from year to year, less, in the case of a
"
building, a.n allowance of ten per cent for
the cost of repairs and for all other expen1011
-
-
..
-
3 £.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
necessary to maintain the building in a state
to command such gross rent."
We shall first look at the provisions of the sE ction
to ascertain the meaning. The crucial words are
"gross annual rent at whir:h the land or building
might at the time of assessment reasonably be
~ expected to let from year to year". The dictionary
meaning of the words "to let", is "grant use of for
rent or hire". It implies that the rent which the
landlord might realise if the house was let is the
basis for fixing the annual value of the building.
The criterion, therefore, is the rent realisable by
the landlord and not the value of the holding in
" the hands of the tenant. This aspect has been
emphasized by the Judicial Committee in Bengal
Nagpur Railway Company Limited v. Corporation of
Calcutta('). The question for determination in that
case was whether the assessment of a certain
premises to the consolidated rate was made in
accordance with the provisions of s.127(a) of the
Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923. There the plot in
question was a vacant land occasionally used by the
• member of Railway Officer's Club for practice of
the gamo of Golf. It was bought by the Railway
Company not for present use but to be kept in re·
serve against the company's future requirement. The
Corporation assessed the land on the basis of rental
value of land in the neighbourhood. It was argued
that the premises ought to be valued on the basis
)
of rent which would be paid by a hypothetical
tenant who must be presumed to keep the land
vacant, or at the most use it as an imperfect golf
eourse. The Judicial Committee rejected the contention and made the following observations at p. 5 :
"Indeed, it provides a striking example
of the danger attending an injudicious use of
precedent. The owner of land in England
is not chargeable with rates, as owner, at all.
If he leaves land vacant and unoccupied, he
(I) [1946] L. R. 74 I. A. I.
1961
The Corporation
of Calcutta
v.
Sm. Padma IJebi
SubfJa Rao J.
J9Cl
'l'he Cc.r1){fraiio11
of Calcutta
v.
Sm. I'ndm.•J. Debi
Subba Uno J.
-
54
.SUPHEllIE COURT REPOll'I'S
[I 9621
pays no rates.
llndcr the Calcutta Act mere·•
ownership carries with it a liability to pay
one-half of the rate assessed on tho anuuiil
viilnc of the land. It i" impossible to construe s.127 as meaning that, when land is
unoccupied, its annual value must be taken
to ho the rent at which it might be expected
to be let to a tenant who was precluded from
•
occupying it.
11iere is nothing in the words
of the Rectio1; to suggest that ii hypothetical
tenancy of so improbable a character waR
contemplated, and tho elahornte provisions
of s.151 can hardly have been
framed in
order to reduce by" half, for the benefits of
the non occupying. owner, what would already
he a merely nominal sum."
The same princip!I' was accepted by n division
bench of th!· 1\Iaclra:; High Court as <'arly as 1886
in Secretar11 of State
\".
Madrr1.~ .Municipality(•).
Section I 23 of the City of Jlfadrni; J\Iunicipal A<'t
(]\[ad. I of I 884) which was similar in it A terms to
s.12/(a) of the Cak:ntta J\fuuicipal Art, 1923, ran
as follows:
"The gross annual
rent at which a.
building or Janel might reasonably be expected
to !Pt from month to month or from year t-0
year shall for
the
purposPH of assPHSm!'nt
under this Act he deemed to be the annual
,-aluo of such building or land."
Thn learned .Judges i11 «on8truing thr "aid Roction
observed thus at JI. 41 :
"The Htandanl of value iH certainly the
v!lluc of the property to the owner which is
to
be measured, whether he orcupies the
•
-
-. '
property himself or lets it out to a tenant by
,
the amount of rent per annum it \f"Ould be ...
worth to a hypothetical tenant."
(I) [1886] 1.L.R. 10 Mad. 38.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
55
Mukherjee, J., in Corporation of Calcutta v. Ashutosh
De (1), accepted the said principle and applied the
same in construing s.127(a) of the Act though
Roy, J., differed from
him. We would, with
respect, accept the said principle in the construction of the said section and hold that the value of
the property to the owner is the standard
m
making the assessment thereunder.
The word "reasonably" in the section throws
further light on this interpretation.
The word
"reasonably" is not capable of precise definition.
"Reasonable" signifies "in accordance with reason."
In the ultimate analysis it is a question of fact.
Whether a particular act is reasonable or not
depends on the circumstances in a given situation.
A bargain between a willing lessor and a willing
lessee uninfluenced by any extraneous circumstances
may afford a guiding test of reasonableness. An
inflated or deflated rate of rent based upon fraud,
emergency, relationship, and such other considerations may take it out of the bounds of reasonableness. Equally it would be incongruous to consider
•
fixation of rent beyond the limits fixed by penal
legislation as reasonable. Under the Rent Control
Act,
the receipt of any rent higher than the
standard rent fixed under the Act is made penal
for the landlord. Section 3 of the said Act says
that any amount in excess of the standard rent of
any premises shall be irrecoverable notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. Section 33(a)
thereof provides inter alia that "whoever knowingly
receives, whether directly or indirectly, any sum
on account of the rent of any premises in excess of
the standard rent" will be liable to certain
penalties. "Standard rent" has been defined in
2(10)(b) to mean that "where the rent has been
fixed under s. 9, the rent so fixed , or at which it
"'
would have been fixed if application were made
(l) (1917) 31 C.W.N. 864.
1961
Th, Co,porntion
of Calcutta
v.
Sm. Padm.a Debi
Subba Rao J.
1961
The Cor-poraliotl
of CakuJta
v.
Sni. Padm~ Debi
S lib'.J Rao J.
SUPREME OOURT REPoRTS
(1962]
under the said section." A combined reading of the
said provisions lem·cs no room for doubt that a
contract for a rent at a rate l1ighcr than the
standard rent is not onh- not enforceable but also
~hat the landlord woulrl ho .committing an offenco
1f he collccte<l
a rent above the rate of the
standard rent. One may l('gitimatcly i;ay under
those
circumstances
that a
landlord ran not
reasonably be expected to let a building for a rent
higher than the standard rent.
A la\\· of the lan<l
with its penal eonst!CJtienccs cannot be ignored in
ascertaining the reasonable expectations of a landlord in the matkr of rent. In this view, the law of
the land mu&t ncccssarih· be takP11 as one of the
circumstance8 obtaining ' in
the open
market
placing an upper limit 011 the rate of rent for which
a building can reasonably be expected to let.
It is said that ~.12i(a) does 11ot contemplate
the actual rent received u\" a lamllord but a
hypothetical rent which he can r<'asonauly uc
expected to rcceiYO if the uuilding is let. So
state<l the proposition is unexceptionaulc. Hypothetical rert may uc dcscriued as a rent which a
landlord may reasonauly be expected to get in the
open market. But an open market cannot include
a "black market", a term euphemistically used to
commercial transactions entered
into
between
parties in defiance of law. In that situation, a
Rtatutory limitation of rent cirnumscriucs the scope
of the bargain in the mark0t. In no circumstances
the hypothetical rent can exceed that limit.
Strong reliance is placed by learned counsel
for the appellant on the <lecision of the House of
Lords in Poplar Assessment Committe.r. v. Roberts (')
in support of the contention that the standar<l rent
fixed under th~ Rent Control Act shall not be taken
into account in <letcrmining the valuation for rating
purposes.
There, it was held that in arriving at
(I) [1922J 2 A. C. 93, 104, 107, 116, 118, Ill.
• -
•
>
·.
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
151
+ the valuation of a hereditament under s. 4 of the
Valuation (Metropolis) Act, 1869, the maximum
gross value to be assigned to the hereditament was
not limited to the standard rent of the hereditament within the meaning of the Rent Restrictions
Act, 1920.
One of the noble Lords, Lord Carsqn,
dissented from the majority view. It is not
necessary to consider that case in detail except to
note the passages in the judgments of the learned
Lords emphasizing upon the peculiar aspect of the
English Law of rating.
Lord Buckmaster stated :
"From the earliest time it is the inhabitant who has to be taxed. It is in respect of
his occupation that the rate is levied, and
the standard in the Act is nothing but a
means of finding out what the value of that
occupation is for the purposes of assessment."
Lord Atkinson observed :
"What the ratepayer is, under both the
Act of 183fi and that of 1869, rated in respect
of is decided by many cases in this House to
be the beneficinJ occupation of a hereditament."
Lord Sumner declared :
"Rating is a process between an occupier
and a rating authority, to the determination
of which the landlord and the lessee are
,
strangers."
Lord Parmoor stated thus :
"Under 43 Eliz. c. 2, rates are to be
levied upon every occupier of lands, houses
etc. The distinction between occupier and
?wner, in this connection, is
of primary
nnportance.
The occupation value of proA.
perty may be, and often is, distinct from its
value to the owner. This distinction would
probably be emphasized . where an artificial
Iil61
The· CorJ>Oration.
of Calcutta
v.
Sni. Padma Debi
Subb'a Rdo J;
1961
Tho Corporal""
•! C.UuUa
y,
Sm. Padota Debi
58
SUl?REME COURT R'.EPORTS
(1962(
statutory maximum is fixed and a statutorv
.
'
.
restriction rirc,·enti; an owner from recovering
from any tenant a greater amount, aR rent,
than the statutory maximum."
These passages bring out ;n bold relief the distinc·
tion between the English and the Indian law which
has already been pointed out by the Judicial
Committee in Bengal Nagpur Railu·ay Company
Limited '" Corporation of Calcmta (').
That is why,
while in England the Yalu<> of occupation by a.
tenant iR the crit('l'ion for fixing the standard rent
under the rating law, under the Act the letting
value of a building tu tho lan<llord iR the standard
in fixing tlw rental Yaluc. If this distinction iR
home in mind much of th•· doud cast in tbiR case
i" diHpclled.
ft would he instructive to quote the
weighty ubsen·atioui; of Atkin, L. J., as he then
was, whi<"h were apprond by Lord Carson in his
dissenting judgm<'nt ; and they arc :
"If no hii;thcr rent than the standard rent
and statutmv increases is enforceable, as a
matter of c·ommon sense that seems to be the
limit of the rent a tenant can be rcasonablv
t>xpccted to giw ................ "
•
"How then is the annual rent to be
ascertained ? It is ohviouH that the definition
presupposes that the premises arc deemed to
be vacant anrl arc deemed to be capable of
lX'ing let."
Accepting the Hnid
observations, Lord Carson
proceeded to observe,
"I cannot pcrnuade myself that it is
possible to ask the assessment authority to
enter into such super-speculative and hypothe·
tical regions, and I am of opinion that
the only rent we have to consider is a. rent
de J°'ure recoverable and not a
voluntary
promise which cannot be enforced."
(I) (19+6) L. ll. 741.A. I.
-
•
,
-
•
-
•
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
59
With great respect to the other learned Lords, we
are inclined to agree with the observations of
Atkin, L. J., as approved by Lord Carson. That
apart, the majority view can easily be distinguished
on the peruliar principle of rating obtaining in
England which is fundamentally different from
that accepted under the Act. There is another
difference between the English law and the Indian
law: under the English Act of 1920, payment of
rent in excess of the
statutory
rent
was
not barred and the landlord might
receive
the same, but under the Rent Control
Act
receipt of a higher rent than the standard rent
is penalised ; that is, while in England a contract
to pay a higher rent may not by enforceable
in a Court of law, it is not unlawful, but in India
it is
both unenforceable and unlawful.
This
difference is of vital importance in judging the
reasonableness of a landlord's expectations to get
a particular rent.
The Bombay High Court in Mongharam
Jiwandas v . . Municipal Corporation of the City· of
Bombay (1) and the Madrns High Court in The
1lfadurrzi
Municipality
v.
Kamakshisund.aram
Chettiar (') followed the majority judgment of the
House of Lords in Poplar Assessment Committee
Case (') while the Rangoon High Court in The
Jfunicipal Corporation of the City of Rangoon, v. The
Surriti Bara Bazzar Company Limited (') and the
Calcutta High Court in the present case distinguished the said decision. We would prefer to accept
the view expressed by the Calcutta and Rangoon
High Courts, as the decisions of the said Courts
are based upon a correct appreciation of the
distinction between the law of rating in England
and that under the Act.
-'
It is said that, as under s. 9(l)(b) of the Rent
(l) l.L.R. [1951] Born. 713.
(2) (1955) II M.L.J. 369.
(3) (1922) 2 A.C. 93, 104, 107, 116, 118. 125.
(4) (1923) J.L.R. I Rang. 668.
1961
'l'he Corporation
of Calcutta
v.
Sm. Padma Del. i
Subba Rao J.
1961
The Corporation
of CalcuUa
v.
.Sn•. Padma Debi
Subba llao J.
60
l:lUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l962]
Control Act the landlord can get tho Htandard rent
raiRPd by an amount equivalent to the increase in
taxes, rates or ccssc,, there would not be any
prejudice eycn if the annual v(Lluc of the building
is fixed on the basis of (l, rnte of rent higher than
that permissible under the said Act.
But
this
reasoniug would laud
us in a
v1mous
circle
and would enable one to circumvent the provisions
of the Rent Control Act, for though a tenant is
not liable under an Act to pay a rent higher than
the standard rent, by thio; proecss he wou Id bo
compelled to pay a higher rent. On tho other
~and, the scope of th(l,t section can legitimately
be confined to situations gi,·ing rise to increase of
taxes such as the increase in the rate, etc.
Nor are we impressed by the argument that
the omission of a specific provision, as in s.26 of
the Calcutta Rent Act of 1920, prohibiting the
Calcutta Corporation from making assessment of
any rent higher than the rent fixed by the Rent
Controller in the subsequent Acts would inevitably
lead to the conclusion that thC' omission implies
the conferment of such a power.
Section 26 of
the Calcutta Rent Act, 1920 (Ben. III of 1920)
debars the Corporation of Calcutta and other
local bodies from raising the annual value of any
premises above the standard rent ; but the life of
that Aet expired in the year 1926.
For many
years thereafter there were no Ront Control Acts
in Bengal ; but some Rent Control Acts came to be
passed in the years 1942, 1943 and 1946. In 1950,
Act XVII of 1950 was passed to make better provision for the control of rents of premises in Calcutta
and in certain othor (l,rcas in West Bengal. The
said Act was amended hy subsequent Acts and was
finally repealed by Act XII of 1956. It may be
mentioned that in the subsequent Acts there was
no prohibition similar to that contained in s. 26
of the Calcutta Rent Act of 1920. It may also
be st&kd that there is no such prohibition in tho
..
..
-
..
-
t"
-
•
•
)
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
61
Municipal Act of 1923.
But when that Act was
repealed and replaced by the Calcutta Municipal
Act, 1951) W. B. XXXIII of 1951), a proviso waa
added to s.168( 1) to the effect, that in respect of
any land or building, the standard rent of which
has been fixed under s.9 of the lient Control Act
of 1950, the annual value under s.168 ( 1) shall
not exceed the annual amount of standard rent
so fixed. It may be noticed from the history of
t),e legislation that when the Calcutta Municipal
Act, 1923, was passed, the Calcutta Rent Act of
1920 was still in force. Section 128 of the Calcutta
Municipal Act, 1923, laid down the criteria for
fixing the annual value tinder that Act and perhaps
it was found not necessary to incorporate therein
the prohibition contained in s.26 of the Rent
Act of 1920. But that in itself cannot mean that
the absence of such an express prohibition would
imply that but for such a corresponding provision
of the Rent Act the section should be understood as
free from such a prohibition. The intention of the
Legislature depends upon the interpretation of the
words used in s.127(a) of the Act and not on the
provisions of another Act. On the other
hand,
the Legislature, which must be presumed to have
had knowledge that the Calcutta Rent Act of 1920
would expire within three years from the commencement of the Municipal Act of 1923, and also have
been aware that former Act contained such a
prohibition, if it intended to remove any such
prohibition during those three years or even thereafter, would have expressly made a provision to
that effect in the Municipal Act, 1923.
On the
other hand, the phraseology of the section must
have been designedly used wide enough to comprehend such a prohibition. Indeed, when the
Act was repealed in 1951 by Act XXXIII of 1951,
what was implicit in s.127(a) was made explicit
in the proviso to s.168(1) of that Act. We cannot, therefore, draw any implied prohibition from
1981
Phe Corporation
of Oal<JUla
v.
Sm. PadmaDebi
SubbaRao J.
196]
The Corporalion
of Calcutta
v.
Sm. Padma Debi
Subba Rao J.
G'.!
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
the history of the legislation. In the result, we
hold, on a fair rlladi11g of the express provision of
s.l:2i (a) nf the Act in
th~ Jicrht of the decisions
.
0
cons1<lercd, that the r<'ntal ndue cannot he fixed
higher than the Rtanrlarcl r0nt
under the Rent
Control Act ..
Th<' next question is, what is the meaning
of the phrase "at the time nf assessment" occurring in s.12i(a) of the Act.. The majority view of
the High Court was that as8CSfment commences
with the making of the valuation under s. l:ll of
the Art ancl ends with the dc,termination of the
objection under s.140 thereof, anrl t.hat an event
vrhirh took place during thii; period may be relied
upon for assessini; the annual vahic unr!cr >d2i(a)
of the Act. The correctness of this view has not
seriously been contestccl before us.
'l'hat apart,
for the reasons mentio11ed by Lahiri an<l Sen, J.T.,
thRt conulu8ion is justified on the provisions of the
Act.
No other question iR raisecl. The appeal fails
ancl is dismissed with costB.
APJieal dismisBed.
A:\1AR JYOTI STONE CJH~STING CO.
t'.
THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHER::i
(R. r. sn<nA, c .. J., s. K. DAs, A. K. SAHKAR,
N. RAJAGOPAJ.A AYYA!S'GARandJ.R. MvDHOLKAn,J.T.)
Quorry·-Refusal of permit.-01,.nership "f mf~ral•-Pr~
sumplion-I'unjab Land RP>'fnue Act, 1881
().:~II of 1881)
d. 42.
The appellant had been granted a permit by the Collec:
tor for quarrying stone upto June 30, 1957 under the Delhi
Minor Mineral Rule& 1938 framed under s.155(1) ofthe
Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1837.
On the expiry of the tcrr:i
of this permit the appellant applied for another permit but 1t
W-' refused on the ~ound that the land ha<;! been inelu\lcc;\
..
•
•