# The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar & Another

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 490
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-04-16
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 5200 of 2025
- **Bench:** J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-correspondence-rbanms-educational-institution-v-b-gunashekar-another-38890
- **Pages:** 34

## Headnote

Issue arose as regards the correctness of the order passed by the
High Court and the trial court rejecting the application filed by the
appellant u/Ord.VII r.11(a) and (d) CPC for the rejection of plaint.
Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Ord.VII r.11 - Rejection of
plaint - Appellant Institute in possession of suit property since
1905 - Respondents filed suit seeking permanent injunction
restraining appellant from creating any third-party interest
over the property based on an alleged agreement to sell
executed by respondents with a third party - Respondents paid
Rs.75,00,000/- in cash as advance - Appellant filed application
u/Ord.VII r.11 seeking rejection of plaint - Both the trial court
and the High Court rejected the same - Correctness:
Held: Agreement for sale does not confer any right to the purchaser
to file a suit against a third party who is either the owner or in
possession, or who claims to be the owner and to be in possession -
Respondents' claim suffered from multiple fatal defects - No privity
between the respondents and the appellant - Suit at the instance
of the respondents not maintainable and only the vendors could
have approached the court for a relief of declaration - Respondents
had no legal right that could be enforced against the appellant as
their claim impliedly barred by virtue of s.54 of TPA - Respondents
not in possession and the appellant in settled possession for over
a century, suit for bare injunction by proposed transferee not
maintainable - Respondents, being mere agreement holders, had
no personal interest in the suit schedule property that could be
enforced against third parties - No declaratory relief was sought -
Respondents sought only relief of permanent injunction restraining
* Author
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the appellant from alienating the property, without a declaration
affirming the title of their vendors - Without possession and without
seeking a declaration of title, not only the suit is barred but the
cause of action also fictitious - High Court without noticing the
said defects in the plaint, dismissed the application filed by the
appellant - When the defects go to the root of the case, barred
by law with fictitious allegations and are incurable, no amount of
evidence can salvage plaintiffs' case - Furthermore, public interest
implications of the instant case are significant consideration - Such
institutions must be protected from speculative litigation that can
drain their resources and impede their charitable work - Allowing
suits like the instant one to proceed to trial, would waste judicial time
and resources, and encourage similar speculative and extortionate
litigations - Respondents having paid Rs.75,00,000/- by cash,
despite the introduction of s.269ST IT Act and the amendment to
s.271 DA, not only creates suspicion on the transaction, but also
displays violation of law - Ignorance in fact is excusable but not
the ignorance in law - Thus, the plaint ought to have been rejected
u/Ord. VII r.11(a) and (d) - Orders passed by the High Court as
well as trial court rejecting the application filed by the appellant,
cannot be sustained in law and is set aside - Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 - s.52, 53-A, 54. [Paras 15.1-20]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Ord.VII r.11 - Rejection of
plaint - Scope:
Held: Ord. VII r.11 serves as a crucial filter in civil litigation,
enabling courts to terminate proceedings at the threshold where
the plaintiff's case, even if accepted in its entirety, fails to disclose
any cause of action or is barred by law, either express or by
implication - There is a bounden duty on the Court to discern
and identify fictitious suit, which on the face of it would be barred,
but for the clever pleadings disclosing a cause of action, that
is surreal - Generally, sub-clauses (a) and (d) are stand alone
grounds, that can be raised by the defendant in a suit - However,
it cannot be

## Text

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[2025] 5 S.C.R. 94 : 2025 INSC 490
The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution
v.
B. Gunashekar & Another
(Civil Appeal No. 5200 of 2025)
16 April 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards the correctness of the order passed by the
High Court and the trial court rejecting the application filed by the
appellant u/Ord.VII r.11(a) and (d) CPC for the rejection of plaint.
Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Ord.VII r.11 - Rejection of
plaint - Appellant Institute in possession of suit property since
1905 - Respondents filed suit seeking permanent injunction
restraining appellant from creating any third-party interest
over the property based on an alleged agreement to sell
executed by respondents with a third party - Respondents paid
Rs.75,00,000/- in cash as advance - Appellant filed application
u/Ord.VII r.11 seeking rejection of plaint - Both the trial court
and the High Court rejected the same - Correctness:
Held: Agreement for sale does not confer any right to the purchaser
to file a suit against a third party who is either the owner or in
possession, or who claims to be the owner and to be in possession -
Respondents' claim suffered from multiple fatal defects - No privity
between the respondents and the appellant - Suit at the instance
of the respondents not maintainable and only the vendors could
have approached the court for a relief of declaration - Respondents
had no legal right that could be enforced against the appellant as
their claim impliedly barred by virtue of s.54 of TPA - Respondents
not in possession and the appellant in settled possession for over
a century, suit for bare injunction by proposed transferee not
maintainable - Respondents, being mere agreement holders, had
no personal interest in the suit schedule property that could be
enforced against third parties - No declaratory relief was sought -
Respondents sought only relief of permanent injunction restraining
* Author
[2025] 5 S.C.R.
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the appellant from alienating the property, without a declaration
affirming the title of their vendors - Without possession and without
seeking a declaration of title, not only the suit is barred but the
cause of action also fictitious - High Court without noticing the
said defects in the plaint, dismissed the application filed by the
appellant - When the defects go to the root of the case, barred
by law with fictitious allegations and are incurable, no amount of
evidence can salvage plaintiffs' case - Furthermore, public interest
implications of the instant case are significant consideration - Such
institutions must be protected from speculative litigation that can
drain their resources and impede their charitable work - Allowing
suits like the instant one to proceed to trial, would waste judicial time
and resources, and encourage similar speculative and extortionate
litigations - Respondents having paid Rs.75,00,000/- by cash,
despite the introduction of s.269ST IT Act and the amendment to
s.271 DA, not only creates suspicion on the transaction, but also
displays violation of law - Ignorance in fact is excusable but not
the ignorance in law - Thus, the plaint ought to have been rejected
u/Ord. VII r.11(a) and (d) - Orders passed by the High Court as
well as trial court rejecting the application filed by the appellant,
cannot be sustained in law and is set aside - Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 - s.52, 53-A, 54. [Paras 15.1-20]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Ord.VII r.11 - Rejection of
plaint - Scope:
Held: Ord. VII r.11 serves as a crucial filter in civil litigation,
enabling courts to terminate proceedings at the threshold where
the plaintiff's case, even if accepted in its entirety, fails to disclose
any cause of action or is barred by law, either express or by
implication - There is a bounden duty on the Court to discern
and identify fictitious suit, which on the face of it would be barred,
but for the clever pleadings disclosing a cause of action, that
is surreal - Generally, sub-clauses (a) and (d) are stand alone
grounds, that can be raised by the defendant in a suit - However,
it cannot be ruled out that under certain circumstances, clauses
(a) and (d) can be mutually inclusive - When clever drafting veils
the implied bar to disclose the cause of action; it then becomes
the duty of the Court to lift the veil and expose the bar to reject
the suit at the threshold - Power to reject a plaint under this
provision is not merely procedural but substantive, aimed at
preventing abuse of the judicial process and ensuring that court
96
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time is not wasted on fictitious claims failing to disclose any cause
of action to sustain the suit or barred by law - Merely including
a paragraph on cause of action not sufficient but rather, on a
meaningful reading of the plaint and the documents, it must
disclose cause of action - Plaint should contain such cause of
action that discloses all necessary facts required in law to sustain
the suit and not mere statements of fact which fail to disclose a
legal right of the plaintiff to sue and breach or violation by the
defendant(s). [Paras 14-15]
Constitution of India - Art. 141 - Applicability of the ratio laid
down by this Court, irrespective of the stage at which it is
relied upon:
Held: Ratio laid down by this court, is applicable irrespective of
the stage at which it is relied upon - Ratio is relevant and not
the stage - Once a ratio is laid down, the courts have to apply
the ratio, considering the facts of the case and once, found to be
applicable, irrespective of the stage, the same has to be applied,
to throw out frivolous suits. [Para 15.2.3]
Income Tax Act, 1961 - s.269ST - Penalty on cash receipt
of more than 2 lakh - Purpose and application of s.269ST -
Issuance of directions by the Supreme Court:
Held: s.269ST was introduced to curb black money by digitalising
the transactions above Rs.2,00,000/- - Most times, such
transactions go unnoticed or not brought to the knowledge of the
income tax authorities - Ignorance in fact is excusable but not
the ignorance in law - Thus, issuance of directions that whenever
suit filed with claim that Rs. 2,00,000/- and above is paid by cash
towards any transaction, the courts must intimate the same to
the jurisdictional Income Tax Department to verify the transaction
and the violation of s.269ST, if any' - Income Tax authority to take
appropriate steps if such cases come to their notice - Whenever,
a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- and above is claimed to be paid by cash
towards consideration for conveyance of any immovable property
in a document presented for registration, the jurisdictional SubRegistrar to intimate the same to the jurisdictional Income Tax
Authority - Whenever, it comes to the knowledge of any Income Tax
Authority that a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- or above has been paid by
way of consideration in any transaction relating to any immovable
property from any other source or during the course of search or
[2025] 5 S.C.R.
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assessment proceedings, the failure of the registering authority to
be brought to the knowledge of the Chief Secretary of the State/
UT for initiating appropriate disciplinary action against such officer
who failed to intimate the transactions. [Para 18.1]
Case Law Cited
Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra Dead throught
LRs. & Anr. [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 817 : (2004) 8 SCC 614; Suraj
Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Another [2011] 11
SCR 848 : (2012) 1 SCC 656; K. Basavarajappa v. Tax Recovery
Commissioner, Bangalore & Others [1996] Supp. 7 SCR 523 :
(1996) 11 SCC 632; Jharkhand State Housing Board v. Didar Singh
& Another (2019) 17 SCC 692; Premji Ratansey Shah & Others v.
Union of India & Others [1994] Supp. 2 SCR 117 : (1994) 5 SCC
547; T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal & Another [1978] 1 SCR
742 : (1977) 4 SCC 467; P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha
Reddy & Others [2015] 1 SCR 1108 : (2015) 8 SCC 331; Soumitra
Kumar Sen v. Shyamal Kumar Sen & Others (2018) 5 SCC 644;
Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through
legal representatives [2020] 5 SCR 694 : (2020) 7 SCC 366; Om
Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India & Another [2006] Supp. 3
SCR 803 : (2006) 6 SCC 207; Cosmos Co. Operative Bank Ltd v.
Central Bank of India & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 352; Anathula
Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs and others [2008] 5
SCR 331 : AIR 2008 SC 2033 - referred to.
List of Acts
Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Specific Relief Act, 1963; Income
Tax Act, 1961; Contract Act, 1872; Registration Act, 1908.
List of Keywords
Agreement to sell immovable property; Consideration in cash;
Rejection of plaint; Suspicious circumstances surrounding the
agreement; Title; Fictitious suit; Abuse of judicial process; Privity
between parties; Relief of declaration; Vendors not parties to
suit; Personal interest; Right to sue; Incurable defects in case;
Fictitious cause of action; Public interest implications; Impeding
charitable work; Curbing black money; Digital economy; Budget
speech 2017; Dark economy; Finance Bill 2017; Cap on cash
transactions; Ignorance in law.
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Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5200 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.06.2022 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRP No. 130 of 2021
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Asmita Singh, Tushar Nair.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Abraham Mathews, S Shivaprasad, Nishe Rajen Shonker.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted.
2.
The present appeal challenges the order dated 02.06.2022 passed
by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru1 in Civil Revision
Petition No.130 of 2021, whereby the High Court dismissed the
revision petition filed by the appellant against the order of the trial
Court dated 11.06.2021 rejecting their application filed under Order
VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19082 for
rejection of the plaint.
3.
On 12.08.2022, when the matter was taken up for consideration,
this Court has passed the following order:
"Issue notice, returnable in six weeks.
There will be stay of the operation of proceedings in OS
No.25968 of 2018 pending before the Court of XIII Addl.
City Civil & Sessions Judge, MayoHall Unit, Bengaluru
(CCH-22) till the next date of hearing."
1
Hereinafter referred to as "the High Court"
2
For short, "CPC"
[2025] 5 S.C.R.
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3.1. On 22.11.2024, the aforesaid interim order was extended by this
Court and is in force till date.
BRIEF FACTS
4.
The appellant viz., R.B.A.N.M.S. Educational Institution, was established
in the year 1873 as a public charitable trust, dedicated to serving firstgeneration learners from marginalized communities in urban Bangalore.
In 1905, a significant parcel of land, then known as 'the Sappers
Practice Ground,' was leased to the appellant. Subsequently, in 1929,
this property was formally conveyed to the appellant by the Municipal
Commissioner of Civil and Military Station of Bangalore. Since then,
the appellant has been in continuous possession of the said property,
utilizing it for various educational purposes including Pre-University
Colleges, first-grade degree colleges, and sporting facilities serving
both their institutions and the youth of Bangalore.
5.
The respondents filed a suit bearing O.S.No.25968 of 2018 against the
appellant, before the City Civil Court and Sessions Judge at Bangalore,
seeking permanent injunction restraining the appellant from creating
any third-party interest over the suit schedule property, based on an
alleged agreement to sell executed by the respondents and Ramesh
S. Reddy with one Maheshwari Ranganathan and others, in respect of
the suit schedule property, on 10th April, 2018 for a sale consideration
of Rs.9,00,00,000/-, for which, they claim to have paid Rs.75,00,000/-
as an advance payment. It was alleged in the plaint that the appellant
was trying to manipulate the title deeds of the suit schedule property
with an intention to alienate or dispose of the same to third parties.
6.
After service of summons, the appellant filed an application bearing
I.A. No. 3 of 2018 under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC, seeking
rejection of the plaint, inter alia stating that the respondents are only
agreement holders and not owners of the suit schedule property
and that, mere execution of an agreement to sell does not create or
confer any right or interest in the property in favour of the proposed
purchasers.
7.
The respondents filed their objections to the aforesaid application
filed by the appellant.
8.
Upon hearing both sides, the trial Court rejected the aforesaid
application seeking rejection of the plaint on 03.06.2020. Challenging
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the same, the appellant preferred C.R.P. No. 205 of 2020, which was
allowed in part, by the High Court vide order dated 19.11.2020. The
operative portion of the order reads as under:
"The petition is allowed in part. The impugned order dated
3.6.2020 in O.S.No.25968/2018 on the XIII Additional City
Civil and Sessions Judge, Mayohall Unit, Bengaluru is set
aside. The petitioner's application filed under Order VII
Rule 11(a) and (d) of Code of Civil Procedure is restored
for reconsideration calling upon the Civil Court to decide
on merits of the application in accordance with law in the
light of the grounds urged in an expedited manner but
within an outer limit of three months from the date of first
hearing after this order."
9.
Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the trial Court reconsidered the
application filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC and
ultimately, rejected the same, on 11.06.2021. Aggrieved by the
same, the appellant preferred Civil Revision Petition No. 130 of
2021 before the High Court and the same also ended in dismissal
by the order impugned herein. Therefore, the appellant is before us
with the present appeal.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the
alleged agreement to sell, which forms the fundamental basis of
the suit, cannot create any interest in the suit schedule property as
per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In this regard,
the learned counsel relied on the judgment in Rambhau Namdeo
Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra Dead throught LRs. & Anr.,3 wherein,
this Court held that a mere agreement to sell does not create any
interest in the property. This position was further reinforced in the
judgment in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana
& Another4, which reiterated that a contract for sale merely confers
a limited right under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882. The learned counsel also highlighted the practical application
of this principle in K. Basavarajappa v. Tax Recovery Commissioner,
3
(2004) 8 SCC 614
4
(2012) 1 SCC 656
[2025] 5 S.C.R.
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Bangalore & Others,5 in which, it was held by this Court that a
proposed vendee with an agreement to sell lacks locus standi to
challenge third-party rights.
10.1. The learned counsel emphasized the suspicious circumstances
surrounding the alleged agreement to sell i.e., the purported
vendors have not been made parties to the suit, their addresses
were conspicuously absent in the plaint, and the entire advance
payment of Rs.75 lakhs was claimed to have been made in
cash without any documentary proof. Additionally, the learned
counsel invited our attention to the respondents' pattern of
filing similar suits in respect of the other valuable properties in
Bangalore, suggesting a systematic attempt at land grabbing
through dubious agreements to sell.
10.2. The learned counsel further pointed out impropriety of
maintaining a pure injunction suit where title itself is in dispute.
Citing the decision of this court in Jharkhand State Housing
Board v. Didar Singh & Another,6 the learned counsel contended
that when there is a cloud over title, a suit merely for injunction
without seeking declaration of title is not maintainable. Referring
to the decision in Premji Ratansey Shah & Others v. Union of
India & Others,7 the learned counsel contended that Section
41(h) and (j) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, bars grant of
injunction when equally efficacious relief is available through
other means and when the plaintiffs have no personal interest
in the property. Ultimately, the learned counsel submitted that
applying the ratio laid down in the decision in T. Arivandandam v.
T.V. Satyapal & Another8 to the facts of the present case, the
plaint is barred by law and does not disclose a right to sue
against the appellant herein on the basis of an agreement to
sell executed by the respondents, with third parties.
10.3. With these submissions and case laws, the learned counsel
prayed that this appeal will have to be allowed and the suit
filed by the respondents deserves to be rejected under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC.
5
(1996) 11 SCC 632
6
(2019) 17 SCC 692
7
(1994) 5 SCC 547
8
(1977) 4 SCC 467
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11. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents would
submit that at the stage of considering an application under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC, the court must confine itself to the averments in
the plaint without examining the defense or other external materials.
Placing reliance on the decisions in P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P.
Neeradha Reddy & Others9 and Soumitra Kumar Sen v. Shyamal
Kumar Sen & Others,10 the learned counsel proceeded to argue that
the plaint's averments must be accepted as true at this stage, and
the defendant's objections are immaterial.
11.1. According to the learned counsel, the suit was filed to protect
the respondents' legitimate interests over the property in
question under the agreement to sell, apprehending alienation
of the property by third parties. Further, the learned counsel
distinguished the decisions cited by the appellant, particularly
that in Rambhau Namdeo Gajre (supra) and contended that
it was decided after full trial and examination of evidence,
unlike the present case where the cause of action stems
from the agreement itself. The learned counsel also sought to
differentiate the decision in T. Arivandandam (supra) noting that
unlike that case which involved vexatious litigation following
lost eviction proceedings, the present matter involved genuine
rights under a registered agreement to sell. The learned counsel
further submitted that rejection of plaint is a drastic remedy that
should be exercised sparingly, only when the plaint is manifestly
vexatious and meritless; and that, the proper course would
be for the appellant to file a written statement and contest
the suit on merits, rather than seeking rejection of the plaint
at the threshold.
11.2. It is further submitted that both the Courts below have examined
the plaint in the light of Order VII Rule 11 (a) CPC to ascertain
that it does indeed make out a valid cause of action, i.e., that
the Respondents have acquired an interest in the property by
virtue of the agreement to sell dated 10.04.2018 and hence,
if the claim of the appellant is that they hold a valid title to the
property, it is for them to prove the same during trial.
9
(2015) 8 SCC 331
10
(2018) 5 SCC 644
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11.3. The learned counsel also submitted that the appellant is
misguided in asserting that the provisions of Section 53-A of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 act as a bar against parties
or interlopers who are not party to the transaction envisaged
in that section. That apart, the decision in K. Basavarajappa
(supra) does not apply to the facts of the present case, for
that the same was about whether an agreement to sell will
stand in the way of the property being sold under auction for
tax recovery purposes and the same cannot and should not
be used as a device to defeat the suit at the threshold.
11.4. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the impugned
order of the High Court does not require any interference at
the hands of this court.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
12. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides and
perused the materials available record.
13. Seemingly, the appellant institution's journey began nearly 150
years ago, and its possession of the disputed property dates back
to 1905, when it was initially leased and subsequently conveyed by
the Commissioner of Civil and Military Station of Bangalore. The
present dispute arose when the respondents filed a suit in O.S. No.
25968 of 2018 seeking permanent injunction against the appellant.
The respondents' claim rests entirely on an agreement to sell dated
10.04.2018, purportedly executed by certain individuals who, notably,
are not parties to the suit. The appellant, confronted with this litigation,
filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC seeking
rejection of the plaint. Both the trial court and the High Court rejected
the said application filed by the appellant. Hence, this appeal came
to be filed by the appellant before us.
14. Let us first examine the scope and purpose of Order VII Rule 11
CPC.11 This Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali
11
"11. Rejection of plaint.- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases-
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the
valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped,
and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be
fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
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(Gajra) dead through legal representatives12, explained in detail the
applicable law for deciding the application for rejection of the plaint.
The relevant paragraphs of the said decision are reproduced below:
"23.1 ...
23.2. The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an
independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is
empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold,
without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a
trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied
that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds
contained in this provision.
23.3. The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that
if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is
barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not
permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings
in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put
an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time
is not wasted.
23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi13 this Court held
that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this
provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless,
and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to
waste judicial time of the court, in the following words :
(SCC p.324, para 12)
"12. ...The whole purpose of conferment of such power
is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and
bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to
occupy the time of the Court, and exercise the mind
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9:
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite
stamp paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the
plaintiff was prevent by any cause of exceptional nature for correction the valuation or supplying the
requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend
such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff."
12
(2020) 7 SCC 366 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 562
13
1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC
OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823
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of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not
be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without
point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation,
the Court readily exercises the power to reject a
plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action."
23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a
civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions
enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly
adhered to.
23.6. Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the
Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause
of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint14 read
in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether
the suit is barred by any law.
23.7. Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of
documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his
suit, which reads as under:
"14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or
relies.- (1)Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or
relies upon document in his possession or power in
support of his claim, he shall enter such documents
in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint
is presented by him and shall, at the same time
deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed
with the plaint.
(2) Where any such document is not in the possession
or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible,
state in whose possession or power it is.
(3) A document which ought to be produced in Court
by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to
be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the
plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly,
shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received
in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
14
Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. V. M.V. Sea Success I (2004) 9 SCC 512
106
[2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document
produced for the cross examination of the plaintiff's
witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to
refresh his memory."
(emphasis supplied)
23.8. Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the
documents filed alongwith the plaint, are required to be
taken into consideration for deciding the application under
Order VII Rule 11(a). When a document referred to in the
plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated
as a part of the plaint.
23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the Court
would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are
contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding
whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is
made out.
23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in
the written statement and application for rejection of the
plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be
adverted to, or taken into consideration15.
23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order VII
Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are
taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied
upon, would the same result in a decree being passed.
This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I
Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success I which reads as : (SCC
p.562, para 139)
"139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action
or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether
it does or does not must be found out from reading
the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments
made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be
correct. The test is as to whether if the averments
made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their
entirety, a decree would be passed."
15
Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr. (2004) 3 SCC 137
[2025] 5 S.C.R.
107
The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution v.
B. Gunashekar & Another
23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co.16 the Court
further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence
or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance,
and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The
plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or
subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima
facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark
upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact.
D.Ramachandran v. R.V.Janakiraman17.
23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found
that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit,
and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be
justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11
CPC.
23.14. The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be
exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either
before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to
the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held
by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of
Maharashtra18. The plea that once issues are framed, the
matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this
Court in Azhar Hussain (supra).
23.15. The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in
nature. It states that the plaint "shall" be rejected if any of
the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If
the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause
of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court
has no option, but to reject the plaint.
24. "Cause of action" means every fact which would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order
to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of
material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove
in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit.
16
(2007) 5 SCC 614
17
(1999) 3 SCC 267
18
(2003) 1 SCC 557
108
[2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
24.1. In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam19
this Court held:
"24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which
if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff
to prove an order to support his right to a judgment
of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts,
which taken with the law applicable to them gives
the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It
must include some act done by the defendant since
in the absence of such an act, no cause of action
can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual
infringement of the right sued on but includes all the
material facts on which it is founded"
(emphasis supplied)
24.2. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal20 this Court
held that while considering an application under Order VII
Rule 11 CPC what is required to be decided is whether
the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something
purely illusory, in the following words: (SCC p. 470, para 5)
"5. ...The learned Munsif must remember that if on
a meaningful - not formal - reading of the plaint it is
manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of
not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise
his power under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care
to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled.
And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a
cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing ..."
(emphasis supplied)
24.3. Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery
Appellate Tribunal21 this Court held that law cannot permit
clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action.
What is required is that a clear right must be made out
in the plaint.
19
(2005) 10 SCC 51
20
(1977) 4 SCC 467
21
(1998) 2 SCC 170
[2025] 5 S.C.R.
109
The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution v.
B. Gunashekar & Another
24.4. If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has
created the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in
Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal22 held
that it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation
will end at the earliest stage. The Court must be vigilant
against any camouflage or suppression, and determine
whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse
of the process of the court.
.....
28. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab
v. Gurdev Singh23 held that the Court must examine the
plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued
to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the
plaint is within time. The words "right to sue" means the
right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. The
right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises.
The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the
suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal
threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom
the suit is instituted. Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that
where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to
be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected."
14.1. Thus, it is clear that the above provision viz., Order VII Rule 11
CPC serves as a crucial filter in civil litigation, enabling courts
to terminate proceedings at the threshold where the plaintiff's
case, even if accepted in its entirety, fails to disclose any cause
of action or is barred by law, either express or by implication.
The scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC and the authority of the
courts is well settled in law. There is a bounden duty on the
Court to discern and identify fictitious suit, which on the face
of it would be barred, but for the clever pleadings disclosing
a cause of action, that is surreal. Generally, sub-clauses (a)
and (d) are stand alone grounds, that can be raised by the
defendant in a suit. However, it cannot be ruled out that under
certain circumstances, clauses (a) and (d) can be mutually
22
 (2017) 13 SCC 174
23
 (1991) 4 SCC 1 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1082
110
[2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
inclusive. For instances, when clever drafting veils the implied
bar to disclose the cause of action; it then becomes the duty of
the Court to lift the veil and expose the bar to reject the suit at
the threshold. The power to reject a plaint under this provision
is not merely procedural but substantive, aimed at preventing
abuse of the judicial process and ensuring that court time is
not wasted on fictitious claims failing to disclose any cause
of action to sustain the suit or barred by law. Therefore, the
appeal before us requires careful consideration of the scope of
rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, particularly,
in the context of the suit filed based on an agreement to sell
against third parties in possession.
15. Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC mandates rejection of the plaint where it
does not disclose a cause of action. In Om Prakash Srivastava v.
Union of India & Another,24 this Court pointed out that cause of
action means every fact which, if traversed, would be necessary
for the plaintiff to prove in order to support their right to judgment.
It consists of bundle of facts which narrate the circumstances and
the reasons for filing such suit. It is the foundation on which the
entire suit would rest. Therefore, it goes without saying that merely
including a paragraph on cause of action is not sufficient but rather,
on a meaningful reading of the plaint and the documents, it must
disclose a cause of action. The plaint should contain such cause of
action that discloses all the necessary facts required in law to sustain
the suit and not mere statements of fact which fail to disclose a legal
right of the plaintiff to sue and breach or violation by the defendant(s).
It is pertinent to note here that even if a right is found, unless there
is a violation or breach of that right by the defendant, the cause of
action should be deemed to be unreal. This is where the substantive
laws like Specific Relief Act, 1963, Contract Act, 1872, and Transfer
of Property Act, 1882, come into operation. A pure question of law
that can be decided at the early stage of litigation, ought to be
decided at the earliest stage. In the present case, the respondents'
claim based on an agreement to sell. The legal effect of such an
agreement must be examined in light of Section 54 of the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882, which explicitly states that a contract for the
sale of immovable property does not, of itself, create any interest
24
(2006) 6 SCC 207
[2025] 5 S.C.R.
111
The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution v.
B. Gunashekar & Another
in or charge on such property. This principle has been consistently
upheld by this Court in the following judgments:
(i) Rambhau Namdeo Gajre (supra)
"13. The agreement to sell does not create an interest of
the proposed vendee in the suit property. As per Section
54 of the Act, the title in immovable property valued at
more than Rs 100 can be conveyed only by executing a
registered sale deed. Section 54 specifically provides that
a contract for sale of immovable property is a contract
evidencing the fact that the sale of such property shall
take place on the terms settled between the parties, but
does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such
property. It is not disputed before us that the suit land
sought to be conveyed is of the value of more than Rs
100. Therefore, unless there was a registered document of
sale in favour of Pishorrilal (the proposed transferee) the
title of the suit land continued to vest in Narayan Bapuji
Dhotra (original plaintiff) and remain in his ownership.
This point was examined in detail by this Court in State
of U.P. v. District Judge [(1997) 1 SCC 496] and it was
held thus : (SCC pp. 499-500, para 7)
"7. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival
contentions we find that the High Court with respect
had patently erred in taking the view that because
of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act the
proposed transferees of the land had acquired an
interest in the lands which would result in exclusion
of these lands from the computation of the holding
of the tenure-holder transferor on the appointed day.
It is obvious that an agreement to sell creates no
interest in land. As per Section 54 of the Transfer of
Property Act, the property in the land gets conveyed
only by registered sale deed. It is not in dispute that
the lands sought to be covered were having value
of more than Rs 100. Therefore, unless there was a
registered document of sale in favour of the proposed
transferee agreement-holders, the title of the lands
would not get divested from the vendor and would
112
[2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
remain in his ownership. There is no dispute on this
aspect. However, strong reliance was placed by
learned counsel for Respondent 3 on Section 53-A
of the Transfer of Property Act. We fail to appreciate
how that section can at all be relevant against the third
party like the appellant State. That section provides
for a shield of protection to the proposed transferee
to remain in possession against the original owner
who has agreed to sell these lands to the transferee
if the proposed transferee satisfies other conditions
of Section 53-A. That protection is available as a
shield only against the transferor, the proposed
vendor, and would disentitle him from disturbing the
possession of the proposed transferees who are
put in possession pursuant to such an agreement.
But that has nothing to do with the ownership of
the proposed transferor who remains full owner of
the said lands till they are legally conveyed by sale
deed to the proposed transferees.