# The decision di this Court in Dr. Gopal Das Verma v. Dr. s. K

- **Citation:** [1970] 1 S.C.R. 9
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-03-14
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 661 of 1966
- **Bench:** J.C. Shah, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-decision-di-this-court-in-dr-gopal-das-verma-v-dr-s-k-4742
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1958 s. 14(1)(h)-Premises let for
residence..cum-business to tenant1 predecessor-in-interest
Tenant acquiring residetdial premises-Tenant establishes same business whether liable
to be evicted.
Landlord and Tenant-Premises let for residence-cum...busi'ness to pre-
<lecessor-in-interest of tenant-Tenant acquires residential premises-Establishes business after a break-If liable to be evicted.
The predecessor-in-interest of the respondents who was a
practising
advocate1 took on rent certain premises for residence. He could with the
written consent of the appellant-landlord set up his professional office also
there. After the death of their predecessor-in-interest the respondents lived
in the premises and sometimes later two of the respondents qualified as
law)'ers and started having an office in the premises. The appellant filed
a suit for the·1 respondents' eviction on the ground that the respondents badi
acquired a "suitable residence" by building a large residential house and
were liable to be ejected under s. 13 ( 1) (h) of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent
Control Act, 1952. During the pendency of the suit the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 came into force and u,nder s. 14(1) (h) of the Act, the word.
"suitable" was omitted. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding
that
since the premises had been let out to their predecessor-in-interest not for·
residential purpose alone but also for business purposes, no eviction could.
bo ordered under the provisions of s. 13(l)(h) of the old Act ors, 14(1}
(hJ of the new Act. The first appellate Court, and the High Court in
revision affirmed the order of the trial Court. Dismissing the appeal this
Court,
HELD : Assuming, that s. 14(1) (h) of the new Act, applied, having
regard to its language, the original tenant in the present case was one who
was in occupation of premises which were used for a composite purpose
namely, residence and profession.
There could, therefore, be no evictio~
merely by acquisition of vacant possession of a residence by such a tenant
and tho position would be the same with regard to his heirs and legal representatives, the present respondents. Section 14 (I )(h) can apply only
where a tenant is in occupation of premises which are only residential:
then alone he would have to go if he acquires or has residential accommo:
dation of his own. [14 Fl
The decision di this Court in Dr. Gopal Das Verma v. Dr. s. K.
Bhardwaj [19621 2 S.C.R. 678 applied apprositely to this case. The test of
dominant intention with regard to the use of the premises was not applied
in Dr. Gopal Das Verma's case. [13 F-G; !SA]
·
In view of the finding of the courts below that the premises had been
let to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents for reside.nce-cumprofession, the submi'ision that the permission was personal to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent, which came to an end on his death
could not be entertained. [15 El
Ll2Sup.CJ/69-2
iO
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 1 S.CR

## Text

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KARTAR SINGH
v,
CHAMAN LAL & OTHERS
March 14, 1969
[J.C. SHAH AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1958 s. 14(1)(h)-Premises let for
residence..cum-business to tenant1 predecessor-in-interest
Tenant acquiring residetdial premises-Tenant establishes same business whether liable
to be evicted.
Landlord and Tenant-Premises let for residence-cum...busi'ness to pre-
<lecessor-in-interest of tenant-Tenant acquires residential premises-Establishes business after a break-If liable to be evicted.
The predecessor-in-interest of the respondents who was a
practising
advocate1 took on rent certain premises for residence. He could with the
written consent of the appellant-landlord set up his professional office also
there. After the death of their predecessor-in-interest the respondents lived
in the premises and sometimes later two of the respondents qualified as
law)'ers and started having an office in the premises. The appellant filed
a suit for the·1 respondents' eviction on the ground that the respondents badi
acquired a "suitable residence" by building a large residential house and
were liable to be ejected under s. 13 ( 1) (h) of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent
Control Act, 1952. During the pendency of the suit the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 came into force and u,nder s. 14(1) (h) of the Act, the word.
"suitable" was omitted. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding
that
since the premises had been let out to their predecessor-in-interest not for·
residential purpose alone but also for business purposes, no eviction could.
bo ordered under the provisions of s. 13(l)(h) of the old Act ors, 14(1}
(hJ of the new Act. The first appellate Court, and the High Court in
revision affirmed the order of the trial Court. Dismissing the appeal this
Court,
HELD : Assuming, that s. 14(1) (h) of the new Act, applied, having
regard to its language, the original tenant in the present case was one who
was in occupation of premises which were used for a composite purpose
namely, residence and profession.
There could, therefore, be no evictio~
merely by acquisition of vacant possession of a residence by such a tenant
and tho position would be the same with regard to his heirs and legal representatives, the present respondents. Section 14 (I )(h) can apply only
where a tenant is in occupation of premises which are only residential:
then alone he would have to go if he acquires or has residential accommo:
dation of his own. [14 Fl
The decision di this Court in Dr. Gopal Das Verma v. Dr. s. K.
Bhardwaj [19621 2 S.C.R. 678 applied apprositely to this case. The test of
dominant intention with regard to the use of the premises was not applied
in Dr. Gopal Das Verma's case. [13 F-G; !SA]
·
In view of the finding of the courts below that the premises had been
let to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents for reside.nce-cumprofession, the submi'ision that the permission was personal to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent, which came to an end on his death
could not be entertained. [15 El
Ll2Sup.CJ/69-2
iO
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 1 S.CR
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 661 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order d.1ted
December 8, 1964 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at
Delhi in Civil Revision No. 92-D of 1962.
S. C.
Manchanda, S. K.
Mehta, and K. L. Mehta, for the
appellant.
Bishan Narain, I. S. Sawhney and M. R. Chhabra, fer the
respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Grover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment
of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench at New Delhi) dismissing
a petition for revision directed against the concurrent judgments
of the courts below dismissing the action for eviction filed by the
appellant against the respondents from a premises on Ajmal Khan
Road, Karol Bflgh, New Delhi.
The facts may be succinctly stated. By means of a rent deed
dated February 13, 1950 the appellant, who is the owner of the
suit premises inducted as a tenant Labha Mal Arora, now deceased, who was a practising Advocate. Clauses (2) and (6) of
the rent deed were in the following terms :-
"2. TI1at the tenan1 agrees to use the property for his
residence.
6. That the tenant shall not assign or sublet the
above said property or any part thereof without the
written consent of the landlord, or utilise the Property
for any purpose other than that mentioned above."
On the same date a letter Ex. D-2 was written by the appellant
to the late Labha Mal Arora saying:
"As per our oral talk regarding your tenancy for my
house No. 6/64, I have no objection your having your
professional office "alongwith residence" there provided
it is not inconsistent with the provisions of Delhi Improvement Trust Act."
It appears and it has been so found, that Lablia Mal Arora who
had his office at a different place shifted the same to the suit
premises where he was residing with his family.
He died in the
year 1952. Till 1952 the premises were being used only for residence by his sons and widow. In August 1957 Chamanlal responden! no. l, wh~ qualified himself as a legal practioner, started
havmg an office m the premises. It would appear that the other
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KARTAR SINGH v. CHAMAN LAL (Grover, J.)
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son respondent No. 3 also started practising as a lawyer in the
same premises some time later.
On 21-11-1957 the appellent
served a notice on the sons and widow of the deceased Labha Mal
Arora that it has been learnt that they had constructed a doublestoreyed building in Naiwala Karol Bagh and that smce the suit
premises were required bona fide for the personal residence of
the appellant they should shift to their house and vacate the rented
premises.
This was followed by a second notice to the same
effect.
As the possession of the premises was not delivered tJ;ie appellant instituted a suit for ejectment against the responden'ts under ·
the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952_(hereinafter called
the old Act). Two grounds were taken for seeking eviction. One
was that the respondents had built a large residential house and
were liable to be ejected under S. 13(1)(h) of the old Act. The
second was that the premises were required bona fide for personal
use. It may be mentioned that the second ground was abandoned
in the trial· court. The suit was contested by the respondents on
the ground that the late Labha Mal Arora had taken the premises on rent for residence as we[] as for an office for professional
purposes and the premises had been used as residence-cum-office.
For this reason it was asserted that the construction of a residential house by the respondents did not furnish a ground for eviction.
During ihe pendency of the suit the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 (hereafter called the new Act) came into force.
Section
14(1)(h) which was equivalent to S. 13(l)(h) of the old Act contained the word 'suitable' which was omitted as it appeared before
the weird "residence" in S. 13(l)(h); the relevance and signIBcance
of that omission will be noticed presently. The trial court relied
inter alia on the letter Ext. D-2 and the statement of Chaman Lal
respondent according to whom two rooms were used-by the late
Labha Mal Arora as his office and another one room -was being
used by his clerk and held that the premises had been let for
"residence-cum-business purposes". The argument that the late
Labha Mal Arora had only been granted a licence to use the premises for professional purposes and that the licence came to an
end on his death, was repelled. It was found that the respondents had built a residential house, and since the premises in suit
had been let out to their predecessor-in-interest not for residential
purpose alone but also for business purposes no eviciton could
be ordered under the provisions of S. 13(l)(h) of the old Act or
s. _14( 1) (h) of the new Act. The Additional Senior Sub-Judge disnussed ~~e appeal pr~ferred by the appellant in ag;_eement with
!he dec1S1on of the tr;al court. The following portion from his
1udgrnent relating to the finding with regard to the purpose for
12
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] 1 S.C.R·
which the premises had been let out to the late Labha Mal Arora
may be reproduced:
"It is in evidence that prior to taking the premises
in suit on rent from the appellant, Labha Mal deceased,
was having his professional office as an advocate in Sadar
Bazar, Delhi, and on taking the premises In suit on
rent he had shifted his office in the suit premises. This
fact is fully supported by the statement of Shri Chaman
Lal, respondent No. 1, and the notices, Ex. D.W. 9/1,
and D.W. 912 issued by Shri Labha Mal from the suit
premises. Shri Chaman Lal has stated that out of the
five rooms of the suit premises, two rooms were used
by his deceased father as office. From the above also lt
is proved that the suit premises were let by the appellant
to Shri Labha Mal deceased for residence-cum-business
purposes."
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On the question of the ambit and scope of S. 13(l)(h) of the old
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Act the learned Judge expressed the opinion that it would be ·
unreasonable to hold that a tenancy which had been created both
for purposes of residence and carrying on a profession could be
successfully terminated merely by showing that the tenants had
acquired a suitable residence.
The appellant approached the High Court on the revisional
side.
J. S. Bedi, J. considered the rent deed Ext. P-3 and the
letter Ex. D-2 as also the other evidence and came to the same
conclusion at which the courts below had arrived. Reliance was
placed on the additional fact that when the suit was instituted the
premises were being used by Chama! Lal both for purposes of
residence and office.
Before dealing with the contentions raised on behalf of the
appellant it is necessary to refer to S. 13(1)(h) of the old Act and
S. 14(1)(h) and S. 57 of the new Act. Section I3(1)(h) of the
old Act contained a provision that if the Coun was satisfied inter
alia that the tenant had whether before or after the commencement
of the Act built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a
suitable residence it could order ejectment. In S. 14(l)(h) of the
new Act the only change that was made was that the word "suitable" before the word "residence" was omitted.
Under section
57 of the new Act notwithstanding the repeal of the old Act all
suits and other proceedings pending under that Act were to be
continu"d and disposed of in accordance with provisions of the
old Act.
According to the first proviso to sub-section (2) the
court or other authority "shall have regard to the provisions of
this Act." In Karam Singh Sobhi & A nr. v. Shri Pratap Chand
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KARTAR SINGH v. CHAMAN LAL (Grover, I.)
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& Anr.(') this Court had to consider the effect of what was
contained in S. 57 of the new Act. It was held that the effect
of the first proviso to S. 57(2) was that pending proceedings would
continue under the old Act with this addition that where the new
Act had slightly modified or clarified the previous provisions, those
modifications and clarifications would govern the case. Similarly
in Brij Kishore & Others v. Vishwa Mitter Kapur & Others(") it
was laid down that the first proviso to S. 57(2) of the new Act
must be read harmoniously with the substantive provisions of subs. (2) and the only way of harmonising the two was to read the
expression "shall have regard to the provisions of !his Act" as
merely meaning that. where the new Act had slightly modified or
clarified the previous provisions those modifications and clarification~ should be applied. These words did not take way what was
provided by sub-s. (2) and ordinarily the old Act would apply to
pending proceedings.
It has been contended by Mr. S. C. Manchanda for the appel·
!ant that the new section would be applicable as no radical departure has been made in S. 14(1) (h) by omission of the word "suitable" and that there was only slight modification or clarification
of the previous provision, namely, S. 13(1 )(h). In our opinion
whether S. 13 (1) (h) of the old Act or S. 14( 1 )(h) of the new Act
is applied the result, as will be prese.ntly seen, will be the same in
the instant case.
Coming to the question whether the suit premises were taken
by the late Labha Mal Arora for residence only or for residence
as well as for use as office for carrying on his professional work
of a legal practitioner, it may be observed that the concurrent finding of the court below. is that the premises had been taken for
residential-cum-business or profession~! purposes.
That finding
being one of the fact must be accepted as final. It would, therefore, seem that the decision of this Court in Dr. Gopal Das Verma
v. Dr. S. K. Bhardwaj and Another(') can be appositely appliec..
In that case it was held that a tenant could nof'be ejeeted under
S. 13(1)(h) because the tenancy _of premises let out or used for
residence and carrying on of profession could not be terminated
merely by showing that the tenant had acquired a suitable residence. There the premises had been let mlt to a doctor who was
an ear, nose and throat specialist. It was found that the premises
had been used by the tenant for professional as well as residential
purposes with the consent of the landlord.
The case, therefore
fell outsides. 13(1)(e) but even underS. 13(l)(h) eviction could
not be ordered. This is what was said in that connection.
(I) [1964] 4 S. C.R. 647.
(2) A. I. R. (52) 1965 S. C. 1574.
(3) ] 1962] 2 S. C. R. 678 at p. 685.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 1 S.C.R.
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"If the premises from which ejecunent is sought are
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used not only for residence but also for profession how
could s. 13(1)(h) come into operation? One of the purposes for which the tenancy is acquired is professional
use, and that cannot be satisfied by the acquisition of
premises which arc suitable for-residence alone, and it
is the suitability for residence alone which is postulated
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by s. 13(l)(h).
Therefore, in our opinion, it would
be unreasonable to hold that the tenancy which has been
created or used both for residence and profession can
be successfully terminated merely by showing that the
tenant has acquired a suitable residence."
Jn the above case this Court further held that S. 2(g) of the old
Act whkh defined the. word "premises" referred to three kinds of
user to which the premises c~n be put to i.e. residence, commerce
and any other purpose.
This necessarily included residence and
commerce combined.
Since it was shown that the premises had
been let both for residence and for commrecial purposes it did
not follow that the premises ceased to be premises under S. 2(g);
they continued to be premises under the last clause of that provision.
The dennition of 'premises' in the new Act is contained
in S. 2(1) and it is the same as in S. 2(g) of the old Act. The
word 'tenant' is defined by S. 2( I) of the new Act to mean "any
perscn by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any
premises is or but for a
special contract would be,
payable
............ " Having regard to S. 14(1 )(h) of the new Act the
original tenant in the present case was one who was in occupation
of premises which were used for a composite purpose, namely,
residence and profession.
There could, therefore, be no eviction
merely by acquisition of vacant possession of a residence by such
a tenant and the position would be_ the same with_ regzrd to his
heirs and legal representatives, the present respondents.
It is
quite clear that S. 14(l)(h) can apply only where a tenant is in
occupation of a premises which are oiily residential; then alone
he would have to go if he acquires or has residential accommodation of his own.
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Mr. Manchanda h'as next contended that the decision of this
Court in Dr. Gopa/ Das Verma's case(') is distinguishable because it appeared from various facts that the dominant intention
was to use the premises as a nursing home.
He submits that in
the present case the dominant intention was to use the premises as
residence and the late Labha Mal Arora wa5 merely given perH
mission or licence which was of a personal nature to have his
(I) [1962J 2 S.C.R.678atp.68S.
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KARTAR SINGH v. CHAMAN LAL (Grover, /.)
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office as well there. We are unable to find that any test of dominant intention was applied in Dr. Gopal Das Verma's case(').
The position in England is different where premises are let
partly for business purposes and partly l'or residence. There the
statutory provisions lay down that where a dwelling is let partly
for business purposes and partly for residence, the Rent Act applies
to the whole('). Moreover where there is no covenant as to nser
and the question is what nser was contemplated, the Court will
infer what use was contemplated by the tenancy agreement; the
test was "the main purpose" or "predominant inteinion" or "the
prevailing contemplation" or "a preponderating contemplation"
for the letting.(') (ibid, p. 69).
We are unabl.e to derive any
assi<:tance from the English cases on the point.
Lastly Mr. Manchanda sought to raise the question of the
permission contained in the letter Ext. D-2 being a licence which
was personal to late Labha Mal Arora and which should be deem·
ed to have come to an end on his death. It is further pointed out
)hat afte~ his death for a i;iumber ofsears the respondents used
the premises purely for residence. In view of the finding of the
~ol!rts below that the premises had been let to the predecessorm-mterest of the respondents for residence-cum-business or profession, this submission cannot be entertained.
. For al( the above reasons this appeal fails and it is dismissed
with costs.
Y.P.
Appeal dismissed.
(1) (19621 2 S. C. R. 678 at p. 685.
(2) (See the Rent Acts by R. E. Megarry Q. C. Tenth Edition pp. 87-88.)