# THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI, BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. MAHESH AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [2021] 9 S.C.R. 1123
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2021-11-10
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 6673-6674 of 2021
- **Bench:** A. M. Khanwilkar, Sanjiv Khanna
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-executive-engineer-gosikhurd-project-ambadi-bhandara-maharashtra-vidarbha-35296
- **Pages:** 39

## Headnote

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013:
ss. 25 and 24(1)(a) - Interpretation of s. 24(1)(a) -
Determination of period within which an award to be made - Held:
s. 11A of the 1894 Act and s. 25 of the 2013 Act prescribe two
different periods of limitation - If two year period for making an
award in terms of s.11A of the 1894 Act is applied to awards made
u/s. 24(1)(a), it may lead to practical absurdities and anomalies -
This would mitigate against the legislative intent behind prescription
of time for making of an award in respect of saved acquisition
proceedings initiated under the repealed 1894 Act - Therefore to
give effect and making the underlying intention of the Parliament,
the limitation for passing/making of an award u/s. 24(1)(a) would
be in terms of s. 25, which would commence from 01.01.2014, that
is, the date when the 2013 Act came into force - Awards passed u/s.
24(1)(a) would be valid if made within twelve months from
01.01.2014, subject to the caveat that a declaration which has
lapsed in terms of s.11A of the 1894 Act before or on 31.12.2013
would not get revived - Thus, the choice is exercised to arrive at a
just, fair and harmonious construction consistent with the legislative
intent - Rational approach so as to further the object and purpose
of ss.24 and 26 to 30 is required - On facts, publication of
declaration for land acquisition u/s. 6 of the 1894 Act, on 08.08.12
- On 01.01.14, the Act of 2013came into force and 1894 Act stood
repealed - On 30.10.14, award purportedly made in terms of s.
24(1)(a) - Writ petitions by landowners challenging the award -
High Court set aside the award holding that the acquisition
proceeding had lapsed since in terms of s. 11A award ought to have
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been passed within two years from the date of declaration-before
08.08.14; and that the award purportedly made on 30.10.14 was
backdated - Award purportedly dated 30.08.2014, was in any case
duly made on or before the extended date of 20.03.2015 - Period
of 79 days from 26.05.2014 when the High Court stayed operation
of the notification dated 19.03.2014, till the new notification dated
13.08.2014 was issued has to be excluded -- Thus, the award is
legal and valid and order passed by the High Court is set aside -
Land Acquisition Act 1894.
ss. 25, 24(1)(a) and 30 - Compensation u/s. 24(1)(a) -
Determination of - Explained.
s.24(1)(a) and 25 -Words "all the provisions relating to
determination of compensation" in s. 24(1)(a) - Meaning of - Held:
It would be read as including the period of limitation specified in s.
25 of the 2013 Act - Word 'all' and the expression "relating to"
used in s. 25 of the 2013 Act, are to be given a wide meaning to
ensnare the legislative intent - Words and phrases.
s. 24(1) - Interpretation of - Constitution Bench decision in
Indore Development Authority's case held that the 2013 Act operates
prospectively, and that s. 114 of the 2013 Act effects a repeal but
with certain savings, in accordance with s. 24 - Thus, the acquisition
proceedings are preserved under the 1894 Act till the stage of making
of the award - Where an award is not made, the provisions relating
to determination of compensation under the 2013 Act would apply;
where the award is made, proceedings would continue under the
provisions of the 1894 Act as if the said Act has not been repealed.
s. 24(2) - Interpretation of - Decision in Indore Development
Authority's case holding that where proceedings for acquisition had
been initiated under the 1894 Act but no award u/s. 11 of the 1894
Act had been made, the provisions of the 2013 Act would apply
limited to determination of compensation - Where, however, an
award had been made under the 1894 Act, s. 24(1)(b) protects the
vested rights of the parties - 2013 Act provides for higher
compensation along with provisions for rehabilitation, whic

## Text

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THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT
AMBADI, BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA
IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
v.
MAHESH AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal Nos. 6673-6674 of 2021)
NOVEMBER 10, 2021
[A. M. KHANWILKAR AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013:
ss. 25 and 24(1)(a) - Interpretation of s. 24(1)(a) -
Determination of period within which an award to be made - Held:
s. 11A of the 1894 Act and s. 25 of the 2013 Act prescribe two
different periods of limitation - If two year period for making an
award in terms of s.11A of the 1894 Act is applied to awards made
u/s. 24(1)(a), it may lead to practical absurdities and anomalies -
This would mitigate against the legislative intent behind prescription
of time for making of an award in respect of saved acquisition
proceedings initiated under the repealed 1894 Act - Therefore to
give effect and making the underlying intention of the Parliament,
the limitation for passing/making of an award u/s. 24(1)(a) would
be in terms of s. 25, which would commence from 01.01.2014, that
is, the date when the 2013 Act came into force - Awards passed u/s.
24(1)(a) would be valid if made within twelve months from
01.01.2014, subject to the caveat that a declaration which has
lapsed in terms of s.11A of the 1894 Act before or on 31.12.2013
would not get revived - Thus, the choice is exercised to arrive at a
just, fair and harmonious construction consistent with the legislative
intent - Rational approach so as to further the object and purpose
of ss.24 and 26 to 30 is required - On facts, publication of
declaration for land acquisition u/s. 6 of the 1894 Act, on 08.08.12
- On 01.01.14, the Act of 2013came into force and 1894 Act stood
repealed - On 30.10.14, award purportedly made in terms of s.
24(1)(a) - Writ petitions by landowners challenging the award -
High Court set aside the award holding that the acquisition
proceeding had lapsed since in terms of s. 11A award ought to have
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been passed within two years from the date of declaration-before
08.08.14; and that the award purportedly made on 30.10.14 was
backdated - Award purportedly dated 30.08.2014, was in any case
duly made on or before the extended date of 20.03.2015 - Period
of 79 days from 26.05.2014 when the High Court stayed operation
of the notification dated 19.03.2014, till the new notification dated
13.08.2014 was issued has to be excluded -- Thus, the award is
legal and valid and order passed by the High Court is set aside -
Land Acquisition Act 1894.
ss. 25, 24(1)(a) and 30 - Compensation u/s. 24(1)(a) -
Determination of - Explained.
s.24(1)(a) and 25 -Words "all the provisions relating to
determination of compensation" in s. 24(1)(a) - Meaning of - Held:
It would be read as including the period of limitation specified in s.
25 of the 2013 Act - Word 'all' and the expression "relating to"
used in s. 25 of the 2013 Act, are to be given a wide meaning to
ensnare the legislative intent - Words and phrases.
s. 24(1) - Interpretation of - Constitution Bench decision in
Indore Development Authority's case held that the 2013 Act operates
prospectively, and that s. 114 of the 2013 Act effects a repeal but
with certain savings, in accordance with s. 24 - Thus, the acquisition
proceedings are preserved under the 1894 Act till the stage of making
of the award - Where an award is not made, the provisions relating
to determination of compensation under the 2013 Act would apply;
where the award is made, proceedings would continue under the
provisions of the 1894 Act as if the said Act has not been repealed.
s. 24(2) - Interpretation of - Decision in Indore Development
Authority's case holding that where proceedings for acquisition had
been initiated under the 1894 Act but no award u/s. 11 of the 1894
Act had been made, the provisions of the 2013 Act would apply
limited to determination of compensation - Where, however, an
award had been made under the 1894 Act, s. 24(1)(b) protects the
vested rights of the parties - 2013 Act provides for higher
compensation along with provisions for rehabilitation, which should
not be taken away - Furthermore, full effect has to be given to the
provisions contained in s. 24 as it is not for the court to legislate -
Courts can and do, in appropriate cases, clear ambiguity in
legislations.
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Land Acquisition Act 1894: s. 11A - Two year period within
which award to be made u/s. 11A - Application of, even after repeal
- Held: s. 11A requires that an award u/s. 11 must be passed within
a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration
and if no award is so made, the proceedings for acquisition of land
would lapse - Period during which any action or proceedings to be
taken pursuant to the declaration is stayed by an order of a court is
to be excluded while calculating the period of two years.
Limitation: Statutes of limitation - Nature of - Held: Is
generally regarded as procedural as its object is not to create any
right but prescribe periods within which legal proceedings should
be instituted for enforcement of rights or adjudication orders should
be passed - Statutes of limitation have retrospective effect insofar
as they apply to all legal proceedings brought after they come into
force - However, the laws relating to limitation have been held to
be prospective since they do not have the effect of reviving the right
of action which is already barred on the date of their coming into
operation, nor do they have the effect of extinguishing a right of
action subsisting on the date - Thus, unless the language of the
provision dealing with period of limitation clearly manifests, in
express terms or by necessary implication, a contrary intention
divesting vested rights, such provision is to be construed as
prospective.
General Clauses Act, 1897: s. 6 - Effect of repeal - Discussed.
Interpretation of statutes: Retrospective application of statutes
- Constitution Bench decision in Indore Development Authority's case
holding that extent of retrospectivity would also depend upon the
degree of unfairness it causes to the parties - Absence of express
limiting words is not to be used as a basis for implying retrospective
operation as this would be reverse of the true presumption -
However, presumption in favour of retrospectivity may be necessary
when distinct implications typically arise in the context of the statute
which repeals a previous statute, and would leave a 'lacuna' if the
new statute were not construed as having retrospective effect - Statute
which is prospective in its direct operation cannot be called as
retrospective because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn
from time antecedent to its passing - Furthermore, for interpretation,
a construction which results in unreasonably harsh and absurd
results must be avoided.
THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,
BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION v. MAHESH
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Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Section 25 of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 would apply to the awards made and
published under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. The limitation
period for passing/making of an award under Section 24(1)(a) in
terms of Section 25 would commence from 1st January 2014,
that is, the date when the 2013 Act came into force. Period during
which the Court order would inhibit action on the part of the
authorities to proceed with the making of the award would be
excluded while computing the period under Section 25 of the
2013 Act. Accordingly, period of 79 days from 26th May 2014
when the High Court had stayed operation of the notification dated
19th March 2014, till the new notification dated 13th August 2014
was issued has to be excluded. The award purportedly dated 30th
October 2014, was in any case duly made on or before the
extended date of 20th March 2015. Hence, the concerned award
is valid. The State of Maharashtra may conduct an inquiry in
reference to the imputation regarding manipulation and
backdating of the subject award and take such remedial and
corrective action as may be necessary and to ensure such
situations do not arise in future.The impugned judgment setting
aside the award and holding that the acquisition proceedings had
lapsed is set aside. The acquisition proceedings had not
lapsed and the award is legal and valid. [Paras 40, 41][1160-G;
1161-A-E]
2.1 Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 requires
that an award under Section 11 must be passed within a period of
two years from the date of publication of the declaration and if no
award is so made, the proceedings for acquisition of land shall
lapse. As per the explanation, the period during which any action
or proceedings to be taken pursuant to the declaration is stayed
by an order of a court is to be excluded while calculating the
period of two years. [Para 5][1140-G-H]
2.2 Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 interdicts
the common law principle that an enactment after repeal is
ineffective as if it had never existed, except as to matters past
and closed. Section 6 is a general transitory provision that
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resurrects operation of the repealed law in terms of
comprehensive and broadly worded clauses (a) to (e). Clauses
(b), (c) and (e) of Section 6, in particular, state that the repeal
does not affect anything duly done or suffered under the repealed
enactment; any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or
accrued under any repealed enactment; or any investigation, legal
proceedings or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege,
obligation, liability, penalty, etc. Legal proceedings, investigation
or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any
penalty, punishment or forfeiture may be enforced as if the
repealed Act or regulation were still in existence notwithstanding
its repeal. However, the savings of Section 6 do not apply to some
extent or in entirety when the legislative intent is different. The
contrary intent can be expressed or gathered by necessary
implication. Further, the ambit of repeal cannot be wider than the
boundary envisaged by the repealing enactment. Therefore, a
comprehensive repeal may be limited if the repealing enactment
directly or by necessary implication clamours that it will not apply
to certain matters. [Para 7][1143-A-D]
2.3 Section 114 of the 2013 Act repeals the 1894 Act, which
ceases to be effective and applicable from the date of enforcement
of the 2013 Act. In terms of sub-section (2) to Section 114, the
repeal shall not act so as to prejudice or affect application of
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. However, the application
of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is subject to "save as
otherwise provided" by the 2013 Act. In other words, when it is
commanded or imperative by the provisions of the 2013 Act,
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is not to be given legal
effect. [Para 8][1143-E-F]
2.4 Sub-section (1) to Section 24 of the 2013 Act is a nonobstante clause. It confers the provision with an overriding status
over other provisions. Accordingly, in terms of Sections 24(1) of
the 2013 Act, Section 114 of the 2013 Act as well as Section 6 of
the General Clauses Act will not apply to the extent hindered by
Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. The reason is that s. 114 of the
2013 Act, while accepting the applicability of Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, makes its application subject to "save as
THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,
BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION v. MAHESH
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otherwise provided" in the 2013 Act. Further, s. 6 of the General
Clauses Act itself states that the general savings will not apply
when the legislative intent is contrary. [Para 9][1143-F-H]
2.5 Section 24(1) deals with two specific situations where
the land acquisition proceedings were initiated before the repeal
of the 1894 Act, namely: (i) where an award has been made, and
(ii) where an award has not been made. As per clause (b) to Section
24(1) where an award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has been
made, the proceedings would continue under the repealed 1894
Act, notwithstanding its repeal. In such cases, the 2013 Act will
not apply. Clause (b) to s. 24(1) is not applicable in the case at
hand as it is admitted that no award was made on or before 31st
December 2013. [Para 10][1144-A-C]
2.6 In the instant case, clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the
2013 Act would apply as the land acquisition proceedings initiated
under the 1894 Act had not culminated into an award till the repeal
of the 1894 Act. Section 24(1)(a) partly nullifies the legal effect of
savings under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act as it hybridizes
application of the 1894 Act and the 2013 Act. While preserving
validity of the acquisition proceedings by issue of declarations
under the 1894 Act, it states that all the provisions for
determination of compensation under the 2013 Act shall apply.
The section consciously saves the legal effect of the notifications
issued under Section 4 and/or Section 6 of the 1894 Act and
obviates the necessity to issue a fresh notification under the 2013
Act. This 'perseveration of the determination date' for the
computation of compensation for the awards made under Section
24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act is a thought through legislative invocation
that curtails time delays and cost escalation of infrastructure
projects, as well as checks the post-acquisition notification
malpractices, and at the same time ensures that the landowners
are entitled to the benefit of the enhanced compensation as per
the 2013 Act. [Para 11][1144-C-F]
2.7 Section 11A of the 1894 Act and Section 25 of the 2013
Act prescribe two different periods of limitation with adverse
consequences, as on failure to make the award the acquisition
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proceedings lapse. The choice is between Section 11A of the 1894
Act and s. 25 of the 2013 Act. Absence of precise words or express
declaration would not inhibit from interpreting and exercising
the right choice, keeping in view the language as also the object
and purpose of clause (a) to s. 24(1). In other words, effect and
meaning is to be given to the underlying intention of the
Parliament in the words "all the provisions relating
to determination of compensation" under the 2013 Act.
[Para 15][1146-B-D]
2.8 The words "all the provisions relating to determination
of compensation" in Section 24(1)(a) would be read as including
the period of limitation specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act.
To elaborate, the word 'all' and the expression "relating to" used
in Section 24(1)(a) are required to be given a wide meaning to
ensnare the legislative intent. Given this trend in interpretation,
the words "all the provisions of this Act relating to the
determination of compensation" must not be imputed a restricted
understanding of the word 'relating' only to the substantial
provisions on calculation of compensation, that is, Sections 26 to
30 of the 2013 Act. Rather, the expression should be given an
expansive meaning so as to include the provision on limitation
period for calculation of compensation, that is, Section 25 of the
2013 Act. [Para 16][1146-D-F]
The State Wakf Board, Madras represented by its
Secretary v. Abdul Azeez Sahib & Ors. AIR 1968
Madras 79; Navin Chemicals Mfg. and Trading Co.
Ltd. v. Collector of Customs (1993) 4 SCC 320:[1993]
2 Suppl. SCR 326; Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited
v. Amit Gupta and Others 2021 SCC Online SC 194;
Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Company
and Another (1984) 4 SCC 679 : [1985] 1 SCR 432;
Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain and Others v. Eknath Vithal
Ogale (1995) 2 SCC 665 : [1995] 1 SCR 996; M/s.
Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Others
(1988) 2 SCC 299 : [1988] 2 SCR 962; H.H.
Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia
Bahadur of Gwalior etc. v. Union of India & Anr. (1971)
1 SCC 85 : [1971] 3 SCR 9 - referred to.
THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,
BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION v. MAHESH
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[2021] 9 S.C.R.
2.9 Law of limitation is generally regarded as procedural
as its object is not to create any right but prescribe periods within
which legal proceedings should be instituted for enforcement of
rights or adjudication orders should be passed. Statutes of
limitation, therefore, have retrospective effect insofar as they
apply to all legal proceedings brought after they come into force.
However, the laws relating to limitation have been held to be
prospective in the sense that they do not have the effect of
reviving the right of action which is already barred on the date of
their coming into operation, nor do they have the effect of
extinguishing a right of action subsisting on the date. In this sense,
the limitation provisions can be procedural in the context of one
set of facts and substantive in the context of a different set of
facts. Therefore, unless the language of the provision dealing
with period of limitation clearly manifests, in express terms or by
necessary implication, a contrary intention divesting vested rights,
such provision is to be construed as prospective. In the context
of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, it is to be stated
that the said clause would apply only if the period for making of
an award had not ended and time was available as on 1st January
2014. Where and if the period for making of the award had already
lapsed before 1st January 2014, clause (a) to Section 24(1) would
not apply so as to deprive and deny the vested rights which have
already accrued in favour of the landowners. The instant case is
not of divesting of vested rights of the landowners on enactment
of the 2013 Act. [Para 17][1148-A-E]
2.10 Section 25 is a rule of procedure immediately following
Section 24 and a part of fasciculus of "all the provisions", from
Sections 25-30, "relating to determination of compensation".
Hence, the expression "all the provisions relating to the
determination of compensation" under the 2013 Act will
encompass Section 25. [Para 18][1148-F]
2.11 Given the object and purpose behind Sections 24, and
26 to 30 of the 2013 Act, practical absurdities and anomalies may
arise if the two-year period for making of an award in terms of
Section 11A of the 1894 Act commencing from the date of issue
of the declaration is applied to the awards to be made under
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Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. This would mitigate against the
underlying legislative intent behind prescription of time for
making of an award in respect of saved acquisition proceedings
initiated under the repealed 1894 Act, which is two-fold: (i) to
give sufficient time to the authorities to determine compensation
payable under the 2013 Act; and (ii) to ensure early and expedited
payment to the landowners by reducing the period from two years
under Section 11A of the 1894 Act to twelve months under Section
25 of the 2013 Act. In case of declarations issued in January 2012,
on application of Section 11A of the 1894 Act, the time to
determine compensation under the 2013 Act would vary from a
day to a month, and while in cases where the declarations were
issued within twelve months of the repeal of the 1894 Act, the
landowners would be at a disadvantage as an award beyond the
twelve-month period specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act would
be valid. In the first set of cases, given the onerous factual and
legal exercise involved in determination of compensation and
the need to issue notification under Section 26(2) of the 2013
Act, publication of the awards would be impractical. Hasty and
incorrect awards would be deleterious for the landowners. If the
awards are not pronounced, the acquisition proceedings would
lapse defeating the legislative intent behind Section 24(1)(a) of
the 2013 Act to save such proceedings. Therefore, the choice is
exercised to arrive at a just, fair and harmonious construction
consistent with the legislative intent. A rational approach so as
to further the object and purpose of Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of
the 2013 Act is required. Section 25 refers to publication of a
notification under Section 19 as the starting point of limitation.
In the context of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act there
would be no notification under Section 19, but declaration under
Section 6 of the 1894 Act. When the declarations under Section 6
are valid as on 1st January 2014, it is necessary to give effect to
the legislative intention and reckon the starting point. In the
context of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, declarations under
Section 6 of the 1894 Act are no different and serve the same
purpose as the declarations under Section 19 of the 2013 Act.
Consequently, in cases covered by clause (a) to Section 24(1) of
the 2013 Act, the limitation period for passing/making of an award
under Section 25 of the 2013 Act would commence from 1st
THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,
BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION v. MAHESH
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January 2014, that is, the date when the 2013 Act came into force.
Awards passed under clause (a) to Section 24(1) would be valid if
made within twelve months from 1st January 2014. This dictum
is subject to the caveat that a declaration which has lapsed in
terms of Section 11A of the 1894 Act before or on 31st December
2013 would not get revived. [Para 20][1149-E-H; 1150-A-F]
2.12 The submission of the land owners, relying upon Rule
19 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Settlement (Maharashtra) Rules,
2014, for giving a restrictive meaning and excluding Section 25
of 2013 Act is misplaced. This Rule states that the formula
provided in Sections 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act would apply where
a notification under Section 4(i) of the 1894 Act was issued before
31st December 2013, and an award has not been made before
the 31st December 2013. The Rule refers to the formula for
computation of compensation to be applied under Section 24(1)(a)
of the 2013 Act, but it does not follow that Section 25 which
prescribes the limitation for making of an award would not apply.
Section 25 of the 2013 Act applies to awards made under Section
24(1)(a) and the period of limitation of twelve months
would commence from 1st January 2014. [Para 21][1150-F-H;
1151-A-C]
2.13 The submission by the State that neither the period
for making of an award under Section 11A of the 1894 Act nor
Section 25 of the 2013 Act would apply, would result in a situation
which the legislature had never envisaged. The consequence
would be that there is no time period prescribed for making and
passing of an award under clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013
Act. This would be unacceptable and again completely contrary
to the legislative intent in enacting Section 25 in the 2013 Act.
Sensible and purposive construction to avoid absurdities and
inconsistencies is, therefore, justified when Section 25 is
interpreted. [Para 22][1151-C-E]
Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others
(2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1 - followed.
2.14 The determination of compensation is a complex factual
and legal exercise. Section 26(2) of the 2013 Act postulates that
the market value calculated as per sub-section (1) shall be
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multiplied by a factor specified in the First Schedule. The First
Schedule enumerates different components which constitute the
minimum compensation package to be given to those whose land
is acquired and to the tenants referred to in clause (c) of Section
3. Columns 2 and 3 of the First Schedule mandate that the market
value in case of rural areas is to be multiplied/factored between 1
and 2 based on the distance of the project from urban area. The
factor is to be notified by the "appropriate government". When
the factor/multiplier is more than 1, the compensation payable
would be proportionately higher than the market value.
[Paras 19, 23][1148-G; 1152-A-C]
2.15 The impugned judgment holds that the period when
the stay order dated 26.05.2014 was effective is inconsequential
and irrelevant as the High Court had not stayed the acquisition
proceedings. It is difficult to accept the said reasoning for the
simple reason that it ignores the language of the interim order
and its true effect in redetermination of compensation. The
interim order passed by the High Court had inhibited further
action on the part of the authorities to proceed with the acquisition
of land. This period of inhibition is excluded while computing the
period for passing of the award by an authority, under section of
the 1894 Act. Further, the stay granted would be applicable
to others also who had not obtained stay in that behalf.
[Para 25][1152-F-H; 1153-B]
Abhey Ram (D) by LRs. and Others v. Union of India
and Others (1997) 5 SCC 421 : [1997] 3 SCR 931
- referred to.
2.16 The reasoning that the statute cannot provide for all
possible scenarios, and it is for the courts to plug the gaps through
the process of judicial interpretation by ascertaining the legislative
intent and that the Court resorts to construe the words of the
provision in a reasonable way having regard to the context would
be applicable to Section 25 of the 2013 Act as well. If interpreted
otherwise, it would bring inconsistencies and would cause
injustice. [Paras 27, 29][1154-B-C; 1154-G-H]
Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others
(2020) 8 SCC 129:[2020] 3 SCR 1 - followed.
THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,
BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION v. MAHESH
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2.18 Inasmuch as the High Court had, on 26th May 2014,
stayed the operation of the notification dated 19th March 2014,
and subsequently modified the order on 23rd September 2014
permitting publication of the awards, the intervening period of
129 days between 26th May 2014 until 23rd September 2014
and in any case of 79 days from 26th May 2014 till the new
notification dated 13th August 2014 was issued must be excluded.
Ordinarily, an award made or passed before 31st December 2014
would be valid. However, owing to the intervening period of 79
days, it could be made up to 20th March 2015. The specific case
of the landowners before the High Court was about lapsing of
acquisition proceedings owing to the mandate of Section 11A of
the 1894 Act. It was not even remotely suggested that the
acquisition proceedings had lapsed even in terms of the mandate
of the new legislation being 2013 Act, in particular Section 25
thereof. In other words, the High Court was essentially called
upon to answer the assail in reference to the lapsing provision in
the 1894 Act. However, that will have no bearing on the fact
situation of the instant case, to which the regime predicated in
Section 25 of the 2013 Act ought to apply. [Para 30][1155-A-D]
2.19 Indeed, the High Court leaned in favour of the
argument that the stated award dated 30th October 2014 is
backdated. That, however, was in the context of applicability of
Section 11A of the 1894 Act and by not excluding the period during
which the High Court stay was operating. Indisputably, the High
Court did not examine the matter in the context of applicability
of provisions of Section 25 of the 2013 Act and further, as has
been held hitherto, the period during which the court's stay to
the notification dated 19th March 2014 was operative, needs to
be excluded. In the case of latter, the factum of manipulation and
backdating of award becomes insignificant unless the High Court
was to go a step further and hold that the award was not made
even until 20th March 2015. In that view of the matter, the
conclusion reached is inevitable and it must follow that the
acquisition proceedings in question had not lapsed in law.
[Para 34][1158-E-G]
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2.20 Arguendo, if the afterthought plea raised by the
landowners was to be entertained before this Court for the first
time that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed even on account
of the mandate of Section 25 of the 2013 Act, the same needs to
be negatived for more than one reason. First, no factual foundation
was set out by the landowners including to assert that the stated
award was not made even till 20th March 2015 nor was the High
Court called upon to examine that fact. Secondly, the landowners
"themselves" stated (admitted) that the Commissioner had given
permission/approval to the draft award on 20.11.2014. Further,
the High Court had not held that the award was made or
pronounced beyond the period specified under Section 25.
[Para 35][1158-G-H; 1159-A-B]
2.21 Ordinarily, in terms of Section 25, the award ought to
have been published up to 31.12.2014. However, the period of
79 days, when interim stay order was in operation, needs to be
excluded, in which case the award could be validly made until
20th March 2015. Given this date, even if it is assumed that the
award dated 30th October 2014 is backdated, it was duly made
soon after the approval was accorded by the Commissioner on
20.11.2014, which was certainly without any doubt, before
20.03.2015. [Para 36][1159-C]
2.22 The prima facie opinion noted by the High Court on
the factum of backdating of the subject award would not make
any difference to the outcome of the relief pursued by the
landowners by way of writ petition for a declaration that the subject
acquisition proceedings had lapsed. Such declaration cannot be
issued in the fact situation of the instant case. However, as the
High Court noticed certain discrepancies, as pointed out to it by
the landowners in the record and proceedings before the Special
Land Acquisition culminating in making of the stated award, it
would be appropriate to leave that aspect open for being enquired
into by the appropriate authority by conducting enquiry to identify
the relevant facts and circumstances and if it is found to be a
mischief, responsible person therefor may be proceeded against
as per law. Suffice it to state that neither the observations made
by the High Court nor this decision may affect the final opinion
THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,
BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION v. MAHESH
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[2021] 9 S.C.R.
or conclusion that may have to be reached in such an enquiry.
In other words, the enquiry be proceeded independently on
its own merits by giving opportunity to all concerned.
[Paras 37, 38][1159-D-G]
2.23 It is submitted that the notice under Section 12(2) of
the 1894 Act dated 6th May 2015 was served on the landowners
on various dates in May 2015. Sub-section (1) to Section 37 of
the 2013 Act as well as sub-section (1) to Section 12 of the 1894
Act state that the award shall be filed in the Collector's office and
shall be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector
and the persons interested. It would not matter whether the
person interested have appeared before the Collector or not.
Further, the award is final and conclusive evidence as of the true
area. Sub-section (3) to Section 37 of the 2013 Act requires the
Collector to keep open to public and display summary of the
entire proceedings undertaken in the case of acquisition of land,
including the amount of compensation awarded. These mandates
must be complied with, but as they are post the making of the
award and, therefore, would not affect the validity of the award
when made within the statutory time. Issue of notice by the
Collector to the persons interested, which is to be given to the
persons not present personally or through the representatives
when the award is made, is to be issued immediately, but the
issue of notice is not a condition precedent for making the award.
Belated issue of notice would not, therefore, legally affect the
validity of the award, though there may be other consequences.
Equally, limitation period to challenge and question the
compensation awarded would commence on the service/
intimation about making of the award on the landowners. When
satisfied that the award was made/ published within the prescribed
period, even when there was backdating of the award or delay in
effecting service on the landowners, the land acquisition
proceedings need not be set aside. [Para 39][1160-A-F]
Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land
Acquisition Officer and Another AIR 1961 SC 1500 :
[1962] SCR 676 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2020] 3 SCR 1
followed
Para 12, 14, 22, 29
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AIR 1968 Madras 79
referred to
Para 16
[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 326
referred to
Para 16
[1985] 1 SCR 432
referred to
Para 16
[1995] 1 SCR 996
referred to
Para 16
[1988] 2 SCR 962
referred to
Para 16
[1971] 3 SCR 9
referred to
Para 16
[1997] 3 SCR 931
referred to
Para 25
[1962] SCR 676
referred to
Para 39
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 66736674 of 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.07.2017 in Writ Petition
No. 6884 of 2015 and order dated 23.11.2017 in Misc. Civil Application
No. 22747 of 2017 in Writ Petition No.6884 of 2015 of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur.
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 6675-6676 of 2021.
C. U. Singh, V. Giri, Sr. Advs., Nitin Mishra, Ms. Mitali Gupta,
Rajat Sehgal, Advs. for the Appellant.
B. H. Marlapalle, Sr. Adv., Dilip Annasaheb Taur, Rahul Chitnis,
Sachin Patil, Aaditya A. Pande, Geo Joseph, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The legal issue that arises in these appeals relates to
interpretation of Section 24(1)(a) of The Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 ('2013 Act', for short), and in particular the question:
Whether the two-year period specified under Section 11A of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('1894 Act', for short) will
apply even after the repeal of the 1894 Act, or the twelvemonth period specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act will
THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,
BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION v. MAHESH
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[2021] 9 S.C.R.
apply for the awards made under clause (a) of Section 24(1)
of the 2013 Act?
Subsequent to the decision on the aforesaid question of law, we
shall consider the second aspect - whether the award dated 30th October
2014 is within the permissible time-limit or whether the acquisition
proceedings have lapsed? To answer this question, we shall also examine
whether the award claimed to have been passed on 30th October 2014 is
backdated and whether the date has been changed by manipulating the
award? For convenience and clarity, we would deal with the two issues
separately.
3. In order to answer the legal question, some elemental facts are
required to be noted. The State of Maharashtra, on 16th June 2011, had
issued a notification under Section 41 of the 1894 Act for the acquisition
of 203.86 hectares of land in village Adyal, District Bhandara,
Maharashtra for the Gosikhurd Project. This was followed by publication
of declarations under Section 62 of the 1894 Act, the last of which is
dated 8th August 2012. Vide Gazette Notification No. S.O. 3729(E) dated
19th December 2013, the 2013 Act came into force on 1st January 2014,
and in terms of Section 114 of the 2013 Act, the 1894 Act was repealed.
On 30th October 2014, the Special Land Acquisition Officer purportedly
made an award in terms of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act.
1 4.Publication of preliminary notification and power of officers thereupon - (1) Whenever
it appears to the appropriate Government the land in any locality is needed or is likely
to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, a notification to that effect shall
be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that
locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall
cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient
places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of
such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the
notification).
(2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either generally or specially authorized
by such Government in this behalf, and for his servants and workman, -
to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality;
to dig or bore into the sub-soil;
to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for such
purpose;
to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line
of the work (if any) proposed to be made thereon;
to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches;
and, where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and
the boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clear away any part of any standing
crop, fence or jungle;
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4. On 18th December 2015 and 25th January 2016, two writ petitions
were filed by some of the landowners for quashing and setting aside of
Provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon any enclosed court or
garden attached to a dwelling house (unless with the consent of the occupier thereof)
without previously giving such occupier at least seven days' notice in writing of his
intention to do so.
2 6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.