# THE GODAV ARI SUGAR MILLS LTD v. SHRI D._K. WORLIKAR

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 305
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 425 of 1958
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. W Anchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-godav-ari-sugar-mills-ltd-v-shri-d-k-worlikar-1594
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Industrial Dispute-N otificai:ion-C onstruction -Head office of
Sugar Industry, if within its purview-Bombay Industrial Relations
Act, r946 (Bom. II of r947), s. 2(4)-Notification No. IIJI-46
of r952.
·
The respondent, a stenographer employed by the appellant
at its head office in Bombay, challenged the legality and propriety of the dismissal order passed against him by an application
under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act,
1946, and contended that the Notification No. n31-46 issued by
the Government of Bombay in 1952 under s. 2(4) of the said Act
brought within its purview the head office of the appellant which
was dealing in Sugar Industry. The appellant challenged the
competency of the application on the ground that the Act did not
apply to the respondent's:case and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction as the Notification did not apply to the head office of the
appellant:
Held, that on a proper construction of the Notification, it
ca.:nnot be said that the Government of Bombay intended to
extend the scope of the Notification to the head office of a Sugar
Industry. The Notification did not bring within its purview the
sugar industry as such but the manufacture of sugar and its
by-products, the object being to confine its benefits to service or
employment which was connected with the manufacture of sugar
and its by-products including the growing of sugar canes and all
agricultural and industrial operations connected with the growing
of sugarcane.
.

## Text

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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
THE GODAV ARI SUGAR MILLS LTD.
v.
SHRI D._K. WORLIKAR
305
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. W ANCHOO, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-N otificai:ion-C onstruction -Head office of
Sugar Industry, if within its purview-Bombay Industrial Relations
Act, r946 (Bom. II of r947), s. 2(4)-Notification No. IIJI-46
of r952.
·
The respondent, a stenographer employed by the appellant
at its head office in Bombay, challenged the legality and propriety of the dismissal order passed against him by an application
under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act,
1946, and contended that the Notification No. n31-46 issued by
the Government of Bombay in 1952 under s. 2(4) of the said Act
brought within its purview the head office of the appellant which
was dealing in Sugar Industry. The appellant challenged the
competency of the application on the ground that the Act did not
apply to the respondent's:case and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction as the Notification did not apply to the head office of the
appellant:
Held, that on a proper construction of the Notification, it
ca.:nnot be said that the Government of Bombay intended to
extend the scope of the Notification to the head office of a Sugar
Industry. The Notification did not bring within its purview the
sugar industry as such but the manufacture of sugar and its
by-products, the object being to confine its benefits to service or
employment which was connected with the manufacture of sugar
and its by-products including the growing of sugar canes and all
agricultural and industrial operations connected with the growing
of sugarcane.
.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 425 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the :pecision dated
October 9, 1956, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of
India, Bombay, in Appeal (Bom.) No. 111 of 1956.
M. C. Setalva<l, Attorney--General of India, S. N.
Andley, J. B. Da<lachanji, Rameshwar Nath and
P. L. Vohra, for the appellants.
M. S. K. Sastri, for the respondent.
1960. March 15. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
1960
Godavari Sugar
Mills Ltd.
v.
D.£(. Worlikar
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave Gajeniragadkar ].
raises a short question about the construction of the
notification No. 1131-46 issued by the Government of
Bombay on October 4, 1952, under s. 2(4) of the
Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Born. 11 ·of
1947) (hereinafter called the Act). The respondent,
306
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
who was a stenographer em ployed by the appellant,
the Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd., at its head office in
Godavari Sugar Bombay was dismissed by the appellant on April 22,
Mills Ltd.
1955.
He had been working as .a stenographer for
v.
D.K. Wvrtii<ar some years past on a salary of Rs. 135 pins Rs. 27
as dearness allowance.
He ""1s charged with having
Gajrndrngadkor ]. committed acts of disobedience and in"ubordination,
and after a proper enquiry where he was given an
opportunity to defend himself, he was found guilty of
the alleged misconduct; that is why his services were
terminated ; that is the appellant's case.
The respondent challenged the legality and propriety of his dismissal by an ttpplication before the
Labour Court at Bombay; he purported to make this
application under s. 42(4) read withs. 78 (1) (a) (i) and
(iii) of the Act.
The appellant in reply challenged
the competence of the application on the ground that
the Act did not apply to the respondent.'s case, and so
the Labour Court had no jur·isdiction to entertain it ..
Both the parties 11greed that the question of jurisdiction thus raised by the appellant should be tried as a
preliminary issue; and so the Labour Court considered the said objection and upheld it. It held that
the notification in question on which the respondent
relied did not apply to the head office of the appellant
at Bombay ; accordingly the Labour Conrt dismissed
the respondent's application. The respondent cha.]-
lenged the correctness of this decision by preferring
an appeal before the Industrial Court..
His appeal,
however, failed since the Ind us trial Co IJl't agreed with
the Labour Comt in holding th11t t.he notification did
not apply to the head office of the appellant. The
matter was then taken by the respondent before the
Labour Appellate 'I't·ibuual and this time the respondent succeeded, the Labour Appellate Tribunal having
held that the notification applied to the head office
and that the respondent was entitled to claim the
benefit of the provisions of the Act.
On this finding
the Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside the order
passed by the courts below and remanded the case to
the Labour Court for disposal on the merits in accordance with law. It is this order which has given rise
to the present appeal; and the only question which it
-
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. ., .
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
307
raises for our decision is whether the notification in
Ig6o
question arJplies to the head office of the appellant at Godavari Sugai
Bombav.
Milis Ltd.
The Act has been passed by the Bombay Legislav.
ture. in order to regulate relations of employers and
D.K. Worlikar
employees, to make provis_ion for settlement of ind us- Ga ·endrar;adkar J.
trial disputes and to provide for certain other
1
·
purposes. It has made elaborate provisions in order
to carry out its object, and has conferred some benefits
on the employees in addition to those which have been
conferred on them by the Central Industrial Disputes
Act, XIV of 1947. Under s. 42(4) of the Act, for
instance, an employee desiring a change in respect "Of
any order pa.ssed by the employer under standing
orders can make an application to the Labour Court
in that behalf subject to the proviso which it is un·
necessary t;o set out. Section 78(l)(a)(iii) requires the
Labour Court to decide whether any change made by
an employer or desired by an employee should be
made. An ordef of dismissal passed by an employer
can, therefore, be challenged by the employee directly
by an application before the Labour Court under the
Act, whereas under the Central Act a complaint
against wrongful dismissal can become an industrial
dispute only if it is sponsored by the relevant union
or taken up by a group of employees and is referred
to the industrial tribunal for adjudication under s. 10
of the Act. Since the respondent claims a special
benefit under the Act he contends that his case falls .
under the notification. It is common ground that if
the notification applies to the case of the respondent
the application made by him to the Labour Court
would be competent and would have to be considered
on the merits; on the other hand, if the said notification does not apply then the application' is
incompetent and must be dismissed in limine on that
ground.
..·
Let us now read the notification. It has been issued
by the Government of Bombay in exercise of the
powers conferred on it by s. 2, sub-s. (4), of the Act,
and in supersession of an earlier notification, and it
provides that "the Government of Bombay is pleased
to direct that all the provisions of the sitid Act shall
308
SUPREME COURT REPOH,TS
[1960)
1960
apply to the following industry, viz., the manufacture
Godavari Sugar of sugar and its by-products including (1) the growing
Mills Lid.
of sugarcane on farms belonging to or attached to
v.
concerns engaged in the said manufacture, and (2) all
D.K. Worlikar agricultural and industrial operations connected with
. . --
the growing of sugarcane or the said manufacture,
Ga;endragadkar f. engaged in such concerns. 'Note: For the purposes of
this notification all service or employment connected
with the conduct of the above industry shall be
deemed to be part of the industry when engaged in or
by an employer engaged in that industry".
It is significant that the notification applies not to
sugar industry as such but to the manufacture of
sugar and its by-products. If the expression" sugar
industry" had been used it would have been possible
•
to construe that expression in a broader sense having
regard to the wide definition of the word ".industry "
prescribed in s. 2(19) of the Aot; but. the notification
has deliberately adopted a different phraseology and
has brought within its purview not the suga.r industry
as such but the manufacture of sugar and its by-products. Unfortunately the Labour Appellate Tribunal
has read the notification as though it referred to the
sugar industry as such. That is a serious infirmity in
the (j.ecision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
Besides, the inclusion of the two items specified in
els. (1) and (2) is also significant. Section 2(19)(b)(i)
shows that " industry" includes agr'iculture and
agricultural operations. Now, if the manufacture of
sugar and its by-products had the same meaning as
the expression sugar industry, then the two items
added by els. (1) and (2) would have been included in
the said expression by virtue of the definition of
"industry" itself and the addition of the two clauses
would have been superfluous. The fact that the two
items have been included specifically clearly indicates
that the first part of the notification would not have
applied to them, and it is with a view to extend the
scope of the said clause that the inclusive words introducing the two items have been used. This fact also
shows the limited interpretation which must be put
on the words "the m'tnufacture of sugar and its byproducts ".
•
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
309
It is true that the note added to the notification
. .r960
purports to include within the scope of the notifiGodavari Sugar
cation some cases of service and employment by the
Mills.Ltd.
· deeming process. Unfortunately the last clause in
v.
the note is unhappily worded and it is difficult to D. K. Worlikar
understand what exactly it was intended to mean.
.
-
.
Even so, though by the first part of the note some Gajendragadkar J.
kinds of service or employment are deemed to be part
of the industry in question by virtue of the fact that
· they are connected with the conduct of the said
industry, the latter part of lbhe note requires that the
said service or employment· must be engaged in th.at
industry. It is possible that the workers engaged in
manuring or a clerk in the manure depot which is
required to .issue manure to the agricultural farm
which grows sugarcane may for instance be included
within the scope of the notification by virtue of the
note; but it is difficult to see how the respondent,
who is an employee in the head office at Bombay, can
claim the benefit of this note. The addition made by
the deeming clause on the strength of the connection
of certain services and employments with the conduct
of the industry is also controlled by the requirement
that the said services or employments must be
engaged in that industry so that connection with the
industry has nevertheless to be established before the
note can be applied to the respondent.
It has been urged before us by Mr. Sastri, for the
respondent, that at the head office there is accounts
department, the establishment section, stores purch,ase'
section and legal department;, and he pointed out that
the machinery which is purchased for the industry is
landed at Bombay, received by the head office and is
,then sent to the factories. In fact the factories and
the offices attached to them are situated at Lakshmiwadi and Sakharwadi respectively and are separated
by hundreds of miles from the head office at Bombay.
The fact that the machinery required at the factories
is received at the head office .and has to be forwarded
. to the respective factories cannot, in our opinion,
assist the respondent in contending that the head
office itself and all the employees engaged in it fall
wjthin the note to the notification. The object of the
'10
1960
Godavari Sugar
Mills Ltd.
v.
D. K. Worlikar
Gajendragadkat' ].
310
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
notification appears to be to confine its benefit to
service or employment which is connected with the
manufacture of sugar and its by-products including the
two items specified in cl. (1) and cl. (2).
Subsidiary
services such as those we have indicated are also included by virtue of the note; but in our opinion it is
difficult to extend the scope of the notification to the
head office of the appellant. We must accordingly
hold that the Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in law
in holding that the case of the respondent was governed by the notification.
Incidentally we would like to add that the registrar
appointed under s. 11 of the Act has consistently
refused to recognise the staff of the head office as coming under the notification, and it is common ground
that the C()nsistent practice in the matter so far is
against the plea raised by the respondent. It is perfectly true that in construing the notification the
prevailing practice can have no relevance; but if
after construing the notification we come to the conclusion that the head office is outside the purview of
the notification it would not be irrelevant to refer to
the prevailing practice which happens to be consistent
with the construction we have placed on the notification. It appears that in the courts below reference
was made to a similar notification issued in respect of
textile industry under s. 2, su b-s. (3), of the Act and
the relevant decisions construing the said notification
were cited. We do not think any useful purpose will
be served by considering the said notification and the
decisions thereunder.
In the result the appeal is allowed, the order passed
by the Labour Appellate Tribunal is set aside and the
respondent's application is dismissed. There will be
no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
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