# THE MANAGEMENT OF RANIPUR COLLIERY v. BHUBAN SINGH AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 719
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajen.Dragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-management-of-ranipur-colliery-v-bhuban-singh-and-others-1735
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Industrial
Dispute-Standing Orders -
Interpretation ofEnquiry-Whether includes proceedings
b~fore Industrial Tribunal
-Industrial Disputes Aet, z947 (z4 of z947)~ss. 3, 33A.
The Company after regular enquiry and pending permission
of the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, suspended some workmen without pay, whereupon the
workmen filed applications under s. 33A of the Act before the
Industrial Tribunal on the ground that their suspension without
pay beyond ten days was against the provisions of the Standing
Orders governing their conditions of service to the effect that an
employee might be suspended provided the suspension without
pay, whether as punishmo:nt or pending enquiry, did not exceed
ten days. Th,e Tribunal dismissed the workmen's applications
under s. 33A and granted permission to the Company to dismiss
the workmen concerned. The workmen appealed. The Appellate Tribunal upheld the order granting permission to dismiss
the workmen but came to the conclusion that the words "pending enquiry " in cl. 27 of the Standing Orders included proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal and that there was breach of
the Standing Orders.
Held, that the employer could apply under s. 33 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for permission to dismiss an
employee when after a regular enquiry he had come to the finding that the case against the employee was proved and that the
punishment of dismissal was the proper punishment. The Industrial Tribunal had not to enquire into the conduct of the
employee or the merits of dismissal but see whether a prima
faeie case had been made out and a fair enquiry made by the
employer. The time taken before the Tribunal in such proceedings was beyond the control of the employer.
Standing Orders were concerned with employers and
employees and not with Tribunals. In the instant case, the
words "pending enquiry" in cl. 27 of the Standing Orders,
referred only to the enquiry by the employer and not to the proceedings before the Tribunal..
The principle laid down in Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mill's case
that workmen would not be entitled to payment of wages during
the whole period of suspension if the Tribunal gave permission to
dismiss them, would apply only to cases where there was a ban
under s. 33 and the employer had to apply under that section
for lifting the ban after completing the enquiry.
'959
April 2I.
720
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp.
'959
Rampalat Chamar v. The Assam, Oil Co. Ltd., (r954) L.A.C.
78, dissented from.
'
The Management
The A"tomobile Products of India Ltd. v. Rukamji Bala, [r955]
of Ranipur
I S.C.R. r241, referred to.
~ · _
,
Colliery
Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram Sarup, [r95(i]
v.
S.C.R. 916, followed and explained.
Bhuban Singh
&- Others

## Text

(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'.rS
719
THE MANAGEMENT OF RANIPUR COLLIERY
v.
BHUBAN SINGH AND OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, P. B. GAJEN.DRAGADKAR and
K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Industrial
Dispute-Standing Orders -
Interpretation ofEnquiry-Whether includes proceedings
b~fore Industrial Tribunal
-Industrial Disputes Aet, z947 (z4 of z947)~ss. 3, 33A.
The Company after regular enquiry and pending permission
of the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, suspended some workmen without pay, whereupon the
workmen filed applications under s. 33A of the Act before the
Industrial Tribunal on the ground that their suspension without
pay beyond ten days was against the provisions of the Standing
Orders governing their conditions of service to the effect that an
employee might be suspended provided the suspension without
pay, whether as punishmo:nt or pending enquiry, did not exceed
ten days. Th,e Tribunal dismissed the workmen's applications
under s. 33A and granted permission to the Company to dismiss
the workmen concerned. The workmen appealed. The Appellate Tribunal upheld the order granting permission to dismiss
the workmen but came to the conclusion that the words "pending enquiry " in cl. 27 of the Standing Orders included proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal and that there was breach of
the Standing Orders.
Held, that the employer could apply under s. 33 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for permission to dismiss an
employee when after a regular enquiry he had come to the finding that the case against the employee was proved and that the
punishment of dismissal was the proper punishment. The Industrial Tribunal had not to enquire into the conduct of the
employee or the merits of dismissal but see whether a prima
faeie case had been made out and a fair enquiry made by the
employer. The time taken before the Tribunal in such proceedings was beyond the control of the employer.
Standing Orders were concerned with employers and
employees and not with Tribunals. In the instant case, the
words "pending enquiry" in cl. 27 of the Standing Orders,
referred only to the enquiry by the employer and not to the proceedings before the Tribunal..
The principle laid down in Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mill's case
that workmen would not be entitled to payment of wages during
the whole period of suspension if the Tribunal gave permission to
dismiss them, would apply only to cases where there was a ban
under s. 33 and the employer had to apply under that section
for lifting the ban after completing the enquiry.
'959
April 2I.
720
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp.
'959
Rampalat Chamar v. The Assam, Oil Co. Ltd., (r954) L.A.C.
78, dissented from.
'
The Management
The A"tomobile Products of India Ltd. v. Rukamji Bala, [r955]
of Ranipur
I S.C.R. r241, referred to.
~ · _
,
Colliery
Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram Sarup, [r95(i]
v.
S.C.R. 916, followed and explained.
Bhuban Singh
&- Others
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No.
768 of I957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgme11t and
order dated September 2I, 1956, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Calcutta in· Appeal No. Cal.
IOI of 1956.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, 8. N.
Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants.
Dipak Dutta Choudhri, for the respondents.
, I959. April 2_1.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by ,
'
,
,
wanchoo J.
'V ANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special le:J.ve
•
against the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal
of India in an industrial matter. The appellant is the
· Ranipur Colliery (herein:J.fter called the company)
which carries on the business of coal mining in Dishergarh (\Vest Bengal). The respondents are six workmen employed by the company. They along with,
another person were working as tub-checkers. It was
found that they were making false reports both as to
quality and quantity of coal, which it was their duty
to check, with the result that the company suffered
loss. Consequently, the company served charge-sheets
on them and a regular enquiry was held on April I3,
I955, at which they were present and had full opportunity to give their explanation, cross-examine witnesses and generally contest the charge. The company
came to the conclusion after the enquiry that the
workmen were guilty of the misconduct with which
they were charged and should be dismissed. As, however, an industrial dispute between the company and
its workmen was, pending before the Industrial Tribunal, the company applied under s. 33 of the Industrial ,
Disputes' Act (hereinafter called the Act) for permission to dismiss the workmen. It appears that five out
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
721
of seven workmen filed two applications under s. 33-A
of the Act before the Industrial Tribunal on the
ground that they had been suspended without pay
from May 4, 1955, and that this was against the provision of the Standing Orders governing their conditions
of service. These three applications were heard together by the Industrial Tribunal, which came to the
conclusion that the permission should be granted to
the company to dismiss the seven workmen and
accordingly did so.
Having granted this permission,
the Industrial Tribunal, in consequence, dismissed the
applications under s. 33-A.
Six of the workmen then went up in appeal to the
Labour Appellate Tribunal against the grant of permission to dismiss and the dismissal of their a pplications under s. 33-A. Their case was (i) that no permission to dismiss should have been granted, and (ii) that
five of them had been placed under suspension without
wages for an indefinite period in violation of the express provision of the Standing Orders and therefore
they were entitled to relief. The Appellate Tribunal
dismissed the appeal with respect to the grant of permission to dismiss. It, however, came to the conclusion that there was a breach of cl. 27 of the Standing
Orders, and therefore allowed the appeal of five workmen (other than Akhey Roy), who had applied under
s. 33-A and ordered that they should be paid their
wages from the date of suspension without pay to the
date of the Industrial Tribunal's order, less ten days as
provided in cl. 27 of the Standing Orders. Thereupon
the company applied to this Court for special leave
which was granted; and that is how the matter has
come before us.
It appears that Akhey Roy has been unnecessarily
joined- as a respondent, for the order of the Appellate
Tribunal does not show that any relief was granted to
him and his appeal to the Appellate Tribunal must
therefore be taken to have been dismissed.
Thus the only point that falls for consideration is
whether suspension without pay pending permission
of the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33 of the Act is a
9I
r959
The Management
of Ranipur
Colliery
v.
Bhuban Singh
6' Others
Wanchoo ].
I959
The Managenient
of Ranipur
Colliery
v.
Bhuban Singh
G Others
Wanchoo ].
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
breach of cl. 27 of the Standing Orders.
The brief
facts necessary in this connection are these : Seven
workmen were served with charge-sheets on April 1,
1955. After their replies had been received, an enquiry
was held on April 13, 1955, and they were found
guilty of misconduct. It was decided thereupon to
apply for permission for their dismissal under s. 33 of
. the Act. The application was made to the Tribunal
on April 29, 1955.
Thereafter the workmen were
suspended on May 4, 1955, without pay pending orders
of the Industrial Tribunal.
Clause 27 of the Standing Orders, on which reliance
has been placed, reads thus-
" An employee may be suspended, fined or dismissed without notice or any compensation in lieu of
notice if he is found to be guilty of misconduct, provided suspension without pay, whether as a punishment or pending enquiry, shall not exceed ten days".
The contention on behalf of the workmen is that
the words "pending enquiry" appearing in cl. 27
include enquiry under s. 33 of the Act before the
Industrial Tribunal also.
Therefore, if the Industrial
Tribunal takes longer than ten days to decide the
application under s. 33 and the workman is suspended
without pay, there would be a breach of cl. 27 of the
fftanding Orders after ten days are over. On the
other hand, it is contended on behalf of the company
that the words "pending enquiry" in cl. 27 refer only
to the enquiry by the employer and not to the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33. The
Appellate Tribunal bas come to the conclusion that
the words "pending enquiry" in cl. 27 include
proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33
and therefore if suspension without pay is for more
than ten days, even though it may be pending orders
of the Industrial Tribunal under s., 33, there is a breach
of cl. 27 of the Standing Orders. In this connection it
has relied on an earlier decision of its own in Rampalat Ghamar v. The Assam Oil Go., Ltd. (1), where the
words were" pending full enquiry". It was of opinion
that there was no difference between "pending
(1) [1954) L.A.C. 78.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
723
enquiry" and "pending full enquiry " and that the
proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33
are also included in these words.
We agree that there is no real difference between
"pending enquiry" which appears in cl. 27 of the
Standing Orders and "pending full enquiry" which
appeared in the Standing Orders in The Assam Oil
Company case (1).
But we are of opinion that the view
taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal both in The
Assam Oil Company case (1), and in this case is incorrect.
This Court has held in The A utomdbifo Products
of India Ltd. v. Rukamji Bala (2) that s. 33 imposes a
ban on the employer to dismiss a workman and it gives
power to the Industrial Tribunal, on an application
made to it, to grant or withhold the permission to dismiss, i.e., to lift o.r maintain the ban. So far, however,
as the employer is concerned, his enquiry is (or, at any
rate, should be) over when he comes to the finding
that the case against the employee is proved and that
the punishment of dismissal is the proper punishment.
It is only then that the employer applies under s. 33
for permission to dismiss the employee. Further, the
proceedings under s. 33 are not an enquiry by the
Industrial Tribunal into the rights or wrongs of the
dismissal; all that it has to see is whether a primafacie
case has been made out or not for lifting the ban imposed by the section and whether a fair enquiry has been
made by the employer in which he came to the bona
fide conclusion that the employee was guilty of misconduct. Once it found these conditions in favour of
the employer, it was bound to grant the permission
sought for by him. It is thus clear that proceedings
under s. 33 are not in the nature of an enquiry into the
conduct of the employee by the Industrial Tribunal:
(see Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram
Sarup (3)). The proceedings therefore before the Industrial Tribunal cannot be called an enquiry into the
conduct of the employee. On the other hand, the
enquiry which is contemplated by cl. 27 is an enquiry
into the conduct of the employee. That enquiry could
(r) [r954] L.A.C. 78.
(2) [r955] I S.C.R. 1241.
(3) [r956] S.C.R. 916.
x959
The Management
of Ranipur
Colliery
v.
Bhuban Singh
& Others
Wanchoo ].
•
I959
The l\[ anagement
of Ranipu-r
Colliery
•
v.
Bhuban Singh
6- Others
Want:hoo ].
724
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959) Supp.
only be by the employer. Therefore, when cl. 27 uses
the words " pending enquiry ", these words can only
refer to the enquiry by the employer into the conduct
of the emploJee. It is, in our opinion, entirely unnecessary that the words " pending enquiry " should
have been qualified by the words " by the employer '',
before they can be interpreted as referring to the
enquiry by the employer. Standing Orders are concerned with employers and employees and not with tribunals. Therefore, when an enquiry is mentioned in
cl. 27 it can in the context only refer to the enquiry
by the employer and not to a proceeding under s. 33
before the tribunal. We are therefore of opinion that
in the context in which these words have been used in
cl. 27 they mean an enquiry by the employer and are
not referable to the proceedings under: s. 33 of the Act
before the Tribunal.
The scheme and object of s. 33 also show that this
conclusion is reasonable. Section 33 of the Act, as
already stated, imposes a ban on the employer, thus
preventing him from dismissing an employee till the
permission of the tribunal is obtained. But for this
ban the employer would have been entitled to dismiss
the employee immediately after the completion of his
enquiry on coming to the conclusion that the employee
was guilty of misconduct. Thus ifs. 33 had not been
there, the contract of service with the employee would
have come to an end by the dismissal immediately
after the conclusion of the enquiry and the employee
would not have been entitled to any further wages.
But s. 33 steps in and stops the employer from dismissing the employee immediately on the conclusion
of his enquiry and compels him to seek permission of
the Tribunal, in case some industrial dispute is pending between the employer and his employees. It stands
to reason therefore that so far as the employer is concerned he has done all that he could do in order to
bring the contract of service to an end. To expect
him to continue paying the employee after he had
come to the conclusion that the employee was guilty
of misconduct and should be dismissed, is, in our
opinion, unfair, simply because of the accidental
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
725
circumstance that an industrial dispute being pending
he has to apply to the tribunal for permission. It seems
to us therefore that in such a case the employer would
be justified in suspending the employee without pay
after he has made up his mind on a proper enquiry to
dismiss him and to apply to the tribunal for that purpose. If this were not so, he would have to go on
paying the employee for not doing any work, and the
period for which this will go on will depend upon an
accidental circumstance, viz., how long the tribunal
takes in concluding the proceedings under s. 33. In
the present case th<:J' application for permission was
made on April 29, 1955, and the Tribunal's award was
given on March 10, 1956, more than ten months later.
So if the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal is correct, the employer has to pay the employee for this
period of more than ten months, even though the employer had completed his enquiry and made up his mind
to dismiss the employee long before and would have
done so but for the ban imposed by s. 33. . The purpose of providing ten days as the maximum period of
suspension without pay pending enquiry in cl. 27 obviously is that the employer should not abuse the provision of suspension pending enquiry and delay the
enquiry inordinately, thus keeping the employee hanging about without pay for a long period. The object
further seems to be to see that the employer finishes
his enquiry promptly within ten days if the suspension of the employee is without pay. But it could not
have been. intended that the Industrial Tribunal
should also conclude the proceedings under s. 33 within ten days, and if that was not done there would be a
breach of cl. 27. In any -0ase the time taken by the
proceedings before the tribunal under s. 33 is beyond
the control of the employer and as the provisions of
cl. 27 would be inappropriate and inapplicable to the
said proceedings. We are therefore of opinion that
the words " pending enquiry " in cl. 27 both in the
context and in justice and reason refer only to the
enquiry by the employer and not to the proceedings
before the tribunal under s. 33.
This interpretation would not cause any serious
I959
The M anagenienl
of Ranipur
Colliery
v.
Bhuban Singh
& Others
Wanchoo ].
726
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
r959
hardship to the employee, for if the tribunal grants
Th M-
, permission to tbe employer to dismiss the employee he
e
anagemen
.
.
of Ran;pur
will not get anythmg from the date of his suspension
Colli"Y
without pay; on the other hand, if the tribunal refuses
v.
to grant the permission sought fo:r, he would be entitlBh><ban Singh ed to his back wages from the date of his suspension
& Others
· h
W
h
wit out pay.
e may int is connection refer to the
wanchoo J.
case of Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. (1) where a
similar point arose for decision. In that case the
Standing Orders provided suspension without pay only
for four days. It was there held that suspension
without pay pending enquiry as also pending permission of the tribunal could not be considered a punishment, as such suspension without pay would only be
an interim measure and would last only till the application for permission to punish the workman was
made and the tribunal had passed orders thereon. It
was also held that if the permission was accorded the
workman would not be entitled to payment during the
period of s.uspension but if the permission was refused
he would have to be paid for the whole period of suspension. The principle laid down in that case applies
to this case also.
We would only like to add that that
principle will apply only to those cases where there is
a b[l,n under s. 33 and the employer has to apply under
that section for lifting the ban after completing the
enquiry. The matter will be different if there is no
question of applying under s. 33 and under the relevant Standing Orders the employer is competent to
dismiss the employee immediately after his enquiry is
complete. In such a case if the Standing Orders provide that suspension without pay will not be for more
than a certain number of days, the enquiry must
either be completed within that period or if it goes beyond that period and suspension for any reason is
considered necessary, pay cannot be withheld for
more than the period prescribed under the Standing
Orders. In the present case, the suspension without
pay took place even after the application under s. 33
had been made and was pending permission under
that section.
As the Industrial Tribunal has accorded permission to dismiss the employees 'in this case and
(r) [1956] S.C.R. 916.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727
as that part of the award has been upheld by the
Appellate Tribunal, there is no question of the employees being paid during the period of suspension without pay.
We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside
the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and restore the order of the Industrial Tribunal dismissing the
two applications under s. 33-A. In the circumstances,
we pass no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed. ·.
RANJIT SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
(JAFER IMAM and J. L. KAPUR, JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Perjury-False statement in affidavit-Affidavit affi"Ymed to the best of knowledge and belief-N v obligation to
file affidavit-Offence, if made out-Indian Penal Code, I86o (XLV
of I86o), SS. I9I and I93·
A habeas corpus application was made to the High Court
al)eging that one S had been illegally arrested and kept in unlawful custody without any charge being made against him and
without obtaining remand from a Magistrate. By way of a
return the appellant, a sub-Inspector of Police, filed a false
affidavit controverting the allegations made in the application.
He was prosecuted and convicted under s. 193· Indian Penal
Code. The appellant challenged his conviction on the grounds
that: (i) as he was not bound under the law to file an affidavit,
the case did not fall under s. 191 of the Indian Penal Code and
he could not be convicted under s. 193 ; and (ii) the affidavit
having been affirmed as true to the best of the knowledge and
belief of the appellant it could not be said which part was true to
his knowledge and which to his belief.
Held that, the appellant was rightly convicted. It was not
necessary for the application of s. 191 of the Indian Penal Code
that the accused should be bound under the law to make an
affidavit. If he chose to make one and bound himself on oath
to state the truth he was liable under s. 193 of the Code if he
made a false statement and it was no defence to say that he was
not bound to enter the witness-box or make an affidavit.
In the
present case it was necessary for the appellant to file an affidavit
as he was bound to place the facts and circumstances justifying
I959
The l\fanag,•ment
of Ranij>ur
Colliery
v.
Bhuban Singh
.J;. Others
Wanchoo J.
r959
April 2I,