# THE NAGPUR ELECTRIC LIGHT ANI) POWER CO., LTD. & OTHERS v. K. SHREEPATHIRAO

- **Citation:** [1959] 1 S.C.R. 463
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-04-14
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 5 of 1958
- **Bench:** S. R. DAS c. J, Venkatarama Aiyar, s. K. DAS, Gajendragadkar, VIVIAN BosE
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-nagpur-electric-light-ani-power-co-ltd-others-v-k-shreepathirao-1669
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

Termination of Service-Co~pany E,;,,ployee-Standing Orders
-Construction-Employees ~nd workmen-Distinction.
The services of the respondent, an ·employee of the appellant
compaf1y, were terminated in accordance with the Standing Orders
of the company, approved by the
appropriate authorities
under the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946, and the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial
Disputes Settlement Act, 1947· Standing Order No. 2(a) defined
" employees" as "all persons ... employed in the Office or Mains
Department or Stores or Power House or Receiving Station of the
Company.~.whose names and ticket numbers are included in the
departmental musters ". The Standing Orders also· defined the
term "workman " and provided that every workman should have
a ticket.
No ticket had been issued to the respondent by the
company, and consequently his ticket number. was not included
n the departmental muster. The respondent challenged the
validity of the order terminating his services by an application
made before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution
on the grounds, inter alia, that the Standing Orders in question
were confined to those employees only to whom tickets were
issued, and that as no ticket was issued to him he wa·s not an
employee within the meaning of the Standing Orders which did
not therefore apply to him and, consequently, the termination of
his services under Standing Order No. 16(1) was illegal:
Held, (1) that the words "whose names.and ticket numbers
are included in the departmental musters" occurring in Standing
Order No. 2 (a) should be read as "whose names and .tick€t numbers, if any, are included in the departmental musters";
'
Cortis v. The Kent Water Works Company, (1827) 7 B. & C.
314; 108 E. R. 741 anq Perumal Goundan v. The· Thirunittlarayapuram J ananukoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nidhi, (1918) I.LR.
41 Mad. 624, applied.
•
(2) that under the Standing Orders, in which a distinctionis
made between ' employees' and 'workmen', while e,very workman must have a ticket, there may be employees who may have no
tickets the possession of which is riot an essential characteristic
of an employee; and,
(3) that the Standing Orders apply to all employees for
whose benefit they !)ave been made .
•
April II.
•
464
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959)
Accordipgly, the Standing Orders were applicable to the
respondent and the termination of his service in accordance with
The Nagpur Iilec· Standing Order No. 16(1) was valid and, therefore, the application
tric Light and Power made by hiin to the High Court must fail.
Co., Ltd.,
v.
Shrlepathi J?ao
•
Cn1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
5 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated September 26, l!l56, of the former Nagpur
High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 66 of 1956,
arising out of the judgment and order dated April 14,
1956, of the said High Court in Misc. Petition Ng. 6 of
1956.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, B. Sen,
D. B. Padhya and J. N. Shroff, for the appellants.
ll. V. S. J1 ani, for the respondent .
•
1958.
April 11.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
s R. Das J.
S. K. DAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave.
,
.The appellants before us are the Nagpur Electric Light
and Power Co. Ltd. (hereinaftc1' referred to as the
Company), a public limited company having its registered office at Nagpur in Madhya Pradesh, its Manager,
and Assistant Manager. The respondent, Shreepathi
Hao, joined the service of the Company as a typist on
a salary of Its. 30 per month in .July, 1936. He rose
in rank from time to time and was appointed Deputy
Head Clerk in 1947 in the grade of Rs. 120-10-225.
Since 1952 he has been receiving a basic sa!My of
Rs. 245 per month. On Xovember 28, 1955, an
ex plan a ti on was called for from him with regard to
the issue of certain bills to consumers of electricity
called "high tension consumers.", without having
certain "notes for the information of consumers"
printed

## Text

'
•
~.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
463
THE NAGPUR ELECTRIC LIGHT ANI) POWER
CO., LTD. & OTHERS
v.
K. SHREEPATHIRAO
(S. R. DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, s. K. DAS,
GAJENDRAGADKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)
Termination of Service-Co~pany E,;,,ployee-Standing Orders
-Construction-Employees ~nd workmen-Distinction.
The services of the respondent, an ·employee of the appellant
compaf1y, were terminated in accordance with the Standing Orders
of the company, approved by the
appropriate authorities
under the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946, and the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial
Disputes Settlement Act, 1947· Standing Order No. 2(a) defined
" employees" as "all persons ... employed in the Office or Mains
Department or Stores or Power House or Receiving Station of the
Company.~.whose names and ticket numbers are included in the
departmental musters ". The Standing Orders also· defined the
term "workman " and provided that every workman should have
a ticket.
No ticket had been issued to the respondent by the
company, and consequently his ticket number. was not included
n the departmental muster. The respondent challenged the
validity of the order terminating his services by an application
made before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution
on the grounds, inter alia, that the Standing Orders in question
were confined to those employees only to whom tickets were
issued, and that as no ticket was issued to him he wa·s not an
employee within the meaning of the Standing Orders which did
not therefore apply to him and, consequently, the termination of
his services under Standing Order No. 16(1) was illegal:
Held, (1) that the words "whose names.and ticket numbers
are included in the departmental musters" occurring in Standing
Order No. 2 (a) should be read as "whose names and .tick€t numbers, if any, are included in the departmental musters";
'
Cortis v. The Kent Water Works Company, (1827) 7 B. & C.
314; 108 E. R. 741 anq Perumal Goundan v. The· Thirunittlarayapuram J ananukoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nidhi, (1918) I.LR.
41 Mad. 624, applied.
•
(2) that under the Standing Orders, in which a distinctionis
made between ' employees' and 'workmen', while e,very workman must have a ticket, there may be employees who may have no
tickets the possession of which is riot an essential characteristic
of an employee; and,
(3) that the Standing Orders apply to all employees for
whose benefit they !)ave been made .
•
April II.
•
464
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959)
Accordipgly, the Standing Orders were applicable to the
respondent and the termination of his service in accordance with
The Nagpur Iilec· Standing Order No. 16(1) was valid and, therefore, the application
tric Light and Power made by hiin to the High Court must fail.
Co., Ltd.,
v.
Shrlepathi J?ao
•
Cn1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
5 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated September 26, l!l56, of the former Nagpur
High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 66 of 1956,
arising out of the judgment and order dated April 14,
1956, of the said High Court in Misc. Petition Ng. 6 of
1956.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, B. Sen,
D. B. Padhya and J. N. Shroff, for the appellants.
ll. V. S. J1 ani, for the respondent .
•
1958.
April 11.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
s R. Das J.
S. K. DAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave.
,
.The appellants before us are the Nagpur Electric Light
and Power Co. Ltd. (hereinaftc1' referred to as the
Company), a public limited company having its registered office at Nagpur in Madhya Pradesh, its Manager,
and Assistant Manager. The respondent, Shreepathi
Hao, joined the service of the Company as a typist on
a salary of Its. 30 per month in .July, 1936. He rose
in rank from time to time and was appointed Deputy
Head Clerk in 1947 in the grade of Rs. 120-10-225.
Since 1952 he has been receiving a basic sa!My of
Rs. 245 per month. On Xovember 28, 1955, an
ex plan a ti on was called for from him with regard to
the issue of certain bills to consumers of electricity
called "high tension consumers.", without having
certain "notes for the information of consumers"
printed at tlre back of the bills.
The respondent submitted his explanation on the next clay, marking a
copy thereof to one of the directors of the Company.
On December 2, 1955, he was again asked to 0xplain
why he marked a copy of his explanation to one-of the
directors. The respondent submitted an explanation
in respect of this matter also.
On the same date, he
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
465
was again' asked to explain as to how and why certain
"double adjtistments" had been made in the accounts The Nar;pur Elecof 1954 relating to the consumers' department oftricLightandPower
the Company,
the allegation being that a sum of
Co., Ltd.,
Rs. 1,05,894-7. 7 which represented the amount of bills
Shreep:;!ti Rao
of the Central ]{ailwav had been deducted twice in the
accounts. The resp01;dent submitted an explanation
s. J<. Das J.
on December 3, 1955, in which he said that the charge
was vague and that_. after 1949, he was not in any
way concerned with the preparation of summaries and
annual statements of accounts of the consumers'
department. On December 5, 1955, an order of susper:-
sion was made agaimt the respondent which stated that
the order was to take immediate effect and to remain
in force until further orders, pending some investigation. against the respondent. Two clays later, on
December 7, 1955, a memorandum was served on the
respondent terminating his services with effect from
January 31, 1956.
The memorandum, so far as it is
relevant for our purpose, read-
" We hereby give you notice under Standing Order
16(1) that your services will stand terminated as from
31st January, 1956.·
The. Company's Managing Director is satisfied
that it is not in the interests of the business of the
Company to disclose reasons for termina.ting your
services."
On December 19, 1955, a notice was served ou the
Company on behalf of the. respondent whe,rein it was
stated that the order of suspension dated December 5,
1955, a.nd the order of termination dated December' ,7,
1955, were illegal and ultra vire8 and a request was
made to withdraw the said orders and reinstate the
respondent within 24 hours, failing which the respondent said that he would take legal actimt int.lie rnatter.
On December 26, 1955, the Company sent a reply to
the notice denying the allegations, and the Company
further stated that it had no desire to enter into a
disc.vssion with the respondent as to the propriety of
the orders passed.
On J anuarY. 2, 1956, the respomlent filed a petition
under Art. 226 of the Co.nstitution in. the High C<1urt
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466
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
'958
at Nagpur in which he prayed for the issue of approThe Naffp'" Etec- pria~e writs or di~ecti_ons quashing the orders of sustric Light and Power pons10n and termmat10n dated· December 5, 1955, and
co., Ltd.,
December 7, 1955, respectively and asking for certain
v.
other reliefs.
This petitio.n was heard by a learned
Shreepatizi Rao single Judge on certain preliminary objections raised
s. K. Das J.
by the present appelfants, and, by an order dated
April 14, 1956, he upheld the preliminary objection'S
and dismissed the petition. The preliminary objections
taken were these: ·it was urged that· the service of the
respondent was terminated in accordance with the
Standing Orders of the Company, a:pproved by the
relevant authorities.under the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (XX of
1946), hereinafter referred to as the central Act, and
also under the provisions of the Central Provinces and
Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 (0. P.
and Berar Act XXIII of 194 7), hereinafter called the
local Act ; and if the respondent had any grievance
against the said Standing Orders, his only remedy was
,
to get the Standing Orders amended as provided for
in the relevant Act, but he had no right to move the
High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for
quashing the orders passed against him or for reinstatemC'ut, etc.
Alternatively, it was urged that if the.
Standing Orders did not apply in the case of the
respondent as was the respondent's case, then the
ordinary law of master and servant applied, and the
only remedy of the respondent was to sue the Company
·in damages for wrongful di1nnissal.
On these prelimina~-y objections the learned Judge held (1) that the
respondent was not an employee within the meaning
of the Stqnding Orders and therefore his case was not
governed by the Standing Orders ; (2) that the relationship between the appellants and the respondent was
contractual and not statutory and the remedy of the
respondent was to sue the Company in damages for
wrongful dismissal; and (3) as for amendment of the
Standing Orders so as to include the respondent and
persons in his category, the only remedy open tel' the
respondent was to take action under the relevant Act by
approaching a recognised union to move in the matter.
.
.
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S.C.lt.
SUPREME COURT 1tinPORTS
467
On the dismissal of his petition, the respondent
Ig58
pre.ferred .an appeal under cl. lO of the Letters ~a~e.nt. The Nau ur ElecTh1s appeal was heard and allowed by a D1v1s10n tric Ligh;~ndpower
Bench on September 26, 1956, on the findings that (1)
co. ua ..
the Standing Orders did not apply to the. respondent,
v.
though he was an employee within the meaning of Shmpathi Rao
that expression in s, 2 (1) of the local Act ; (2) the' cond'itions of the respondent's service were governed by
s. !(. Das f.
the provisions of the local Act and on a breach thei'eof,
the respondent had a right to move the High Court
for appropriate orders under Art. 226 of the Constitution; and (3) as 'the termination of the service of the
respondent was without statutory authority, it must be
vacated. The Division Bench accordingly allowed the
appeal, quashed the orders of suspension and termination.of service and declared that the respondent continued to be an employee of the Company on terms
which were applicable _to him on the date of his
suspension, namely, December 5, 1955. There was also
a direction to the Company to pay back wages to the
respondent.
The appellants herein then moved this Court and
obtained special leave to appeal from the order of the
Division Bench, dated September 26, 1956.
The present appeal has been broaght in pursuance of the
order granting special leave to the appellants.
The first and foremost question which arises for
decision in this appeal is whether the Standing Orders
of the Company apply to the respondent.
We have
already stated-and it is not in dispute_:.that the
Standing Orders were approved by the certifyililg
officer under the provisions of the central Act and by
the Labour Commissioner under s. 30 of the local Act.
It is necessary to explain here the general scheme of
the provisions of the two Acts under which the Standing Orders were approved. Under the central Act, the
expression " Standing Orders " means rules relating to
matters set out in the Schedule, and s. 3 requires that
within six months from the date on which the central
Act l'!ecomes applicable to an industrial establishment
the employer shall submit to the certifying officer five
copies of the draft Standing Orders proposed by him
.
.
.
.
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468
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
z958
for adoption in his industrial establishment. Sub-sec-
.
tion (2) of s. 3 lays down that provision shall be made
The Nagpur Elco-.
I [ ft r
t •
l
c• h d l
tric Light and Power 111 sue l c. ra
iOl' ever)' matter set ou 111 t lO
1:")0 e u e
ca., Lid.
which nrny be applicable to the industrial establishv
ment and where model Standing Orders have be0n
ShmpatM Rao prescribed, the draft shall be, SO far as practicable, in
conformitv with such model.
The Schedule refers to
s. JC D'" J.
the matt~rs which are to be provided by Standin~
Orders, rmd item 8 of the Schedule relates to "termination of employment, and the' notice thereof to be
given by employer and workman".
We nrny state
here that the central Act contains a definition of
"workman" which, at the material time in this case,
meant any person employed in any industrial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual m· clerical,
1'1bour for hire or reward, but did not include anv
member of the armed forces.
Sections 4 to IO of th.e
central Act deal with (a) conditions for certification of
Standing Orders, (b) certification of Standing Ordern,
(c) appeals, (d) date of operation of Standing Orders,
(e) register of Standing Orders, (f) posting of Standing
Orders and (g) duration and modification of Standing
Orders.
There are similar provisions in the local Act,
Chapter IV of which deals with .Standing Orders.
Sub-section (1) of s. 30 of the local Act lays down-
" Every employer, in respect of any industry to
which this Act has been made applicable under subsection (:3) of section 1, shall, within two months of the
date of such notification, submit to the Labour Commissioner for approval, in such manner as may be
prescribed, a copy of the Standing Orders concerning
the relations between him and his employees with
regard to all industrial matters mentioned in Schedule I. "
Item 8 of Sc:hepnle I of the local Act is again " termination of employment, notice to be given by employer
and employee". The other sub-sections of s. 30 lity
down the procedure to be followed for the approval of
Standing Oeders by the Labour Commissioner, apJ)eal ·
by an aggrieved person, etc.
Sections 31 and 32 lay
down the procedure for an amendment of the Standing
Orders either at the instance of the employer or at the
.
.
.
.
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S.C.R.
SUPRE~1E COURT REPORTS
460
instance of a representative of employees. It is worthy
r958
of note that sub-s. (1) of s. 30 requires every employer Tl
t
b ·
h
L b
C
· ·
f th
ie Nftgp11r Elec0 su m1t to t e
a our omm1ss10ner a copy o · e tric Light and Power
Standing Orders concerning the relations between him
co., Ltd.,
and his employees with regard to all industrial matters
v.
mentioned in Schedule I.
The local Act defines the
Shreepathi Rao
expression "employee" and, at the relevant time, it
mfant any person employed by an employer to do any
s. K. Das f.
skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for contract or hire or reward
0in any industry.
It is worthy
of note that the definition of " employee " in the local
~!\ct corresponds more or less to the definition of
" workman " under the central Act.
There are some
minor differences in the definition of the two expressions in the two Acts, but with those differences we
are nQt concerned in the present case.
The Standing Orders with which we are concerned in
the present case came into force on November 14, 1951,
1111d it is convenient at this stage to refer to the relevant Standing Orders.
Standing Order no. 2 defines
certain expressions used in the Standing Orders. It
states-
" In these Orders, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context :-
(a) " employees"
means all persons, male or
female, employed in the Office or Mains Department or
Stores or Power House or Receiving Station of the
Company, either at Nagpur or at Wardha whose
names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters.
(b) "The Manager" means the person appointet'l.
as such and includes the Assistant Manager and in
relation to \Vardha establishment :•the Resident
Engineer ".
( c) "Ticket" includes a ;Card, pass o_; token.
(d) "·workman" means such categories ofetnployees as may from time to time be declared to be
" \Vorkman " by the Management ".
Standing Order no. 3 classifies employees into certain
categories and Standing Order no. 4 deals with tickets.
In substance, it says that every workman, permanent
0
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470
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
r958
or temporary, shall have a ticket or card, and an
El apprentice shall have an apprentice card; the tickets
Xhe Nagpur
"-
-
d
h ll b
d
frw,LightandPaw,,or cards issue
s. a
e surren ered when the workf:,"· Ltd..
man is discharged or ceases to belong to the class of
v.
employment for which the card or ticket is issued. It
Shmpathi, Rao is to be noticed that under the definition clause" workman" means such categories of employees as may
;;. K. Das J.
from time to time be declared to be workmen by the
management and Standing Ord~r no. 4 makes it clear
that every workman, permanent or temporary, will
have a ticket. " Standing Order no. lG deals with termination of employment, and cl. (I.) thereof, relevant
fo:r: our purpose, must be quoted in full-.
"J<'or terminating the employment of a·pcrmanent
employee, a notice in writing shall be given either by
the employer or -the employee, giving one caJ.endar
nionth's notice. The reasons for the termination of
the services ·will be 'cop:tmunicated to the employee in
writing, if he so desires at _the time of discharge, unless
such a communication, in the opinion of the Management, may directly or indirectly fay the Company and
the Management .or the person signing the communication open to criminal or civil proceedings at the
instance of the employee, or the Company's Managing
Director is satisfied that it is not in the interests of the
i.msiil.es's' ot' the Company to disclose the reasons and so
orders' in wdtin'g. "
~ow, it is 'i1ot
1i'ri dispute that the respondent is a
' workman '. with!n the ineaning of the Central Act
and an 'employee ' as defined in the local Act: The
eontroversy before us is as. to. whether .. he is an
'.employee' within the meaning oftHe Standing \:)rders .
.l\drp'.ittedly,'h~ ticket has been issued' .to the respoi;l:
dent' 'by the Company; his_ ti_cket number mprnot,
therefore, oo included in the departmental_ rμ11ster:
The learfied Judges of the High Court held tji.at the
inclusion' df the name and tick.et number in the depart;
mental mu'ster was an essential characteristic of a·n
' employee ' as defined for the purp6se of the St!J:nding
Orders, and the ·mere fact of employnierlt 1in the Office,
Mains Department;!Stores, Power House·br l{eceiving
S~ation of the Compa.iry was not, enough to make a
.
.
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
471
person so employed an '·employee ' within the meanI958
ing of th? Sta:rrdirig Or~et,s; '~~d. as the r~spon~ent did The Nagpur Elecnot fulfil the necessary 9ond1t10n of ha vmg his name tric Light and Power
and ticket number incli1d.ed ' in:' ~he departmental
co., Ltd.,
muster, he was not an 'employee' as' 'ilefined for the
v.
Standing Orders, which did not therefore apply to him.
Shreepathi Rao
On behalf of the appellants, it is contended that regard
beti;ig had to the context and the entire body of the
s. K~ Das f.
Standing Orders, the aforesaid view of the High Court
is not correct, and on a proper construction, inclusion of
. the name and ticket number in the departmental lnuster
is not an essential characteristic of an ' employee' as
defined for the Standing Orders.
It is rightly pointed
oub that if.the possessionof a ticket and a ticket number is taken as an essential characteristic of an
' empJ..oyee ',
then there is hardly any difference
between an 'employee' and a 'workman' as defined
in the Standing Orders; because a 'workman' ineans
such categories of employees as may from time to time
be declared to be workmen, and under Standing Order
no. 4 all workmen must have tickets. If a person employed by the company must have a ticket before he
can be an employee, and if workmen are ·such catego-·
ries of employees as have tickets, the distinction
between the two disappears andjt is difficult to under-·
stand why two definitions were necessary.
.
On a consideration, however, of the subject o(
context of the Standing Orders, read in their entirety
and in harmony with one another, it becomes at once
clear why two definitions are necessary and what is
the disti1iction between the two classes-' employees•
and 'workmen '-in the "Standing Orders.
The ex-·
pression 'employee'. denotes a larger group-namely,
all persons, male or female, who are employed in the
Office, Mains Department, Stores, Powe.i House, or
Heceiving Station of the Company, either at Nagpur
or , \Vardha. ' \V orkmen ' denotes a smaller group,
viz., such categories of employees as have been declared
·to be workmen, and who must have a ticket. Such a·
distiml'tion is dearly intelligible in an industrial.
establishment, where for security and other reasons a
system of tickets or passes is necessary for .thos~ wbJJ·
.
.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
1958
work in the Power House or Mains Department or other
Th
"
P
L··i • places where essential machinery is installed while
' "ag "' • "
h
h
h
1 · 1
ff"
l .
tricLightandPowcrot ers, sue
as t e c er1ca sta , 111a)7 'vor r i11 an
co., Lid.,
office building where security demands are either non.
v.
existent or much less insistent. This distinction means
Slmepathi llao that all 'workmen ' are 'employees', but all 'employees' are not ' workmen' for the purpose of the
s. I<. D"as J.
Standing Orders, and the inclusion of ticket numbers
in the departmental musters will be applicab.le to
those t>mployces only to whom tickets have been
issued; but such inclusion is not an essential charac- .
teristic of an employee.
Let us now sec if such a distinction is consistent
with the Standing Orders as a whole.
Standing Order
no. 3, which classifies employees, defines a probationer
'
in cl. (c) and says that a probationer means an em;iloyee
who is appointed in a·clear vacancy on probation for
a period not exceeding twelve months, etc. Standing
Order no. 4 does not require the issue of n ticket to a
probationer; yet a probntioner is an employee. It is
thus obvious that the Standing Orders do make a
distinction between 'employees' and ' workmen', and
there may also be employees who lrn ve no tickets.
Some of the Standing Orders apply to workmen only,
c. g., Standing Orders 12, 13, 14 and 15. Other Slnnding Orders apply to all employees, whether they are
workmen or not. Standing Order no. 16 falls in the
latter category; it applies to all employees.
Standing Order no. 8 (b), we think, makes the position still more clear. It says-
" Any employee, who after marking his at.tenclance or presenting his ticket, card, or token, as the
case may be, is found absent from his proper place of
work during working hours without permission or
without an" sufficient reason, shall be liable to be
treated as absent for the period of his absence."
lf every employee has to have a ticket, it is difficult
to understand why this Standing Order should make a
distinction between an employee who marks his r;ttendance and another who presents his t·iclcet, carrl or token.
Such a distinction is easily understandable when some
e111ployees do .not
posses~ a ticket, card or token,
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S.O.R.
SUPHEME COUBT HEPORTS
473
so that they merely mark their attendance; while
z95B
those who possess a ticket, card or token present it.
Tit• Nagpur EtecIt has been suggested that Standing Order no. 4 iStricLight and Power
not exhaustive in the matter of issue of tickets; it
Co., Ltd.,
talks of an issue ofa ticket to every permanent workv.
d
b dl ·
)
Shreepathi Rao
man, a car· to every
a
i wor ;;:man, a temporary
t~clrnt. to every temporary workman, and an apprcns. K. Vas 1.
tice card to every apprentice. It does not prescribe
the issue of a pass or token, though the definition of a
'ticket' includes a pass or token.
The suggestion
further is that Standing Order no. 2 (a) itself authorises
the issue of tickets to other employees, so that there
may be one kind of tickets issued to workmen under
Standing Order no. 4 and another kind of tickets to
other employees under Standing Order no. 2 (a).
On
this.view, it is suggested that the alternatives mentioned in l::ltanding Order no. 8 (b) really amount to an
option given to an employee either to mark his
attendance or present his ticket. lt i8, however,
difficult to understand the necessity of an option of
this kind when every employee must have a ticket,
particularly when the exercise of such an option is
likely to defeat the very purpose for which tickets are
issued in an industrial establishment. \Ve do not,
however, think that the case of the respondent is in
any way strengthened by holding that Standing Order
no. 2 (a) itself authorises the issue of tickets to employees other than workmen. Even on that construction, the failure of the. Company to issue tickets under
Standing Order no. 2 (a) will not deprive the employees
of their real status as employees and of the benefit 'of
the Standing Orders.
The direction for the issue of
tickets will, in that view of the Standing Order, be an
enabling provision only and not an essential characteristic of an employee. Further, Stttnding Order
no. 4 provides for the surrender of tickets issued thereunder but Standing Order no. 2 (a), if it is construed
as enabling the Company to issue tickets, makes no
pro1~sion for the surrender of tickets when the em.
ployee ceases to be an employee. This absence of any
provision for surrender applicable to such tickets
•
•
474
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
r9s8
clearly implies that issue of tickets is not contem,
n, Nagpi" Uec-plated by the ·Standing Order.no. 2 (a) itself.·· ·
.
tricLightandPower
On·behalf of the· )'espondent, howBver,· the· mam
Co., Ltd.,
argument has been of a different character. It has
v.
been argued that there need not be one set of StandShmpothi llao ing Orders for all emphoyees, and·the Standing Orders
s. H. Das J.
in question being confinecl to. those employees to whom
tickets had heen issued, the respondent who had ntJ
ticket was outside their purview1 and the result was
that the Company had committed a breach of tha
statutory· provision in s. 30 of the local Act in the
sense that no Standing Orders had been made in
re,spect of the respondent and employees like him to
whom tickets had not been issued. It has been argued
that, therefore, no action. could be taken against the
respondent either under the Standing Orders or ~ven
under the ordinary law. of master and servant.
We
.ire unable to accept this argument as correct.
We
lrnve pointed out that th" Standing O,rders themselves
make a distinction between ' employees ' and 'workmen', and there nrny also be employees who have no
tickets.
To hold that the Standing Orders apply to
those employees only to whom tickets have been
issued will make employees synonymous with workmen-a result negatived by two separate definitions
given in Standing Order no. 2.
The central Act as
well as the local Act contemplate the making of Standing Orders for all employees in respect of matters
which are required to be dealt with by Standing
Orders.
The Standing Orders in question were not
objected to as being defective or incomplete by workmen, and they have been approved by the appropriate
authority and they must be construed with reference
to their subject or context. ln the absence of compelling reasonE> to the contrary, it should be held that
they apply to all employees for whose benefit they
have been made.
Vv e see no compelling reasons for
holding that the Standing Orders do not apply to the.
respondent. In our view, and having regard to the
subject or context of the Standing Orders, the wtirds
"whose names and ticket numbers arc included in the
dep,ftrtmental musters" in Standing Order no. 2 (a) do
.
.
•
S.0.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
475
not lay down any essential characteristic of an emr958
ployee and are applicable only in cases where tickets
have been issued to an employee.
The essential The Nagpur Elecf. h d f" · ·
f
1
·
1
Irie Light a1'd Power
content o t e e imt1011 o an emp oyee is emp oyment
Co., Ltd .•
in the Office, Mains Department, eto., of the Company
v.
either at Nagpur or W ardha, and that of a workman
ShreepathiRao
the necessary declaration by the Company which
would entitle him to a ticket under Standing Order
s ](. Das ].
no. 4.
·There is also another relevant consideration which
must be borne in mind in construing the Standing
Orders in question. Section 30 of the local Act imposes a statutory obligation on the employer to make
- Standing Orders in respect of all his employees and a
breach of the statutory obligation involves a criminal
liability. That ~eing so, the court would be justified,
if it can reasonably d9 so, to construe the Standing
Orders so as to make them consistent with the compliance of the said statutory bbligation.
We are not unmindful of the ptihciple that in construing a statutory provision or rule,·_ every word
occurring therein must b.e given its -prop'er meaning
ana 'wE;iight.
Th_e necessity of such an interpretation
is all the more "important in a definition clause. 'But
even a defii:iition clause must derive its meaning frorn
the context or subject. In Cortis v. The Kent W ate!f:
works Company (1), the question for consideration was
the interpretation of the appeal dlause in an Act for
Paving, Cleansing, Lighting, etc., Of the Town and
Plirish of vVoolwich (47 Geo. III, Sess.'2~ cap. CXI).
By the "16th section of the statute, "the commission<irs
are to .make rates upon all and every the person or persons who (fo or . shall hold, occupy' possess, etb:' any
land within "tlie p:;i.rish ". The statute also gave a tight
of appeal to anj r:Jerson or persons-. aggtieved by any
rate, but the appeal clause required tHe person or perl
sons appealing against' 'a rate to 'enter in't'6'd'recognis"
ance; the question was if this req'l'.lirement w'as intended -to exclude corporations' f'r611f the purview of· the appeal "clau~e, as corporations, it' «·a·s urged, cannot ettt~r
ititb 'a recbgnisande. In interpreti:iig the appeal cla u~~;
Bayley · J. observed-
.
· -
.
.
1
..
(1) (1827) 7 J3. &; C. 3M i lOS E. 'R. 741.
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•
476
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[Hl59]
r95S
"But assuming that they cannot enter into a
Th "-P El
rceoguizance, vet if thev n.re j)ersons car)able of being
e Hap· '/IJ'
ec-
---:
•1
J
,
.
'-'
tdcLighia>ulPowuaggnevPd by and appealmg agamst a rate, I should
co., ua.,
say that that part of the clause which gives the appeal
v.
applies to all persons capable of appealing, and that
Shmpathi Rao the other part of the clause which requires a recognizance to be enkred into applies only to those persons
S. K. Das].
bl
"·ho are capa e of entering into a recognizance, hnt
is inapplicable to those who are not."
The same principle of interpretation was applied in
Perumal Gounclan v. 1'he 1'hiruinala.ra.yapuram Jana ..
nukoola. Dhanasekha.ra Sangha Niclhi ('), in construing
the Explanation to 0. XXXIII, r. 1, of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which says intei· alia that "a person
is a pauper ............ whcn he is not. entitled to property
worth one hundred rupees other than his nece~sary
wearing apparel and the subject matter of the suit".
The que.~tion was if the aforesaid provision applied to
companies. It was held that it would be wrong to
construe the provision to mean that 011ly persons who
possess wearing apparel can sue as paupers. v\' e. are
of the view that the same rule of construction should
apply in the present case, and the words "whose
names ai1cl ticket numbers are included· in the department.al musters" occurring in Standing Order no. 2(a)
should be read as "whose names and ticket numbers,
if any, are included in the departmental musters" and
should apply in the case of those employees only who
possess tickets and whose ticket nnmbern are capable
of being entered in departmental musters; they are
not intended to exclude employees who do not possess
tickets or to whom tickets have not been issued and
consequently whose names only are so entered.
The learned J uclges of the High Court were influenced hy the. circumstance that in an earlier case
D. 0. Dungore v. S. S. Danclige (Miscellaneous Petition
No. 134 of 1954 decided by the same High Court on
September 23, 1955) the Company took np the stand
that the Standing Orders applied to employees to
whom tickets had been issued-a stand different from
and inconsistent with that taken in the present case.
S') (1917) I.L.R. 4•1 Mad. 624.
•
' •
•
,.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT R.EPORTS
477
It may be pointed out, however, that D. C. Dungore
r958
of the earlier case was not an employee within ·the 7 ,
"
·
El
.
.
.
'
11e Naupur
_, ecmeanmg of the relevant Act, and there could be no tric Li ah; and Power
Standing Orders in respect of his co1iditions of service.
c
0
0 .• Ltd.,
Moreover, in the matter of construction of a stp,tutory
v.
provision no (1uestion of estoppel arises, and the learnShrupathi Rao
eel Judges had pointed out that the respondent himself
h
l
h
0
d"
0 l
1 d
11
s. J(. na> I
thoug t t lat t e otan mg
re ers app ie · to a employees. vVe have rested our decision as to the applicability of the Standing Orders not Oil
what the
appelhnts or the respondent thought at one time or
another, but on a true construction of the Standing
Orders thcm;;el ves, including the definition clause in
Standing Order no. 2(a).
We take the view that the Standing Orders apply
to th~ respondent.
This is really decisive of the appeal, because. if the Standing Orders apply to the
respondent and his service has been terminated in
accordance with Standing Order no. 16(1), the writ
application which the respondent made to the High
Court must fail.
The learned Attorney-General appearing for the
appellants addressed us on the scope and ambit of
Art. 226 of the Constitution, and he contended that
even if the respondent had been wrongfully dismissed
by his pri va,tc employer, the proper remedy was by
means of a suit and not by invoking the special writ
jurisdiction of the High Comt. These contentions raise
i~portant questions, but 1rn do not think that we are
caUed upon to decide them in this case.
Lastly, it has been urged on behalf of the responr
dent that even if we hold that the Standing Orders
apply to the respondent, we should remand the case
to the High Court for a decision on merits of other
points raised by the respondent, because .the question
whether the Standing Orders apply or not was treated
• as a preliminary issue by the High Courb and no
decision was given on other points. Vile asked learned
Advocate for the respondent what other points remain
for det:ision on his writ application, once it is held
that the Standing Orders apply to the respondent .and
o•
•
•
478
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
I958
his service has been terminated in accordance with
Standing Order no. 16(1).
Learned Advocate then
The Nagpur Elec-
,.
d'
t
St d'
0 d
18
h" h
"d
t . L' 11
dP
re1erre
us o
an mg r er no.
, w 10 prov1 es
ricigianower.r:
I"'·
b"
co., Ltd.,
ior pena. ties for nnsconduct, and su m1tted that the
v.
provisions thereof have not been complied with by the
.Shmpathi Rao appellants. He particularly referred to cl. (c) of Standing Order no. 18 and submitted that the order of suss. I<. Das J.
pension passed against the respondent was in violation
of the safeguards mentioned therein. The short
answer to this argument is th:it no penalty for misconduct has been imposed on the respondent under
Standing Order no. 18.
The Company paid his salary
to the respondent from the date of suspension to
January 31, 1956, which also showed that no order
was passed by way of punishment for misconduct.
The Company chose to terminat<? the service of the
respondent in accordance with Standing Order ifo. 16,
and did not think fit to proceed against the respondent
for any alleged misconduct, and it was open to the
Company to do so.
So far as Standing Order no 16. is
concerned, all the requirements thereof have been
complied with. That being the position, no other
point remains for decision in the present case.
The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds
and is allowed. The judgment and order of the High
Court dated September 26, 1956, are set aside and
the writ petition of the respondent is dismissed. In
view of the stand which the appellants had taken in
the earlier case with regard to the Standing Orders,
we think it proper to say in this case that the parties
l]ll\St bear their own costs throughout.
Appeal allowed .
•
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•