# THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS v. November 20 J. S. BASAPPA

- **Citation:** [1964] 5 S.C.R. 517
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963-11-20
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 494-496 of 1962
- **Bench:** A.K. Sarkar, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-provincial-government-of-madras-v-november-20-j-s-basappa-2990
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Juri:Jdiction of Civil Courts-Statute conferring finality of
orders of assessment-levy of tax without jurisdiction-If Civil
Courts' jurisdiction excluded-Composit
turnover-Transactions
Validly taxed .and those not, severability of-Madras General Sales
Tax Act, 1908 (IX ofl908), SS. 11, 12.
-.
The respondent, a groundnut-oil merchant filed three suits
alleging that the property in some goods remained with him till
the export of the goods to an extra-provincial point and till the
payment of price after export, and sales tax was not demandable
; on these sales under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1933 .•
The appellant contended that the sales were not inter-provincial
sales, the suits were not maintainable in a civil court, the respondent
had not exhausted his alternative remedies and the suits were
barred by limitation under s. 18 of the Act.
t
..
Before the High Court an additional ground based upon
the decision in M/s. Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner
of Sales Tax, [1955) 2 S.C.R. 483 was raised that the whole assessII)ent was invalid because it included an illegal levy which.was not
severable from the legal demand.
Held: (i) Section 18 of the Sales Tax Act applies to suits for
damages and compensation in respect of acts done under the Act.
The period of limitation prescribed in that section does not
a:pply to the kind of suits which were filed by the respondent .
(ii) The jurisdiction of civil courts is not necessarily taken
away when the decision of a tribunal is made final, because the
civil court's jurisdiction to examine the order with reference to
fundamental provisions of the statute, non-compliance with which
would make the proceedings illegal and without jurisdiction, still
remains unless the statute goes further and states either expressly
or by necessary implications that the civil court's jurisdiction ia
completely taken away.
(iii) Applying the above principle the jurisdiction of the civil
court was not taken away as the taxing of 'outside' sales was a
matter wholly outside the jurisdiction of the taxing authorities.
Firm of Il/uri Subhayya Chetty & Sons v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, [1964) I S.C.R. 752 and Secretary of State represented
'I by tlie Collector of South Arco/ v. Mask &.Co. 67 I.A. 222.
518
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
4.
1963
(iv) The entire assessment was void because it was not possible
in the present case to separate from the composite turnover transacThe Provincial tion which were validly taxed from those which were not, in '"
Government of mh uch as this pertaiphs. to thhe ddomain of tax officers and the courts
M d
ave no powers wit m t at omam.
a ras
M/s. Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of
v.
Sales Tax, [1955) 2 S.C,R. 483 and Bennett.& White. (Calgary) Ltd.
J.S. Basappa
v. Municipal District of Sugar City, [1951) AC. 786.

## Text

5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
517
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS
1963
V.
November 20
J. S. BASAPPA
(A.K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND
J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Juri:Jdiction of Civil Courts-Statute conferring finality of
orders of assessment-levy of tax without jurisdiction-If Civil
Courts' jurisdiction excluded-Composit
turnover-Transactions
Validly taxed .and those not, severability of-Madras General Sales
Tax Act, 1908 (IX ofl908), SS. 11, 12.
-.
The respondent, a groundnut-oil merchant filed three suits
alleging that the property in some goods remained with him till
the export of the goods to an extra-provincial point and till the
payment of price after export, and sales tax was not demandable
; on these sales under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1933 .•
The appellant contended that the sales were not inter-provincial
sales, the suits were not maintainable in a civil court, the respondent
had not exhausted his alternative remedies and the suits were
barred by limitation under s. 18 of the Act.
t
..
Before the High Court an additional ground based upon
the decision in M/s. Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner
of Sales Tax, [1955) 2 S.C.R. 483 was raised that the whole assessII)ent was invalid because it included an illegal levy which.was not
severable from the legal demand.
Held: (i) Section 18 of the Sales Tax Act applies to suits for
damages and compensation in respect of acts done under the Act.
The period of limitation prescribed in that section does not
a:pply to the kind of suits which were filed by the respondent .
(ii) The jurisdiction of civil courts is not necessarily taken
away when the decision of a tribunal is made final, because the
civil court's jurisdiction to examine the order with reference to
fundamental provisions of the statute, non-compliance with which
would make the proceedings illegal and without jurisdiction, still
remains unless the statute goes further and states either expressly
or by necessary implications that the civil court's jurisdiction ia
completely taken away.
(iii) Applying the above principle the jurisdiction of the civil
court was not taken away as the taxing of 'outside' sales was a
matter wholly outside the jurisdiction of the taxing authorities.
Firm of Il/uri Subhayya Chetty & Sons v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, [1964) I S.C.R. 752 and Secretary of State represented
'I by tlie Collector of South Arco/ v. Mask &.Co. 67 I.A. 222.
518
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
4.
1963
(iv) The entire assessment was void because it was not possible
in the present case to separate from the composite turnover transacThe Provincial tion which were validly taxed from those which were not, in '"
Government of mh uch as this pertaiphs. to thhe ddomain of tax officers and the courts
M d
ave no powers wit m t at omam.
a ras
M/s. Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of
v.
Sales Tax, [1955) 2 S.C,R. 483 and Bennett.& White. (Calgary) Ltd.
J.S. Basappa
v. Municipal District of Sugar City, [1951) AC. 786.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals
Nos. 494-496 of 1962.
Appeal from the judgment and decrees dated
March 12, 1957, of the Andhra Pradesh High 'Court
in A.S. Nos. 566 to 568 of 1961.
"'
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, T. V.R. Tatachari and
B.R.G.K. Achar, for the appellants.
Bhimsankaram, Chander Kohli and E. Udayaratnam, •
for respondents.
November 20, 1963 .. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Hidayatullah J.
HIDAYATULLAH, J.-This judgment will .dispose
of Civil Appeals Nos. 494 to 496 of 1962. The State
of Andhra Pradesh which now stands substituted
for the Provincial Government of Madras is the
appellant. The respondent is one J.S. Basappa, a
groundnut-oil merchant of Kurnool who was selling ~
oil within the Province and also exported it to extraProvincial points. These three appeals concern salestax for the years 1944-45, 1945-46 and 1946-47. They
~
arise out of three suits filed ·by Basappa against the "'
Provincial Government of Madras now represented
by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, the details
of which are given below.
For the year 1944-45, Basappa was assessed to
sales-tax amounting to Rs. 12,983-2-2 of which,
according to him, a sum of Rs. 1,594-1-5 onjy represented sales within the Province. He claimed that the
remaining sales took place outside the Province of
Madras. He submitted that property in the goods remained with him till the export of the goods to an extraProvincial point and till payment of price after export.
-
He claimed that these .sales could ·not. be included in t-t
•
..
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
519
his turnover under the Madras General Sales-tax
1963
Act, 1939 (Act No. IX of 1939) and sales-tax was
wrongly demanded from him. In respect of this The Prpvinciaf
assessment, he filed O.S. No. 14 of 1950 (original Government of
No. O.S. 40 of 1949) in the Court of the Subordinate
Madras
Judge, Kurnool for refund of Rs. 11,389-0-9 ps.
v.
The Madras State Government in a written statement J. s. Basappa
traversed all the allegations and stated that delivery
-
of the goods was made in Kurnool when the goods Hidayatullah J.
were booked and further that the goods wer.e despatched at buyer's risk and remained at buyer's risk through
out. It also contended that the notice under s. 80
was not proper and the suit was not in accordance
with that notice and was not maintainable because
the orders under the Sales-tax Act were made final
by s. 11(4) of the Sales-tax Act and because Basappa
had not exhausted his other remedies under the Salestax Act. Lastly, it contended that the suit was barred
by time not having been filed within six months from
the date of the act complained of as required bys. 18
of the Sales-tax Act or within one year as required
by Art. 16 of the Indian Limitation Act.
In respect of the year 1945-46, Basappa filed
O.S. No. 44 of 1949 claiming a refund of Rs. 8,356/-
on similar grounds, and in respect of the year 1946-47
he filed 0.S. No. 23 of 1949 for a declaration that the
levy of Rs. 9 ,233-6-7 was illegal and without jurisdiction
and for a permanent injunction to restrain the taking
authority from collecting the tax. In this suit, in
addition to the defences also taken in the other suits
it was contended that the suit was incompetent as a
revision application was pending with the Board of
Revenue.
These suits were disposed of by the Subordinate
Judge, Kurnool by a common judgment dated February
22, 1951. The main points which were decided were:-
(1) whether the suits were not maintainable as (a}
the civil court had no jurisdiction and (b) the assessee
had not exhausted his other remedies, (2) whether the
suits were barred by time, and (3) whether the sales
took place outside the Province of Madras and the
520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. (1964]
1963
levy of the tax in respect of some of the transactions
was illegal. The Subordinate Judge held that there
The Provincial was nothing in the Sales-tax Act to exclude the jurisdicGorernment of tion of the civil court and that the finality spoken of
Madras
by s. 11 of the Sales-tax Act was a finality arising
v.
under the Sales-tax Act and had no reference to the
J. s. Basappa jurisdiction of the civil court.
He also held that
-
Basappa was not required to exhaust his other remedies
Hidayatullah J. before moving the civil court by suit. On the second
point, the Subordinate Judge held that O.S. No. 14
of 1950 and 44 of 1949 were barred by time under
s. 18 of the Sales-tax Act or Art. 16 of the Limitation
Act whichever might be applied. The learned Subordinate Judge held that Art. 62 of the Limitation Act
was not applicable because Basappa had not pleaded
in these two suits that payment of the tax was made
under a mistake. The Subordinate Judge, however,
held that O.S. No. 23 of 1949 was in time. In 0.S.
No. 14 of 1950 and 44 of 1949, he recorded findings
that tax amounting to Rs. 7 ,203-12-9 in respect of
O.S. 14 of 1950 and Rs. 5,370-7-0 in respect of 0.S.
No. 44 of 1949 were wrongly levied, because those
amounts concerned sales
which took place outside
the Province of Madras. In O.S. 23 of 1949, he held
that sales of the value of Rs. 79,465/- took place
outside the Province and tax in respect of them at
1 % (which was the uniform rate applicable to all .the
three years) was not demandable. A declaration
to this effect was granted and an injunction was issued
restraining the State Government from recovering
Rs. 793-10-6 from Basappa. In the result, O.S. No.14
of 1950 and 44 of 1949 were dismissed with costs
and O.S. No. 23 of 1949 was partially decreed with
proportionate costs.
Basappa appealed in all the three suits against
the decision of the Subordinate Judge, Kurnool.
The Government of Madras objected in the appeal
of Basappa from the decision in O.S. No. 23 of 1949
in respect of the decree for Rs. 793-10-6. In the
High Court, applications were made in the appeals
for urging an additional ground that the whole assess-
...
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
521
ment was invalid bei:;ause it included an illegal levy
which was not severable from the legal demand.
This ground was based upon the decision of this
Court in Mjs. Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Assistant
Commissioner of Sales
Tax and others 0 1• This
1963
The· Provi11cii1/
Government of
Madras
request was not opposed and permission was granted
v.
to Basappa. The High Court differed from the J. s. Basappa
Subordinate Judge on the question of limitation and
held that neither s. 18 of the Sales-tax Act nor Art. 16 Hidayaru/lahJ.
of the · Limitation Act was applicable to the suits,
which were governed by Art. 62 of the Limitation
Act. The High Court accordingly held that O.S.
14 of 1950 and 0.S. 44 of 1949 which were dismissed
as barred by time were not barred. On the main
question, the High Court classified all the sales into
four categories whieh were: ·
1. Where the plaintiff himself was the consignor
as well as the consignee,
2. Where the plaintiff himself was the consignor
and the buyer the consignee,
3. Where the buyer was the consignor as well ·as
the consignee, and
·
4. Where a third party was shown as the consignor, the consignee being the plaintiff. ,
The Subordinate Judge had held that sales-tax was
properly demandable in respect of categories 2 and.3
but not in respect of categories l and 4. The second
part of the decision was not assailed before the·High
Court. The High Court again considered categories 2
and 3 and held that sales coming under those categories
were properly assessable to sales-tax as the sales took
place within the Province of Madras. The High Court,
however, acting upon the decision of this court in
Ram Narain's case(1) held that the legal and the illegal
levies were so mixed up that the entire demand for
tax was rendered illegal and void. Jn the ·result,
the appeals filed by Basappa were allowed and the
cross-objection filed by the Provincial Government
of Madras was dismissed. The · High Court certified these cases and the present appeals have been filed.
(!) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 483.
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
1963
Three questions are raised by Mr. A.V. Viswanatha Sastri .. They are, (1) that the civil court had no
Tht Provincial jurisdiction to try these suits, (2) that the suits 0.S. 14
Government of of 1950 and 44 of 1949 were barred by time under
Madras
s. 18 of the Sales-tax Act and (3) that the High Court
v.
was wrong in holding that the assessments were not
J. S. Basappa capable of being split up and in declaring the total
assessments to be void.
Hidayarullah J.
· The first two points give no trouble at all. Section
18 of the Act reads:
"No sriit shall be instituted against the Government .and no suit, prosecution or other proceeding shall be instituted against any Officer
or servant of the State Government in respect
of any act done or purporting to be done under
-
this Act, unless the suit, prosectuion or other
•
proceeding is instituted within six months from
the date of the act complained of."
. .
This seetion applies to suits for damages and compensation in .respect of acts under . the Act. It is
worded in · familiar language by which authorities,
including Government, are protected and indemnified · in respect of bona fide acts done or purporting
to be done under powers conferred by the statute.
The period of limitation prescribed in the section does
not apply to the kind of suits which were filed by
Basappa. This point has no substance and was
not even pressed in the High Court.
-
Similarly, the first point must also be decided
against the State of Andhra Pradesh, ' because of
of a recent decision of this court in Firm of 11/uri
...
Subhayya Chetty Sons v. The State of Andhra Pradesh<1 l
•
1.,
That case was decided under s. ISA of the Madras
I
General Sales-tax Act which was inserted by s. · 10
of the Madras ·General Sales-tax Amendment Act,
1951 which came into force on May 15; 1951. That
section reads:
"No suit or other. proceeding shall, except as
expressly provided in this Act, .be instituted
(1) [1964) 1 S.C.R .. 752.
,..
..
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
523
in any Court to set aside or modify any assess1963
ment made under this Act."
The present appeals have to be decided without the -n-. Provincial
assistance of s. I SA, because the suits were filed in the Go•wnment of
Court of Subordinate Judge, Kurnool and were decided
Madra.v
by him before the amendment came into force. Prior
v.
to the insertion of s. 18A there was no specific proJ. S. Basappa
vision taking away the jurisdiction of the civil court
. --
except s. 11(4) by which a finality attached to orders Hidayarttl.lah.J.
passed in appeal. Under that section, appeals were
provided in respect of orders of assessment and there
was also a provision for revision in s. 12. It was
provided by sub-s. l4J of s. 11 that "every order passed
in appeal under this section, shall, subject to the
powers of revision conferred by s. 12, be final." While
enacting s. 18A the Legislature added an elaborate
machinery which did. not exist earlier for correcting
assessments.
Mr. Sastri contends that in deciding whether
the civil court's jurisdiction is barred, we must take
into account the provisions of s. 11 and s. 12, because
these provisions which provide adequate remedies
"march with the construction" of s. 11(4), · He
submits that the finality which was conferred on the
appellate order subject to a revision must necessarily
be a finality against determination of the same question
by the civil court. It is pointed out by this court in
Chetty' s case<1 l that the exclusion of the jurisdiction
of the civil court is not to be readily inferred and
that even if a provision giving the orders a finality
was enacted, civil courts still have jurisdiction to
interfere where fundamental provisions of the Act
are not complied with, or where the statutoryTribunals
do not act in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the court on that occasion summed up the
law as follows:
"In dealing with the question whether Civil
Courts' jurisdiction to entertain a suit is barred
or not, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact
. . that there is a general presumption that . there
(I) [1964Tf S.C.R. 752.
1963
The 'Provincial
Governmem of
Madras
v.
V. ·S. Basappa
'Iiilayatullah J.
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
must be a remedy in the ordinary civil courts to
a citizen claiming that an amount has been
recovered from him illegally and that such a
remedy can be held to be barred only on very
clear . and unmistakable indications to the contrary. The exclusion .of the jurisdiction of Civil
Courts to entertain civil causes will not be assumed unless the relevant statute contains an express
provision to that effect, or leads to a necessary
and inevitable implication of that nature. The
mere fact that a special statute provides for
certain remedies may not by itself necessarily
exclude the jurisdiction of the civil courts to deal
with a case brought before it in respect of some
of the matters covered. by the said statute."
Referring to the remarks of Lord Thankerton in
Secretary of State represented by the Collector of
South Arcot v. Mask & Co.P l-"it is also well-settled
that that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil
courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where
the provisions of the Act have not been complied
with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial
procedure",-it was observed:
"It is necessary to add that these observations,
though made in somewhat wide terms, do not
justify the assumption that if a decision has
been made by a taxing authority under the pro-
.. visions of the relevant taxing statute, its validity
can be challenged by a suit on the ground that
it is incorrect on the merits and as such, it can
be claimed that the provisions of the said statute
· have not been complied with. Non-compliance
· with the provisions of the statute to which reference
is made by the. Privy Council must, we think,
be non-compliance with such fundamental provisions of the statute as would make the entire
proceedings before the appropriate authority
illegal and without jurisdiction. Similarly, if
an appropriate authority has acted in violation
(l) 67 I.A. 222 at 236.
• •
•
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
525
of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure,
1963
that may also tend to make the proceedings
illegal and void and this infirmity may affect The !'rovinciiil.
the validity of the order passed by the authority Governmem 01
in question."
Madras
It was thus held that the ~ivil court'~ jurisdii:tio? may J. s. ;~sappq
not be taken away by makmg the dec!Slon of a tnbunal
_:____:_
·
final, because the civil court's jurisdiction to examine Hidavawlla/II
the order, with reference to fundamental provisions
· ·
·
of the statute, non-compliance with which would
make the proceedings illegal and without jurisdiction,
still remains, unless the statute goes further and states
either expressly or by necessary implication that the
civil court's jurisdiction is completely taken away.
Applying these tests, it is clear that without a
provision like s. I SA in the Act, the jurisdiction of the
civil court would not be taken and at least where
the action of the authorities is wholly outside the
law and is not a mere error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Mr. Sastri says that we must interpret the
Act in the same way as if s. ISA was implicit in it
and thats. ISA was added to make explicit what was
already implied. We cannot agree. The finality
that statute conferred upon orders of assessment,
subject, however, to appeal and revision, was a finality
for the purposes of the Act. It did not make valid
an action which was not warranted by the Act, as for
example, the levy of tax on a commodity which
was not taxed at all or was exempt. In the present
case, the taxing of sales which did not take place
within the State was a matter wholly outside the
jurisdiction of the taxing authorities and in respect
of such illegal action the jurisdiction of the Civil court
continued to subsist. In our judgment the suits were
competent.
The last question is whether the assessment
as il whole must fail or only in respect of the part which
was outside the jurisdiction of the sales-tax authorities.
We have already reproduced the four categories into
"
which all the transactions of sale were classified.
The High Court and the Court below found that
526
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
categories 1. and 4 represented transactions of sale
which could not be taxed at all by the authorities
The Provincial as those transactions took place outside the State.
Government of It may be mentioned that the Sales-tax Act did not
Madras
then contain any provision which established a nexus
v.
between the sales and the Province. That provision
J. s, Basappa came .later. The High . Court relying upon Ram
-
.
Narain's case<'> , held that the assessments as a whole
Hidayatu/lah f. must fail. In Ram Narain's case a portion of the
assessment was invalid under Art. 286 of the Constitution and the question was whether the total assess"
ment. must fail. This Court observed:
"The necessity for doing so is, however obviated
by reason of the fact that the assessment is one
composite whole relating to the pre-Constitution. as well as the post-Constitution periods
and. is invalid in toto. There is authority for
the proposition that when an assessment . consists of a single undivided sum in respect of the
totality of the property treated as assessable,
the wrongful . inclusion in it of certain items
of property which by virtue of a provision of
law were expressly exempted from taxation renders
the assessment invalid in toto."
This Court cited with approval a passage from Bennett
& White (Calgary) Ltd. and Municipal District of
Sugar City No. 5<2i where the Judicial Committee
observed:
"When an assessment is not for an entire sum,
but for separate sums, dissected ·and earmarked
each of them to a separate assessable item,
a court can sever the items and cut out one or
more along with the sum attributed to it, while
affirming the residue. But where the assessment
consists of a single undivided sum in respect
.. of the totality of property treated assessable
and when one component lnot dismissible as
• 'de minimis) is on any view not assessable and
wrongli included, it would seem clear that such
a procedure is barred and the assessment is
,.
l l) [!955] 2 S.C.R. 483.
(2) [1951] A.C. 786 at 816.
. '
·•
-
• -
5 S.C.R.
_._,,
«',... .•
~~1_:_'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
527
bad wholly. That matter is covered by authority.
/963
In Montreal Light Heat & Power Consolidated
v. City of Westmount (1926) S.C.R. (Can.) 515 The Provincial
the court (see especially per Anglin C.J.) in these Government of
conditions held that an assessment which was
Madras
. bad in part was infected throughout and treated
v.
it as invalid. Here. their Lordships are of opinion, J. s. Ba!lappa
by parity of reasoning, that the assessment was
invalid in toto."
Hidayatu//ah J.
It is urged by Mr. Sastri that the tax here is at the
uniform rate of 1 % and as all the returns and documents
necessary to separate the bad part from the good are
available, there is no need to cancel the whole assessment. He contends that these cases are rather governed by the other rule that where the assessment is
for separate sums, only that portion need be declared
illegal which is void. It is necessary to explain the
distinction between the two classes of cases and how
they are to be distinguished. A difference in approach
arises only in those cases where the assessment of
many matters results in amounts of tax which though
parts of the whole assessment, stand completely
separate. There the court can declare the "separate
dissected and earmarked" items illegal and excise
them from the levy. In doing so, the court does
not arrogate to itself the functions of the taxing authorities; but where the tax is a composite one and to
separate the good part from the bad, proceedings
in the nature of assessment have to . be undertaken,
the civil court lacks the jurisdiction. Here, the amount
of tax is a percentage of the turnover and the turnover
is a mixed one and it is thus not merely a question
of cutting off some items which are separate but
of entering upon the function of assessment which
only the authorities under the Sales-tax Act can undertake. Cases of assessment based upon gross valuation
such . as the case from Canada referred to by the
Judicial Committee afford a parallel to a case of
assessment of a composite turnover such as we have
here. Just as in the Canadian case it was not possible
to separate the valuation ·of movable properties from
528
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
that of immovable properties, embraced in a gross
--
valuation roll, so also here, it is not possible to separate
The . .Provincial from the composite turnover transactions which are
Governmerrt .of validly taxed, from those which are not, for that must
Madras
pertain· to the domain of tax officers and the courts
v.
have no powers within that domain.
Tn our opinion,
.'· S. Basappa the High Court was right in declaring the total assessH .d -. -
11 h J menLt? be affected by the portion which was illegal
' ayatu '! .. and v01d.
.
In the result, these appeals fail and are dismissed
with costs, one set only.
·
Appeals dismissed
1963
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA
November-15
V.
SUNIL KUMAR MUKHERJEE & ORS .
. (P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO AND
./
. .
K.C. DAS GUPTA JJ.)
. Life Insurance Corporation-Emp/oyees,-Termination of service
-Non-compliance with the provisions of the Act and order-TerminaMl
tion if, valid-Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956),
-
sii. 7f 11(1) (2) and 49-Life Insurance Corporation Field Officers
(Alteration of Remuneration and other terms and Conditions of
Service) Order,: 1957, els . . 10, 11,-Life Insurance Corporation
Regulations, 1958, els. 4 and 5.
One of the respondents Mr.· S.K. Mukherjee was an employee
of the Metropolitan Insurance Co. Ltd., and had been working
as an.!nspe0qfwhen the appellant took over the company.
Thereafter, in February 1958, he was .directed to work as a field officer.
By the order dated October 16, 1958 his services were terminated
with immediate effect and he was informed that he would be paid
his emoluments up to the current month and one month's salary
in lieu of notice. He was not given an opportunity to show cause
against this termination. .His petition before the High Court
under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of this
~.
order was allowed by the learned single Judge. After appealing
to a Division Bench without success the appellant came in appeal