# The Queen v. The Justices of Bei·kshire ([1878-79] 4 Q.B.D. 469)

- **Citation:** [1956] 1 S.C.R. 653
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-01-13
- **Bench:** S. R. Das C.J, Venkatarama Ayyar, B. P. Sinha, S. K. DAs, GovINDA MENON
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-queen-v-the-justices-of-bei-kshire-1878-79-4-q-b-d-469-1254
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Preventive detention-Detention order by the Commissioner of
Police-Duty to report forthwith to the State Government-" Forthwith", J1feaning of-Time tak-,n for sending report-Validity of detention-Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (IV of 1950), ss. 3(3), 7.
Section 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, provides
that when an order of detention is made by an officer mentioned in
s. 3(2) he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government
together with the grounds on which the order has been made ..... .
and no such order ...... shall remain in force for more than twelve
days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been
approved by the State Government.
On 13th January 1956 the Commissioner of Police, Bombay,
passed orders under s. 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950,
directing the detention of the petitioners and in pursuance thereof
they were arrested on 16th January 1956
The grounds on which
the orders were made were furnished to the petitioners on 20th
January 1956 and the next day the Commissioner reported the fa.ct
of the order and the grounds therefor to the State Government,
which approved of the same on 23rd January 1956. The pet.itioners
contested the validity of the detention on the ground that when the
Commissioner passed the orders for detention on 13th January 1956
it was his duty under s. 3(3) to report that fact forthwith to the
State Government, and as he did not do so until 21st January 1956,
he had acted in contravention of the statute and that the detention
was therefore illegal. It was found that the delay in sending the
report could not have been a.voided by the Commissioner and that
it was due to causes to which the petitioners had very largely contributed.
Held, that the word "forthwith" in s. 3(3) of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950, has not a fixed and an absolute meaning and
it must be construed with reference to the object of the section and
the circumstances of the case. It cannot mean the same thing as "as
soon as may be" in s. 7 of the Act and the former is more peremptory than the latter. The difference between the two expressions
lies in this that while under s. 7 the time that is allowed to the
authority to send the communication to the detenu is what is
reasonably convenient, under s. 3(3) what is allowed is only the
1956
September 17
654
SUPREME COURT RE.PORTS
[1956]
1956
period during which he could not, withoub any fault of his own,
send the report.
/(eshav Nilkanth
.
.
,
J gl k
An act which is to be done forthwith must be held to have
oear
b
d
h""d
"h
een so
one w en it is one wit
all reasonable despatch and
The Co;::,,is$iouer without avoidable delay.
of Police, Greater
The Queen v. The Justices of Bei·kshire ([1878-79] 4 Q.B.D. 469),
Bombay
Hudson and others v. Hill and others ([1874] 43 L. J. C.P. 273),
and R•g. v. Pri<M, (S-Moore P.O. 203), relied on.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petitions Nos .. 102, 105
to llO of 1956.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution for
writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus.
N. C. Chatterjee, Sadhan Chandra Gupta and
Janardhan Sharma, for petitioners in Petitions Nos.
102, 105 to 108 of 1956.
Sadhan Chandra Gupta and Janardhan Sharma,
for petitioners in Petitions Nos. 109 and 1JOof1956.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, Porus
A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents in Petitions Nos. 102 and 105 of 1956.
Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents
in Petitions Nos. 106 to llO of 1956.
1956. September 17.
The Judgment of the
Court was. delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-These are petitions filed
under article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of
writs in the nature of habeas corpus. They arise on
the same facts and raise the ;same questions.
On 13-1-1956 the Commissioner of Police, Bombay,
passed orders under section 3(2) of the Preventive
Detention Act IV of 1950 (hereinafter referred to as
the Act), directing the detention of the present petitioners, and pursuant thereto, they were actually
arrested on 16-

## Text

•
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
KESHA V NILKANTH JOGLEKAR
v.
653
THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, GREATER
BOMBAY
(and connected petitions)
[S. R. DAS C.J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA,
S. K. DAs and GovINDA MENON JJ.]
Preventive detention-Detention order by the Commissioner of
Police-Duty to report forthwith to the State Government-" Forthwith", J1feaning of-Time tak-,n for sending report-Validity of detention-Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (IV of 1950), ss. 3(3), 7.
Section 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, provides
that when an order of detention is made by an officer mentioned in
s. 3(2) he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government
together with the grounds on which the order has been made ..... .
and no such order ...... shall remain in force for more than twelve
days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been
approved by the State Government.
On 13th January 1956 the Commissioner of Police, Bombay,
passed orders under s. 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950,
directing the detention of the petitioners and in pursuance thereof
they were arrested on 16th January 1956
The grounds on which
the orders were made were furnished to the petitioners on 20th
January 1956 and the next day the Commissioner reported the fa.ct
of the order and the grounds therefor to the State Government,
which approved of the same on 23rd January 1956. The pet.itioners
contested the validity of the detention on the ground that when the
Commissioner passed the orders for detention on 13th January 1956
it was his duty under s. 3(3) to report that fact forthwith to the
State Government, and as he did not do so until 21st January 1956,
he had acted in contravention of the statute and that the detention
was therefore illegal. It was found that the delay in sending the
report could not have been a.voided by the Commissioner and that
it was due to causes to which the petitioners had very largely contributed.
Held, that the word "forthwith" in s. 3(3) of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950, has not a fixed and an absolute meaning and
it must be construed with reference to the object of the section and
the circumstances of the case. It cannot mean the same thing as "as
soon as may be" in s. 7 of the Act and the former is more peremptory than the latter. The difference between the two expressions
lies in this that while under s. 7 the time that is allowed to the
authority to send the communication to the detenu is what is
reasonably convenient, under s. 3(3) what is allowed is only the
1956
September 17
654
SUPREME COURT RE.PORTS
[1956]
1956
period during which he could not, withoub any fault of his own,
send the report.
/(eshav Nilkanth
.
.
,
J gl k
An act which is to be done forthwith must be held to have
oear
b
d
h""d
"h
een so
one w en it is one wit
all reasonable despatch and
The Co;::,,is$iouer without avoidable delay.
of Police, Greater
The Queen v. The Justices of Bei·kshire ([1878-79] 4 Q.B.D. 469),
Bombay
Hudson and others v. Hill and others ([1874] 43 L. J. C.P. 273),
and R•g. v. Pri<M, (S-Moore P.O. 203), relied on.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petitions Nos .. 102, 105
to llO of 1956.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution for
writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus.
N. C. Chatterjee, Sadhan Chandra Gupta and
Janardhan Sharma, for petitioners in Petitions Nos.
102, 105 to 108 of 1956.
Sadhan Chandra Gupta and Janardhan Sharma,
for petitioners in Petitions Nos. 109 and 1JOof1956.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, Porus
A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents in Petitions Nos. 102 and 105 of 1956.
Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents
in Petitions Nos. 106 to llO of 1956.
1956. September 17.
The Judgment of the
Court was. delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-These are petitions filed
under article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of
writs in the nature of habeas corpus. They arise on
the same facts and raise the ;same questions.
On 13-1-1956 the Commissioner of Police, Bombay,
passed orders under section 3(2) of the Preventive
Detention Act IV of 1950 (hereinafter referred to as
the Act), directing the detention of the present petitioners, and pursuant thereto, they were actually
arrested on 16-1-1956. The grounds on which the
orders were made were formulated on l~-l-1956, and
communicated to the petitioners the next day. On
21-1-1956 the Commissioner reported the fact of the
order and the grounds therefor to the State Govern-
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
655
ment, which approved of the same on 23-1-1956.
The contention of the petitioners before us is that
when the Uommissioner passed the orders for detention on 13-1-1956, it was his duty under section 3(3}
to report that fact forthwi·th to the State Government, and as he did not do so until 21-1-1956, he had
acted in contravention :of the statute, and that the
detention was therefore illegal. That raises the question as to what "forthwith" in section 3(3) of the Act
signifies, and whether on the facts· the report was
made "forthwith", within the meaning of that word
in that sub-section.
The word "forthwith", it has been observed, is of
elastic import. In its literal sense, it might be construed as meaning that the act to be performed forthwith in relation to another should follow it automatica.lly without any interval of time, or, as held
in some of the American authorities, should be
performed at one and the same time as the other.
But even in America, the preponderance of judicial
opinion does not favour this construction.
In
Corpus Juris, Volume 26, page 998 the position is thus
stated:
•>Although the term has received a strict construction, ordinarily it is not to be strictly construed,
but should receive a liberal or reasonable construction. Some regard must· be had to the nature of the
act or thing to be performed and the circumstances
of the case".
In England, there is a long catena of decisions interpreting the word "forthwith" occurring in statutes,
rules and contracts, and their trend has been to construe it liberally. As early as 1767, discussing the
meaning of the word 'immediately'-and the word
"forthwith'.' has been held to have the same significance-Lord Hardwicke observed in Rex v. Francis(1):
"But then the word immediately, is strorrgly
insisted on, as a word which excludes all mesne acts
and time; and therefore, that this taking away the
money must necessarily be in the presence of Cox.
(1) Cuu. 165; 94 E.R. 1129, 1133.
1956
K eshav N ilka1t: h
Joglekar
v.
The Commissiomr
of Police, Greater
Bombay
Vmkatarama
AyyarJ.
656
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
But all the nine Judges held this word immediately,
K<Sha• Nilkanth to be of so loose a signification, and not to imply
Joglekar
necessarily, that the money was taken away in Cox's
1956
v.
presence. For this word does neither in its use and
The Commissioner application, nor in its grammatical construction,
of Police, Greater exclude all mesne acts or time' ........ But it is more
Bombay
necessary and proper in this case, to consider the
Ve"katarama
signification of this word in the legal way. And it is
plain, that in this acceptation, it is not understood to
exclude mesne acts or time ........ And on the Statute
Hue and Cry, 27 Eliz. c. 13, s. 11, where the words
with as much convenient speed as may be, are made
use of, all the precedents have expressed tliese words,
by the word immediate, as may be seen in the books.
The last case which I shall mention on this point, is
that of the writs of habeas corpus, issuing out of this
Court, which are most frequently made returnable
immediately; and in this case the word is never understood either to exclude mesne acts or time, but only
means, with convenient speed ........ ".
Ayyar J.
In Reg. v. The Justices of Worcester('), where the
question was as to the meaning of the word "forthwith" in section 50 of 6 Will. IV, Coleridge, J. ob-
~ served:
"I agree that this word 'forthwith' is not to
receive a strict construction like the word 'immediately', so that whatever follows, must be done immediately after that which has been done before. By
referring to section 50, it seems that whatever is to
be done under it, ought to be done without any unreasonable delay.
I think that the word 'forthwith'
there used, must be considered as having that meaning".
The meaning of the word "immediately" came up
for consideration in Thompson v. Gibson(2). Holding
that it was not to be construed literally, Lord Abinger
C. B. observed:
"If they" (acts of Parliament) "could be construed literally, consistently with common sense and
justice, undoubtedly they ought; and if I could see,
11) [1889) 7 Dow!. Pr. Cas. 789-791: 54 R.R. 902 (903).
(2) [1841] 8 '!. & W. 282: 151 E.R. 1045, 1047.
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
upon this act of Parliament, that it was the intention
7956
of the legislature that not a single moment's interval I<eshav Nilka"tl'
should take place before the granting of the certificate,
Joglekar
I should think myself bound to defer to that declared
v.
intention. But it is admitted that this cannot be its Tha Con1missionar
interpretation; we are therefore to see hQw, con0/ Police, Greater
sistently with common sense and the prineiples of
Bot11ba:v
justice, the words 'immediately afterwa1ds' are to be
Vmlwtara:na
construed. If they do not mean that it is to be done
Ayyar J.
the very instant afterwards, do they mean within ten
minutes, or a quarter of an hour, afterwards? I think
we should interpret them to mean, within such reasonable time as will exclude the danger of intervening
facts operating upon the mind of the Judge, so as to
disturb the impression made upon it by the evidence
in the cause".
In agreeing with this opinion, Alderson, B. expressly
approved of the decision of Lord Hardwicke in Rex.v.
Francis(1).
This construction of the word 'immediately' was adopted in Page v. Pearce(2), Lord Abinger
C. B. observing:
"It has already been decided, and necessarily so,
that the words 'immediately afterwards' in the statute,
cannot be construed literally; and if you abandon the
literal construction of the words, what can you substitute but 'within a reasonable time?' .... "
./
In The Queen v. The Justices of Berkshire(3), where
the point was as to the meaning of "forthwith" in
section 52 of 35 & 36 Viet., Chapter 94, Cockburn C. J.
observed:
"The question is substantially one of fact. It is
impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule as to
what is the meaning of the word 'immediately', in all
cases. The words 'forthwith' and 'immediately' have
the same meaning.
They are stronger than the expression 'within a reasonable time', and imply prompt,
vigorous action, without any delay, and whether
there h!'.'.s been such action is a question of fact, having regard to the circumstances of the particular case".
(l} Cun. 165: 94 E.R. 1129, 1183.
(2) [1841] 8 M. & W. 677 (678): 151 E.R. 1~11 (1212).
(S) [1878-79] 4 Q.B.D. 469 (471).
86
658
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
1956
The same construction has been put on the word
"forthwith" occurring in contracts. In Hudson and
J(1Js!iav Nilkanth
Jogfokar
others v. Hill and others(') which was a case of charterv.
party, it was observed at page 280:
Th• Com"'i"ioner
'"Forthwith' me·ans without unreasonable delay.
of Police, Greater The difference between undertaking to do something
Bomb~y
'forthwith' and within a specified time is familiar to
Vmkatara"'a , everyone conversant with law. To do a thing 'forthAyyar J.
with' is to do it as soon as is reasonably convenient".
In Reg. v. Price("), it was held by the Privy Council
that the word "forthwith" in a bail bond meant
within a reasonable time from the service of notice.
On these authorities, it may be taken, an act· which
is to be done forthwith must be held to have been so
done, when it is done with all reasonable despatch and
without avoidable delay.
But it is argued by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that the
view taken in the above decisions as to the meaning
of the word "forthwith" has been abandoned in the
later decisions, and that under the law as it stands,
when an act has to be performed forthwith in relation to another, what has to be decided is not whether it was done within a reasonable llime, but whether it was done so closely upon the other as to form
together one continuous act. He relied in support of
this opinion on the decision in Re Muscovitch("),
affirming that in Re Muscovitch('). That was a decision on rule 132 of the Bankruptcy Rules, which provided that "Upon entering an appeal, a copy of the
-, notice of appeal shall forthwith be sent by the appellant to the registrar of the court appealed from".
The facts were that the appeal was lodged in time on
25-10-1938 but the notice was served on 28-10-1938,
and it was found that there was "no satisfactory reason or no reason at all, why there was any delay in
the matter" (Re Muscovitch(')). On that, it was held
that the requisition that "the notice shall forthwith
be sent" was not satisfied. This is authority only for
the position that when an act is done after an interval
of time and there is no explanation forthcoming for
(1) [1874] 48 L.J. C.P. 278 (280).
(2) 8 Moore P.O. 203: 14 E.R. 78,
{3\ [1939] 1 A.E.R. 135.
(4) [1988] 4 A.E.R. 570.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
659
the delay, it cannot be held to have been done "forthwith". That is made clear by Sir Wilfrid Greene 1\1. R.
in the following passage in Re Muscovitch(1) at
page 139:
"Having regard to the construction which was
put upon the word 'forthwith' which is peremptory,
and admits of no interval of time between the entry
of the appeal and the sending of the notice save such
as may be imposed by circumstances which cannot be
avoided, I find it impossible in the present case to say
that the notice was sent forthwith within the meaning of the rule".
Reliance is also placed for the petitioners on the decision in Ex parte Lamb: In re Southam(9), which was
follow~ in Re Muscovitch(1).
There, construing the
word "forthwith" in rule 144 of the Bankruptcy Rules,
1870, which corresponds to rule 132, which was the
subject of interpretation in Re Muscovitch(1), Jessel
M. R. observed at page 173:
"I think that the word 'forthwith' must be construed according to the circumstances in which it is
used. Where, as in Hyde v. Watts( 8), there is a covenant to insure a man's life, there must of necessity
be some delay, for the act could not be done in a
moment. But where an act which is required to be
done 'forthwith' can be done without delay, it ought
to be so done".
In that case also, the learned Judges found that the
delay was not explained. And the observation of Lush
L. J. in the same case was that "the word 'forthwith'
has not a fixed and an absolute meaning; it must
be construed with reference to the objects of the rule
and the circumstances of the case".
There is
nothing in the decisions in Re Muscovitch(1) and Ex
parte Lamb: In re 8outham(2) which can be considered
as marking a departure from the construction put on
the word "forthwith" in the earlier authorities that
it meant only that the act should be performed with
reasonable speed and expedition, and that any delay
in the matter should be satisfactorily explained.
(1) [193~] 1 A.E.R. 18~
(2) [1881-B2J 19 Ch. ·D. 169.
(3) 12 llI & w. 254.
1956
Keshav Nillwnth
Joglckar
v.
The Commissiomr
of PoUct, Greater
Bombay
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
1956
Keshav N ilkanth
Joglekar
v.
The Commissioner
of Police, Greater
B::,,nbay
V<!nkatarama
AyyarJ.
660
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
It is argued for the petitioners that even if the construction put on the word "forthwith" in the above
decisions is accepted as correct, it must, in any
event, yield to any contrary intention expressed in
the statute, and that the provisions of the Act
afforded clear indication of· such an intention. It is
contended that the :egislature while providing in
section 7 that the grpunds should be communicated
to the detenu "as sobn as may be" has enacted that
the report under section 3(3) should be sent "forthwith", that the use of two different expressions in
the two sections is a clear indication that they do not
mean the same thing, that as the words "as soon as
may be" import that the act might be performed in
a reasonable time, the word "forthwith" which is
more peremptory must be construed as excluding it.
The decisions in Emperor v. Phuchai(') and in K. U.
Kulkarni v. Ganpat Teli(') were quoted in support
of the position that when two different expressions
are used in different parts of the same clause or section, they should be construed as used in different
senses.
We agree that "forthwith" in section 3(3) cannot
mean the same thing as "as soon as may be" in section 7, and that the former is more peremptory than
the latter. The diffrrence between the two expressions lies, in our opinion, in this that while under section 7 the time that is allowed to the authority to
send the communication to the detenu is wbat is reasonabl.v convenient, under section 3(3) what is
allowed is only the period during which he could not,
without any fault of his own, send the report. Under
section 7 the question is whether the time taken for
communicating the grounds is reasonably requisite.
Under section 3(3) it is whether the report has been
sent at the earliest point of time possible, and when·
there is an interval of time between the date of the
order and the date of the report, what has to be considered is whether the delay in sending the report
could have been avoided.
(1) I.L.R. 50 All. 909: A.I.R. 1929 All. SS.
(2) I.L.R. [1942] Bom. 287: A.I~· 1912 Bom 191.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
661
It was contended that as section 7 required that
1956
the communication should be made not later than 5 Keshav Nilkauth
days from the date of the order, and as section 3(3)
Joglekar
was more peremptory than section 7 in that it rev.
quired that the report should be made forthwith, the The Co~missio11cr
period allowable under section 3(3) could not exceed 01 Police, Greater
5 days, and that as in these cases the reports were
Bombay
sent 8 days later, they could not be held to have been
Venkatarama
sent forthwith. This argument mixes up two different
Ayyar J.
matters C?ntained in section 7. The period of 5 days
provided therein is an absolute one and is independent of the period which is permissible under the expression "as soon as may be'', which must, by its
very nature, be indefinite depending on the facts and
circumstances of the case. It will be as erroneous to
read 5 days lnto the period allowable under the expression "as soon as may be" as to read the 12 days
within which the State has to approve the order under
section 3(3) into the period which is allowable under
the expression "forthwith". The result then is that
the report sent by the Commissioner to the State on
21-1-1956 could be held to have been sent "forthwith"
as required by section 3(3), only if the authority
could satisfy us that, in spite of all diligence, it was
not in a position to send the report during the period
from 13th to 21st January 1956.
We must now examine the facts from t.he above
standpoint. The Commissioner of Police has filed an
affidavit explaining why the reports were not sent till
21st January 1956, though the orders themselves had
been made as early as 13th January 1956. Ever since
the publication of the proposal to form a State of
Maharashtra without the city of Bombay, there
had been considerable agitation for the establishment 0f a Samyuktha Maharashtra with the city of
Bombay included in it. An action committee had
been set up on 15-11-1955 for the purpose, and there
had been hartal and morchas resulting in outbursts of
lawlessness and violence and in the burning of a police
chowki.
The final decision on the question was expected to be taken and announced in the middle of
January 1956, and the atmosphere was highly surcharged.
It was in this situation that the Commis-
1956
Kcshav Nilkanth
Joglekar
v.
Tlte Co1nmissioner
of Police, Greater
Bombay
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
662
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956)
sioner decided to take action under section 3(2) of
the Act against the leading spirits of the movement,
and passed the present orders for detention against
the petitioners on 13-1-1956.
In his affidavit, the
Commissioner states that he decided first "to locate
the persons against whom orders of detention were
made by me on the 13th January 1956 and after
having done so, to arrest all of them simultaneously
so that none of them may go underground or abscond
or evade execution of the detention orders".
Then
the affidavit goes on to state:
"It was not possible for me to send the report
earlier as the situation in the City of Greater Bombay was tense, pregnant with danger on the 13th
January 1956, and continued to be so till 16th January 1956, and actual rioting occurred during that
night and those riots continued till 22nd January
1956.
I and my staff were kept extremely busy all
thoroughout in maintaining law and order and
simultaneously taking steps to round up miscreants.
In this unusual and tense situation, it was not possible to make a report earlier than the day on which
it was made''.
We see no reason for not accepting these statements.
What happened on the 16th and the following days are now matters of history.
The great city
of Bombay was convulsed in disorders, which are
among the worst that this country has witnessed.
The Bombay police had a most difficult task to perform in securing ijfe and property, and the authorities must have been working at high pressure in
maintaining law and order. It is obvious that the
Commissioner was not sleeping over the orders which
he had passed or lounging supinely over them.
The delay such as it is, is due to causes not of his
making, but to causes to which the activities of the
petitioners very largely contributed.
We have
no hesitation in accepting the affidavit, and we hold
that the delay in sending the report could not have
been avoided by the Commissioner and that when
they were sent by him, they were sent "forthwith"
within the meaning of section 3(3) of the Act.
-
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
663
Mr. S. C. Gupta put forward some special conten1956
tions on behalf of the petitioners in C.M.Ps. Nos. 109 Kesliav Nilkantli
and 110 of 1956.
He contended that as the order
Jogiekar
originally made against the petitioner in C.M.P. No.
v.
109 of 1956 was that he should be detained in Arthur Tiie Co111missio1ur
Road Prison, Bombay' the subsequent order of the of Police, Greater
Commissioner by which he was detained in Nasik
Bombay
Prison was without jurisdiction. It is clear from the
Venkatarania
affidavit of the Commissioner that the petitioner was
Ayyar J.
not ordered to be detained in Arthur Road. Prison
but in Nasik Road Central Prison, and that he was
kept temporarily in Arthur Road Prison, pending
arrangements to transport him to Nasik. It was next
contended that the materials on which the orders of
detention were made and set out in the communications addressed to the petitioners all related to their
past activities, and that they could not constitute
grounds for detention in f1tturo.
This contention is
clearly unsound. What a person ·is likely to do in
futurecanonly be a matter of inference from various
circumstances, and his past record will be valuable,
and often the only, record on which it ·ould be made.
It was finally contended that what was allege -
against the petitioners was only that they advocated
hartal., and that that was not a ground for making
an order of detention. But the charge in these cases
was that the petitioners instigated hartal bringing
about a complete stoppage of work, business and
transport with a view to promote lawlessness and
disorder, and that is a ground on which an order could
be made under section 3(2).
All the contentions urged by the petitioners therefore fail, and these petitions must be dismissed.