# THE RAJASTHAN STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION v. SUBHASH SINDHI COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY JAIPUR & ORS

- **Citation:** [2013] 4 S.C.R. 978
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2013-02-12
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 7254 of 2003
- **Bench:** Dr. B.S. Chauhan, V. Gopala Gowda
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-rajasthan-state-industrial-development-and-investment-corporation-v-subhash-29083
- **Pages:** 40

## Headnote

C
Land Acquisition - Release of Land from acquisition -
Agreement for sale of land, after it was notified uls.4 of Land
Acquisition Act - Challenge to the acquisition proceedings by
the vendor and vendee dismissed with liberty to ask for
release of the land on the ground of parity - Writ petition by
D
vendee for release of the land allowed - Held: High Court
wrongly directed release of the land - The agreement to sell,
entered into subsequent to the Notification under Land
Acquisition Act, did not create any title in favour of the vendee
- Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 - s.4.
E
Estoppel - There can be no estoppel against the law or
public policy - A statutory body cannot be estopped from
denying that it had entered into a contract which was ultra
vi res.
F
Circulars/Notice/Guidelines - Executive instructions
which have no statutory force, cannot override law - Therefore,
any notice, circular, guidelines, etc. which run contrary to
statutory laws, cannot be enforced - In the instant case,
circulars issued be State Government, being inconsistent with
G the policy and law regarding acquisition, cannot be taken note
of - Issuance of such circulars amounts to committing f1aud
upon statutes and also tantamounts to colourable exercise of
power.
H
978
RAJASTHAN STATE INDST. DEV & INV CORPN. v. SUBHASH
979
SINDHI COOP. HSG SOC., JAIPUR
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 14 - Doctrine of A
discrimination - Held: Article 14 does not envisage negative
equality - Doctrine of discrimination is applicable only when
invidious discrimination is meted out to equals, similarly
circumstanced without any rational basis or to relationship that
would warrant such discrimination.
B
Writs: Purpose, nature and grant of - Held: Primary
purpose of writ is to protect and establish rights and to impose
corresponding imperative duty existing in law - It cannot be
granted unless an existing legal right of the applicant and
existent duty of the respondent is established - Writ does not C
create or establish a legal right, but enforces one which stood
already established - The writ is equitable in nature and thus
its issuance is governed by equitable principles - Grant of writ
is at the discretion of the Court - The Courts to exercise such
discretion on the ground of public policy, public interest and
D
public good.
Writ of Mandamus - Grant of - Criteria discussed.
Words and Phrases:
'Void' - Meaning of.
'Discrimination' - Meaning of.
E
F
A large area of land, including the land in question,
was notified u/s. 4(1) of Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act,
1953 for the purpose of industrial development, to be
executed by the appellant-Corporation. Immediately
thereafter, the respondent-Society entered into an
agreement to sell, with the khatedars of the land in
question. Subsequently, on declaration u/s. 6 of the Act,
G
possession of the notified land, including the land in
question, was taken by the Government, which was
handed-over to the appellant-Corporation. The land in
question, alongwith other piece of land was further
allotted by the appellant-Corporation to respondent No.37
H
980
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2013] 4 S.C.R.
A (a Company).
The acquisition proceedings were challenged by the
khatedars of the land in question and the respondentSociety jointly in writ petition before High Court of
8 Rajasthan at Jodhpur which was dismissed on the
ground of delay and laches. SLP against the same was
also dismissed, but with the observation that the
dismissal would not operate as res-judicata if the society
approached the Court for release of the land on the
C ground that iand of similarly situated persons were
released from acquisition.
The respondent-Society filed writ petition, praying for
release of the land in question. The petition was allowed
with direction to release the land in question in favour of
D the respondent-Society. Hence the present appeals.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Acquisition proceedings cannot be
challenged at a belated stag

## Text

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[2013] 4 S.C.R. 978
A
THE RAJASTHAN STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION
v.
SUBHASH SINDHI COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY
JAIPUR & ORS.
B
(Civil Appeal No. 7254 of 2003 etc.)
FEBRUARY 12, 2013
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.)
C
Land Acquisition - Release of Land from acquisition -
Agreement for sale of land, after it was notified uls.4 of Land
Acquisition Act - Challenge to the acquisition proceedings by
the vendor and vendee dismissed with liberty to ask for
release of the land on the ground of parity - Writ petition by
D
vendee for release of the land allowed - Held: High Court
wrongly directed release of the land - The agreement to sell,
entered into subsequent to the Notification under Land
Acquisition Act, did not create any title in favour of the vendee
- Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 - s.4.
E
Estoppel - There can be no estoppel against the law or
public policy - A statutory body cannot be estopped from
denying that it had entered into a contract which was ultra
vi res.
F
Circulars/Notice/Guidelines - Executive instructions
which have no statutory force, cannot override law - Therefore,
any notice, circular, guidelines, etc. which run contrary to
statutory laws, cannot be enforced - In the instant case,
circulars issued be State Government, being inconsistent with
G the policy and law regarding acquisition, cannot be taken note
of - Issuance of such circulars amounts to committing f1aud
upon statutes and also tantamounts to colourable exercise of
power.
H
978
RAJASTHAN STATE INDST. DEV & INV CORPN. v. SUBHASH
979
SINDHI COOP. HSG SOC., JAIPUR
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 14 - Doctrine of A
discrimination - Held: Article 14 does not envisage negative
equality - Doctrine of discrimination is applicable only when
invidious discrimination is meted out to equals, similarly
circumstanced without any rational basis or to relationship that
would warrant such discrimination.
B
Writs: Purpose, nature and grant of - Held: Primary
purpose of writ is to protect and establish rights and to impose
corresponding imperative duty existing in law - It cannot be
granted unless an existing legal right of the applicant and
existent duty of the respondent is established - Writ does not C
create or establish a legal right, but enforces one which stood
already established - The writ is equitable in nature and thus
its issuance is governed by equitable principles - Grant of writ
is at the discretion of the Court - The Courts to exercise such
discretion on the ground of public policy, public interest and
D
public good.
Writ of Mandamus - Grant of - Criteria discussed.
Words and Phrases:
'Void' - Meaning of.
'Discrimination' - Meaning of.
E
F
A large area of land, including the land in question,
was notified u/s. 4(1) of Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act,
1953 for the purpose of industrial development, to be
executed by the appellant-Corporation. Immediately
thereafter, the respondent-Society entered into an
agreement to sell, with the khatedars of the land in
question. Subsequently, on declaration u/s. 6 of the Act,
G
possession of the notified land, including the land in
question, was taken by the Government, which was
handed-over to the appellant-Corporation. The land in
question, alongwith other piece of land was further
allotted by the appellant-Corporation to respondent No.37
H
980
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2013] 4 S.C.R.
A (a Company).
The acquisition proceedings were challenged by the
khatedars of the land in question and the respondentSociety jointly in writ petition before High Court of
8 Rajasthan at Jodhpur which was dismissed on the
ground of delay and laches. SLP against the same was
also dismissed, but with the observation that the
dismissal would not operate as res-judicata if the society
approached the Court for release of the land on the
C ground that iand of similarly situated persons were
released from acquisition.
The respondent-Society filed writ petition, praying for
release of the land in question. The petition was allowed
with direction to release the land in question in favour of
D the respondent-Society. Hence the present appeals.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Acquisition proceedings cannot be
challenged at a belated stage. In the instant case, the
E earlier writ petition filed by the society and the khatedars
jointly, was dismissed by the High Court only on the
ground of delay. This Court upheld the said judgment
and order, while granting the said parties liberty to
challenge the acquisition afresh, on the ground of
F discrimination alone. [Para 6) [998-C-D]
2.1. A purchaser, subsequent to the issuance of a
Section 4 Notification under Land Acquisition Act, in
respect of the land, cannot challenge the acquisition
G proceedings, and can only claim compensation as the
sale transaction in such a situation is Void qua the
Government. Any such encumbrance created by the·
owner, or any transfer of the land in question, that is
made after the issuance of such a notification, would be
H deemed to be void and would not be binding on the
RAJASTHAN STATE INDST DEV & INV CORPN. v. SUBHASH
981
SINDHI COOP. HSG SOC., JAIPUR
Government. In the instant case, the society members
A
had entered into an agreement to sell, even though a
Notification under Section 4 to carry out acquisition had
been issued by the Government fully knowing the legal
consequences that may arise. The agreement to sell did
not create any title in favour of the society. (Paras 7 and
B
33) [998-D-F; 1015-D-E]
Gian Chand v. Gopala and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 528: 1995
(1) SCR 412; Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan and
Ors. AIR 1996 SC 520: 1995 (4) Suppl. SCR 710; Jaipur C
Development Authority v. Mahavir Housing Coop. Society,
Jaipur and Ors. (1996) 11 SCC 229: 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR
491; Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v.
Dau/at Mal Jain and Ors. (1997) 1 SCC 35: 1996 (6) Suppl.
SCR 584; Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and
Ors. (2008) 9 SCC 177: 2008 (10) SCR 1012; Har Narain
D
(Dead) by Lrs. v. Mam Chand (Dead) by LRs. and Ors.
(2010) 13 SCC 128: 2010 (12) SCR 974; V. Chandrasekaran
and Anr. v. The Administrative Officer and Ors. JT 2012 (9)
SC 260: 2012 (12) SCC 133 - relied on.
E
2.2. The word, "void" has been defined as:
ineffectual; nugatory; having no legal force or legal
effect; unable in law to support the purpose for which it
was intended. It also means merely a nullity, invalid; null;
worthless; sipher; useless and ineffectual and may be
F
ignored even in collateral proceeding as if it never were.
The word "void" is used in the sense of incapable of
ratification. A thing which is found non-est and not
required to be set aside though, it is sometimes
convenient to do so. There would be no need for an order G
to quash it. It would be automatically null and void
without more ado. The continuation orders would be
nullities too, because no one can continue a nullity. [Para
11] [999-E-G]
Smt. Kalawati v. Bisheshwar AIR 1968 SC 261: 1968
H
982
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 4 S.C.R.
A SCR 223; State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri
Manikoth, Naduvil (dead) and Ors. AIR 1996 SC 906: 1995
(6) Suppl. SCR 139; Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of
Bombay AIR 1955 SC 123: 1955 SCR 613; Pankaj Mehra
and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1953:
B 2000 (1) SCR 825; Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash
University and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 2552: 2001 (3) SCR 1129;
Government of Orissa v. Ashok Transport Agency and Ors.
(2002) 9 SCC 28: 2002 (3) SCR 632 • relied on.
c
Black's Law Dictionary • referred to.
2.3. The policies of the Government, which allowed
the exemption of land upon which construction existed
on the date of issuance of Section 4 Notification, is not
applicable in the instant case. In the instant case, the
D respondent society entered into an agreement to sell,
subsequent to the issuance of the Section 4 Notification,
and therefore, the question of the existence of any
construction on the said land by any of its members on
the date of Section 4 Notification does not arise. The
E aforesaid policy decision therefore, must be
implemented, while strictly adhering to the terms
incorporated therein. [Para 13] [1000-D·F]
Bondu Ramaswamy and Ors. v. Bangalore Development
F Authority and Ors. (2010) 7 SCC 129: 2010 (6) SCR 29 •
relied on.
3.1. Even if the lands of other similarly situated
persons has been released, the society must satisfy the
court that it is similarly situated in all respects, anci has
G an independent right to get the land released. Article 14
of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality,
and it cannot be used to perpetuate any illegality. The
doctrine of discrimination based upon the existence of
an enforceable right, and Article 14 would hence apply,
H only when invidious discrimination is meted out to
RAJASTHAN STATE INDST. DEV & IN'I. CORPN. v. SUBHASH
983
SINDHI COOP. HSG SOC., JAIPUR
equals, similarly circumstanced without any rational
A
basis, or to relationship that would warrant such
discrimination. [Para 12] [1000-A-C]
Smt. Sneh Prabha and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr. AIR
1996 SC 540: 1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 264; Yogesh Kumar
B
and Ors. v. Government of NCT Delhi and Ors. AIR 2003 SC
1241: 2003 (2) SCR 662; State of West Bengal and Ors. v.
Debasish Mukherjee and Ors. AIR 2011 SC 3667: 2011 (13)
SCR 1077; Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors.
(2012) 7 SCC 433: 2012 (5) SCR 768 - relied on.
3.2. A party seeking relief on the ground of
discrimination must take appropriate pleadings, lay down
c
the factual foundation and must provide details of the
comparable cases, so that the court may reach a
conclusion, whether the authorities have actually D
discriminated against that party; and whether there is in
fact any justification for discrimination, assessing the
facts of both sets of cases together. [Para 16] [1002-GH; 1003-A]
3.3. There is nothing on record to show that the
society had ever applied for release of the said land
before the Competent Authority who had initiated the
acquisition proceedings under the Act. Furthermore, the
society is not in a position to show that the societies
whose lands stood released, were similarly situated to
itself in all respects, i.e., such Societies had no title over
the land, and had in fact, entered into an agreement to
sell subsequent to the issuance of the Notification under
Section 4 of the Act. [Para 14] [1001-F-G]
Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. State of Madhya Pradesh
and Anr. AIR 2011 SC 1989: 2011 (6) SCR 443 - relied on.
3.4. The primary purpose of the writ is to protect and
establish rights, and to impose a corresponding
E
F
G
H
984
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2013) 4 S.C.R.
A imperative duty existing in law. It is designed to promote
justice, (ex debito justiceiae) and its grant or refusal is at
the discretion of the court. The writ cannot be granted
unless it is established that there is an existing legal right
of the applicant, or an existing duty of the respondent.
B Thus, the writ doe& not lie to create or establish a legal
right but, to enforce one that stood already established.
[Para 17] (1003-B-C]
3.5. While dealing with a writ petition, the court must
C exercise discretion, taking into consideration a wide
variety of circumstances, inter-alia, the facts of the case,
the exigency that warrants such exercise of discretion,
the consequences of grant or refusal of the writ, and the
nature and extent of injury that is likely to ensue by such
grant or refusal. Hence, discretion must be exercised by
D the court on grounds of public policy, public interest and
public good. The writ is equitable in nature and thus, its
issuance is governed by equitable principles. Refusal of
relief must be for reasons which would lead to injustice.
The prime consideration for issuance of the writ is,
E whether or not substantial justice will be promoted.
Furthermore, while granting such a writ, the court must
make every effort to ensure from the averments of the
writ petition, whether proper pleadings are being made.
Further in order to maintain the writ of mandamus, the
F first and foremost requirement is that, the petition must
not be frivolous and it is filed in good faith. Additionally,
the applicant must make a demand which is clear, plain
and unambiguous. It must be made to an officer having
the requisite authority to perform the act demanded.
G Furthermore, the authority against whom mandamus is
issued, should have rejected the demand earlier.
Therefore, a demand and its subsequent refusal, either
by words, or by conduct are necessary to satisfy the
court that the opposite party is determined to ignore the
H demand of the applicant with respect to the enforcement
RAJASTHAN STATE INDST DEY. & INV CORPN. v. SUBHASH
985
SINDHI COOP HSG SOC., JAIPUR
of his legal right. However, a demand may not be
A
necessary when the same is manifest from the facts of
the case, that is, when it is an empty formality, or when it
is obvious that the opposite party would not consider the
demand. Thus, it is evident that a writ is not issued
merely as is legal to do so. The court must exercise its
B
discretion after examining pros and cons of the case.
[Paras 17 and 18] [1003-C-H; 1004-A-B, H; 1005-A]
Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Govardhandas
Bhanji AIR 1952 SC 16: 1952 SCR 135; Praga Tools
Corporation v. Shri C. V /manual and Ors. AIR 1969 SC 1306:
C
1969 (3) SCR 773; Punjab Financial Corporation v. Garg
Steel (2010) 15 SCC 546: Union of India and Ors. v.
Arulmozhi lniarasu and Ors. AIR 2011 SC 2731: 2011 (9)
SCR 1 ; Khela Banerjee and Anr. v. City Montessori School
and Ors. (2012) 7 sec 261 - relied on.
D
General Officer Commanding v. CBI and Anr. AIR 2012
SC 1890: 2012 (2) SCR 640 - referred to.
3.6. During the hearing of the case, if it is pointed out
to the court that the party has raised the grievance
E
before the statutory/appropriate authority and the
authority has not decided the same, it is always warranted
that the court may direct the said authority to decide the
representation within a stipulated time by a reasoned
order. However, it is not desirable that the court take upon
F
itself the task of the statutory authority and pass an
order. [Para 20] [1005-D-E]
G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. and Ors.
AIR 1952 SC 192: 1952 SCR 583; Life Insurance Corporation
G
of India v. Mrs. Asha Ramchandra Ambedkar and Anr. AIR
1994 SC 2148: 1994 (2) SCR 163; H.P. Public Service
Commission v. Mukesh Thakur and Anr. AIR 2010 SC 2620:
2010 (7) SCR 189; Manohar Lal (D) by Lrs. v. Ugrasen (D)
by Lrs. and Ors. JT 2011 (12) SC 41 : 2011 SCR 634 - relied
on.
H
986
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 4 S.C.R.
A
3.7. There was correspondence between the JOA
and the appellant RllCO, and also other departments.
There were also meetings held with higher officials of the
State Government, including the Chief Minister but
despite this, the land of the appellant was not released.
B It was in fact, after the order of this Court dated 9.9.1992,
that the respondent society sent a telegram dated
17.10.1992, to the Chief Secretary demanding justice, and
there was no request made to the Competent Authority
to release the said land in its favour. Immediately
c thereafter, the second writ petition was filed. The said
telegram cannot be termed a comprehensive
representation. It does not furnish any detail, or give any
reason, with respect to how not releasing the land of the
society could amount to violative of any provision of the
0 Constitution of India including Article 14. It also did not
disclose any comparable cases, where land belonging to
persons/institutions who were similarly situated to itself,
stood released. [Para 24) [1008-E-H; 1009-A]
3.8. The High Court entertained the writ petition,
E without comparing the actual facts of the respondent
society qua other societies. The High Court has not
recorded any finding to the effect that the land which
stood released from acquisition proceedings, was also
acquired by group housing societies subsequent to the
F issuance of the Section 4 Notification, or the society had
acquired interest in the same on the basis of an
agreement to sell, or on any other ground similar to those
raised by the respondent society. The situation of
societies whose land stood released, was not compared
G with the case of the respondent society. [Paras 30 and
33) [1013-H; 1014-A-C; 1016-F-G]
4.1. Executive instructions which have no statutory
force, cannot override the law. Therefore, any notice,
circular, guidelines etc. which run contrary to statutory
H laws cannot be enforced. [Para 19) [1005-B]
RAJASTHAN STATE INDST DEV & INV CORPN. v. SUBHASH
987
SINDHI COOP. HSG SOC., JAIPUR
B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. etc. v. State of Mysore and Ors.
A
etc. AIR 1966 SC 1942; Sant Ram Sharma v. State of
Rajasthan and Ors. AIR 1967 SC 1910: 1968 SCR 111;
Secretary, State of Kamataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors.
AIR 2006 SC 1806: 2006 (3) SCR 953; Mahadeo Bhau
Khilare (Mane) and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.
B
(2007) 5 sec 524: 2007 (6) SCR 244 - relied on.
4.2. The material on record revealed, that after
entering into an agreement to sell just after the Section 4
Notification in respect of the suit land was issued, the
C
respondent society submitted a plan for approval before
the JOA, and also applied for conversion of the user of
the land before the Revenue Authority. In relation to this,
it also deposited requisite conversion charges on
13.8.1986. However, as certain developments took place
in the interim period, and the State Government made a
D
public advertisement dated 27.2.1982, asking people to
get their agricultural land converted to land to be used
for non-agricultural purposes. Circular dated 1.3.1982
issued by the State Government enabled the persons/
tenure holders seeking conversion and regularization.
E
The Circular also provided that land covered by buildings
or by any constructed area as on the cut-off date, i.e.
20.8.1981 would also be exempted from acquisition
proceedings, if any. Similar benefits were conferred upon
those who were purchasers of land subsequent to the
F
issuance of a Section 4 Notification, though such transfer
was void. The benefit was also extended to cooperative
housing societies, which had made certain developments
and constructions prior to the said cut-off date i.e.
20.8.1981, and even to those areas where no construction
G
was made or even where no sale deed had been
executed, but there existed an agreement to sell prior to
20.8.1981. It is also evident from the Circular that even if
the Government wanted to exempt the land, it would
require a notification by the Government. Law provides
H
988
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 4 S.C.R.
A a notification under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, or abandonment of the land acquisition
proceedings by the State but it is permissible only prior
to taking possession of the land. Once the land is vested
in the State free from all encumbrances, it cannot be
B divested. Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondentsociety was entitled for release of the land. [Paras 21, 22]
[1005-G-H; 1006-A-D, F-H; 1007-A]
4.3. The object and purpose of issuing such circulars
could be to regularise the construction of residential
C houses where the land was sought to be acquired for
residential purposes. Various states have issued circulars
to meet such a situation. However, such a construction
should be in consonance with the development scheme,
or may be compatible with certain modification. Even in
D absence of such schemes, this Court has dealt with the
issue and held that where the land is acquired for
establishing residential, commercial, or industrial area
and the application for release of the land reveal that the
land has been used for the same purpose, the
E Government may release the land, if its existence does
not by any means hinder development as per the
notification for acquisition. In the instant case land has
been acquired for industrial development. The
respondent-society wants the said land for developing the
F residential houses. The land cannot be permitted to be
used for residential purposes. Therefore, demand of
respondent-society cannot be accepted. [Paras 22 and
33] [1007-8-D; 1017-F]
4.4. The circulars issued by the State Government,
G being inconsistent with the policy and the law regarding
acquisition, cannot be taken note of. Issuance of such
circulars amounts to committing fraud upon statutes,
and further, tantamounts to colourable exercise of power.
The State in exercise of eminent domain acquires the
H land. Thus, before completing the acquisition
RAJASTHAN STATE INDST DEV & INv. CORPN. v. SUBHASH
989
SINDHI C00°. HSG SOC., JAIPUR
proceedings, it should not release the land in favour of A
some other person who could not have acquired title
over it at any point of time. [Para 33] [1017-D-E]
Union of India and Anr. v. Bal Ram Singh and Anr. 1992
Suppl (2) SCC 136; Sube Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana
B
and Ors. (2001) 7 SCC 545; Jagdish Chand and Anr. v. State
of Haryana and Anr. (2005) 10 SCC 162; Dharam Pal v. State
of Haryana and Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 397: 2008 (17) SCR 564
- relied on.
4.5. There can be no estoppel against the law or C
public policy. The State and statutory authorities are not
bound by their previous erroneous understanding or
interpretation of law. Statutory authorities or legislature
cannot be asked to act in contravention of law. -"The
statutory body cannot be estopped from denying that it D
has entered into a contract which was ultra vires for it to
make. No corporate body can be bound by estoppel to
do something beyond its powers, or to refrain from doing
what it is its duty to do." Even an offer 0,r concession
made by the public authority can always be withdrawn
E
in public interest. Thus, the respondent-society is not
entitled to take any advantage of those illegal circulars.
[Para 23] [1007-F-H; 1008-A, D-E]
State of Madras and Anr. v. K.M. Rajagopa/an AIR 1955
SC 817: 1955 SCR 541; Badri Prasad and Ors. v. Nagannal
F
and Ors. AIR 1959 SC 559: 1959 Suppl. SCR 709; Dr. H.S.
Rikhy etc. v. The New Delhi Municipal Committee AIR 1962
SC 554: 1962 Suppl. SCR 604; Surajmul/ Nagoremull v.
Triton Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 1925 PC 83; Shiba Prasad
Singh v. Srish Chandra Nandi AIR 1949 PC 297 - relied
G
on.
5. -In the instant case, the Government itself labeled
the safe-deeds, executed after issuance of s.4 Notification
as void. Therefore, the State authorities could not have
regularised such orders. The schemes floated by the
H
990
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2013] 4 S.C.R.
A State Government (knowing well that acquiring land after
the issuance of Section 4 Notification would be void),
indicates a sorry state of affairs. Such orders have been
passed without realizing that administration does not
include mal-administration. [Paras 32 and 33] (1014-H;
B 1015-A, 1017-B-C]
The Kera/a Education Bi/11957 AIR 1958 SC 956: 1959
SCR 995 - followed.
All Bihar Christian Schools Association and Anr. vs. State
C of Bihar and Ors. AIR 1988 SC 305: 1988 (2) SCR 49;
Sindhi Education Society and Anr. vs. The Chief Secretary,
Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Ors. (2010) 8 SCC 49: 2010 (8)
SCR 81; State of Gujarat and Anr. vs. Hon'ble Mr. Justice
R.A. Mehra (Retd.) and Ors. JT 2013 (1) SC 276: 2013 (3)
o SCC 1 - relied on.
6. In the instant case, at the initial stage, the writ
petition was filed before the High Court at Jodhpur, while,
the land is situated in the heart of the Jaipur city, and all
relevant orders including notifications for acquisition
E were issued at Jaipur. The writ petition ought to have
been filed before the Jaipur Bench as per the statutory
requirements therein. No explanation was furnished, as
under what circumstances the first writ petition had been
filed by the society alongwith tenure-holders at Jodhpur.
F Therefore, the sanctity of the order passed by the High
Court is rather doubtful and it creates doubt about the
bonafides of the parties and further, as to whether such
a move could have been made in good faith. [Para 31]
[1014-D-F]
G
Sri Nasiruddin vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal AIR
1976 SC 331: 1976 (1) SCR 505; U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill
Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. and Ors. AIR
1995 SC 2148: 1995 (1) Suppl. SCR 733; Rajasthan High
Court Advocates Association vs. Union of India and Ors. AIR
H 2001 SC 416: 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 743; Dr. Manju Verma
RAJASTHAN STATE INDST. DEV & INV CORPN. v. SUBHASH
991
SINDHI COOP. HSG SOC., JAIPUR
vs. State of UP. and Ors. (2005) 1 SCC 73: 2004 (6) Suppl.
A
SCR 22 - relied on.
Case Law Reference:
1995 (1) SCR 412
relied on
Para 7
B
1995 (4) Suppl. SCR 710 relied on
Para 7
1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 491 relied on
Para 7
1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 584 relied on
Para 7
2008 (10) SCR 1012
relied on
Para 7
c
2010 (12) SCR 974
relied on
Para 7
2012 (12) sec 133
relied on
Para 7
1968 SCR 223
relied on
Para 9
D
1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 139 relied on
Para 9
1955 SCR 613
relied on
Para 11
2000 (1) SCR 825
relied on
Para 11
E
2002 (3) SCR 632
relied on
Para 11
1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 264 relied on
Para 12
2003 (2) SCR 662
relied on
Para 12
2011 (13) SCR 1077
relied on
Para 12
F
2012 (5) SCR 768
relied on
Para 12
2010 (6) SCR 29
relied on
Para 13
2011 (6) SCR 443
relied on
Para 15
G
1952 SCR 135
relied on
Para 17
1969 (3) SCR 773
relied on
Para 17
(2010) 15 sec 546
relied on
Para 17
H
992
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 4 S.C.R.
A
2011 (9) SCR 1
relied on
Para 17
(2012) 1 sec 261
relied on
Para 17
2012 (2) SCR 640
referred to
Para 17
B
AIR 1966 SC 1942
relied on
Para 19
1968 SCR 111
relied on
Para 19
2006 (3) SCR 953
relied on
Para 19
2007 (6) SCR 244
relied on
Para 19
c
1952 SCR 583
relied on
Para 20
1994 (2) SCR 163
relied on
Para 20
2010 (7) SCR 189
relied on
Para 20
D
2011 SCR 634
relied on
Para 20
1992 Suppl (2) sec 136 relied on
Para 22
(2001) 1 sec 545
relied on
Para 22
E
(2005) 1 o sec 162
relied on
Para 22
2008 (17) SCR 564
relied on
Para 22
1955 SCR 541
relied on
Para 23
F
1959 Suppl. SCR 709
relied on
Para 23
1962 Suppl. SCR 604
relied on
Para 23
AIR 1925 PC 83
relied on
Para 23
AIR 1949 PC 297
relied on
Para 23
G
1976 (1) SCR 505
relied on
Para 31
1995 (1) Suppl. SCR 733 relied on
Para 31
2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 743 relied on
Para 31
H
RAJASTHAN STATE INDST. DEV & INV. CORPN. v. SUBHASH
993
SINDHI COOP. HSG SOC., JAIPUR
2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 22
relied on
Para 31
1959 SCR 995
followed
Para 32
1988 (2) SCR 49
relied on
Para 32
2010 (8) SCR 81
relied on
Para 32
2013 (3) sec 1
relied on
Para 32
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
7254 of 2003.
A
B
From the Judgment & Order dated 30.07.2002 of the High
C
Court of Judicature at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in D.B. Civil Writ
Petition No. No. 454 of 1993.
WITH
C.A. No. 853 of 2013.
Dhruv Mehta, Dr,. Manish Singhvi, AAG, Milind Kumar,
Amit Lubhaya, Pragati Neekhra for the Appellant.
D
P.S. Patwalia, Rakesh Dwivedi, M.N. Krishnamani, Ajay
Singh, Ashok K. Mahajan, Shibashish Misra, Sanskriti Pathak,
E
P.V. Yogeswaran, R. Gopalankrishnan, Sanjay Parikh, Mamta
Saxena, Bushra Parveen, A.N. Singh, Aruneshwar Gupta for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been
preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated
30.7.2002 passed by the High Court of Rajasthan (Jaipur
Bench) in Civil Writ Petition No. 454 of 1993, by which the High
G
Court has issued directiol)s to the Rajasthan State Industrial
Development and Investment Corporation (in short "RllCO'), the
appellant herein, to release the land in dispute from land
acquisition in favour of respondent No.1 - housing society
(hereinafter referred to as 'the society').
H
994
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 4 S.C.R.
A
2. As both the appeals have been preferred against the
common impugned judgment, for convenience, Civil Appeal No.
7254 of 2003 is taken to be the leading case. The facts and
circumstances giving rise to this appeal are:
8
A. That, a huge area of land admeasuring 607 Bighas and
5 Biswas situate in the revenue estate of villages Durgapura,
Jhalan Chod, Sanganer and Dhol-ka-Bad in District Jaipur,
including the suit land measuring about 17 Bighas and 9 Biswas
in village Durgapura stood notified under Section 4(1) of the
C Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to
as the 'Act') on 18.7.1979, for a public purpose i.e. industrial
development, to be executed by the RllCO.
B. The respondent society claims to have entered into an
agreement to sell with the Khatedars of the suit land on
D 21.7.1981.
C. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made on
22.6.1982 for the land admeasuring 591 Bighas and 17
Biswas. After meeting all requisite statutory requirements
E contained in the Act, possession of the land, including the land
in dispute was taken by the Government and was subsequently
handed over to RllCO, on 18.10.1982 and 17.11.1983. The
Land Acquisition Collector assessed the market value of the
land of the Khatedars, and made an award on 14.5.1984. Vide
F allotment letter dated 10.3.1988, RllCO, made allotment of land
admeasuring 105 acres of the land, out of the total acquired
land measuring 591 Bighas, to Diamond & Gem Development
Corporation Ltd., a Private Ltd. Company (hereinafter referred
to as the 'Company'), respondent no. 37, to facilitate the
establishment of a Gem Industrial Estate for the manufacturing
G of Gem stones. This piece of land included within it, the land
which was subject matter of an agreement to sell between the
respondent society and the original khatedars.
D. Acquisition proceedings emanating from the Section 4
H Notification dated 18. 7.1979, were challenged by the
RAJASTHAN STATE INDST. DEV & INV CORPN. v. SUBHASH
995
SINDHI COOP HSG SOC., JAIPUR [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
respondent society, as well as by the khatedars jointly in 1989,
A
by filing of Writ Petitions before the High Court of Rajasthan at
Jodhpur. A lease deed was executed by appellant-RllCO in
favour of the company-respondent No.37 in relation to 105
acres of land on 22.5.1989, including the land in question, which
is comprised of Khasra Nos. 226 to 230 is village Durgapura.
B
The aforementioned writ petitions filed by the respondent
society and the original khatedars, challenging the land
acquisition proceedings stood dismissed on the ground of
delay and latches, vide judgment and order dated 21.8.1990
passed by the High Court.
c
E. Aggrieved, the respondent society and one khatedar
filed SLPs before this Court challenging the judgment and order
dated 21.8.1990. This Court vide order dated 9.9.1992
dismissed the said SLPs, however, while doing so, the Court
made an observation that the dismissal of the said SLPs, would
D
not operate as res-judicata if the society approaches the court
for release of their land on the ground that lands owned by
similar set of individuals or institutions, if any, has been
released from acquisition. Such a direction was issued in view
of the submissions made by the respondent society, stating that
E
allotment of the said land in favour of the Company had been
made fraudulently.
F. In view thereof, the society filed a Writ Petition No. 454
of 1993 praying for release of the land admeasuring 17 Bighas
F
and 9 Biswas in Khasra Nos. 226 to 230, in revenue estate of
village Durgapura or in the alternative, for the allotment of
equivalent suitable land, and also for the cancellation of the
allotment of 105 acres of land in favour of the Company. The
writ petition was contested by the appellants on the grounds
G
that the respondent society had no locus standi to challenge
the acquisition proceedings which had attained finality upto this
Court; the transfer of land by the khatedars to the respondent
society was void; the respondent society could not claim parity
with other persons/societies, whose land stood released for
H
996
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2013] 4 S.C.R.
A bonafide reasons on good grounds. The High Court heard the
said writ petition alongwith another writ petition that had been
filed by the Company, which will be dealt with separately. During
the pendency of the writ petition, certain other developments
took place, that is, the allotment of land made in favour of the
B Company, was cancelled by the appellant vide order dated
1.10.1996, and possession of the same was taken over from
it on 3.10.1996.
G. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the said
C writ petition vide judgment and order dated 30.7.2002, thereby
releasing land admeasuring 17 Bighas and 9 Biswas in favour
of the respondent society.
Hence, this appeal.
D
3. Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant-RllCO, and Shri Manish Singhvi, learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Rajasthan, have
submitted that challenge to the acquisition proceedings
emanating from the Section 4 Notification dated 18.7.1979 had
E attained finality upto this Court. However, this Court vide order
dated 9.9.1999 had granted very limited relief to the
respondent-society, to the extent that it could approach the court
for release of its land only on the ground of discrimination qua
other tenure holders, whose land stood released and that the
dismissal of the SLP would not operate as res-judicata. The
F society had not made any representation before th~ filing of the
first or the second writ petition, before any appropriate authority
for release of the said land, nor had it raised issue with respect
to any form of discrimination suffered by it. The High Court also
did not consider the case on the basis of any ground of
G discrimination whatsoever, rather made a bald observation,
stating that as the land of the other tenure holders had been
released, the society too, was entitled for similar relief. Such
an order is not justified for the reason that court did not compare
the facts of two sets of the parties.
H
RAJASTHAN STATE INDST DEY. & INV CORPN. v. SUBHASH
997
SINDHI COOP HSG SOC., JAIPUR [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate an illegality or fraud.
A
Moreover, it is to be established that discrimination was made
cautiously. The agreement to sell dated 21.7.1981 in favour of
the respondent-society did not create any title in favour of the
society. Furthermore, any sale subsequent to a Section 4
Notification with respect to the said land, is void. An agreement
B
to sell, or to execute any transfer of such land is barred by the
Rajasthan Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1976
(hereinafter referred to as, the 'Act 1976'). At the most, the High
Court could have directed consideration of the representation
of the society, if there was any, but it most certainly could not c
have issued direction to release the said land itself. The Society
had approached the High Court, Jodhpur (main seat) though,
petition could be filed only before the Jaipur Bench as the suit
land situate at Jaipur and all relevant orders/notifications were
issued at Jaipur. Thus, the present appeals deserve to be
0
allowed.
4. Per contra, Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent - society and its
members, has submitted that a representation was in fact
made by the society, but the same was not considered by the
E
State Government, and that the award made in respect of the
land itself, clearly revealed that some land was released by the
government, in favour of various persons and institutions. The
respondent society had therefore, been discriminated against,
by the State authorities. The respondent-society is entitled for
F
the relief on the basis of the Government Orders, (hereinafter
referred to as G.Os.) provided for release of the land of Group
Housing Societies, if under acquisition. Technical issue must
not be entertained by this Court, as the second writ petition has
been filed under the liberty granted by this Court. Thus, the
G
present appeals lack merit and are liable to be dismissed.
5. Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the Company, respondent no. 37, has submitted that
the High Court has directed to release the land in favour of the
H
respondent - society, from the land which was allotted to the
998
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 4 S.C.R.
A Company, and that Company has no objection to the order
passed by the High Court, releasing a particular piece of land
in favour of the society. Thus, the appeals are liable to be
dismissed.
B
6. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
It is a settled legal proposition that acquisition proceedings
cannot be challenged at a belated stage. In the instant case,
the earlier writ petition filed by the society and the khatedars
C jointly, wc.s dismissed by the High Court only on the ground of
delay. This Court upheld the said judgment and order, while
granting the said parties liberty to challenge the acquisition
afresh, on the ground of discrimination alone.
o
7. There can be no quarrel with respect to the settled legal
proposition that a purchaser, subsequent to the issuance of a
Section 4 Notification in respect of the land, cannot challenge
the acquisition proceedings, and can only claim compensation
as the sale transaction in such a situation is Void qua the
E Government. Any such encumbrance created by the owner, or
any transfer of the land in question, that is made after the
issuance of such a notification, would be deemed to be void
and would not be binding on the Government. (Vide: Gian
Chand v. Gopala & Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 528; Yadu Nandan
Garg v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 520; Jaipur
F Development Authority v. Mahavir Housing Coop. Society,
Jaipur & Ors. (1996) 11 SCC 229; Secretary, Jaipur
Development Authority, Jaipur v. Dau/at Mal Jain & Ors.,
(1997) 1 SCC 35; Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of
Delhi & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 177; Har Narain (Dead) by Lrs.
G v. Mam Chand (Dead) by LRs. & Ors., (2010) 13 SCC 128;
and V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. The Administrative Officer
& Ors., JT 2012 (9) SC 260).
8. Thus, in the instant case, the respondent-society, and
H its members, have to satisfy the court as regards their locus
RAJASTHAN STATE INDST DEV & INV CORPN. v. SUBHASH
999
SINDHI COOP HSG SOC., JAIPUR [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
standi with respect to maintenance of the writ petition on any
A
ground whatsoever, as none of the original khatedars has joined
the society in subsequent petition.
9. In Smt. Kalawati v. Bisheshwar, AIR 1968 SC 261, this
Court held:
'Void means non-existent from its very inception."
10. In State of Kera/a v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar
Manjeri Manikoth, Naduvil (dead) & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 906,
B
this Court held:
c
'The word "void" has a relative rather than an absolute
meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid
or illegal. It can be avoided. There are degrees of
invalidity, depending upon the gravity or the infirmity, as 0
to whether it is, fundamental or otherwise."
11. The word, "void" has been defined as: ineffectual;
nugatory; having no legal force or legal effect; unable in law to
support the purpose for which it was intended. {Vide: Black's
Law Dictionary). It also means merely a nullity, invalid; null;
E
worthless; sipher; useless and ineffectual and may be ignored
even in collateral proceeding as if it never were.
The word "void" is used in the sense of incapable of
ratification. A thing which is found non-est and not required to
F
be set aside though, it is sometimes convenient to do so. There
would be no need for an order to quash it. It would be
automatically null and void without more ado. The continuation
orders would be nullities too, because no one can continue a
nullity. (Vide: Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay,
G
AIR 1955 SC 123; Pankaj Mehra & Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 1953; Dhurandhar Prasad
Singh v. Jai Prakash University & .Ors., AIR 2001 SC 2552;
and Government of Orissa v.