# THE REKRARIA COTTON MILLS LTD v. THE STATE OF BOMBAY

- **Citation:** [1953] 1 S.C.R. 825
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1951-09-10
- **Case number:** Criminal Th r /.,'e J.:~a ri'r1 Gofton .11il!s Ltd. Appeal No. 61 of 1952
- **Bench:** Mehr Chand Mahajan, VrVIAN BosE, Jagannadha Das
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-rekraria-cotton-mills-ltd-v-the-state-of-bombay-205
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

825
Essential Supplies Act (XXIV of 1946), ss. 7, 9--Notification
requiring manufacturers to submit tru,e and accurate information--
"Delivery", meaning of-Possession of del credere (JJJent-Whether
possession uf seller-Delivery to such (JJJent, effect of-Penal statutes
-Liberal constrnction.
A Government Notification issued under the Essential Supplies Act, 1946, required every manufacturer to submit "true and
accurate information relating to his undertakings'' and a note on
the printed form stated that "by 'delivered' or 'delivery' is meant
physical deli very of cloth in bales and pieces but not cloth which,
though paid for, is still in the physical possession of the seller."
The appellant Mills were manufacture"s of cloth and D.K. & Co.
were their sole del credere selling agents who guaranteed payment
to the appellant of the price of all sales made and, on the other
side, guaranteed delivery <<l.J;.b.e purchasers with whom they dealt
direct. One D.:11. informed1'!1o \fills as the agent of an up-country
quota-holder that be had been authorised by the latter to take delivery of 13 bales and on this account paid Rs. 14,000 to D.K. & Co.
D.K. & Co. wrote to the Mills that they bad received payment.
The ;\fills despatched the goods to D.M. but meanwhile the quotaholder had changed his agent and D.M. refused to take delivery.
The Mills credited the money which had been received from D.M.
to D.K. & Co. and advised D. K. & Co. to keep the goods in a
certain godown till the question of delivery was settled. In a
return submitted under the Essential Supplies Act, 1946, these 13
bales ivere shown as "delivered" to D. K. & Co.
The appellants
were prosecuted and convicted on the ground that physical deli·
very was not given to D.K. & Co. and ohe return was not therefore true and accurate :
Held, that, as the goods had left the Mill premises, the price
had been paid and the property in them bad passed and as they
were in a godown under the control of D. K. & Co., D. K. & Co.
were in the circumstances, the persons to whom the goods were
actually delivered and the conviction was illegal.
A del creclere agent is an agent of the seller only np to a -point.
Beyond that he is either a principal or an agent of the buyer.
In a penal statute it is the duty of the Court to interpret
words of ambiguous meaning in a broad an<l liberal sense.
101
1953
March 30
826
i'il~PREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1953
CRBHNAI,
APPELLATE
,JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Th r /.,'e J.:~a ri'r1
Gofton .11il!s Ltd.
Appeal No. 61 of 1952.
'
Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme
Court on the 10th September, 1951, from the Judgment and Order dated the .5th March, 1951, of the
High Court of .Judicature a.t Bombay (Chagla C.J. and
Bhagwati J.) in Criminal Appeal No. 394 of 1950 arising out of the Judgment and OrrlPr dated the 29th
May, 1950, of the Court of the Presidency Magistrate,
Second Court, Mazagaon, Bombay, in Cases Nos. 630/P
and li35 /P of 1949.
v.
The State of
Bombay.
111. P. Amin (R . .!. Kolah, with him) for appellants Nos. l, 2 and 4 ...
A. K. Jluthuswmni for appellant No. 3.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus
A. ]V[ ehta, with him) for the respondent.
1953. March 30. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
,,
BosE J.-The appellants have been convicted under
sections 7 and 9 of the Essential Supplies Act (No.
XXIV of 1946) on two counts. The first appellant is
a registered joint stock company, the Seksaria Mills
Ltd. It was fined Rs. 10,000 on each of the two counts,
that is to say, a total fine of Rs. 20,000, and this
was upheld in appeal. The second appellant is the
Director of the Mills. He was sentenced to two months'
rigorous imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 2,00,000
on each count. In appeal the sentence of imprisonment
was set aside and the fine reduced to Rs. 10,000 on
each count.
The third appellant is the General
Manager of the Mills.
He was sentenced to a fine of
Rs. 2,000 on each count. This has been upheld. The
fourth appellant is

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
THE REKRARIA COTTON MILLS LTD.
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VrVIAN BosE and
JAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]
825
Essential Supplies Act (XXIV of 1946), ss. 7, 9--Notification
requiring manufacturers to submit tru,e and accurate information--
"Delivery", meaning of-Possession of del credere (JJJent-Whether
possession uf seller-Delivery to such (JJJent, effect of-Penal statutes
-Liberal constrnction.
A Government Notification issued under the Essential Supplies Act, 1946, required every manufacturer to submit "true and
accurate information relating to his undertakings'' and a note on
the printed form stated that "by 'delivered' or 'delivery' is meant
physical deli very of cloth in bales and pieces but not cloth which,
though paid for, is still in the physical possession of the seller."
The appellant Mills were manufacture"s of cloth and D.K. & Co.
were their sole del credere selling agents who guaranteed payment
to the appellant of the price of all sales made and, on the other
side, guaranteed delivery <<l.J;.b.e purchasers with whom they dealt
direct. One D.:11. informed1'!1o \fills as the agent of an up-country
quota-holder that be had been authorised by the latter to take delivery of 13 bales and on this account paid Rs. 14,000 to D.K. & Co.
D.K. & Co. wrote to the Mills that they bad received payment.
The ;\fills despatched the goods to D.M. but meanwhile the quotaholder had changed his agent and D.M. refused to take delivery.
The Mills credited the money which had been received from D.M.
to D.K. & Co. and advised D. K. & Co. to keep the goods in a
certain godown till the question of delivery was settled. In a
return submitted under the Essential Supplies Act, 1946, these 13
bales ivere shown as "delivered" to D. K. & Co.
The appellants
were prosecuted and convicted on the ground that physical deli·
very was not given to D.K. & Co. and ohe return was not therefore true and accurate :
Held, that, as the goods had left the Mill premises, the price
had been paid and the property in them bad passed and as they
were in a godown under the control of D. K. & Co., D. K. & Co.
were in the circumstances, the persons to whom the goods were
actually delivered and the conviction was illegal.
A del creclere agent is an agent of the seller only np to a -point.
Beyond that he is either a principal or an agent of the buyer.
In a penal statute it is the duty of the Court to interpret
words of ambiguous meaning in a broad an<l liberal sense.
101
1953
March 30
826
i'il~PREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1953
CRBHNAI,
APPELLATE
,JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Th r /.,'e J.:~a ri'r1
Gofton .11il!s Ltd.
Appeal No. 61 of 1952.
'
Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme
Court on the 10th September, 1951, from the Judgment and Order dated the .5th March, 1951, of the
High Court of .Judicature a.t Bombay (Chagla C.J. and
Bhagwati J.) in Criminal Appeal No. 394 of 1950 arising out of the Judgment and OrrlPr dated the 29th
May, 1950, of the Court of the Presidency Magistrate,
Second Court, Mazagaon, Bombay, in Cases Nos. 630/P
and li35 /P of 1949.
v.
The State of
Bombay.
111. P. Amin (R . .!. Kolah, with him) for appellants Nos. l, 2 and 4 ...
A. K. Jluthuswmni for appellant No. 3.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus
A. ]V[ ehta, with him) for the respondent.
1953. March 30. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
,,
BosE J.-The appellants have been convicted under
sections 7 and 9 of the Essential Supplies Act (No.
XXIV of 1946) on two counts. The first appellant is
a registered joint stock company, the Seksaria Mills
Ltd. It was fined Rs. 10,000 on each of the two counts,
that is to say, a total fine of Rs. 20,000, and this
was upheld in appeal. The second appellant is the
Director of the Mills. He was sentenced to two months'
rigorous imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 2,00,000
on each count. In appeal the sentence of imprisonment
was set aside and the fine reduced to Rs. 10,000 on
each count.
The third appellant is the General
Manager of the Mills.
He was sentenced to a fine of
Rs. 2,000 on each count. This has been upheld. The
fourth appellant is the Sales Manager of the Mills. He
was sentenced to four months' rigorous imprisonment
and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000 on each count. In appeal the
sentence of imprisonment was upheld but the fine was
reduced to Rs. 10,000 on each count. The substantive
sentences are to run concurrently.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
827
1953
A Goverqment of India Notification dated 2nd
February, 1946, required every manufacturer to
b 't "t
d
· f
t'
1 t'
t h'
The !:iekMria
su m1
. rue, an accurate ill orma :10!1 re a mg o is Cotton Mill, Ltd.
undertakmgs ' to the Textile Commrns10ner C.S.T. Secv.
tion at Bombay. In compliance with this Order the
The State of
first appellant submitted a return, signed by the third
Bontbay.
appellant, on 10th March, 1947. This return is Exhibit A-1. It showed that 13 bales of cloth (20 half
bales and 3 full bales) were delivered to Messrs. Dwarkadas Khetan & Company of Bombay during the
month of February, 1947, on behalf of the quotaholder Shroe Kishan & Company. Another return of
the same date (Exhibit A-2), also relating to the
month of February, 1947, showed that 6 bales were
delivered to the same Dwarkadas Khetan & Company on behalf of another quota-holder Beharilal
Hairathi.
A note on the back of each printed form states --
" By ' delivered ' or ' delivery ' is meant physical
delivery of cloth in bales or in pieces but not cloth
which though paid for is still in the physical possession of the seller."
The offence charged is that this information is not
true and accurate. The case for tho prosecution is that
the bales remained in the physical possession of the
first appellant at all material times and were not
physically delivered to Messrs. Dwarkadas Khetan &
Company.
Before us the learned i'.lolicitor-General added that
even if there was physical delivery to Dwarkadas
Khetan that did not comply with the requirements of
the form because the form requires information regarding physical delivery to the quota-holder or his agent
and as Dwarkadas Khetan was not the agent of the
quota-holder, the .statement is inaccurate and misleading.
The learned Presidency Magistrate who tried the
case, and also the High Court on appeal, hold that the
proRecution have established their cas0 and so have
convicted and upheld the convietions respectively.
BoscJ.
828
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ll953J
1963
The business procedure of the first. appellant is
explained by Dwarkadas Khetan. His firm, Dwark11The S eksaria d
JTh
& C
h
fi
]]
'
0
,,.11 Ltd as ·'- etan
ompany, are t e
rst a ppe ant s
ottonJ.ui
11
"
,
v.
sole sellmg agents.
They are del credere agents
1'hc Stntcof and guarantee payment to the first appellant of all
Bombay.
saks made· and, on the other side, guarantee delivery
BoseJ.
to the purch~isers with whou1 they deal direct.
It is
necessary at this stage to understand that because of
various orders and rules made under the Essential
Supplies Act the first appellant could only sell to
specified quota-holders and only up to the limits of
their quotas. The two quota-holders which concern us
are Shree Kishan & Company and Beharilal Bairathi.
The first appellant's selling procedure is this.
When
goods are ready for sale, it sends Dwarkadas Khetan
& Company in duplicate a, " ready sale note ". These
notes contain particulars about the bales and the
persons to whom they are to be delivered. Upon receipt
of this Dwarkadas & Company contact the quotaholders or their agents.
The next step is for the quota-holder to pay Dwarkadas & Company the price of the goods specified in the
"ready sale note". Upon receipt of the money, one of
the two notes is handed over to the quota-holder or his
agent and he is given a receipt for the money paid. At
the same time Dwarkada.s & Company send the first
appellant an "advice slip " telling it that the money
has been received and asking it to prepare a delivery
order. The first appella.nt then debits Dwarkadas &
Company with the price and not the purchaser. For
payment it looks to Dwarkadas & Company.
Upon receipt of this advice slip the first appellant's
office prepares tho delivery order and delivers the
goods to the party concerned. The person receiving the
goods then signs the deli very order in token of receipt
and the signed order is sent to Dwai·kadas & Company
who, after making the necessary entries in their books,
return the order to the Mills office.
It will be seen that the first appellant has no direct
dealings with the purchaser. It acts through Dwarkadas & Company in every case.
S.C.R.
SUPRE~iE CODHT REPOHTS
1953
It will now b,e necessary to trace the history of the
two consignments relating to the 13 bales and the 6
bales separately. We will deal with the 13 bales first.
The 8eksariu
('otton .1..ltills Ltd.
The quota-holder in respect of the 13 bales was Shree
Kishan & Company. This firm was an up-country firm
and so it was necessary for it to appoint a local agent
in Bombay for making payments and receiving delivery. There was some confusion about the agent so
appointed ; at first one Dharsi Moolji was appointed
and then P. C. Vora. The letter informing the first
appellant that Dharsi Moolji bad been appointed is not
on record but we were told at the Bar that it is not
disputed that the letter is dated 7th February,
194 7. In any case, Dharsi Moolji wrote to the
first appellant on 20th February, 1947, saying that
he had been authorised to take delivery of the
January quota on behalf of Messrs. Shree Kishan &
Company and on 21st February, 1947, he paid Dwarkadas Khetan & Company a sum of Rs. 14,000 for this
quota. A receipt and an entry in Dwarkadas' books
evidence the payment.
The same day Dwarkadas Khetan wrote to the first
appellant telling it that his firm had received payment
in advance from Shree Kishan & ('ompany and that
the 13 bales should be sent to "our godown ",
Whether the "our " refers to Dwarkadas' godown or
to a godown jointly shared between Dwarkadas and
the first appellant is not clear. The learned High
Court Judges hold that the godown belonged to the
first appellant, but that, in our opinion, is not very
material for reasons we shall give later.
On receipt of this "advice slip" the first appellant
prepared what it has called a " ready sale note " on
the same day, 21st February, 1947, authorising the
purchaser to take delivery within a week. Dharsi
Moolji was named as the Commission Agent. (The man
now entered is Prataprai Chunilal, that is, P. C. Vora,
but the original name was Dharsi l\foolji. The change
was made for reasons which will presently appear).
v.
The State of
Boil/bay.
Bo8eJ.
830
SVPitEM.E COURT REPORTS
[1953]
19JJ
In pursuance of all this, the first appellant despatched the 13 bales on 28th February, 1947, and sent them
The Seharia t Dh
· u
l" · B t · th
h"l
th
t
Cotton Mills Ltd. o
ars1 lvJ.OO JI.
u m
e meanw 1 e o er even s
v.
had taken place.
One P. C. Vora wrote to the first
The State of appellant on 17th February, 1947, and said that he
Bombay.
had been authorised to take possession of these 13 bales.
Bose J,
\Vhat had happened in the meanwhile was that the
quota-holder Shree Kishan & Company had changed
its local agent. Accordingly, when the goods reached
Dharsi l\ioolji he refused to take delivery. The selling
agent Dwarkadas
th\)reupon telephoned the first
appellant. He explained that he h.ad actually received
the money for the bales from Dharsi l\ioolji a,nd had
not received anything from P. C. Vora and so could
not deliver the goods to the latter and equally could
not accept money from P. C. Vora until the matter
had been straightened out with Dharsi Moolji. The
first appellant thereupon told Dwarkadas to keep the
goods in the Dady Seth godown. On the same day,
apparently before all this occmred, the first appellant
credited Dwarkadas Khetan with the monev he
had received from Dharsi Moolji on accom~t of
the 13
bales, less
Dwarkadas'
commission. In
other words, this adjustment in the accounts was
the equivalent of payment for the 13 bales by Dwarkadas Khetan to the first appellant on account of the
purchaser Shree Kislmn & Company. It will be
remembered that Dwarkadas Khetan & Company were
the sole soiling agents and they alone were responsible
to the l\fills for orders which were placed through
them.
The muddle between Dharsi .iVIoolji and P. C. Vora
was cleared up between 3rd l\farch, 1947, and 14th
March, 1947.
On 3rd March, 1947, Dwarkadas
Khetan returned the Rs. 14-,000 which Dharsi Moolji
had paid and on 14th l\farch, 1947, al·ccpted the
money from P. C. Yorn. The alteration in the "ready
sale note" of 21st February, 1947, was presumably
made because of these facts.
Four davs later, Dwarkadas Khetan delivered the goods to P. C. Vora.
(There was no need to make any alterations in the first
8.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
831
1953
appellant's account books because Dwarkadas was
responsible for the price whatever happened between
him and Dharsi and alw because in any event the Go~~:, s:i~;;;r~d.
goods were sold to Shree Kishan: the only query at that
v.
time was who was his agent to accept delivery for him).
'l'he State of
The return with which we are concerned was made
on 10th March, 1947. It will be seen from the above
that the position at that date was as follows:
( l) the
selling agent had informed the first appellant that he
had effected a sale, (2) the selling agent had paid the
first appellant for the goods, (3) specific bales had been
set aside and appropriated to the sale and consequently the property in the goods had passed,
(4) the
goods had actually left the Mills' premises, and (5)
they were in the Dady Seth godown under the control
of Dwarkadas Khetan.
vVe say the goods were under the control of Dwarkadas Khetan for three reasons~ ( 1) as shown above, the
property in the goods had passed and so the first
app~lant no longer had title to them, (2) Dwarkadas
says that until he received the money for them from
P. C. Vora he would have refused to deliver them, (3)
being a del credere agent he would have been within his
rights (a) to refuse delivery to anybody till he was paid
and (li) to deliver them despite anything the first
appellant might say once he received his money; also
because Dwarkadas' Mehtaji says-
"If the goods are not accepted by the merchants or
their agents, the same arc sent to ns and we keep them
in the godown."
Bearing these facts in mind, we will now examine
the offending document. It is a printed form.
The
heading is- -
"Manufacturer's Returns showing details of delivery
to quota-holders or others of civil cloth."
Then there is a note as follows :
"IMPORTANT :-This form should be completed
in accordance with the instructions printed overleaf
................. giving full details relating to the previo11&
month."
Bambay.
]Jose J.
832
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953]
1.9.;.,
Under that is the followingThe Seksarin
"~11 stocks pledged/hypoth~cated.b:;: mar:ufactuCotton Mills Ltd. rers with banks or others shall be mcluded m this state-
"·
ment."
The State ~f
The only column in the printed form which could be
Bombay.
related to this is column 3 headed" Full name and adBo" J.
dress of person to whom delivered." On the back there
i\re the following instructions:-
" II. The word ' others ' in the heading of the
form includes artificers who are privileged to purehase
cloth under General Permission No. TCS 42 /1, dated
10th August, 1944, and any person to whom deliveries
are made under any other General or Special Permission or Order of the Textile Commissioner. The
name of artificers or any other persons shall be mentioned in column 3 and B,gainst their names, number
and date of General or 8pecial Permission shall be mentioned in column 2.
-
III. By 'delivered' or 'delivery' is meilnt physical
delivery of cloth in bales or in pieces but not cloth
which, though paid for, is still in the physical possession
of the seller. "
The form was filled in as follows : In the column
headed "Full name and address of quota-holder" the
name of Shree Kishan & Company is entered. In the
column headed " Full name and address of person to
whom delivered " the name of Dwarkadils Khetan &
Company is entered. The question we have to decide
·is whether these two entries are inaccurate.
Dealing first with the learned Solicitor-General's
argument regarding the construction of the words used
in the form, we are of opinion that it cannot be accepted. The second clause of the portion marked "Important" towards the head of the form states that all
stocks pledged or hypothecated with banks or others
must also be included, and Instruction No. II on the
back directs that the names of "any other person"
must be entered in column 3 and that the number and
date of the General or Special Permission must be set
out in column 2. Whether this means that goods
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
833
1953
cannot be pledged without permission or that only
goods allotted to quota-holders can be pledged we do
t k
b
h
.
. .
l
h
h
The Scksaria
no
n.ow,
ut w atever 1t means, it is c ear t at t eoottonMills Ltd.
entry m column 3 is not intended to be confined to
v.
quota-holders or their agents but means what it says,
The State of
namely the person to whom physical delivery of the
Bombay.
goods has been made whoever he may be.
Bo8e .!.
The only question therefore is whether there was
physical delivery to Dwarkadas Khetan. In one
sense, there can be no doubt about that. The goods
left the Mills' premises, the property in them had
passed and when Dharsi Moolji refused to receive
them they were handed over to Dwarkadas Khetan
and not taken back to the Mills.
Dwarkadas Khetan
asked the Mills what he should do with them, and in
the end he placed them in the Dady Seth godown. In
any ordinary understanding of the term it would be
clear that the goods had been phy:1ictdly delivered to
Dwarkadas Khetan. But the learned High Court
Judges do not appear to have concerned themselves
with the question of actual physical possession because
they say:-
"It would not be true to say, and the record amply
bears it out, that this godown belonged to Dwarkadas
Khetan.
Even if Dwarkadas Khetan had control over
the godown, the control was exercised on behalf of and
as the agent of the Mills."
Therefore, the test of the sort of possession which
they had in mind was not the control over the goods.
But that has always been regarded as one of the tests
of physical or de facto possession.
Lancelot Hall
distinguishing between possession in law and possession in fact says that "possession in the popular
sense denotes a state of fact of exclusive physical
control".
See his treatise on Possessory
Liens
in English Law, page 2. See also Pollock and Wright
in their Essay on Possession in the Common Law,
page 119. Drawing the same distinction they s~y that
"physical possession" may be generally described by
stating that
JO~
834
SUPHENIE COURT REPORTS
[1953]
J9.jS
"when a person is in such a relation to a thing
Tl -;:;-
. that, so far as rogardB the thing, he can assume, exer-
" """""a
·
l
I ~r ·
I
d
00110,, Mills Ltd. cise or resume rnanua cont!'o OJ 1,t al p.easure, an
so
v.
far as regards other persons, the thing is under the prone State ~r tection of his personal presence, or in or on a house or
Bombay.
land occitpied by him, or in some receptacle belonging
to him and under his control."
Bosf J.
This would seem exactly to meet the case of Dwarkadas Khetan.
Possession is an ambiguous term. The law books
divide its concept into two broad categories, (i) physical possession or possession in fact and (2) legal possession which need not coincide with possession in fact.
The offending form with which we are concerned draws
the same broad line. But even on the factual side of
the border niceties creep in and so the possession of a
servant is called custody rather than possession.
But
what of an agent? If a man lives abroad over a period
of years and leaves his house and furniture in charge
of an agent who has the keys of the house and immediate access to and physical control over the furniture,
it would be difficult to say that the agent was not in
physical possession. It is true the legal possession
would continue to reside in the owner but the actual
physical possession would surely be that of the agent.
And so with a del credere agent, because such a person
is the agent of the seller only up to a point. Beyond
that he is either a principal or an agent of the buyer.
This distinction was discussed by one of us in the
Xagpur High Comt in Kalyandi K uwa1;ji v. Tirlcaram
Sheolal(1) and was accepted by the Madras High Court
in Kandula Radhakrishna Rao v. The Province of
M a.dras(').
But we need not go into all this.
Here is an Order
which is to affect the business of hundreds of persons,
many of whom are small petty merchants and traders,
the sort of men who would not have lawyers constantly at their elbow ;· and even if they did, the more
learned their advisers were in the law the more puzzled
(1) A.LR. 1938 Nag. 254.
(2) (1952) I Al.L.J, 494.
~
I
--
-
..
s.c.R.
Sl'.PREME COURT REPORTS
835
they would pe as to what advice to give, for it is not
1953.
till one is learned in the law that wbtleties of thought
.
and bewilderment arise at the meaning of plain English
The Seksaria
d
h. h
d"
f
·
Jl'
GottonMillsLtd.
wor s w 1c any or mary man o average mte 1gence,
not versed in the law, would have no difficulty in
The s~~te of
understanding. In a penal statute of this kind it is our
Bomhay.
duty to interpret words of ambiguous meaning in a
broad and liberal sense so that they will not become
Bose J.
traps for honest, unlei1rned (in the law) and unwary
men. lf there is honest and snbstantial compliance
with an array of puzzling directions, that should be
enough even if on some hypercritical view of the law
other ingenious meanings can be devised. In our opinion, Dwarkadas Khetan could, in the circumstances
given above, be described, without any straining of
language, as the person to whom the goods were actually delivered. It follows the conviction on this count
cannot stand.
We would like to add that in any event, even if ultra
technical notions regarding the concept of possession
were to be incorporated into the case, it would be
wrong to say that there had been anything beyond a
technical and unintentional breach of the law.
The
facts are truly and accurately given according to the
popular and natural meaning of the words used;
nothing was hidden. The goods did reach the quotaholder in the end, or rather his proper agent, and we
cannot see what anyone could stand to gain in an unauthorised way over the very natural mistake which
occurred owing to what seems to have been a time-lag
in the consequences of a change of agency. So, even if
there was a technical breach of the law, it was not one
which called for the severe strictures which are to be
found in the trial court's judgment and certainly not
for the savage sentences which the learned Magistrate
imposed. In the High Court also we feel a nominal fine
would have met the ends of justice even on the view
the learned ,Judges took of the law.
The charge on the second count relating to the 6
bales is a similar one and the fauts follow the same
pattern. They have been detailed in the High C:ourfs
836
SUPREME COURT HEi'ORTS
[i953]
1953
judgment, so it is not necessary to do m9re than out-
'l'I s k
. line them here.
The quota-holder here is Beharilal
0ou:: .:ii·~:'l:d. Bairathi. In this case also, Dharsi Moolji paid Dwarkav.
das Khetan for the goods and the Mills sent the bales
'I!lw•Stato of to Dharsi Moolji for delivery in the same truck as the
Bombay.
13 bales.
Dharsi Moolji refused to accept these bales
Bose J.
1953
April 10
also, so they were deposited in the Dady Seth godown
along with the other thirteen. Dwarkadas Khetan &
Company has been entered as the person to whom delivery was made. For the reasons given above, we hold
that this was a true and accurate return.
The appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence
in each of the four cases is set aside. The fines, if paid,
will be refunded.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for appellants Nos. 1, 2 & 4:
Rajirider
Narain.
Agent for appellant No. 3: Ganpat Rai.
Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
BASIR-UL-HUQ AND O'fHERS
v.
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL.
NUR-UL-HUDA
v.
THE STATE OF 'WEST BENGAL.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VIVIAN BosE and
JAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]
Criminal Procedure Gode, 1898, ss. 190, 195-Indian Penal
Gode, 1860, ss. 182, 297, 500-Report to police all'9ing X had killed
his 11iother-Trespass ivith police on
cremation ground-Report
fo11nd false-Oornplaint by X for trespass and defrin.ation-Maintainability-Jurisdiction to take counizance of ofjence-Whether
barred by s. 195, Criminal Procedure Gode.