# THE REMINGTON RAND OF INDIA LTD v. THE WORKMEN August 11. 1967

- **Citation:** [1968] 1 S.C.R. 164
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1966-10-05
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 548 of 1967
- **Bench:** K. N. Wanchoo, G. K. Mitier
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-remington-rand-of-india-ltd-v-the-workmen-august-11-1967-4095
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

B
Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), s. 17(1)-Pub\ication of the
award within 30 days of its receipt-If mandatO'l'y.
Section 17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, makes it obligatory on the appropriate Government to pub!iish the award received
by it from the Industrial Tribunal; but, the provision in the section
as to time, that the Government shall publish it within a period of
thirty days from the date of its receipt, is merely directory and not C
mandatory. Therefore, where the Government received the award
-on 14th October 1966 and published it in the Gazette on the 15th
November 1966, the award did not cease to be enforceable. [166F-G]
Observations in The Sirsi!k Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (19641 2 S.C.R. 448, 452, explained.
The State of Uttar Pradesh & Others v. Babu Ram Upadhya, D
[1961] 2 S.C.R. 679, 710, followed.
Erume!i Estate v. Industrial Tribunal, (1962] II L.L.J. 144, referred to.
·

## Text

164
THE REMINGTON RAND OF INDIA LTD.
A
v.
THE WORKMEN
August 11. 1967
[K. N. WANCHOO, C. J. AND G. K. MITIER, J.]
B
Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), s. 17(1)-Pub\ication of the
award within 30 days of its receipt-If mandatO'l'y.
Section 17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, makes it obligatory on the appropriate Government to pub!iish the award received
by it from the Industrial Tribunal; but, the provision in the section
as to time, that the Government shall publish it within a period of
thirty days from the date of its receipt, is merely directory and not C
mandatory. Therefore, where the Government received the award
-on 14th October 1966 and published it in the Gazette on the 15th
November 1966, the award did not cease to be enforceable. [166F-G]
Observations in The Sirsi!k Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (19641 2 S.C.R. 448, 452, explained.
The State of Uttar Pradesh & Others v. Babu Ram Upadhya, D
[1961] 2 S.C.R. 679, 710, followed.
Erume!i Estate v. Industrial Tribunal, (1962] II L.L.J. 144, referred to.
·
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 548 of
1967.
Appeal by special leave from the award dated October 5, 1966 E
of the Industrial Tribunal, Alleppey in Industrial Dispute No. 9
of 1965.
H. R. Gokhale and D. _N. Gupta, for the appellant.
M. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu, Vineet Kumar and R.
Nagaratnam, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Mitter, J.-This appeal by the Remington Rand of India Ltd.
against their workmen arises out of an award dated 5th October,
1965 made by the Industrial Tribunal, Alleppey published in the
Kerala Gazette dated 15th November, 1966.
F
The first point taken against this a.ward is that it cannot G
be given effect to as it was published beyond the period fixed
in the Act. The notification accompanying the gazette publication stated that Government had received the award on 14th
October, 1966. It was argued by Mr. Gokhale that in terms of s.
170) of the Industrial Disputes Act the award had to be published
"within a period of thirty days from the date of its receipt by the B
appropriate Government". According to learned
counsel, the
award having reached Government on 14th October. 1966 it should
ha.ve been published at the latest on 12th N_ovember, 1966 as s. 17
(l) of the Act was mandatory. Our attention was also drawn to
•
REMINGTON RAND V. WORKMEN (Afitwr, J.)
1611
A sub-s. (2) of s. 17 according to which it is only the award published
under sub-s. (I) of s. 17 that is final and cannot be called in question by any court in any manner. We were also referred to s. 17-A
and s. 19. Under sub-s. (1) of s. 17-A an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication
under s. 17 and under sub-s. (3) of s. 19 an award is to remain in
operation for a period of one year from the date on which the
B award becomes enforceable under s. 17-A. From all these provisions,
it was argued tha.t the limits of time mentioned in the sections were"
mandatory and not directory and if an award was published
beyond the period of thirty days, in contravention of s. 17(1) it
could not be given effect to. To fortify his argument, learned
counsel relied on certain observations of this Court in The Sirsilk
C Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh.(') In that case, there was
an order referring certain disputes between the appellant and its
workmen to the Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh. The Tribunal sent its award to Government in September 1957. Before the
Government could publish the award, the parties to the dispute
came to a settlement and on 1st October, 1957 a letter was written
to the Government jointly on behalf of the employer and the emD ployees intimating that the dispute which had been pending before
the Tribunal had been settled aiid
a, request was made to
Government not to publish the award. · Government expressed its inability to withhold the publication taking the view
that s. 17 of the Act was mandatory. The appellants filed
writ petitions before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh under Art.
E 226 of the Constitution praying that Government might be directed not to publish the award sent to it by the Industrial Tribunal.
The High Court held that s. 17 was mandatory and it was. not
open to Government to withhold publication. The contention on
behalf of the appellants was that s. 17 providing for the publication
of the award was directory and not mandatory. Mr. Gokhale
F relied on the passage at page 452 of the judgment reading :
"It is clear therefore, readings. 17 ands. 17-A together,
that the intention l>ehind s. 17(1) is that a duty is cast on
Government to publish the award within thirty days of its
receipt and the provision for its publication is mandatory
and not merely directory".
G
~ltimately, however, on a conspectus of ss. 17, 17-A, 18 and 19
it was observed thatB
"though s. 17(1) is mandatory and the Government is
bound to publish the award received by it from an indus-
!rial tribunal, th~ situation arising in a case like the present
is of an exceptional nature and requires a reconciliation
betweens. 18(1) an~ s. 18(3). and in such a situation, the
only way to reconcile the two provisions is to 'Vithhold
the publication of the award, as a binding settlement has
lllready come intO force ...... "
(1) [1964) 2 S.C.R. 448, 452.
BUPllJU(B COUllT JIBPOll'fS
(1968) 1 s.c.11.
Refc;rence was also mal!e to the e11se of Erumeli Estate v. Indus- .\
tri~ Tribunal('). There the question dh'octly arose 116 f(l whether
non-publica.tioll of thi;: award within the period mentioneil in s. 17
(!) invlllidaled the award 11nd the J1:11rned Jl19ge observed tht be
was 11\lt inclined to accept thll.t contention although it was highly
desirable that the award should be published within the time
mentioned. lfe said :
B
"Excepting that a slight delay in publishing the award
under s. 17(1) results in postponing its finality under s. 17 .
(i) or its becoming enforceable under s. 17-.1\, no other
consequence flows from the delay and therefore, in my
view, the provisions of sub-s. (!) of s. 17 should be considered only to be merely directory ......... "
c
Mr. Gokhale also referred us to the case of The State of Uttar
Pradesh &; Others v. Babu Ram Upadhya(') where there is an
elaborate discussion as to whether the use of the word "shall" in
a statute made the provision mandatory. It was observed by
Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) speaking for the majority of the
Court that:
X>
"For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature
the Court may consider inter alia, the nature and the
design of the statute, and the consequences which would
follow from construing it one way or the othei:. the impact
of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying
1
with the provisions in question is avoided, the. circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contin·
gency of the non-compliance with the provisions. the fact
that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not
visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the
object of the legislation will 'be defeated or furthered."
I'
Keeping the above principles in mind, we cannot but hold that a
provision as to time in s. 17(1) is merely directory and not mandatory. Section 170) makes it obligatory on the Government to publish the award. The limit of time has been fixed as showing that the
publication of the award ought not to be hcld up. But the fixation G
of the period of 30 days mentioned therein does not mean that the
publication beyond that time will render the award invalid. It is
not difficult to think of circumstances when the publication of the
award within thirty days may not be possible. For instance, there
may be a strike in the press or there may be anr other good and
sufficient cause by reason of which the publication could not be
made within thirty days. If we were to hold that the award would R
therefore be rendered invalid, it would be attaching undue impor- ·
tance to a provision not in the mind of the legislature. It is well
(1) f1962] II L.L.J. 144.
<'l f1961J 2 s.c.11. 679,710.
R.EHINGTON RAND u. WORKJIEN
(Mittet-, J,)
167
A known that it very often takes a long period of time for the reference to be concluded and the award to be made. If the a;ward
becomes invalid merely on the ground of publication after thirty
days, it might entail a fresh reference with needless harassment to
the parties. The non-publication of the award within the period
of thirty days does not entail any penalty and this is another consideration which has to be kept in mind. What was said in the
B earlier passage from the judgment in The Sirsilk Ltd. v. -Government of Andhra Pradesh(') merely shows that it was not open
'to Government to withhold pubiication but this Court never meant
to lay down that the period of time fixed for publication was mandatory.
c
Coming to the merits of the case, Mr. Gokhale argued that
the Tribunal had gone wrong in revising the wage scales as it had
done. The head of dispute referred to the Tribunal was "revision of wages as per award of the Madras Labour Tribunal in 38
of 1960." The arguments advanced in this case were the same as
in the Bangalore case (just now disposed of) and the Tribunal
...,.
after noting the. phenomenal progress of the Company and the
J) enormous profits it was making, came to the conclusion that there
was no reason why there should be any disparity in wages between
the employees of a branch and the regional office when they were.
doing the same or similar work. In this case also, there was no
evidence of comparable concerns. In our view, what we have said
on this point of the dispute with regard to the Bangalore branch
E applies equally with regard to the Kerala branch and the matter
will have to go back to the Tribunal for fixing the wages and the
adjustment of the workers in the revised scale in the light of the
>Observations made in that case bearing in mind Mr. Gokhale's
•offer on behalf of the Company to increase the wages as in the
>0ther appeal.
F
With regard to dearness allowance again, what was said in
the Bangalore appeal applies equally to this appeal. Here again
the Tribunal said:
·
·
~
"It is also an accepted fact that the cc>st of living both at
'Trivandrum and at Ernakulam is higher than the cost
of living at Madras. Therefore, there is no justification in
perpetuating the disparity in the payment of D.A. to the
workmen working at Madras and those working in the
Trivandrum Branch."
Jn the result, the Tribunal directed that the workmen of Ernakulam
branch should get dearness allowance "at the rate at which and in
JI th~ manner in which" the pay and dearness allowance was being
paid to the employees of Madras Regional Office. In our view,
dearness allowance should be the same as decided in the case of
the workers of the Bangalore .branch.
('\ [ 100412 s.c.R. m.
168
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 1 s.c.a.
The scheme for gratuity is the same as in the· case of the A
Bangalore branch with the only difference that the maximum fixed
was 20 months' wages after 20 years service. In our view, there is
no reason why the scheme for gratuity should not be the same in
the Ernakulam branch as in the Bangalore branch in case of termination of service for misconduct and the qualifying period should
be 15 years' service.
Again, on principles already. formulated, we hold that leave
facilities at Ernakulam should be the same as those prevailing at
Madl'll!I.
B:
Next comes the dispute with regard to the working hours. The
working hours of the employees of Trivandrum and Ernakulam as c·
prevalent were from .9 a. m. to
1. p. m. and from 2 p. m.
to 5-30 p. m. on week days and from· 9 a. m. to 1 p. m.
on Saturdays. At Madras the Company's workers work only for
five days in a week from 9 a. m. to 1 p. m. and 1-45 p. m. to 5-30
p.m. The total working hours were therefore somewhat less than
those at Trivandrum a.nd Ernakulam. The complaint of the union
before the Tribunal was that although by circuJar dated 24th D•
March 1963 the Company hall fixed the working hours from 9.30
a.m. for clerks and 9 a.m. for mechanics and peons, it was extracting half an hour's work per day extra contrary to their own orders.
The Tribunal held that the circular should be given effect to and
that the clerical staff should work from 9.30 a.m: to 1 p.m. and
from 2 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. on working days and from 9.30 a.m. to E·
1 p.m. on Saturdays. We see no reason to disturb this portion of
the award.
Another head of dispute related to work-load. The complaint
of the union was that the workload was too heavy and that the
method of calculation of workload was arbitrary.
According to
them, the workload fixed by. agreement between the Company and F'
its employees in Delhi and Lucknow was seven machines per day
or 150 machines per month, while the workload at Trivandrum
was 10 machines per day. According to the Management the workload fixed i.e., 10 machines per day, was not too much and there
was no reason for disturbing the prevailing arrangement. But the
Mhanahgedment dedid not eddeny thhat duriklng tdhe course of negh?tiations a.
t ey a agre
to r uce t e wor. oa
to seven mac mes per
day or 150 machines per month and the Tribunal adopted this in
the award with a rider that "all the machines attended to. whether
new or old, whether under the service contract or not, will be
counted for the salce of workload". No satisfactory reason has
been adduced as to why we should disturb the award.
The last head Of dispute was with regard to "moving staff
allowance". The union demanc\ed that workmen who were deputed
on tour on Company's work should be given a day off if they had
to travel two nights consecutively. Demand was also made that
J£
REMINGTON
RAND V. WORKMEN (Mitter, J.)
169
A travelling . staff should be paid overtime for· the work done on
holidays while on tour at double the normal wages for the day.
The Management disputed this claim on the ground that it was
not possible to calculate the number of hours worked by the employee at the out-station while on tour. The Tribunal found on
examining a mechanic that .the jurisdiction of the branch was limit,
J!
ed to the districts Trivandrum, Quilon, Alleppey and Kottayam
.and even if he was forced to work on holidays he was given overtime wages. The Tribunal held that it was only just and reasonable
that touring mechanics should be given a day off if they travelled
.. on two· consecutive days for reaching a place of work and also overtime wages at double the wages for the work done on holidays. It
appears to us, that with the limitation as to jurisdiction noted
C above, · the occasion for . a mechanic spending two consecutive
nights for reaching a place of work will arise very seldom, but if
it does, there is no reason why he should not get overtime wages
as awarded by the Tribunal and we see no reason to interfere with
this portion of the award.
In the result, the matter will go back to the Tribunal for disD posal of the issue as t'o the revision of w.age scales and adjustment
of. workers in the revised scales. The scheme for gratuity will stand
modified as. indicated in. our judgment in Civil Appeal No. 2105
of 1966 deJtvered today. The rest of the award will stand. The
appellant will pay the respondent the costs of this appeal.
Award modified.
V.P.S.