# The State ·of Bihar and any interest therein.' v. Kumar Amar

- **Citation:** [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1259
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1955
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 97 aod 98 of 1952
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-state-of-bihar-and-any-interest-therein-v-kumar-amar-331
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

...,,
...
..
S.C.R .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
THE STATE OF BIHAR
ti.
KUMAR AMAR SINGH AND OTHERS
(And connected Appeal)
1259
[S.
R.
DAs,
BHAGWATI,
JAGANNADHADAS,
VENKATARAMA AYYJi.R and B. P. SINHA JJ.J
Constitution of India, Arts. 5 and 7 and Proviso to Art. 7-Wife
migrated from India to Pakistan after the ]st March, 1947-Her husband continued to be in India-Wife whether citizen of IndiaArt .. 7 ovem'ding Art. 5-Administration of Evacuee Property r;Jrdinance 1949 (XXVII of 1949)-Administration of Evacuee Property
Act, 1950 (Act XXXI of 1950)-Evacuee Property Ordinance (Bihar
Ordinance · No. III of 1949)-Evacuee Property-Definition ofW hether includes interest of an evacuee in property held as trustee or
beneficiary and whether includes wakf property and interest therein.
The relevant portion of Art. 5 of the Constituti~n reads :-
"At the commencement of this Constitution every person who
ha~ his domicile in the territory of India and who was born in the
territory of fodia shall be a citizen of India".
·
Article 7 of the Constitution lays down :-
"Notwithstanding anything in Art. 5, a person wh\l has after
the first day of March 1947, migrated from the territory of India to
the territory now included in Pakistan shall not be deemed to be a
citizen of India".
It was contended on behalf of the respondent Kumar Rani who
had migrated from India to Pakistan in 1948 that she was, and continued to be, a citizen of India on the ground that she was born in
India and her domicile continued to be that of her husband, who
throughout continued to be in India and ·that her case was CO\'.ered
by Art. 5 of the Constitution.
Held (repelling the contention) that A~t. 7 of the Constitution
clearly overrides Art. 5. As the respondent had migrated from India
to .Pakistan after the 1st March, 194 7, her case fell under Art. 7 of
the Constitution and that inasmuch as it was a case of an unauthorised issue of an invalid permit which had been properly cancelled the proviso to Art. 7 did not apply and that therefore the respondent could not be deemed to be a citizen of India.
Held also, that the definitions of the phrase "evacuee property"
in the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949 and the
Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950 (XXXI of 1950) clearly
include the interest of an evacuee in any property held as a trustee
or beneficiary.
The definition of evacuee property in Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949 (Bihar Ordinance No. III of 1949) is not
1955
Febtuary 10
1260
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
different and the words used therein comprise also wakf property
""
-f,
The State ·of Bihar and any interest therein.'
v.
Kumar Amar
Singh and others
C1v1L
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION :
Civil
Appeals
Nos. 97 aod 98 of 1952.
Appeals under Articles
132 ( 1) and 133 ( 1) ( c) of
the Constitution of India from the
Judgment aod
Decree dated .the 13th. October 1950 of the High Court'
of Judicature
at
Patna
in
Miscellaneous
Judicial
Cases Nos. 140 and 107 of 1950.
M. C. Setalvad, Attoriley-Generdl for India ( G. N.·
Jorhi, Lal Narain Sinha .and· P. G. Gokhale with him);
for the appellant in C.A. Nos. 97 and 98 of 1952.
B. Sen and I. N. 'Shroff, for the respondents Nos. 1
~~
.
.
·.
..
1955. February 10.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
J AGANNADHADAS
J .-These
are
two . connectecl
appeals arising out of a common judgment of
the
High Court of Patna on two applications to it dated
the 5th July, 1950 and 28th July, 1950, under article
226 of the Constitution. The State of Bihar. is
the
appellant in both· the appeals. The first three respon-·
dents in Appeal No. 97 are the sons of the fourth
respondent therein, viz. Kumar Rani
Sayeeda
Khatoon
(hereinafter referred to as Kumar Rani). The
said Kumar Rani is also the first respondent in Appeal
No. 98. The other. respondents in both the appeals
are Government Officers under the
appellant,
the
State of Bihar. The applications
before
the
High
. Court arose with reference to· action taken against ( l)
the p

## Text

...,,
...
..
S.C.R .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
THE STATE OF BIHAR
ti.
KUMAR AMAR SINGH AND OTHERS
(And connected Appeal)
1259
[S.
R.
DAs,
BHAGWATI,
JAGANNADHADAS,
VENKATARAMA AYYJi.R and B. P. SINHA JJ.J
Constitution of India, Arts. 5 and 7 and Proviso to Art. 7-Wife
migrated from India to Pakistan after the ]st March, 1947-Her husband continued to be in India-Wife whether citizen of IndiaArt .. 7 ovem'ding Art. 5-Administration of Evacuee Property r;Jrdinance 1949 (XXVII of 1949)-Administration of Evacuee Property
Act, 1950 (Act XXXI of 1950)-Evacuee Property Ordinance (Bihar
Ordinance · No. III of 1949)-Evacuee Property-Definition ofW hether includes interest of an evacuee in property held as trustee or
beneficiary and whether includes wakf property and interest therein.
The relevant portion of Art. 5 of the Constituti~n reads :-
"At the commencement of this Constitution every person who
ha~ his domicile in the territory of India and who was born in the
territory of fodia shall be a citizen of India".
·
Article 7 of the Constitution lays down :-
"Notwithstanding anything in Art. 5, a person wh\l has after
the first day of March 1947, migrated from the territory of India to
the territory now included in Pakistan shall not be deemed to be a
citizen of India".
It was contended on behalf of the respondent Kumar Rani who
had migrated from India to Pakistan in 1948 that she was, and continued to be, a citizen of India on the ground that she was born in
India and her domicile continued to be that of her husband, who
throughout continued to be in India and ·that her case was CO\'.ered
by Art. 5 of the Constitution.
Held (repelling the contention) that A~t. 7 of the Constitution
clearly overrides Art. 5. As the respondent had migrated from India
to .Pakistan after the 1st March, 194 7, her case fell under Art. 7 of
the Constitution and that inasmuch as it was a case of an unauthorised issue of an invalid permit which had been properly cancelled the proviso to Art. 7 did not apply and that therefore the respondent could not be deemed to be a citizen of India.
Held also, that the definitions of the phrase "evacuee property"
in the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949 and the
Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950 (XXXI of 1950) clearly
include the interest of an evacuee in any property held as a trustee
or beneficiary.
The definition of evacuee property in Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949 (Bihar Ordinance No. III of 1949) is not
1955
Febtuary 10
1260
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
different and the words used therein comprise also wakf property
""
-f,
The State ·of Bihar and any interest therein.'
v.
Kumar Amar
Singh and others
C1v1L
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION :
Civil
Appeals
Nos. 97 aod 98 of 1952.
Appeals under Articles
132 ( 1) and 133 ( 1) ( c) of
the Constitution of India from the
Judgment aod
Decree dated .the 13th. October 1950 of the High Court'
of Judicature
at
Patna
in
Miscellaneous
Judicial
Cases Nos. 140 and 107 of 1950.
M. C. Setalvad, Attoriley-Generdl for India ( G. N.·
Jorhi, Lal Narain Sinha .and· P. G. Gokhale with him);
for the appellant in C.A. Nos. 97 and 98 of 1952.
B. Sen and I. N. 'Shroff, for the respondents Nos. 1
~~
.
.
·.
..
1955. February 10.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
J AGANNADHADAS
J .-These
are
two . connectecl
appeals arising out of a common judgment of
the
High Court of Patna on two applications to it dated
the 5th July, 1950 and 28th July, 1950, under article
226 of the Constitution. The State of Bihar. is
the
appellant in both· the appeals. The first three respon-·
dents in Appeal No. 97 are the sons of the fourth
respondent therein, viz. Kumar Rani
Sayeeda
Khatoon
(hereinafter referred to as Kumar Rani). The
said Kumar Rani is also the first respondent in Appeal
No. 98. The other. respondents in both the appeals
are Government Officers under the
appellant,
the
State of Bihar. The applications
before
the
High
. Court arose with reference to· action taken against ( l)
the property, and .(2}. the .person, of Kumar Rani by
the Officers of the Government of Bihar, .under the
following circumstances.
Kumar Rani was admittedly born in the territory
of India and claims to be the lawfully wedded wife of
Captain Maharaj Kumar Gopal ·saran Narayan Singh
of. Gaya by virtue of an alleged marriage between
them in 1920 according to Arya Samaj rites and subsequently according. to Muslim rites. She owned and
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1261
possessed considerable properties. In 1946 she created
a wakf of her properties consisting of 427 villages for
the maintenance and support of herself, her sons and
their descendants, by executing a deed of W akf-ulalAulad dated the 4th May, 1946, by which she divested
herself of all her interest in the said properties and
vested them in Almighty God. She appointed, herself
as the sole mutwalli for her life time or until relinquishment, and her three sons to succeed her as joint
mutwallis. The deed also provided that the net income was to be spent for the maintenance of herself
and her three sons with the direction that not more
than half should be spent by the wakif a for her own
use.
In July, 1948, Kumar Rani went to Karachi.
In December, 1948, she returned to India from Pakistan on a temporary permit and went back to Pakistan
in April, 1949.
On the 21st June,
1949, the Bihar
.\dministration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949
~Bihar Ordinance No. III of 1949) came into force.
The Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property issued a
notification on the 2nd September, 1949, under section
5 of
~his Ordinance, declaring all the properties comprised
in
the
abovementioned wakf estate to have
vested in the Custodian as being evacuee property.
He took possession thereof between
the
20th September and 2nd
October, 1949. On the 14th May,
1950, Kumar Rani again came back to India under a
permanent permit obtained from the High Commissioner for India in Pakistan. This permit was, however,
cancelled on the 12th July, 1950, by the Deputy High
Commissioner, on the ground that this was wrongly issued, without the concurrence of the Government,
as required by the rules made under the Influx from
Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949.
In view of this cancellation, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Gaya, issued notice
to Kumar Rani directing her that since her permanent
permit had been cancelled, she should leave India by the
31st July, 1950. In view of these happenings two applications were filed before the High Court of Patna, one
dated the 5th July, 1950, challenging the validity of
the action taken by the Deputy Custodian declaring
the wakJ estate as evacuee property and taking posses6-90 S, C. India/59
1955
T/.e State of Bihm'
v.
Kun;ar Amar
Singh and others
Jagannadhadas J.
•
1955
The State of Diliar
v.
Ku,nar Antar
Sing!i and others
J agannadliadas J.
1262
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
.
.
·,
.
.
sion thereof on the basis of that declaration, and another application dafed the 28th July, 1950, challenging the validity of the order of the Sub-Inspector of
Police, Gay a, directing Kumar Rani to leave India. The
first of-these applications was filed by Kumar Rani
along with her three sons as petitioners and the second
by Kumar Rani alone: Both these applications were
allowed by the High Court and hence these appeals
by the State on leave granted by the High Court.
These two connected appeals came up for hearing before this Court· on the 26th and 27th October, 1953.
This Court after hearing counsel on both sides was of
the opinion that one of the essential facts (to be mentioned in detail herein below when dealing with Appeal No. 97) requisite for a proper decision of Appeal·
No. 97 had been assumed without investigation and
that it was necessary to hr:ve a finding thereupon
after taking evidence.
Tliis Court accordingly remanded Appeal No. 97 to the High Court to submit a
finding and directed that on the receipt of the finding
both the appeals (Appeals Nos. 97 and 98) should be
heard together.
The finding has now been received
and the appeals have been reheard. It is necessary
. at this stage ~to men ti on that. the ad voe ate who a ppeared for the respondents in both the appeals at the
prior hearing appeared before us at this hearing and
stated that he had been instructed to ·withdraw his
appearance in these appeals and to allow the hearing
to proceed ex parte.
The preliminary facts having been stated as above,
it will now be convenient to deal with these two appeals separately.
Appeal No. 98 which raises the
fundamental question as to the continuing citizenship
of Kumar Rani will be taken up first.
Civil Appeal No. 98 of 1952.
. This appeal arises out of the application to the
High Court dated the 28th July, 1950, challenging the
validity of the order dated the 23rd July, 1950, issued
by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Ga ya.
This order is
_challenged on the ground that Kumar Rani was, and
throughout· continued to be, a citizen of India and
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1263
1~55
that the order dated the 23rd July, 1950, which, in
substance, amounted to an order of her externment
f
I d
fK
R
., f
d
TheStateofBiTtar
rom n ia, was in violation o
umar ams un av.
mental right under article 19 of the Constitution asa
Kumar Amar
citizen of India.· The question that arises is whether, Singhandothm
in the circumstances, Kumar Rani was a citizen of
-
, .
India at the date of the order.
The contention of JagannadhadasJ.
Kumar Rani is that though it is a fact that she did
go to Pakistan in the year 1948, she went there only
for a temporary purpose, viz. for securing the medical
treatment of a reputed Hakim and that she was always and continued to be a citizen of India and that,
therefore, the High Commissioner for India in Pakistan had no power to cancel the permit issued to her.
As regards her allegation that when she first went to
Karachi in July, 1948, she did so temporarily for the
purpose of medical treatment, the learned Judges of
the High Court were not inclined to accept her story .
. But, all the same, they held that she was and continued to be a citizen of India, ~n the ground that she
was born in India and that her domicile continued to
be that of her husband, Captain Maharaj Kumar
Gopal Saran Narayan Singh, who, it is not disputed,
_throughout continued to be in India.
The learned
Judges of the High Court apparently had article 5 of
the Constitution in mind and acted on the view of
the English law that the wife's domicile continues·
throughout to be that of her husband during the con-
. tinuance of marriage. It appears to us, with respect,
that the learned Judges of the High Court completely
overlooked article 7 of the Constitution.
The relevant portion of article 5 of the Constitution says as
follows:
· ·
"At the commencement of this Constitution,
every person who has his domicile in the territory of
India and who was born in the territory of India shall
be a citizen of India".
In the view of the High Court since Kumar Rani was
born in India and had the Indian domicile of her husLand, she was a citizen of India. But article 7 says:
"Notwithstanding anything in article 5, a person
162
1955
Th'e ·state of Bihar
v.
Kumar Amar·
Singh ana' others
Jagannadhadas J.
1264
SUPREME;CO.U:(lT REPORTS
[1955] .
who has after the first day of March, 1947, migrated
from the territory of India to the territory now included in Pakistan shall not be deemed to be a citizen
of India".-
There is a proviso to this article which will be
noticed presently. But before noticing the proviso and
its effect, it is necessary to mention the following
facts which may be taken to have been made out on
the record. (1) Kumar Rani went to Karachi in July,
1948.
(2) Her story that she went there temporarily
for medical treatment has been doubted by the High
Court _and appears to us to be unfounded. (3) When
she came to India in December, 1948, she did so on a
temporary permit stating in her application for the
said permit that she was domiciled in Pakistan and
accordingly representing
herself
to
be a Pakistani
national. ( 4) She went back to Pakistan in April, 1949,
on the expiry of that temporary permit. (5) She made
an attempt to obtain a permit ·for permanent return
to· India only after steps had been taken to vest the
property in the Custodian and after the same was
taken possession of. There can be no doubt on these
facts that she must be held to have migrated from the
territory of India after the 1st March, 1947. Even if
therefore article 5 can be said to be applicable to her
on the assumption that Captain Narayan Singh was
her husband and that her domicile was that of her
husband, the facts bring her case under article 7.
Article 7 clearly overrides article 5. It is peremptory
in its scope and makes no exception for such a case,
i.e., of the wife migrating to Pakistan leaving her husband in India. Even such a wife must be deemed not
to be a citizen of India unless the particular facts
bring her case within the proviso to article 7. This
proviso is as follows :
"Provided that nothing in this article shall apply
to a person who, after having so migrated to the territory now included in Pakistan, has returned to the
territory of India under a permit for resettlement or
permanent return issued by or under the authority of
any law".
It is contended with reference to this proviso that
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1265
since she m fact returned under a permanent permit,
she is entitled to the benefit thereof and that the
subsequent cancellation of the said permit is both
illegal and irrelevant. Rule 10 of the Permit System
Rules, 1949, framed by the Central Government under
section 4 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act,
1949, provides that a permit for permanent resettlement in India may be granted by the High Commissioner or Deputy High Commissioner only after securing the agreement of the State or the Province where
the applicant intends to settle. Rule 29 provides that
every permit issued under the rules shall be liable to
cancellation at any time, without any
reason being
assigned by the issuing authority. In the present case,
::he permit has been cancelled in a reasoned order on
the ground that, on the facts of the case, the consent
of the State Governmei1t concerned should have been
obtained before the permit could be issued. This is a
case, therefore. not of a valid permanent permit having been issued and the permit holder returning ro
India on· the strength thereof and .. the same. having
been arbitrarily
cancelled. It is a case of an unauthorised issue of an invalid permit which has been
properly cancelled. Hence the proviso to article 7 can
have no possible application. The applicant, is, therefore, not a citizen of India and the order passed by
the Sub-Inspector of Police, Gaya, dated the 23rd
July, 1950, · directing Kumar Rani to leave India was
accordingly valid. This appeal must therefore succeed.
Civil Appeal f!o. 97 of 1952.
This appeal ·arises out 'of the application to the
High Court dated the 5th July, 1950, challenging the
validity of the notification dated the 2nd September,
1949, · issued by the · Deputy Custodian, · under the
Bihar Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance,
1949, declaring the wakf estate ·as
evacuee
property
and taking
posse~sion thereof.
Three main grounds
on which this has been contested are as follows: (1)
Kumar Rani was not an evacuee. (2) She had written
a letter dated the 2nd June, 1949, addressed · to he·r
secorid · son, 'Kurriar Fateh Singh, whereby she·' relin--
1955
·The State of Bihar
v.
Kumar Amar
Singh and others
Jagannadhadas j,
1955
•q'Jie-State of·Bihar
·v.
··Kumar •Amar
~Singh and .'.others
Jagannadhadas .J.
· 1266
·,SUPREME '.COURT.1REP.ORTS
[1955]
quished ·the ·office of mutwidli · in the .wakf estate, and
therefore by virtue ·of the. said "letter and. in pursuance
of the terms .of the original deed of . wakf, her three
sons, respondents : 1 to 3, had become the .joint mutwallis ·as well .as the owners of the beneficial interest
in the wakf estate. It being undisputed that these
· three remained in India . throughout, it . is . contended
that the property at the date of the no.tification was
·the property -of these three sons and not of Kumar
Rani and that, therefore, ·the -Bihar
Administration
of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, has no applica-
. tion to the facts. (3) The ·Bihar Administration of
:Evacuee Property Ordinance, .1949, .is
not applicable
to wakf property ,and to, the beneficial interest of the
applicants therein. So far as the first point is
concerned an "evacuee" is defined as follows in the Bihar
Administration ·of Evacuee .Property Ordinance, 1949 :
"A person who, on account of the setting up of
the Dominions of India and Pakistan or on account
of ciyil distmbances or the fear of such disturbances,
.'.leaves or •·has, ·On •or after •the· 1st day of November,
·.J946, left, any ··Place ·in the 'Province of Bihar for any
place · outside
the territories now forming part of
·India".
It is clear that, as already found ·above, Kumar Rani
. mi grated to Pakistan from .In.dia after the 1st March,
1947. In view .of the £act that her plea .as to the reason for such migration has not been accepted, she can
well be taken to ·have left India for Pakistan in the
circumstances set out in this definition, and
after
the prescribed date. She has, therefore, been rightly
·taken to ·be ·an "evacuee" ·by the Custodian .. As regards the second point, the alleged relinquishment of
the office of mutwalli by Kumar Rani and the vesting
:of the interest in the wakf ·property in her three sons,
respondents
1 ·to
3, ·as · joint
0mutwallis
thereof,
by virtue of ·the ·terms of the deed of wakf, is
·based
on a letter
addressed -to. the ·second ;res-
-pondent,
·her
second ·son
, Kumar · Fateh
·Singh,
•purporting to have been .. wri_tten ·by ·her ·and dated
·the
2nd
June,
1949.
The
gel).liineness
of
this
letter has been challenged -and it is ·the issue as to itr.
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:S.C;R.
-1267
•genuineness that was remanded: to tthe -. High .Court for
a · finding by the ::previous otder of 'this Court. The
High Court . having -:taken evidence on the matters at
the hearing after remand and · having considered the
same, has clearly found that
the
letter
was
not
genuine. We have gone through the finding arid the
·material relevant thereto, and can find no ·reason not
to accept it. There is, therefore, no substance in this
second contention. As regards the third point, the
contention is based on the definition of · the phrase
"evacuee property"
in ·the Bihar Administration of
Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, which is as follows :
"Evacuee property means a:ny property in which
an evacuee has any right or interest or which is held
by him under any deed of trust or other instrument".
•It is contended that this definition · does not apply
either to the · wakf property or to the beneficial interest
of the mutwalli therein and that, therefore, the property in question did not vest· in the Custodian. Now,
•as already "stated, the original· notification vesting the
wakf property in the Custodian was ~made under section 5 of the · Bihar Admini-stration of ·Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949. This
Ordinance was repealed
by section 55(2) of Central Ordinance No. XXVII .of
1949.
The Central Ordinance defined "evacuee property" as
"any property in ·which an ·evacuee has any right
or interest, whether personal or as a trustee or a:s
beneficiary or in any other capacity".
The Central Ordinance was in turn repealed by Central Act No. XXXI of 1950 ·and "evacuee property"
has been defined therein .. as meaning
"any property of an evacuee whether held by
him as owner or as a trustee or as a beneficiary or as
a tenant or in any oi:her capacity·".
The word "property" is defined as meaning
"property of any kind and includes any right or
interest in such property".
'The
Central Ordinance which repeale'd .. the Bihar
Ordinance as well as ·the ,central Act which repealed
i:he Central Ordinance, each contain ·section ·8(2) providing that
•The State Of Bihar
·v.
Kumar Amar
···:Singh and other.<
Jagtmnadhadas J.
1955
The State of Bihar
.v.
Kumar Amar
Singh and others
Jagannadhadas J.
1955
Fe6ruary 22
1268
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
"where
immediately
before
the
commencement
of this Ordinance (Act) any evacuee property in a
Province
has
vested in any person exercising the
power of Custodian under any law repealed hereby,
the evacuee property shall on the commencement of
the Ordinance (Act) be deemed to have been vested
in the Custodian appointed or deemed to have been
appointed for the Province under the Ordinance (Act)
and shall continue to so vest".
· , ·,
The definitions of the ·phrase "evacuee property"
m
the Central Ordinance and by the Central Act are
clear and unambiguous so as to include the interest
of an · evacuee in any property held as a trustee or
beneficiary. There is no reason to
think that "evacuee property" as defined in the Bihar Ordinance was
meant to be anything "different. The words used in
this definition are of sufficient amplitude and we ·are
of the opinion that the Bihar 'definition· comprised
also · wakj property and interest
therein~ We are also
of the opinion that the successive repeals of ·the Bihar
Ordinance by the Central Ordinance and the Central
Act and the continuance of the vesting · in the Custodian, places the matter beyond
any
doubt.
This
contention
must, therefore,
fail.
This
appeal
alw
must accordingly succe~d.
In the result both the appeals are allowed. The
appellant in the circumstances will get only the cost;
incurred before the High Court on remand in Civil
Appeal No. 97 of 1952.
Appeals allowed.
'
SHYABUDDINSAB MOHIDIN$AB, AKKI
tJ.
THE GADAG-BETGERI · MUNICIPAL BOROUGH
AND OTHERS.
rvrvrAN
BosE,
JAGANNADHADAS
and' B. P, SINHA JT.]
Bombay M~nicipal Boroughs Act, 1925 ·(Bombay Act XVlll
of 1925), s. 19 as amended by Bombay Act LIV _of 1954-;-Lc_gal effect
thereof-Validity of election-S. 35(3)(6)-Notice ,of meeting-Provisions of s. 35(3)'-Whether directory or mimdatory-S. 35(6)-Presence or absence of public-Whether affects the validity of meeting.
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