# THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER v. THE UNITED MOTORS (INDIA) LTD. AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1953] 1 S.C.R. 1069
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1953
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-state-of-bombay-and-another-v-the-united-motors-india-ltd-and-others-97
- **Pages:** 61

## Headnote

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
AND ANOTHER
v.
THE UNITED MOTORS (INDIA) LTD.
AND OTHERS.
UNION OF INDIA,
. STATE OF BIHAR,
STATE OF MADRAS,
STATE OF MYSORE,
I I
I
' '
1069
STATE OF WEST BENGAL,
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH,
STATE OF PUNJAB and
STATE OF TRAV ANCOREI
)- Interveners.
COCHIN
I
I i
j
[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MUKHERJEA,
VIVIAN BosE, GHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI ,JJ.l
Bombay Sales Tax Act (XXIV of 1952). ss. 2 (14), 5, 6, 7, 11
-Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952, l'I'. 5, 6-State law imposing
sales tax-Validity-Powei· of States to levy tax on inter-State sales
-Limitations-Rules-Whether form part of Act-Constitution of
India, 1950, arts. 286 (Z) and (2), 14, 301, 304, 226 -ilieaning and
scope of art. 286 (1) and art. 286 (2)-Application under art. 226
-D11ty of High Court to find whether fundamental rights have been
infringed.
The Legislature of Bombay passed an Act entitled the Bombay Sales Tax ,\ct, 1952, which imposed (by s. 5) a general tax on
every dealer \Vhose turnover in resper;t of saJes within tho State
of Bombay during the prescribed period exceeded Rs. 30,000 and
(by s. 10) a special tax on every dealer whose turnover in respect
of sales of special goods made within the State of Bombay exceeded Rs. 5,000 during the prescribed period.
'fhe term 'sale' was
defined [in s. 2 (l4)] as meaning any transfer of property in goods
for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, and
an Explanation to this definition provided th·;t the sale of auy
goods which have actually been clelivered in the State of Bombay
as a direct result of such sale for the purpose of consun1ption in
the said State shall be deemed, for the purposes of the Act, to
have taken place in the said State irrespective of the fact that
the property in the goods has 1 hy reason of c;nch sn.le, passed in
139
•
1963
Mar~h JO
•
1070
SUPREME coeRT REPORTS
[1953]
1953
another fltate.
Rules 5 and 6 of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules,
1952, which were brought into force on the san~e day on which
The State of Bom- ss. 5 and 10 of the Bombay Sales Tax \ct came into force providtm11 aml Another ed for the deduction of the following sales in calculating the taxv.
able turnover, ·viz., sales which take place (a) in the course of the
The Unih'd
import o! the goods into, or the export of the goods out of, the
.\lotor« (India) territory of India, and (b) in the course of inter-State trade or
Ltd. and Other-» commerce (being the two kinds of sales referred to cl. (l)(b) and cl.
(2) respectively of art. 286 of the Constitution). Rule 5 (2) (i),
however, required, as a conditon of the aforesaid deductions, tho,t
the goods should be consigned by a railway, shipping or aircraft
company or country boat registered for carrying cargo or public
motor transport service or by registered post.
In •n application
under art. 2% of the Constitution challenging the validity of the
Act and praying inter alia for a writ against the State of Bombay
and the Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay, restraining them from
enforcing the provisions of the Act, the High Court of Bombay
held that the definition of 'sale' in the Act was so wide as to include the three categories of sale exempted by art. 286 of the
Constitution from the imposition of tax by the States, and as
the Act imposed a tax on all such sales, it was wholly void. On
appeal
Held,
per (Pata;ija.li Sastri 0. J., Nukherjea, Ghulam
Rasan and Bhagwati JJ,-Bose J. dissenting)-that the Bombay
Sales Tax Act (XXIV of 1952) was not nltra vires the State Legislature on the ground that it contravened art. 14 or art. 286 of the
Constitution. Bui clause (i) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of the Bombay
Sales Tax Rules, 1952, was nltra vires in so far as it provided
that in order that sales mentioned in clause (1) (b) and clause (2)
of art. 286 of the Constitution may be exempt from tax, the goods
shall be consigned only through a railway, shipping or aircraft
company or country boat registered for carrying cargo or public
motor transport

## Text

_Characters 0–39,914 of 140,278. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39914 for what follows._

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
AND ANOTHER
v.
THE UNITED MOTORS (INDIA) LTD.
AND OTHERS.
UNION OF INDIA,
. STATE OF BIHAR,
STATE OF MADRAS,
STATE OF MYSORE,
I I
I
' '
1069
STATE OF WEST BENGAL,
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH,
STATE OF PUNJAB and
STATE OF TRAV ANCOREI
)- Interveners.
COCHIN
I
I i
j
[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MUKHERJEA,
VIVIAN BosE, GHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI ,JJ.l
Bombay Sales Tax Act (XXIV of 1952). ss. 2 (14), 5, 6, 7, 11
-Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952, l'I'. 5, 6-State law imposing
sales tax-Validity-Powei· of States to levy tax on inter-State sales
-Limitations-Rules-Whether form part of Act-Constitution of
India, 1950, arts. 286 (Z) and (2), 14, 301, 304, 226 -ilieaning and
scope of art. 286 (1) and art. 286 (2)-Application under art. 226
-D11ty of High Court to find whether fundamental rights have been
infringed.
The Legislature of Bombay passed an Act entitled the Bombay Sales Tax ,\ct, 1952, which imposed (by s. 5) a general tax on
every dealer \Vhose turnover in resper;t of saJes within tho State
of Bombay during the prescribed period exceeded Rs. 30,000 and
(by s. 10) a special tax on every dealer whose turnover in respect
of sales of special goods made within the State of Bombay exceeded Rs. 5,000 during the prescribed period.
'fhe term 'sale' was
defined [in s. 2 (l4)] as meaning any transfer of property in goods
for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, and
an Explanation to this definition provided th·;t the sale of auy
goods which have actually been clelivered in the State of Bombay
as a direct result of such sale for the purpose of consun1ption in
the said State shall be deemed, for the purposes of the Act, to
have taken place in the said State irrespective of the fact that
the property in the goods has 1 hy reason of c;nch sn.le, passed in
139
•
1963
Mar~h JO
•
1070
SUPREME coeRT REPORTS
[1953]
1953
another fltate.
Rules 5 and 6 of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules,
1952, which were brought into force on the san~e day on which
The State of Bom- ss. 5 and 10 of the Bombay Sales Tax \ct came into force providtm11 aml Another ed for the deduction of the following sales in calculating the taxv.
able turnover, ·viz., sales which take place (a) in the course of the
The Unih'd
import o! the goods into, or the export of the goods out of, the
.\lotor« (India) territory of India, and (b) in the course of inter-State trade or
Ltd. and Other-» commerce (being the two kinds of sales referred to cl. (l)(b) and cl.
(2) respectively of art. 286 of the Constitution). Rule 5 (2) (i),
however, required, as a conditon of the aforesaid deductions, tho,t
the goods should be consigned by a railway, shipping or aircraft
company or country boat registered for carrying cargo or public
motor transport service or by registered post.
In •n application
under art. 2% of the Constitution challenging the validity of the
Act and praying inter alia for a writ against the State of Bombay
and the Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay, restraining them from
enforcing the provisions of the Act, the High Court of Bombay
held that the definition of 'sale' in the Act was so wide as to include the three categories of sale exempted by art. 286 of the
Constitution from the imposition of tax by the States, and as
the Act imposed a tax on all such sales, it was wholly void. On
appeal
Held,
per (Pata;ija.li Sastri 0. J., Nukherjea, Ghulam
Rasan and Bhagwati JJ,-Bose J. dissenting)-that the Bombay
Sales Tax Act (XXIV of 1952) was not nltra vires the State Legislature on the ground that it contravened art. 14 or art. 286 of the
Constitution. Bui clause (i) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of the Bombay
Sales Tax Rules, 1952, was nltra vires in so far as it provided
that in order that sales mentioned in clause (1) (b) and clause (2)
of art. 286 of the Constitution may be exempt from tax, the goods
shall be consigned only through a railway, shipping or aircraft
company or country boat registered for carrying cargo or public
motor transport service or by registered post.
These provisions
of Rule 5 (2) (i) were, however, severable from the other provisions
of the Act and could be ignored.
Per Bose J.-The Bomba)' Sales Tax Act, 1952, is wholly
ultra vires.
Per Patanjali Sastri O.J., Mukherjea and Ghulain Hasan JJ.
-Arbicle 286 (1) (a) of the Constitution read with the Explanation thereto and constrned in the light of art. 301 and art.
304 prohibits the taxation of sales or purchases invo!Ying inter.
State elements by all States except the State in which the goods
are delivered for the purpose of consu1nption therein.
The latter
State is left free to tax such sales or purchases and it derives this
power not by virtue of the Explanation to art. 286 (1) but under
art. 246 (3) read with entry 54 of List II. The view that the
Explanation does not dep1·ive the State in which the p1·operty in
the goods passed, of its taxing power and that consequently both
the State in which the property in the goods passes and t]je State
•
s.c.R.
SUPREME COUR'l' REPOH'l'S
1071
in 'vhich the goods are delivered for constunption lHt\'e the pu\'·ler
1953
to tax, is not corl'flct.
(")
.
"
'1.'hcState ofBu1n·
11 The expression
for the purpose of consumption in ba"
,,,~ '· ti
S
" ·
E 1
·
( )
.
..,
!
r"
11 no i.cr
that late m the
xp anat10n to cl. 1 of art. 286 must be un-
'"
derstood as having reference not merely to the individual importer
J'lw u ·iei
or purchaser but as contemplating distribution eventually to \lotors ;7 ~·
consumers ~n general within the State, and all buyers 'vit~in the itd. aud 0
1,ih:;:!
Sta to of dehvery from out-of-State sellers, except those buy mg for
re-export out of the State, would he liable to be taxecl by the
State.
(iii) Clause (:l) of art. 286 does not affect the power of the
State in which deliyery of goods is made to tax inter-State sales
or purchases of the kind mentioned in the Explanation to cl. (i).
The effect of the Explanation is that such transactions are sayed
from the ban imposed by art. 286 (2).
(iv) The fact that sales which take plt1Ce (a) in the course
of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, tho
territory ol India and (h) in the course of inter-State tracle or
commerce, are not expressly exempted by the Born hay Sales Tax
Act could not render the Act 1!ltra vires inasmuch as the Rules
framed under the Act and brought into force simultaneously must
be read as a part of the Act and Rules 5 and 6 of these Rules
exempt •uch sales.
Delhi Laws Act, In re ([1951] S.C.R. 747)
referred to.
(\') The fact that the Bombay flales Tax Act dues not expreHsly exclude from its operation the transactions mentioned in
art. 286 (1) (a) of the Constitution, vi .. , sales and purchases outside the State, l1oes not render the A.ct u,ltra vires inasmuch as)
on a true construction of the Explanation to art. 286 (1) (a) sales
or purchases in respect of goods delivered for consuinption outside
Bombay are not lttxable under the Act, eyen if the goods are in
Bombay and the sale is effected there.
(vi) The provisions of the charging sections 5 and 10 of tbe
Act fixing Rs. 30,000 and Rs. 5,000 as tbe minimum taxable turnover for general tax and special tax resPectively are not dis·
criminatory and void under art. 14 rea1l with art. 13 of the Constitution aS snch classification is perfectly reasonable and no discrimination is involved in it.
(vii) Taxing statutes imposing tu,x on subjects divisihle in
their nature which do not exclude in express ter1us subjects
exempted by the Constitution, should not for that_~eason be declal'ed wholly nltra vires and void, for, i:1 such (jases it is al\vays
feasible to separate taxes levied on authorised subjects from those
levied on exempted subjects and to exclude tbe latter in the
assessment to tax. In such cases the statute itself should bo
allowed to stand, the taxing authority being prevented by injunction from imposing the tax on subjects exempted by the Constitution.
•
1072
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
> [1953]
1963
Bowman v. Continental Co.
(256 U. S. 642; 65 L. l!ld. 1130)
relied on. Punjab Province v. Dattlat Singh tind Another ([1942]
The State of Boin- F.C.R. 67) distinguished.
bay and Anothe,r
(viii) A sale "in the course of inter-State trade" in art.
T '
vu. .
286 (2) of the Constitution includes a sale by a trader in one
"'
mted
0
·
S
Tl
·
·
t
..,
(I a· ) otate to a consumer in another tate.
ie expression ;.s no con-
~n.otor8
11 ia
Ltd. aiul Others fined to sales between t"'O traders only.
(ix) The expression "for such State 01· any part thereof"
in art. 246 (3) of the Constitution cannot be taken to import into
entry 54 of List II the restriction that the sale or purchase referred to must take place within the territory of that State. All that
it means is that the laws which a State is empowered to make
must be for the purposes of that State.
(x) It is always desirable when relief under art. 226 is
sought on allegations of infringement of fundamental rights, that
the Court should satisfy itself that such allegations are well
founded before proceeding further with the matter.
Bose J.-(i) Article 286 (2) cannot be construed in the light
of art. 304 (l) as the two articles deal with different matters.
(ii) The basic idea underlying art. 286 is to prohibit taxation in the case of inter-State trade and commerce until the ban
under cl. (2) of the said article is lifted by Parliament, and
always in the case of imports and exiiorts.
When the ban is
lifted, the l!lxplanation to cl. (l) of 286 comes into play to determine the situs of the sale. This Explanation does not govern cl. (2)
of art. 286 and, as it can only apply to transactions which in
truth and in fact take place in the course of inter-State trade and
commerce, there is no need to call it in aid until the ban is
removed.
(iii) Explanation (2) to the definition of sale in s. 2 (14) of
the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952, which embodies word for word
the provisions of the l!lxp!anation to art. 286 (1) directly offends
cl. (2) of the said article as the ban under cl. (2) has not been lifted by the Parliament.
(iv) Assuming that the Bombay Sales Tax Rules exclude
all sales which are exempt from taxation under the Constitution,
they cannot save the Act, for the Rules are made by a subordinate authority which is not the legislature and the validity of an
Act of the legislature cannot be made to depend on what a
subordinate authority choses to do or not to do.
(v) The good portion of the Act cannot be separated from
the bad in this case, even if the Explanation to s. 2 (14) is
expunged and the whole Act is therefore ultra vires.
Bllagwati J.-(i) Under the general law relating to sale of
goods, a sale must be regarded as having "taken place" in the
State in which the property in the goods sold bas passed to the
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1073
purchaser and that State is entitled to tax the sale or purchase
1953
as having taken place inside the State. The Explanation to art.
--
286 (1) does not take away the right which the State in which TJ,, "'"'' 0/Bom·
the property in the goods passed has to tax the sale or purchase bn!f and Another
but only deems such purchase or sale, by a legal fiction, to haYe
v.
taken place in the State in which the delivery of the goods bas
The Unitcrl
been made for consumption therein so as to enable the latter ,\lotvrs (India)
State also, to tax the sale or purchase in question. The Explana· Lid. and Others
tion only lifts the ban imposed by cl. (1) (a) on taxation of s>eles
or purchases which take place outside the State, to the extent of
the transactions mentioned in the Explanation to enable the delivery State also to tax them.
(ii) Delivery of the goods for the purpose of consumption
in the delivery State means delivery for the purpose of use by
the consumers, and does not include delivery to a dealer purchasing the goods across the border for dealing with or disposing of
the same in the ordinary course of trade, and the J<lxplanation to
art. 286 (1) therefore only covers those cases where, as a direct
result of the sale or purchase, goods are delivered for consumption
in the delivery State by the consumer and the delivery State can
tax only this limited class of transactions under the Explanation.
(iii) The genernl provision enacted in arL 286 (2) against
the imposition 'Of tax on the sale or purchase of goods in the
course of inter-State trade 01· commerce should give way to the
special provision which is enacted in the Explanation to art. 286
(1) {a) enabling the delivery State to tax such sale or purchase in
the limited class of cases covered by the Explanation, the transactions covered by the Explanation lJeing thus lifted out of the category of transactions in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and assimilated to transactions of sale or purchase \vhich
take place inside the State and thus invested with the character
of an intra-State sale or purchase so far as the delivery State is
concerned.
CIVIL APPELLATE
J URISDIC'l'lON :
Civil Appeal
No. 204 of 1952.
Appeal under article 132 (l) of the Constitution of
India from the Judgment and Order dated 11th December, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. and Dixit J.) in Miscellaneous Application No. 289 of 1952.
The material facts are stated
in the judgment.
1vf. P. Arnin, Advocute·General of Bornbuy, (M .. ilf.
Desai and G. N. Joshi, with him) for the appellants.
N. ltf. Seervai and J.B. Dadachanji for the respondents.
•
.
,
1074
SUPREME COUR'r REPOR'fS
[1953]
1953
Jvl. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (Porus
-
A. 1l1ehta, with him) for the Union of I1'idift.
~-~--
,
. ,.
.
bay aud Another
Lal Narain Sinha for the State of B1har.
v. .
V. K. '!'. Chari, Advowte-General of Jl!Iadms, (A.
The Umtcd_
Kuppuswami, with him) for the State of Madras.
Jlotors (Indra)
.
Ltd. ""'l Othcro.
A. R. Soinanatha Iyer, Advocate-Cleneral of 1l1ysore,
(R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the State of Mysore.
B. Sen for the State of West Bengal.
K. L. 1lfisro, Adrncate-General of Uttar Pradesh,
K. B. Asthanrt, with him) for the State of Uttar
Pradesh.
S. JV]. Sikri, Advocate-Geneml of Punjab, ( 111. L.
Sethi, with him) for the State of Punjab.
'l.'. N. Subrahmanya Iyer, Advocate-Cleneml of
'L'ravancore-Oochin State, (1vl. R. Krishnrt Pillrti, with
him) for the State of Travancorc-Oochin.
1953. l\farch 30. The
judgment
of Patanjali
Sastri 0. J., Mukherjea and Ghulam Hasan JJ. was
delivered by Patanjali Sastri 0. J. Vivian Bose and
Bhagwati JJ. delivered separate judgments.
PATANJALI S,1sTR1 C. ,J.-This is an appeal from the
judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay <leclaring the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952,
(Act XXIV of 1952), itltra vires the State Legislature
and issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus against the
State of Bombay and the Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay, appellants herein, directing them to forbear and
desist from enforcing the provisions of the said Act
against the respondents who are dealers in motor cars
in Bombay.
The Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the
Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred to
as "the Act") and it was brought into force on October 9, 1952, hy notification issue\! under section 1 (3)
of the Act, except sections 5, 9, 10 and 47 which came
into operation on November 1, 1952, as notified under
section 2 (3). On the same day the rules made by the
State Government in exercise of the power conferred
by section 45 of the Act also came into force.
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1075
On November 3, 1952, the respondents 1 to 6, who
1953
are companies· incorporated unrlPr the Indian Com- Ti 8 ----
.
'
9 3
d
I
l\T
h'
w tateofBompames """ct, 1. l , an respom ent "'o. 7, a partners ip l>mi and Another
firm, all of whom are carrying on business in Bombay ·
'"
of buying and selling motor cars, presented a petition
The Unitfd
to the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution Motors (India)
challenging the validity of the Act on the ground that Ltd. and Othm
it is ultra vires the State Legislature, inasmuch as it
l
J)afanjnli
lnu·1Jorted to tax sales anc rmrchases of goods regard-
'--'
._,
8aNtti C,J,
less of the rc8trictions imposed on r-ltate legislative
power by article 28G of the Constitution. It was also
alleged that the provisions of the Act \VC;re discriminatory in their effect and, therefore, void under article
14 read with article 13 of the Constitution. The respondents accordingly prayed for the issue of a writ in
the nature of mandamus against the appellants preventing them from enforcing the provisions of the Act
against the respondents.
A further ground of attack
was added by amendment of the petition to the effect
that the Act being wholly ultra vires and void, the
provisions requiring dealers to apply for registration
in some cases and to obtain a licence in some others
as a condition of carrying on their business, infringed
the fundamental rights of the respondents under
article HJ (1) (g) of the Constitution.
In the affidavit filed in answer the appellants
traversed the allegations in the petition and contended, inter alia, that the Act was a complete code and
provided for special machinery for dealing with all
questions arising under it, inclurling questions of constitutionality, and, therefore, thr petition was not
maintainable, that the present case was not an
appropriate one for the issue of a writ under article
226 as the validity of the imposition of a tax was
questioned, that no assessment proeeedings having been
initiated against the respondents and no
demand
notice having been iswed, ihe respondents had no
cause of action, and that, properly construed, the Act
and the Rules did not contravene ai·tiele 286 or any
other provisions of the Constitution and did not
infringe :my fundamental right of the respondents,
•
1076
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1963
The petition was heard by a Division Bench of the
The State of Bom. High et;urt co~sistin& o: Chagla _C. J: and D!x!t J.
bay. and Another Chagla C. J., \\ho delivered the Judgment, D1x1t J.
v.
concurring, overruled the preliminary objection disTke United
tinguishing the decisions cited in support thereof by
Motors (Indw) pointing out that the principle that a (;()Hrt would
Ltd. and Othm
t ·
t"
"t
J
d
t
1
_
no issue a preroga 1ve wr1 w ien an a equa e a terPatanjali
native remedy was available could not apply where,
sa,,tri o.J.
as here, a party came to the court with an allegation
tliat his fundamental rights had been infringed and
sought relief under article 226.
The learned Judges
however thought, in view of the conclusion they had
come to on the question of competency of the State
Legislature to pass the Act, it was "not necessary to
consider the challenge that has been made to the Act
under articles 14 and 19" and expressed no opinion on
the alleged infringement of the respondents' fundamental rights.
On the merits, the learned .Judges held that the
definition of "sale" in the Act was so wide as to
include the three categories of sale exempted by
article 286 . from the imposition of sales tax by the
Rtates, and, as the definition governed the charging
sections 5 and 10, the Act must be taken to impose the
tax:; on such sales also in contravention of article 286.
The.Act must, therefore, be declared wholly void, it
being impossible to sever any specific offending provision so as to save the rest of the Act, as "the defini.
tion pervades the whole Act and the whole scheme of
the Act is bound up with the definition of sale". The
learned .Judges rejected the argument that the Act
and the Rule(must be read together to see whether
the State has made a law imposing a tax in contravention of article 286, remarking that "if the Act itself is
bad, the rules, made under it cannot have any
greater efficacy". Nor was the Government, which
was authorised to make rules for earrying out the
purpose of the Act, under an obligation to exclude
the exempted sales. The rules, too, did not exclude
all the three categories of exempted sn,les but only
two of them, anrl even stwh exrlnsion was hedged
,.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1077
In view of the importance of the issues involved,
19"3
notice of_ the appeal was issued to the Advocates-The State of Bom.
General oi States under Order XLI, Rule l, and many bay and Another
of them intervened and appeared before us.
The
v.
Attorney-General of India, to whom notice was also
The United
sent, intervened on behalf of the Union of India. We ~~
0" ~~·~ia)
have thus had the assistance of a full argument deal-
· "..'.'._ t ers.
ing with all aspects of the case.
Patanjali
The Advocate-General of Bombay, appearing on
behalf of the appellants, took strong :exception to the
manner in which the learned Judges below disposed of the objection to the maintainability of the
petition. He complained that, having entertained
the petition on the ground that infringement of fundamental rights was alleged, and that the remedy ·under
article 226 was, therefore, appropriate, the learned
Judges issued a writ without finding that any.fundamental right had in fact been infringed. Learned
counsel for the State of West Bengal also represented
that parties in that State frequently got petitions
under article 226 admitted by alleging violation of
some fundamental right, and the court sometimes
issued the writ asked for without insisting on the
allegation being substantiated. We are of opinion
that it is always desirable, when relief under article
226 is sought on allegations of infringement of fundamental. rights, that the court should satisfy itself that
such allegations are well founded before proceeding
further with the matter. In the present case, however, the appellants can have no· grievance, as the
respondents' allegation of infringement of their fundamental right under article 19 (1) (g) was based on
their contention that the Act was ultra vires the State
Legislature, and that contention having been accepted
by the Court below, there would clearly be an unauthorised restriction on the respondents' right to
carry on their trade, registration and licence being
required only to facilitate collection of the tax imposed. As !\fr. Seervai for the respondents rightly submitted, the fact that the Court below left the question
undecided, though the point was concluded by the
140
Sastri ~ 0 .J.
1078
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
i 9s3
decision of this Court in .'l!ohammad Yasin v. Tlze
Th 8 --.,B
Town Area Committee,
Jalalabad ('); which was
e tate oJ
01n-
.
bay and Another brought to the notice of the learned Judges, was not
v.
the fault of the respondents and gave no real cause
The United
for complaint.
11Iot<>rs (India)
.
.
.
Ltd. and Others
Before cons1dermg whether the appellant State has
made a law imposing, or authorising the imposition
Patanjali
of, a tax on sales or purchases of goods in disregard
8ast1'i O.J.
of constitutional restrictions on its legislative power
in that behalf, it is necessary to aseert.ain the scope of
such power and the nature and extent of the restrictions placed upon it by article 286. The power is
conferred by article 246 (3) read with entry 54 of List
II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The
Legislature of any State has, under these provisions,
the exclusive power to make laws "for such State or
any part thereof" with respect to "taxes on the sale
or purchase of goods other than newspapers".
The
expression "for such State or any part thereof" cannot, in our view, be taken to import into entry 54 the
restriction that the saJe or purchase referred to must
take place within the territory of that State. All that
it means is that the laws whieh a State is empowered
to make must be for the purposes of that State. As
pointed out by the Privy Council in the Wallace Brothers case (') in dealing with the competency of the
Indian Legislature to impose tax on the income arising abroad to a non-resident foreign company, the
constitutional validity of the relevant statutory provisions did not turn on the possession by the legislature of extra-territorial powers but on the existence
of a sufficient territorial connection between the taxing State and what it seeks to tax. In the case of
sales-tax it is not necessary that the sale or purchase
should take place within the territorial limits of the
State in the sense that all the ingredients of a sale
like the agreement to sell, the passing of title, delivery
of the goods, etc., should have a territorial connection
with the State. Broadly speaking, local activities of
buying or selling carried on in the State in relation to
local goods would be a suffieient basis to sustain the
taxing power of the State, provided of course, such
Ir) [1952] S.C.R. 572.
(2) [1948] S.C.R. r.
•
S.C.R.
SUPRE~1E COUR'l' UE.PORTS
1079
sale or
1953
activities ulti1?ately resulted in a concluded
purchase to be taxed.
'}_'he State of Boniln exercise of the legislative powor conferred upon bay "'"1 Another
them in substantially similar terms by the Governv.
ment of India Act, 1935, the Provincial Legislatures
The United
d
1
l
.£"
il'.lotor;.: (India)
enacte sa es-tax aws 1or their respective Provinces, Ltd. and Other.•.
acting on the principle of territorial nexus referred to
above; that is to say, they picked out one or more of
Patanjat1.
the ingredients constituting a sale and made them the
8a.•tri O.J.
basis of their sales-tax legislation. Assam and Bengal made among other things the actual existence
of the goods in the Province at the time of the contract of sale the test of taxability. In Bihar the production or manufacture of the good~ in the Province
was made an additional ground.
A net of the widest
range perhaps was laid in Central Provinces and Berar
where it was sufficient if the goods were actually
"found" in the Province at any time after the contract
of sale or pure hase in respect thereof was made.
Whether the territorial nexus put forward as the basis
of the taxing power in each case would be sustiiined
as sufficient was a matter of doubt not having been
tested in a court of law.
And such claims to taxing
power led to multiple taxation of the same trnnsaction bv difforent Provinces and cumulation of the
burdei; falling ultimately on the consuming public.
This situation posed to the Constitution makers the
problem of restrieting the taxing power on sales or
purchases involving inter-State elements, and alleviating the tax burden on the consumer. At the same time
they were evidently anxious to maintain the State
power of imposing non-discriminatory taxes on goodH
imported from other States, while upholding the
economic unity of India by providing for the freedom
of inter-State trade and commerce. In their attempt
to harmonise and achieve these somewhat conflicting
objectives they enacted articles 286, 301 aml 304.
These articles read as follows :
286.
(1) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of
good8 where sueh sale or purchase takes place-
1080
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953j
1953
(a) outside the State ; or
1'heStateofBom-
(b) in the course of the i~port oft!1e go_ods
iu~o,
bay and Another or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.
v. .
Explanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a),
,}1" U(nlttedd. J a sale or 1mrchase shall be deemed to have ta ken
,1.r.1.otors
n 1a
·
.
.
1
Ltd. and Others place in the State m which the goods have actual y
-
.
been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purPatanjali
chase for the purpose of consumption in that State,
SaslYi o.J.
notwithstanding the fact that under the general law
relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has
by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another
State.
(2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law
otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or
authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes
place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce :
Provided that the President may by order direct
that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which
was being lawfully levied by the Government of any
State immediately before the commencement of this
Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this
clause, continue to be levied until the thirty-first day
of March, 1951.
(3) So law made by the Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the
sale or purchase of any such goods as have been
declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the
life of the community shall have effect unless it has
been reserved for the consideration of the President
and has received his assent.
301. Subject to the other provisions of this Part,
trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free.
304. Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or
article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law-
(a) impose on goods imported from other States
any tax to which similar goods manufactured or
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
108i
produced in that State are subject, so, however, as not
J&5J
to discriminate !Jetween goods so imported and goods Tl s· -.,8
'-'
,
w tate oJ
01n·
so manufactured or produced ; and
bay and Another
(b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the
v.
f.
d
f
d
' t
· h
'l'hc Unite4
ree om o tra e, commerce or Ill ercourse wit
or }J t
(I d' J
within that State as may be required in th0 public ~t~.
0
;:d 0;,.;~.
interest:
Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purPatan}ali
8astri O.J.
poses of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the
Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of
the President.
It will be seen that the principle of freedom of inter8tate trade and commerce declared in article 301 is
expressly subordinated to the State power of taxing
goods imported from sister States, provided only no
discrin1ination is made in favour of similar goods of
local origin. Thus the States in India have full power
of imposing what in American State legislation is called
the use tax, gross receipts tax, etc. not to speak of the
familiar property tax, subject only to the condition
that such tax is imposed on all goods of the same kind
produGed or manufactured in the
taxing State,
although such taxation is undoubtedly calculated to
fetter inter-State trade and commerce. In other words,
the commercial unity of India is made to give way
before the State-power of imposing "any" non-discriminatory tax on goods imported from sister States.
Having thus provided for the freedom of inter-State
trade and commerce subject to the important qualification mentioned above, the authors of the Constitution had to devise a formula of restrictions to be
imposed on the State-power of taxing sales or purchases
involving inter-State elements which would avoid the
doubts and difficulties arising out of the imposition of
sales-tax on the same transaction by several Provincial
Legislatures in the country before the commencement
of the Constitution. This they did by enacting
clause (1) (a) with the Explanation and clause (2) of
article 286. Clause (1) (a) prohibits the taxation of all
sales or purchases which take place oul8ide the State,
•
1082
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
1953
but a localised sale is a troublesome coi;i.cept, for, a sale
S -
1
B
is a composite transaction involving as it does several
The tateo
om· ]
h
11
c
f
bay and Another e ements sue as agreement to se , trans1er o ownerv.
ship, payment of the price, delivery of the goods and
Tlte United
so forth, which may take place at different places.
Motor• (India) How, then, is it to be determined whether a particular
Ltd. and Others. sale or purchase took place within or outside the State ?
Pa~injalt
It is difficult to say that any one of the ingredients
sastri o.J.
mentioned above is more essential to a sale or purchase than the others. To solve the difficulty an easily
applicabie test for determining what is an outside sale
had to be formulated, and that is what, in our opinion,
the Explanation was intended to do. It provides by
means of a legal fiction that the State in which the
goods sold or purchased are actually delivered for consumption therein is the State in which the sale or
purchase is to be considered to have taken place,
notwithstanding the property in such goods passed in
another State. Why an " outside " sale or purchase is
explained by defining what is an inside sale, and why
actual delivery and consumption in the State are made
the determining factors in locating a sale or purchase
will presently appear. The test of sufficient territorial
nexus was thus replaced by a simpler and more easily
workable test: Are the goods actually delivered in the
taxing State, as a direct result of a sale or purchase,
for the purpose of consumption therein ? Then, such
sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place
in that State and outside all other States. The latter
States are prohibited from taxing the sale or purchase;
the former alone is left free to do so. Multiple taxation
of the same transaction by different States is also thus
avoided.
It is, however, argued on behalf of Bombay that the
Explanation does not say that the State of delivery is
the only State in which the sale or purchase shall be
deemed to have taken place. If that was the intention,
it would have been easy to say so. On the other hand,
the non-obstante clause in the Explanation is said to
indicate that, apart from cases covered by the legal
fiction, the passing of property in the goods is to determine the place of sale. Thus, both the State of delivery
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1083
and the State in which the property in the goods sold
1953
passes are, it is'claimed, empowered to tax. We are
---
unable to accept this view. It is really not necessary 7'he State of Boin-
•
·
• .
.
bay and An.other
m the context to use the word "only ·' m the way
v.
suggested, for, when the Explanation says that a sale
The United
or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in Motors (l11dia)
a particular State, it follows that it shall be deemed Ltd. and Others,
lilso to have taken place outside the other States. Nor
Patanjali
can t.lie non-obstante clause be understood as implying
Sast•i o.J.
that, under the general law relating to the sale of
goods, the paosing of the property in the goods is the
determining factor in locating a sale or purchase.
Neither the Sale of Goods Act nor the common law
relating to the sale of goods has anything to say as to
what the situs of a sale is, though certain rules have
heen la id down for ascertaining the intention of the
contracting parties as to when or imder what conditions
the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer. That
question often raises ticklish problems for lawyers and
courts, and to make the passing of title the determining factor in the location 0f a sale or purchase would
be to replace old uncertainties and difficulties connected with the nexus basis with new ones. Nor would
the hardship of multiple taxation be obviated if two
States were still free to impose tax on the same transaction. In our opinion, the non-obstante clause was
inserted in the Explanation simply with a view to make
it clear beyond all possible doubt that it was immaterial where the property in the goods passed, as it
might otherwise be regarded as indicative of the place
of sale.
It is also to bP noted in this connection that, on the
construction suggested by the Advocate-General of
Bombay, namely, that the Explanation was not
intended to deprive the State in which the property in
the goods passed of its taxing power, but only to
exclude the sales or purchases of the kind described in
the Explanation from the operation of clause (1) (a)
which prohibits taxation of outside sales or purchases,
the Explanation would operate, not as an explanation,
but ris an exception or a proviso to that clause. It
•
1084
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
ma
may be that the description of a provjsion cannot be
Th S --JB
decisive of its true meaning or interpretation which
e tate o
omd
d
1
d
d h
·
b
h
bay and Another must epen Ont le WOr S USC t erem, ut, W en two
v.
interpretations are sought to be put upon a provision,
The United
that which fits the description which the legislature
Motors (India) has chosen to apply to it is, according to sound canons
Ltd. and Othm of construction, to be adopted provided, of course, it is
consistent with the language employed, in preference
Patanjali
h
to the one which attributes to t e provision a different
Sastri 0.J.
effect from what it should have according to its description by the legislatnre.
It was then said that the formula of delivery for
consumption within a State could only cover the comparatively few cases of sales or purchases taking place
directly between the consumers in the delivery State
and dealers in other States, and inter-State sales or
purchases between dealers in either State, which must
be larger in number and volume, would still be outside the scope of the Explanation, which could not,
therefore, have been intended to empower only one
State, namely, the delivery State, to tax all inter-State
sales or purchases. We see no force in this objection.
It is to be noted that the Explanation does not say
that the consumption should be by the purchaser
himself. Nor do the words " as a direct result "
have reference to consumption. They qualify "actual
delivery". The expression " for the purpose of consumption in that State" must, in our opinion, be
understood as having reference not merely to the
individual importer or purchaser but as contemplating
distribution eventually to consumers in general within
the State. Thus all. buyers within the State of delivery
1 from out-of-State sellers, except those buying for
I'
re-export out of the State, would be within the scope
of the Explanation and liable to be taxed by the State
on their inter-State transactions. It should be remembered here that the Explanation deals only with interState sales or purchases and not with purely local or
domestic transactions. That these are subject to the
taxing power of the State has never been questioned.
We are therefore of opinion that article 286 (1) (a)
read with the Explanation prohibits taxation of sales
••
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1085
or purchases involving inter-State elements by all
I96J
States except the State in which the goods are deli-
--
d c
th
f
•
h
.
.
h The State of BomV~re 1or
e purJ.>OSe o consumpt10n t erem m t e bay and Another
wider sense explamed above. The latter State is left
v.
free to tax such sales or purchases, which power it
The United
derives not by virtue of the Explanation but under Mot<w• (India)
article 246 (3) read with entry 54 of List II.
Ltd. and Other•-.
We will now consider the effect of article286(2) on
Patanjali
the taxability of inter-State sales or purchases of the
Sastri a.J.
kind envisaged by the Explanation to clause(l)(a).
As both the Explanation and clause (2) deal only with
inter-State transactions, it may appear at first blush
that whatever taxing power the Explanation may have
reserved to the State of delivery is nullified by clause
(2), at any rate until Parliament chooses to lift the
ban under the power reserved to it by the opening
words of clause (2). As one way of avoiding this result
it was suggested by the Advocate-General of Bombay
that the expression "inter-State trade and. commerce"
in clause (2) may be construed as meaning dealings
between a trader in one State and a trader in another,
so that the clause would be applicable only to sales or
purchases in the course of dealings between such
traders. The ban under clause (2) could not, in that
view, affect the taxability of a sale by a trader in one
State to a consumer or user in another. We cannot
agree with this restrictive interpretation of the expression " inter-State trade and commerce".