# The State of Bombay v. Sa[at Pragji Karamsi

- **Citation:** [1957] 1 S.C.R. 754
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1954-09-22
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-state-of-bombay-v-sa-at-pragji-karamsi-1371
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

1957
The State of
Bombay
v.
Sa[at Pragji
Karamsi
Kapur J.
1957
March 20
754
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Order. The Chief Commissioner of Kutch under s. 1
of the Bombay Act, had the power to issue notifications
making that Act operative in Kutch or any part of
Kutch and those powers were not affected by Art. 239
of the Constitution particularly because of cl. 1 5 of the
Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950,
which
preserved
these powers of the Chief Commissioner.
Therefore,
the notification issued by the Chief Commissioner on
November 28, I 950 was valid and issued under legal
authority ; and the Act came into force in the parts to
which the notification made it so applicable.
\Ve have
therefore, come to the conclusion that the learned
Judge was in error in holding that the notification was
not a valid one and in so far as that was the basis of
the acquittal of the accused, the judgment under appeal
must be set aside.
In the result the appeal of the State is allowed, the
judgment of the learned Judicial Commissioner acquitting the respondent is set aside and that of the learned
Magistrate sentencing him to a fine of Rs. 50 and
sentence in default and of forfeiture restored.
Appeal allowed.
THE NEWSPAPERS LTD.
v.
THE STATE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, U.P.
(BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA and J. L. KAPUR ]].)
Industrial DisjJut.:, Mt>aning nf-Dtsp11te
betu;een enlpioyer and
a
ringie
ri.;orkn1an--·TV!zether
induJtrial dzspute-Governnu,nt
making
referer.ce on the assufn/Jtion that a dispute exsits
betiveen the ernployer
and hi_1 u1nrk1nen--l11hether r:alidity of the re_(erence can be questioned
--U.P. Industrial Di•putes Act,
1947 (U.P.
XXVIII rd" 1947),
ss.2, 3-Industrial Disputes Act, 19.J.7 (XIV ef 19~ 7, s. 2 (k).
A dispute bern:een an employer and a single workman dot>s
not fall \vithin the definition of "industrial dispute" under the
L'.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. But though the applicability
of the Act to an individual di;;pute as oppost>d to a dispute involving a groLp of \l\1orkmen is excluded, if the workmen as a body
or a considerable section of them make common cause with the
individual '\York.man then such a dispute "'ould be an industrial
dispute.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
755
Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v. Raghunath
Copa!
Patwardhan, (1956) S. C. R. 956 and D N. Banerji v. P. R.
Mukherjee, (1953) S.C:.R. 302, rderred to.
Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen,
( 1953) 1
L.L.J. 757, in so for as it decideci that a dispute raised by an
individual workman is within an industrial dispute, disapprnved.
Gase-law reviewed.
The third respondent was employed as a lino typist by the
appellant company but on allegations of incompetence he was
dismissed from service.
His case \\·as not taken up by any union
of workers of the app~llaot C'.lmpany nor by any of the unions of
·workmen employed in similar or allied trades, but the
U.P.
\Vorking Journalists Union,
Lucknow, with which
the third
resp<mdent had no connection took the matter to the Conciliation
Board, Allah;iha<l, an<l ultimately thE Government made
a
refe1 ence to the Industrial Tribunal bv a notification in
which
one cf the points for determimi,tion ~eferred was as to whether
the services of the third respondent were wrongfully terminated
bv the managemwt. The legality of the reference was challenged
hy the appellant and the queotion was raised as to \\·hether
a
di,pute between an employer and a single w0rkman falls within
the definition of "indu'.;trial dispute" under the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 19+7.
Held, that the reference was bad because the dispute was
not between the emplo,·er on the one hand and his workmen on
the other, nor could ·the U.F. Working Journalists Union be called
"l:is workmen", within the m~aning of the U. P.
Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947.
"£'hough the making of a referenc~ by the Government under
the Act is the exerci·:c o!' its administrative powers, an aggrieyec\
partv can question the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to
sho\\· tha

## Text

1957
The State of
Bombay
v.
Sa[at Pragji
Karamsi
Kapur J.
1957
March 20
754
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Order. The Chief Commissioner of Kutch under s. 1
of the Bombay Act, had the power to issue notifications
making that Act operative in Kutch or any part of
Kutch and those powers were not affected by Art. 239
of the Constitution particularly because of cl. 1 5 of the
Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950,
which
preserved
these powers of the Chief Commissioner.
Therefore,
the notification issued by the Chief Commissioner on
November 28, I 950 was valid and issued under legal
authority ; and the Act came into force in the parts to
which the notification made it so applicable.
\Ve have
therefore, come to the conclusion that the learned
Judge was in error in holding that the notification was
not a valid one and in so far as that was the basis of
the acquittal of the accused, the judgment under appeal
must be set aside.
In the result the appeal of the State is allowed, the
judgment of the learned Judicial Commissioner acquitting the respondent is set aside and that of the learned
Magistrate sentencing him to a fine of Rs. 50 and
sentence in default and of forfeiture restored.
Appeal allowed.
THE NEWSPAPERS LTD.
v.
THE STATE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, U.P.
(BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA and J. L. KAPUR ]].)
Industrial DisjJut.:, Mt>aning nf-Dtsp11te
betu;een enlpioyer and
a
ringie
ri.;orkn1an--·TV!zether
induJtrial dzspute-Governnu,nt
making
referer.ce on the assufn/Jtion that a dispute exsits
betiveen the ernployer
and hi_1 u1nrk1nen--l11hether r:alidity of the re_(erence can be questioned
--U.P. Industrial Di•putes Act,
1947 (U.P.
XXVIII rd" 1947),
ss.2, 3-Industrial Disputes Act, 19.J.7 (XIV ef 19~ 7, s. 2 (k).
A dispute bern:een an employer and a single workman dot>s
not fall \vithin the definition of "industrial dispute" under the
L'.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. But though the applicability
of the Act to an individual di;;pute as oppost>d to a dispute involving a groLp of \l\1orkmen is excluded, if the workmen as a body
or a considerable section of them make common cause with the
individual '\York.man then such a dispute "'ould be an industrial
dispute.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
755
Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v. Raghunath
Copa!
Patwardhan, (1956) S. C. R. 956 and D N. Banerji v. P. R.
Mukherjee, (1953) S.C:.R. 302, rderred to.
Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen,
( 1953) 1
L.L.J. 757, in so for as it decideci that a dispute raised by an
individual workman is within an industrial dispute, disapprnved.
Gase-law reviewed.
The third respondent was employed as a lino typist by the
appellant company but on allegations of incompetence he was
dismissed from service.
His case \\·as not taken up by any union
of workers of the app~llaot C'.lmpany nor by any of the unions of
·workmen employed in similar or allied trades, but the
U.P.
\Vorking Journalists Union,
Lucknow, with which
the third
resp<mdent had no connection took the matter to the Conciliation
Board, Allah;iha<l, an<l ultimately thE Government made
a
refe1 ence to the Industrial Tribunal bv a notification in
which
one cf the points for determimi,tion ~eferred was as to whether
the services of the third respondent were wrongfully terminated
bv the managemwt. The legality of the reference was challenged
hy the appellant and the queotion was raised as to \\·hether
a
di,pute between an employer and a single w0rkman falls within
the definition of "indu'.;trial dispute" under the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 19+7.
Held, that the reference was bad because the dispute was
not between the emplo,·er on the one hand and his workmen on
the other, nor could ·the U.F. Working Journalists Union be called
"l:is workmen", within the m~aning of the U. P.
Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947.
"£'hough the making of a referenc~ by the Government under
the Act is the exerci·:c o!' its administrative powers, an aggrieyec\
partv can question the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to
sho\\· that what was rt [erred was not an industrial dispute.
Stale
of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy, ( 1953) S.C.R. 334, referred
to.
C1vrL APPELLATE juRISDJCTION
Civil Appeal
No. 213 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 22, 1954, of the A.liaahba<l High Court in Special
Appeal No. 8 of 1954 arising out of the judgment and
decree dated January 6, 1954 of the 5ai<l High Court
in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 651 of 1953.
S. P. Sinha and S. N. Mukherjee, for the appellam.
G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for respondent No. 2.
1957
The Newcpapers
ud.
v,
The Sta!' lncistrial
Tribunal, U. P.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ r957]
1957
r957. March go. The Judgment of the Court was
The JV,wspapers
delivered by
y
Ltd.
The Stat:·Industrial
KAPUR J.- The ground on which the appellant
Tribunal, U. P.
company seeks to. have the order of the Industrial
Kapur J.
Tribunal set aside is that no industrial dispute existed
within the meaning of the expression as used in the
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XXVIII of r947)
(hereinafter called the U.P. Act) and consequently the
U.P. Government had no power to make the refe1·ence
in question. 'Industrial Dispute' is defined in G. 2 of
the U.P. Act as having the same meaning assigned to
it as ins. 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (here---r-- ·
in after termed the Central Act). There this expression '
has been defined ins. 2(k) to mean :
"any dispute or difference between employers and
employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with
the employment or non-employment or the terms of
employment or with the conditions of labour, of any
person."
The controversy between the parties arose in the
following circumstances :
·
Tajammul Hussain, respondent No. 3 was employed
as a lino typist by the appellant company.
He was ·y
dismissed on May 8, 1952, on allegations of incompetence under r. l2(ii) of the Standing Orders of the
appellant company. It was alleged that the dismis,,al
of Respondent No. 3 was welcomed by his co-workers
and other workmen in the employ of the appellant
company and they made no grievance of it, nor :iid
they espouse his cause. ·
·
The case of respondent No. 3 was hot taken up by
any union of workers of the. appellant company nor
by any of the unions of workmen· employed similar,
or allied trades, but· the U.P. Working Journalists
Union, Lucknow, with which respondent No. 3 had no 1connection whatsoever,
took the matter to the
Conciliation. Board, Allahf!bad. · Ultimately, the U.P.
Government made a reference to the Industrial Tribunal on June 3, r953,' by ·notification·; the prefatory
words of which are :
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
757
"Whereas an industrial dispute in respect of the
1957
matters hereinafter specified exists between the concern
Tke Newspapers
known as Newspapers Ltd., Allahabad and its workmen;
Lta.
and whereas in the opini?n of the Governo_r it is neces- The 81•1;·/naustrial
sary so to do for the mamtenance of pubhc order and
Tribunal, u. P.
f;
't''
1
t
"
or mam emmg emp oymen .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Kapur J.
One of the questions referred was :-
"Whether the services of Sri Tajammul Hussain
Lino Operator were wrongfully terminated by the
Management ..................... "
On February 13, 1953, the State Industrial Tribunal
at Allahabad decided in favour of respondent No. 3
and ordered his reinstatement "without break of
continuity of service" and also ordered the payment
of his wages for the period during whidi he "remained
dismissed"
An appeal was taken by the appellant
company to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, who by its
order dated February 24, 1953, affirmed the order of
the Tribunal with costs.
The appellant company then
moved a petition in the Allahabad High Court under
Art. 226 of the Constitution but this was dismissed by
Bhargava J. on January 6, 1954, and a Special appeal
against this judgment was also dismissed.
The appellant company has come up in appeal with a certificate
under Art. l 33 ( l) ( c) of the Constitution.
The controversy which arises in this case is whether
a dispute between an employer and a single workman
falls within the definition of 'industrial dispute' as
used in the U. P. Act.
In order to resolve this controversy, it is necessary to refer to the scheme of the U.P.
Act and the relevant rules made thereunder. The
preamble of the Act runs : " .................. to provide for
powers to prevent strikes and lock-outs, and for the
settlement of industrial disputes and other incidental
matters".
Section 3 of the Act confers certain powers ·
on the State Government for the purpose of prevention
of strikes, lock-outs, etc.
The portion of this section
relevant for the purpose of this
appeal
reads
as
follows :
"If in the opinion of the State Government, it is
necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public
safety or convenience, or the maintenance of public
1957
The Newspapers
Ltd.
v,
The State Industrial
Tribunal, U, P.
Kapur J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1957]
order or supplies and services essential to the life of
the community, or for maintaining employment, it may,
by general or special order, make provision-
( c) for appointing industrial courts ;
( d) for referring any industrial dispute for conciliation or adjudication in the manner provided in the
order ;
(g) for any incidental or supplementary matters,
which appear to the State Government necessary or
expedient for the purpose of the order ;"
Under s. 23 of the Act, the State Government can
make rules consistent with the Act for giving effect to
the provisions of the Act.
Under clauses (b), (c), (d) and (g) ofs. 3 and under
s. 8 of the U. P. Act, rules governing Conciliation Boards
and Industrial Tribunals in U. P. were promulgated by
Notification No. 615 (LL) XVIII-7 (LL)-1951, dated
Lucknow, March 15, 1951.
Rule 4 deals with the
reference of disputes to Conciliation Boards.
The
relevant portions of this rule are :
"Any workman or an employer or a registered
association or trade union of employers or registered
trade union of workmen or any federation of such
associations or trade unions or where no registered
trade union of workmen exists in
any
particular
cencern or industry, the representatives not more than
5 in number of the workmen in that concern or the
industry, duly elected in this behalf by a majority of
the workmen employed in that concern or industry,
as the case may be, at a meeting held for the purpose,
may by application in writing move a Conciliation
Officer of the area for settlement of any industrial
dispute by conciliation. The application shall clearly
state the indGstrial dispute or disputes."
Rule 5 deals with proceedings and the power of
inclmion of other undertakings.
The proviso to this
rule is :
"Provided that if the Board of its own motion or
on an application made to it, is of the opinion that
any question involved in any such dispute or matter
affects or is likely to affect more than one workman
in the same concern or industry or busineos or more
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
759
than one concern in the same industry or business,
constituted within the jurisdiction of the Conciliation
Board, it shall include in its proceedings relating to
such dispute or order every such workman or concern
or where there is a registered trade union covering the
majority of such concerns of workmen, such trade
unions."
Rules 7 to l 1-A deal with Industrial Tribunals.
Rule 10 gives power to the Government to make a
reference of any dispute to the Industrial Tribunal
either on its own motion or after
considering the
Report of the Conciliation Board made under r. 6.
Rule l 5 ( l) which deals with the representation of
parties to the dispute provides :
"The parties may in their discretion be represented before a Board or Tribunal or an Adjudicator-
( l) In the case of a workman by-
( a) an officer of a registered trade union of which
he is a member ;
(b) an officer of a federation of trade unions to
which the trade union referred to in sub-clause(a) is
affiliated ;
(c) Where the workman is not a member of any
registered trade union, by an officer of any registered
trade union connected with, or by any other workman employed in the same industry or business, if so
authorised in writing by the workman."
The fanguage of section 36(1) of the Central Act is
almost identical.
Rule 27 prohibits strikes and lock-outs ; and r. 28
gives finality and conclusiveness to the orders made
or directions given.
The use of the word 'workmen' in the plural in the
definition . of 'industrial dispute' does not by itself
exclude the applicability of the Act to an individual
dispute because under s. 13(2) of the General Clauses
Act;
" ............ unless there is anything repugnant in
the subject ................ ..
(2) words in the singular shall include the plural
and vice versa."
1957
Tk Newspapers
Ltd.
v.
T/M State Industrial
Tribunal, U. P.
Kapur J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
But in order to get its true import it·is necessary to
view the enactment in retrospect, the reasons for enactThe Newspapers
Ltd.
ing it, the evils it was to end and the objects it was to
1957
T'· "t ,v·1 d
. 1 subserve.
The Act has therefore to be viewed as a
'" uat n tutna
h l
d .
.
.
d
.
d b
.
Tribunal, u. P.
w o e an
its mtent10n
etermmc
y construmg all
Kapur J.
the constituent parts of the Act together and not by
taking detached sections or to take one word here and
another there.
Exposition "ex visceribus actus"
is
applicable.
Lincoln College's Case(').
So construed the provisions of the U.P. Act show
that the machinery of the Act has been devised with
the object of maintaining industrial peace so as to
prevent interference with public safety or public order
or with the maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the life of the community or of employment.
The Act is based on the necessity of achieving
collective amity between labour and capital by means
of conciliation, mediation and adjudication.
The
object of the Act is the .prevention of industrial "strife,
strikes and lock-outs and the promotion of industrial
peace and not to take the place of the ordinary tribunals of the land for the enforcement of contracts
between an employer and an individual workman.
Thus viewed the provisions of the Act lead to the conclusion that its applicability to an individual dispute
as opposed to dispute involving. a group of workmen
is excluded unless it acquires the general characteristics
of an industrial dispute, viz., the workmen as a body
or a consider<> ble section of them make common cause
with the individual WDrkman and thus create conditions contemplated by s. 3 of the U.P. Act which is
the foundation of State Governmental action under
that Act.
The other provisions which follow that
section only c.ubserve the carrying out of the objects of
the Acts specified therein.
The use of the word workman in the singular in rr.
4, 5 and I 5 forms the basis of the argument for the
inclusion of an individual dispute in the expression
industrial dispute. But this suffers from more infirmities than one.
Rule 4 authorises a workman to
(') 3 Co. Rep. 58. 76 E. R. 764.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
apply to a conciliation Officer for the settlement of
an industrial dispute.
The meaning sought to be
given to this word is inconsistent with the language
of the latter part of that rule ;
"or wh'ere no registered trade union of workmen
exists in any concern or industry, the representatives
not more than 5 in number of the workmen .......... ..
duly elected."
The first proviso to r. 5 is no surer foundation for
the argument because in the context it can only be
interpreted to mean that, should there be an industrial dispute then all workmen who may individually
be the cause of the dispute or are to be affected by its
decision should get notices of foe proceedings. Similarly, r. r 5 only provides for the r::presentation of "a
workman" even if he is only one by an officer of a
trade union or other person mentioned in the rule.
Besides, s. r 3 ( 2) of the General Clauses Act as to the
interpretation of the singular and the plural considerably reduces the efficacy of the argument, which altogether loses its force in view of r. 26 which is as
follows :
"During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding or proceedings before the Tribunal or an Adjudicator in respect of any dispute an employer shall not
(a) alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in
such dispute the conditions of service applicable to
them immediately before the commencement of such
proceedings or (b) discharge or punish, whether such
punishment is by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such disp.ute save with the express
permission in writing of a Conciliation Officer of the
area concerned irrespective of the fact whether the
dispute is pending before a Board or the Tribunal or
an Adjudicator."
The use of the words "workmen" and "workman"
in the above rule is indicative of the intention of the
Act being applicable to collective disputes and not to
individual ones, and this is fortified by the finality
and the binding effect to awards by r. 28 and more
specially by s. r8 of the Central Act which
makes
1957
The Newspapers
Ltd.
v.
The State ln,/ustrial
Tribunal, U. P.
Kapur J.
1957
The .1Vewspapers
Ltd.
v.
The State Industrial
Tribunal, U. P.
Kaptir J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
awards binding not only on the individuals present or
represented but on all the workmen employed in the
establishment and even on future entrants.
Another objection to reading these rules in the
manner above suggested is that it would be tantamount to enlarging the scope of the expression 'industrial dispute' and the powers conferred on the State
Government under s, 3 of the U.P. Act. The executive cannot under the power of framing rules and
regulations clothe itself with powers which the Statute
itself does not give and which are inconsistent with
the interpretation put on the expression 'industrial
dispute.'
The cardinal rule in regard to promulgation
of bye-laws or making rules is that they must be legi
fidei rationi consona, and therefore all
regulations
which are contrary or repugnant to statutes
under
which they are made are ineffective. If the expression 'industrial dispute' as ordinarily understood and,
construed conveys a dispute between an employer on
the one hand and the workmen acting collectively on
the other, then the· definition of those words cannot be
widened by a statutory rule or
regulation promulgated under the Statute or by Executive fiat.
The notification in the present case was under s.3.
( c), ( d) and (g) and under s. 8 which deal with ( c) the
appointment of industrial Courts, (d) referring any
industrial disputes and (g) incidental or supplementary
matters.
The Executive may in the exercise of these
powers make such regulations which are necessary but
under that garb it cannot extend the definition of the
term industrial disputes, μor is this extended meaning
necessary to subserve the objects of the Act.
In our opinion therefore rules 4, 5 and r 5 of the
Rules cannot be a valid foundation for sustaining the
argument raised that an individual dispute was within the definition of 'industrial dispute.'
Ordinarily,
an award of a tribunal binds or affects the rights of
parties to the proceedings but awards of Industrial
Tribunals have extended implications and may affect
the rights of all workmen of a concern or undertaking
and even the future entrants.
This doctrine of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
representation which enlarges the meaning of 'parties' in
the U.P. & Central Acts is an essential idea associated
with industrial disputes and supports collectiveness as
opposed to &
individualism.
See Latham C.J.
in
Metal Trades Employers Association
v.
Amalgamated
Engineering Union
(1).
Then there is the prohibition under r. 26 of the U.P.
Act and s. 33 of the Central Act against any change in
conditions of service during the pendency of the
proceedings the object of which is to ensure discipline
and industrial truce during that period which
also
supports the basic idea of collectiveness in 'industrial
disputes'.
In
Central Provinces
Transport
Services
Ltd.,
v.
Raghunath Copa! Patwardhan (2), this Court observed
that decided cases in India disclose three views as to
the meaning of 'industrial dispute'
(i) a dispute between an employer and a single
workman cannot be an "industrial dispute";
(ii) it can be an industrial dispute ; and
(iii) it cannot per se be an industrial dispute but
may become one if taken up by a trade union or a
number of workmen.
This Court discussed the scope of industrial dispute
as defined in s. 2 (k) of the Central Act, and after
referring to the conflict of judicial opinion as
to its
applicability to the case of a dispute between an employer and a single workman further observed :
"The preponderance of judicial opinion is clearly
in favour of the last of the three views stated above,
and there is considerable reason behind it.
Notwithstanding that the language of s. 2(k) is wide enough to
cover a dispute between an employer and a
single
employee, the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act
does appear to contemplate that
the machinery
provided therein should be set in motion, to settle only
disputes which involve the rights of workmen as
a
class and that a dispute touching the individual rights
of a workman was not intended to be the subject of an
adjudication under the Act, when the same had not
been taken up by the union or a number of workmen."
(') [!935] 54 C.L.R. 387.
(2) [1956] S.C,R. 956.
1957
The Newsp1pers
Ltd.
v.
The State Industrial
Tribunal, U. P.
Kapur J.
1957
Tiu Newspapers
Ltd.
v.
The State Industrial
Tribunal U. P.
Kapur J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
Although the question did not directly arise, this
Court in D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee and others(')
discussed the meaning of the expression
'industrial
dispute' and was of the opinion that it "conveys the
meaning to the ordinary mind that the dispute must
be such as would affect large groups of workmen and
employers ranged on opposite
sides ...... But at the
same time, having regard to the modern conditions of
society were capital and labour have organised themselves into groups for the purpose of fighting their
disputes and settling them on the basis of the theory
that in union is strength, and collective
bargaining
has
come to stay, a single
employee's
case might
develop into an industrial dispute, when as often
happens, it is taken up by the trade union of which
he is a member and there is a concreted demand by
the employees for redress".
This view is in consonance with the basic idea under
lying modern industrial legislation.
The interpretation
given to the co~responding phrase "trade dispute" in
Engfoh law and "industrial dispute" in
Australian
Law also accords with
this view
and
m
the
absence of an express provision to the contrary or
necessary intendment thre is no reason to
give a
different interpretation to the expression in the Indian
Statute.
According to English decisions an individual dispute
of a workman is not included in 'trade dispute' which
corresponds to 'Industrial Dispute' in the Indian Act.
In the English Trade Disputes Act of r 906 and
r g I 9
as also in Reg. 58-AA of the Defence (General) Regulation, 1939, 'trade dispute' as defined in language
very similar to 'industrial dispute' in
the
Indian
Statute
Dealing with a trade dispute, Lord Shaw in
Conway v. Wade (') said :
"But I cannot see may way to hold that "trade
dispute" necessarily includes accordingly every case of
personal difference between any one workman and one
or more of his fellows.
It is true that after a certain
stage even such a dispute, although originally grounded,
(1) [1953] s.c.R. 302, 3ro.
(2) [1909] A.G. 506, 520.
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
it may be, upon personal animosity, may come t
be a subject in which sides are taken, and may develop
into a shuation of a general aspect containing
the
characteristics of a trade dispute ; but until it
reaches
that stage I cannot hold that a trade dispute necessarily exi,ts ."
Lord \\'right observed in National Association of
Local Government Officers v. Bolton Corporation( 1).
"I think the same may be said of the Industrial
Courts Act and of reg. 58-AA, in both of which the
word 'trade' is used in the very wide connotation which
it bears in the modern legislation dealing with conditions of employment,
particularly in
relation
to
matters of collective bargaining and the like."
Ex parte Keable Press Ltd. (2 ) was an instance of an
individual dispute developing into a 'trade dispute'
because of the strike by a union to enforce the reinstatement of dismissed workman.
That was how this
term
(trade dispute) was interpreted by the Court of
Appeal in R. v. National Arbitration Tribuna/(3)
after
taking into consideration the definition of the word
'd. ispute,.
In Australian cases also, without specific reference
to any definition of the phrase the courts have excluded individual disputes from the scope of industrial
disputes. In
]umbunna Coal Mine v. Victorian Coal
Miners Association (4), Griffths C. ]. observed :
"An industrial dispute exists where a considerable
number of employees engaged in some branch of
industry make common' cause in demanding from or
refusing to their employers (whether one or more some
change in the conditions of employment which is
denied to them
............................................. "
Similarly in Federated Saw Mills & Co.
Employees
of
Australasia v. Jemes Moore & Son Properietory Ltd.
(5),
Griffths C. J. ga,·e the characteristics of an industrial
dispute as follows :
"It is necessary at the outset to consider the
meaning which the term 'industrial dispute' conveyed
{1) [19H) A.C. 166, 185.
(3) (1951] 2 All E.R. 828.
(2) ( 9H] 2 All E.R. 633.
\4) [1go8] 6 C.L.R. 309, 332.
(5) [1909] 8 C.L.R. 465, 487, 488.
1957
The Newspapm
w.
v.
The &ate Industrial
Tribunal, U. P.
Kapur].
1957
The Newspapers
L,d,
v.
The State industrial
Tribunal, U. P,
K:,w, rJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[I 95 7)
in 1 goo to the minds of persons conversant with
the
English
language
.......................................... "
"The word 'industrial' ...... denotes two qualties
which distinguish them from ordinary private disputes
between- individuals, namely, ......... (') that on one
side at least of the dispute the disputants are a body
of men acting collectively and not individually. "
Issacs J. in George Hudson Ltd. v. Australian Timber
Workers Union (') sta tecl :
"The very nature of an 'industrial dispute', as
clistingui,hecl from an individual dispute, is to obtain
new industrial conditions, not merely for the specific
individuals then working ......... It is a battle by the
claimants, not for themselves alone and not as against
the respondents alone, but by the claimants so far as
they represent their class ................... "
According to Griffths C.J. "The
term "industrial
dispute" connotes a real and substantial difference
having some element of persistency, and likely, if not
adjusted, to endanger the industrial peace
of the
community".
Viele Federated Saw Mills Case (')
at
p. 488.
The
same meaning was attached
to the
expression by Latham C. ]. in J\;fetal Traders Employers
Association v. Amalgamated Engineering Union
(')
at
p. 4o3:
"Industrial disputes are essentially group
contests-there is always an industrial group on at least
one side. A claim of an individual employee against
his employer is not in itself an industrial dispute ...... "
We shall now refer to the Indian decisions which bear
on this question.
Rajamannar C.J. in Kandan Texti Ltd, v.
The
Industrial Tribunal, Maras and another
(•)
held that
the definition of industrial dispute is wide enough to
cover a dispute between an employer and an individual
workman but taking into consideration S. 18 of the
Central Act he was of the opinion that such an extanded definition cannot be given to it in S. 2 (k) of the
Central Act. Mack J. agreed with the decision
of
Rajamannar C. J. but he said that the case of
an
(1) [1923] 32 C.L.R. 413, 441.
(3) [1935] 54 C. L. R. 387, 403.
(2) [1909] 8 C.L.R. 465, 487, 488.
(4) A. I. R. 1951 Madras 616.
'
r
-,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
individual workman if taken up by the worker's union
makes such a dispute an industrial dispute.
In that
case 1 1 items of difference were referred to the Industrial
Tribunal. One of the items in dispute was the wrongful removal of a workman, Sundaram by name. In the
Hi·2'.h Court an objection was taken to the legality of
the award on the ground
that no industrial dispute
existed and that there was no material before the
Government on the basis of which it could make
a
reference.
It was held that the dispute as to a single
workman was not an 'industrial dispute.'
Kandan
Textile Ltd. case (1) was followed in United Commercial·
Bank
Ltd. v. The
Commissioner of Labour,
Madras( 2 )
which was a case under s. 41 of the Madras Shops and
Establishments Act and the right of appeal given to
an individual employee against the order of the employer dispensing with his services under s. 41 (2) of
Madras Shops and Establishments Act was challenged
on the ground that it had been taken away by
the
Central Act.
It was held that an individual worker
had the right to appeal. Vishwanatha Sastri ]. in his
judgment referred with approval to the distinction
made between an individual dispute and an industrial
dispute in Kandan Textile Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal,
Madras (supra).
The second view that such a dispute falls within the
definition of the word "industrial dispute" is supported
by a decision of a Full Bench of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal-Swadeslzi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v.
Their
Workmen( 3).
There the question was mainly decided
on the basis of s. 33-A of the Central Act (introduced
in 1950) which gives the right to an individual workman dismissed or dealt with contrary to s. 33 of the
Act
during an industrial dispute to raise the matter
before a tribunal.
The introduction of s. 33-A would
not alter the construction to be placed on the phrase
'indmtrial dispute'. On the contrary it supports the
view that an individual di!.pute is not comprised in
that phrase. In view of what has been said above, we
are of the opinion that in so far as that case lays down
(1) A.I.R. 1951 Madras 616,
(o) I.L.R. [1952) Madras 43.
(3)_ [1953] 1 L.L.J. 757.
4-99 s. c. l./59
1957
The NewJpapers
Ltd.
V,
The State Industrial
Tribunal, U. P.
Kapur J.
1957
Tiu Newspapers
Lid,
V,
Tht State Industrial
Tribunal, U. P.
Kapur J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
that a dispute raised by an individual workman as to
his personal grievance is within an industrial dispute,
it cannot be said to have been correctly decided.
The cases which support the third view are th'!
following .
]. Chowdhury v. M. C. Banne1jee(1)
was a case .in
which a lino operator was removed from service on the
ground of his negligence and arrears of work. The
matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal under
the Central Act.
The Management moved the High
Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and s. 45 of
the Specific Relief Act and it was held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter as on
a perusal of the various sections of the Central .\ct
including ss. IO and r 8
the dispute of an individual
workman was not covered bv the term 'industrial
dispute'.
·
In Bilash Chandra ,\fitra v, Balmer Lawrie & Co. ('),
a suit was brought for the recO\·ery of arrears of wages
on the basis of an award of an Industrial Tribunal and
one of the issues raised was whether an 'individual
dispute' fell· within 'industrial di;pute'. Follm,·ing the
judgment in ]. Chowdhwy v.
JI. C.
Bannerje~
(1 ),
Bose J. held that it did not.
Another case in which this dew was
held
rs
N. /. Assurance Co. v. C. G. /. Tribunal (').
There the
Government referred the question of dismissal of an
employee of an Assurance Co. and it was not proved
that his case was taken up by the employees association.
The same view was adopted in Standard Vacuum
Oil Co. v. Industrial
Tribunal(•).
In
Lakshmi Talkies, Afadras v.
Munuswami and
Others('), Balakrishna Ayyar J. held that an 'industrial
dispute' arises where a case of an individual workm·an
is espoused by a union. The same view was taken in
Lynus & Co. v. Hemanta Kumar Samanta(').
The view taken in these cases is in accord with the
interpretation we have put on the expression 'Industrial
dispute' as defined in the U.P. Act or the Central Act.
(1) [1951] 55 C.W.N. 256.
(4) l.L.R. [1952] T.av • .CO. 432.
(o) f1952] 57 C,W.N. 169.
(5) [1955] 2 L.L.J. 477.
(3) [1953] I.L.R. 32 Patna 181.
(6) [1956] 2 L.LJ. Ilg •
. ,.··
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Taking into consideration the whole tenor of the Act
and the decisions of this Court the decided cases to the
extent that they take a contrary view, i. e., an individual
dispute is comprised in an 'industrial dispute'
must unless there is something peculiar as to facts , be
held to have been wrongly decided.
In spite of the fact that the making of a reference
by the Government under the Industrial Disputes Act
is the exercise of its administrative powers, that is not
destructive of the rights of an aggrieved party to show
that what was referred was not an 'industrial dispute'
at all and therefore the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Tribunal to make the award can be questioned, even
though the factua~ existence of a dispute may not be
subject to a party's challenge.
State of Madras v. C. P.
Sarathy(').
It may also be noted that the notification issued by
the U. P. Government on January 3, 1953, already
quoted proceeds on the assumption that a dispute
exists between the "employer and hi<> workmen". The
points of dispute in the reference, however, comprise
the wrongful termination of the service of only
Tajammul Hussain, a lino operator. The words used in
the first part of the notification show that the Government was labouring under the misapprehension that
this dispute was between the employer on the one hand
and his workmen on the other, which, in fact it was
not.
Tajammul Hussain could not be termed workmen (in the plural) nor could the U. P.
Working
Journalists Union be called "his workmen" nor is there
any indication that the individual dispute has got
transformed into an industrial dispute.
The very basis,
therefore, of the reference was bad and must be held
to be so.
We would, therefore, allow this appeal with costs.
1(1) [1953] S.C.R. 334, 347.
99 .
Appeal allowed.
1957
The Newspapers
Ltd.
v.
The State Industrial
Tribunal, U. P.
Kapur J.