# THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR v. AMAN KUMAR SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC

- **Citation:** [2023] 2 S.C.R. 134
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2023-03-01
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal Nos. 646-648 of 2023
- **Bench:** S. Ravindra Bhat, Dipankar Datta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-state-of-chattisgarh-anr-v-aman-kumar-singh-ors-etc-etc-36765
- **Pages:** 30

## Headnote

Constitution of India - Art.226 - Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 - ss.13(1)(b), (2) - FIR registered against one 'AS' and
his wife 'YS' - FIR quashed by High Court - Justification of - Held:
In the present case, FIR does make out a case of cognizable offence
having been committed by 'AS' and 'YS' - Power of quashing a
criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases - Whenever
its powers are invoked either u/Art.226 or s.482, CrPC for quashing
an FIR/complaint, the Courts would not be justified in embarking
upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations made therein - An FIR can be registered
merely on suspicion thus, the High Court ought to have realized
that the FIR which according to it was based on "probabilities"
ought not to have been interdicted - An FIR based on "probability"
of a crime having been committed is of a higher degree as compared
to the one lodged on a "mere suspicion" that a crime has been
committed - Extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an
arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or
caprice - High Court erred in quashing the FIR - Impugned
judgment set aside - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 -
Penal Code, 1860 - s.120-B.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Disproportionate assets
case - FIR registered against one 'AS' and his wife 'YS', public
servants - Political vendetta alleged against 'AS', who was the
Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister in the previous regime -
Held: Allegations levelled were vague and general - Mala fide
motives are required to be affirmatively pleaded and proved -
However, if criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence
and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on
account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives -
[2023] 2 S.C.R. 134
134
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No cogent grounds for quashing the FIR in the present case even
on the ground of mala fide.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Quashing of FIR -
Approach of High Courts - Held: Considerations that apply to
quashing of FIRs pertaining to offences punishable under general
penal statutes ex proprio vigore may not be applicable to a P.C. Act
offence - In cases under the P.C. Act, the proper course for the
high courts would be to permit the investigation to be taken to its
logical conclusion and leave the aggrieved party to pursue the
remedy made available by law at an appropriate stage.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Disproportionate assets
case - Importance of preliminary enquiry - Discussed.
Criminal Law - Inept drafting of FIR - Effect of - Discussed.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The complaint lodged with the Chief Minister
does specifically allege that although AS came from a very humble
background, as evident from his Annual Property Return filed at
the time of joining IRS, "he has managed to amass
disproportionate assets of more than 2500 crores contrary to his
legal sources of income". One could view it as a tall claim, which
is thoroughly unsubstantiated. However, it cannot be wished away
because of the revelations of the preliminary inquiry which led to
registration of the FIR and have formed part thereof. Although it
is true that it is for the prosecution to build up a case that AS, as
a public servant, amassed such wealth or even wealth of any lesser
value that is disproportionate to his known sources of income,
and which could not satisfactorily be accounted for by him, while
it files the police report, it does not seem to be a requirement of
law when the FIR was registered on 25th February, 2020 that
facts and figures with exactitude need to form part of a first
information report. It is found on perusal of the FIR that although
not specifically mentioned, 2004 to 2018 is the "check period"
during which AS and YS have acquired property disproportionate
to their known sources of

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 2 S.C.R.
THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR.
v.
AMAN KUMAR SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 646-648 of 2023)
 MARCH 01, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
Constitution of India - Art.226 - Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 - ss.13(1)(b), (2) - FIR registered against one 'AS' and
his wife 'YS' - FIR quashed by High Court - Justification of - Held:
In the present case, FIR does make out a case of cognizable offence
having been committed by 'AS' and 'YS' - Power of quashing a
criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases - Whenever
its powers are invoked either u/Art.226 or s.482, CrPC for quashing
an FIR/complaint, the Courts would not be justified in embarking
upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations made therein - An FIR can be registered
merely on suspicion thus, the High Court ought to have realized
that the FIR which according to it was based on "probabilities"
ought not to have been interdicted - An FIR based on "probability"
of a crime having been committed is of a higher degree as compared
to the one lodged on a "mere suspicion" that a crime has been
committed - Extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an
arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or
caprice - High Court erred in quashing the FIR - Impugned
judgment set aside - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 -
Penal Code, 1860 - s.120-B.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Disproportionate assets
case - FIR registered against one 'AS' and his wife 'YS', public
servants - Political vendetta alleged against 'AS', who was the
Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister in the previous regime -
Held: Allegations levelled were vague and general - Mala fide
motives are required to be affirmatively pleaded and proved -
However, if criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence
and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on
account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives -
[2023] 2 S.C.R. 134
134
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No cogent grounds for quashing the FIR in the present case even
on the ground of mala fide.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Quashing of FIR -
Approach of High Courts - Held: Considerations that apply to
quashing of FIRs pertaining to offences punishable under general
penal statutes ex proprio vigore may not be applicable to a P.C. Act
offence - In cases under the P.C. Act, the proper course for the
high courts would be to permit the investigation to be taken to its
logical conclusion and leave the aggrieved party to pursue the
remedy made available by law at an appropriate stage.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Disproportionate assets
case - Importance of preliminary enquiry - Discussed.
Criminal Law - Inept drafting of FIR - Effect of - Discussed.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The complaint lodged with the Chief Minister
does specifically allege that although AS came from a very humble
background, as evident from his Annual Property Return filed at
the time of joining IRS, "he has managed to amass
disproportionate assets of more than 2500 crores contrary to his
legal sources of income". One could view it as a tall claim, which
is thoroughly unsubstantiated. However, it cannot be wished away
because of the revelations of the preliminary inquiry which led to
registration of the FIR and have formed part thereof. Although it
is true that it is for the prosecution to build up a case that AS, as
a public servant, amassed such wealth or even wealth of any lesser
value that is disproportionate to his known sources of income,
and which could not satisfactorily be accounted for by him, while
it files the police report, it does not seem to be a requirement of
law when the FIR was registered on 25th February, 2020 that
facts and figures with exactitude need to form part of a first
information report. It is found on perusal of the FIR that although
not specifically mentioned, 2004 to 2018 is the "check period"
during which AS and YS have acquired property disproportionate
to their known sources of income. There are certain calculations
projecting the quantum of money that both AS and YS received
towards salaries, interest and value for properties sold. It is true
that the FIR could have been drafted better. Since a first
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SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC
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information report is the starting point for a long drawn
investigative process and such an investigation could be scuttled
by an accused taking advantage of inept drafting of such report,
this is an area where all the more care and dexterity is called for
to prevent many a thing. However, nothing significant turns on
the inept drafting of the FIR in this case since it does make out a
case of cognizable offence having been committed by AS and YS.
Indeed, if at all there are miscalculations arising out of arithmetical
errors or misdescription of properties not belonging to AS and
YS, they were/are free to point it out while joining the
investigation. It is also open to them to point out to the
investigating officer that there has been absolutely no suppression
or non-disclosure of 31 properties/assets and also that no activity
amounting to 'criminal misconduct' had been committed by them.
However, they chose to challenge the FIR on the specious ground
that the same did not disclose a cognizable offence. [Paras 5456][155-D-H; 156-G-H; 157-A-B]
1.2 While deciding the challenge to the FIR, the High Court
- unwittingly, did not bear in mind the note of caution in Bhajan
Lal to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding
should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and
that too in the rarest of rare cases; further that, the court will not
be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or
genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or
the complaint; and also that, the extraordinary or inherent powers
do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according
to its whim or caprice. Whenever its powers are invoked either
under Article 226 of the Constitution or section 482, Cr. P.C. for
quashing a first information report/complaint, the courts would
not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability,
reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. Thus,
it being the settled principle of law that when an investigation is
yet to start, there should be no scrutiny to what extent the
allegations in a first information report are probable, reliable or
genuine and also that a first information report can be registered
merely on suspicion, the High Court ought to have realized that
the FIR which, according to it, was based on "probabilities" ought
not to have been interdicted. Viewed through the prism of gravity
of allegations, a first information report based on "probability" of
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a crime having been committed would obviously be of a higher
degree as compared to a first information report lodged on a "mere
suspicion" that a crime has been committed. The High Court
failed to bear in mind these principles and precisely did what it
was not supposed to do at this stage. No reason to invalidate the
FIR for alleged breach of the CBI Circular. The High Court was
not justified in its interference with the investigative process and
committed an error of law in quashing the FIR on the grounds it
did. [Paras 58, 59, 61 and 65][157-E-F, G-H; 158-E-H; 159-H]
State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri (1996)
1 SCC 542 : [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 812 - relied on.
1.3 In the writ petitions filed by AS and YS, the pleadings
are insufficient to return a finding that the FIR is an outcome of
mala fide. No doubt, certain allegations are levelled against the
Government and the Chief Minister; however, such allegations
are vague and general in nature. Mala fide motives are required
to be affirmatively pleaded and proved. However, no foundation
in that behalf has been laid and naturally so, the High Court even
did not examine whether exception could have been taken to the
FIR on the ground of mala fide. Neither the head of the political
executive (the incumbent Chief Minister) nor that of the
administrative executive (the Chief Secretary) was personally
arrayed as a party to any of the proceedings. The person against
whom mala fide or bias is imputed should be impleaded as a party
respondent to the proceedings eo nomine and that in his/her
absence no inquiry into the allegations can be made. When an
information is lodged at the police station and an offence is
registered in respect of a disproportionate assets case, it is the
material collected during the investigation and evidence led in
court that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused.
Whether the first information report is the outcome of mala fide
would be of secondary importance. In such a case, should the
allegations of mala fide be of some prima facie worth, would pale
into insignificance if sufficient materials are gathered for sending
the accused up for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not
per se form the basis for quashing the first information report/
complaint. If criminal prosecution is based upon adequate
THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR. v. AMAN KUMAR
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evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become
vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide
motives. [Paras 71][161-A-G]
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma (1992) 1 Supp SCC 222 :
[1991] 2 SCR 1 - relied on.
1.4 The first information report in a disproportionate assets
case must, as of necessity, prima facie, contain ingredients for
the perception that there is fair enough reason to suspect
commission of a cognizable offence relating to "criminal
misconduct" punishable under the P.C. Act and to embark upon
an investigation. Having regard to what has been observed in
paragraph 49 and to maintain probity in the system of governance
as well as to ensure that societal pollutants are weeded out at the
earliest, it would be eminently desirable if the high courts maintain
a hands-off approach and not quash a first information report
pertaining to "corruption" cases, specially at the stage of
investigation, even though certain elements of strong-arm tactics
of the ruling dispensation might be discernible. The
considerations that could apply to quashing of first information
reports pertaining to offences punishable under general penal
statutes ex proprio vigore may not be applicable to a P.C. Act
offence. Majorly, the proper course for the high courts to follow,
in cases under the P.C. Act, would be to permit the investigation
to be taken to its logical conclusion and leave the aggrieved party
to pursue the remedy made available by law at an appropriate
stage. If at all interference in any case is considered necessary,
the same should rest on the very special features of the case.
Although what would constitute the special features has
necessarily to depend on the peculiar facts of each case,
interference could be made in exceptional cases where the
records reveal absolutely no material to support even a reasonable
suspicion of a public servant having intentionally enriched himself
illicitly during the period of his service and nothing other than
mala fide is the basis for subjecting such servant to an
investigation. There are no cogent grounds for quashing the FIR
in the present case even on the ground of mala fide. The
impugned judgment and order is set aside and the writ petitions
are dismissed. [Paras 74-76][162-D-H; 163-A, C-D]
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Lalita Kumari v. Govt. Of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 : [2013]
14 SCR 713 - followed.
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. (1992) 1 Supp.
SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; CBI & Ors. v.
Tapan Kumar Singh (2003) 6 SCC 175 : [2003] 3 SCR
485 - relied on.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Naresh & Ors. (2011) 4 SCC
324 : [2011] 4 SCR 1176; Neeharika Infrastructure
Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 315; Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr.
v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi @ T.H.
Vijayalakshmi & Anr. (2021) SCC OnLine SC 923; R.
P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [1960] 3 SCR 388; Rajesh
Bajaj v. State (NCT of Delhi) (1999) 3 SCC 259 : [1999]
1 SCR 1012 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2003] 3 SCR 485
relied on
Para 16
[2011] 4 SCR 1176
referred to
Para 19
[1960] 3 SCR 388
referred to
Para 25
[1960] 3 SCR 388
referred to
Para 25
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259
relied on
Para 26
[1999] 1 SCR 1012
referred to
Para 51
[2013] 14 SCR 713
followed
Para 51
[1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 812
relied on
Para 59
[1991] 2 SCR 1
referred to
Para 72
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 646-648 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.01.2022 of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in WPCR Nos. 88, 154 and 206 of 2020.
With
Criminal Appeal No. 649 of 2023.
THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR. v. AMAN KUMAR
SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC
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Sanjay R. Hegde, Kapil Sibal, Mahesh Jethmalani, Sr. Advs., Arun
Kumar Jaiswal, Pranjal Kishore , Gautam Narayan, Sanjeevi Seshadri,
Apoorv Kurup, Ojaswa Pathak, Ms. Nidhi Mittal, Ms. Shweta Bhardwaj,
Ms. Aparna Arun, Ravi Sharma, Anjani Kumar Rai, Advs. for the
appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
Leave granted.
2. These 5 (five) appeals are at the instance of, inter alia, the
State of Chhattisgarh (hereafter 'the State', for short) and Sri Uchit
Sharma (hereafter 'US', for short). The appellants call in question a
common judgment and order dated 10th January, 2022 passed by the
Chhattisgarh High Court at Bilaspur, whereby 3 (three) writ petitions
[WPCR 88 of 2020, WPCR 154 of 2020 and WPCR 206 of 2020] were
disposed of. WPCR 88 of 2020, presented by Sri Aman Singh (hereafter
'AS', for short), was allowed by quashing FIR No. 9/2020 dated 25th
February, 2020 (hereafter 'the FIR", for short) under section 13(1)(b)
and (2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereafter 'P.C. Act", for
short) read with section 120B, Indian Penal Code (hereafter 'IPC", for
short), registered by the Economic Offences Wing/Anti-Corruption
Bureau of the State. WPCR 154 of 2020, instituted by the wife of AS,
Smt. Yasmin Singh (hereafter 'YS', for short), was partly allowed. The
spouses were the joint petitioners in WPCR 206 of 2020, which was
also allowed.
3. A complaint dated 11th October, 2019 was lodged by US in the
office of the Chief Minister of the State. It was alleged therein that AS
[an Indian Revenue Service (IRS) officer and the former Principal
Secretary to the erstwhile Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh], his wife YS,
[former consultant to the Govt. of Chhattisgarh, who had worked on
contract as the Director, Communication and Capacity Development
Unit (CCDU), Department of Public Health Engineering, Govt. of
Chhattisgarh from 14th November, 2005 to 31st March, 2015, and as
Director, ICE & Capacity Building, Dept. of Panchayat & Rural
Development, Govt. of Chhattisgarh from 1st April, 2015 to 10th
December, 2018] and his family were involved in corruption and money
laundering, and that he also held assets which are disproportionate to his
known sources of income.
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4. Upon the complaint being received, the Chief Minister by a
handwritten order directed the Chief Secretary of the State to have the
complaint enquired into by the Economic Offences Wing (EOW).
Although, the date "14th OCT, 2019" appears just above the handwritten
order of the Chief Minister, it is not too clear whether he made such
order on 14th October, 2019 or on 15th October, 2019.
5. Be that as it may, vide a forwarding letter dated 21st October,
2019, the complaint was forwarded by the General Administration
Department of the State (hereafter 'GAD', for short) to the Economic
Offences Wing/Anti-Corruption Bureau (hereafter 'ACB/ EOW', for
short) for the purpose of conducting inquiry into the allegations leveled
therein. Acting in furtherance of the said letter dated 21st October, 2019,
the ACB/EOW registered a preliminary inquiry bearing no. P.E.35/2019.
6. Prior to these developments, YS had invoked the writ jurisdiction
of the High Court by instituting a writ petition [W.P. (S)6521/2019],
essentially questioning a departmental inquiry initiated against her. She
had prayed for quashing and/or setting aside of an order dated 10th May,
2019 whereby the GAD had instituted an inquiry against her. Such inquiry
appears to have been initiated on the basis of a complaint dated 12th
April, 2019 lodged by one Vikas Tiwari (spokesperson of the Chhattisgarh
unit of the Indian National Congress party). With the initiation of P.E.35/
2019, in terms of the letter dated 21st October, 2019, YS filed an interim
application (I.A.04/2020) seeking a stay thereof. By an order dated 16th
January, 2020, the High Court directed the State not to take any steps to
her prejudice pursuant to the letter dated 21st October, 2019. The order
of 16th January, 2020 refers to, inter alia, an earlier order dated 21st
October, 2019 which, however, is not on record.
7. The letter dated 21st October, 2019 of the GAD, referred to
above, was also challenged by AS by instituting a writ petition [WPCR
88/2020] before the High Court on 29th January, 2020. In such writ petition,
AS urged the court to pass an order for production of the entire records
pertaining to the letter dated 21st October, 2019 for its perusal, for quashing
the said letter as well as any consequential step/action taken by the
State including P.E.No.35/2019.
8. During the pendency of WPCR 88/2020, the FIR was registered
against AS and YS.
THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR. v. AMAN KUMAR
SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
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9. Within a few days of registration of the FIR, on 28th February,
2020 to be precise, AS applied for an amendment of WPCR 88/2020
seeking to mount a challenge to the FIR. He had also applied for interim
relief for stay of effect/operation of the FIR.
10. YS too, on 2nd March, 2020, instituted WPCR 154/2020 seeking
an order, inter alia, for quashing of the FIR.
11. By an order dated 28th February, 2020, the High Court allowed
the application for amendment and also directed that no coercive steps
be taken against AS till the next date of hearing.
12. On 15th April, 2020, WPCR 206/2020 was jointly instituted by
AS and YS seeking appropriate order for listing of WPCR 88/2020 and
WPCR 154/2020 for final hearing immediately upon resumption of normal
functioning of the Court (which was then curtailed due to the pandemic
caused by Covid-19) and also for an order declaring the action of the
ACB/EOW in directing HDFC Bank Ltd., respondent no.5, to put a hold
on the funds in the salary account of AS, as void and illegal.
13. We need not at this stage refer in detail to the intervening
events of issuance of notice to AS to join the investigation as well as
interim orders passed on the writ petitions from time to time. Suffice it to
note, in an order dated 6th September, 2021, the High Court observed
that there was a dispute with regard to the income of AS and YS and the
ACB/EOW was called upon to produce the case diary as well as figures
in tabulated form showing income and expenditure for perusal by the
Court whether there is disproportionate income or not.
14. Faced with such an order, the State filed an application seeking
exemption to produce the case diary and the figures in tabulated form as
well as applied for vacation of an earlier order dated 28th February, 2020
whereby the ACB/EOW was restrained from taking coercive steps
against AS. The fate of these applications does not clearly appear from
the records. However, for the reasons recorded in the impugned judgment
and order dated 10th January, 2022, the High Court while allowing WPCR
88/2020 quashed the FIR. In view of the FIR having been quashed, the
High Court held that relief sought by YS in WPCR 154/ 2020 in relation
to the FIR had lost its significance. However, the Court rejected the
prayer of YS to prosecute US, the original complainant and J.P. Kujur,
the Investigation Officer, under section 211, IPC. WPCR 154/2020, thus,
stood partly allowed. Insofar as WPCR 206/2020 is concerned, the Court
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made the following directions in paragraph 70:
"70. Since this Court while hearing WPCR No. 88 of 2020 has
already quashed the FIR bearing No. 09/2020 registered against
the petitioners at Police Station- EOW/ACB, District- Raipur (C.G.),
therefore, the relief sought in this petition has lost its significance
and the bank account No. 50100 28338 9868 of petitioner No. 1
shall inoperative (sic) after quashing the FIR in WPCR No. 88 of
2020, therefore, no further direction is required to be passed."
15. Since, the High Court has quashed the FIR and we are called
upon to examine the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment,
we propose to refer to the material portions of the FIR after noting the
rival contentions.
16. Mr. Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing in support of the
appeals preferred by the State, contended that the High Court committed
gross error of law in quashing the FIR by transgressing the legal bounds
for quashing a first information report. Placing reliance on the decision
of this Court in CBI & Ors. Vs. Tapan Kumar Singh1, he contended
that a first information report is not an encyclopedia which must disclose
all facts and details relating to the offence reported; what is of significance
is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable
offence and the information so lodged must provide the basis for the
police to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At the stage
of registration of a first information report, the police officer on the basis
of the information given has to suspect the commission of a cognizable
offence and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable
offence has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect on the basis
of the information received that a cognizable offence may have been
committed, he is bound to record the information and investigate, without
it being necessary for him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the
information.
17. According to Mr. Sibal, when a first information report could
be lodged on the basis of suspicion, the High Court in the present case
erred in law in quashing the FIR on the ground that it was based on
"probabilities". Criticizing the impugned judgment as wanting in
appreciation of the aforesaid basic principle, he urged that the High Court
overstepped its limits.
1 (2003) 6 SCC 175
THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR. v. AMAN KUMAR
SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
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18. Mr. Sibal also contended that in the present case, AS challenged
the FIR a few days after the same was registered on 25th February,
2020 and obtained an order from the High Court to the effect that no
coercive steps be taken against him. Armed with such an order, AS did
not join the investigation despite a notice having been issued. There was
no order staying the investigation. Even if the investigation had proceeded,
there was no imminent fear of arrest. If indeed, AS and YS do have
papers and documents to satisfactorily account for the pecuniary
resources and property and that they do not possess assets
disproportionate to their known sources of income, such papers and
documents could have been produced before the Investigating Officer
thereby enabling him to hold that there is no substance in the complaint
lodged by US, and then to file an appropriate closure report before the
concerned court to be considered in accordance with Law. However,
the Investigating Officer could not proceed with the investigation
effectively and meaningfully in view of the restraining orders passed by
the High Court resulting in the investigative process being aborted.
19. Our attention was next invited by Mr. Sibal to the decisions of
this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Naresh & Ors.2 and
Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra &
Ors.3, in support of the contention that when an investigation by the
police is in progress, the courts should not go into the merits of the
allegations in the FIR; on the contrary, the police must be permitted to
complete the investigation. It was also contended that if after investigation
the Investigating Officer does not find any substance in the complaint/
first information report, he is obliged to file appropriate closure report
before the concerned court for its due consideration in accordance with
law; however, it would be premature to pronounce any conclusion that
the first information report does not disclose any cognizable offence
based on hazy facts.
20. Mr. Sibal, thus, prayed that the impugned judgment and order
of the High Court be set aside and investigation into the FIR be permitted
to be taken to its logical conclusion.
21. Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned senior counsel for the other
appellant, i.e., US, contended that the High Court clearly applied a wrong
test while quashing the FIR. According to him, the test of a prima-facie
2 (2011) 4 SCC 324
3 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315
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or probable case is only required to be shown at the time of framing of
charge; however, for an investigation to proceed on the basis of a first
information report, all that is required to be shown is that the contents of
the complaint/first information report, when taken at face value, make
out an offence.
22. It was further contended by Mr. Hegde that the High Court
conducted a mini-trial while arriving at a conclusion that no offence
against AS and YS has been made out in the FIR which, this Court has
repeatedly held, cannot be conducted in proceedings for quashing of a
first information report. At the stage of considering a prayer for quashing
of first information report, the probable defence of the accused cannot
be considered.
23. Inviting our attention to the interim order dated 6th September,
2021 passed by the High Court, Mr. Hegde contended that such an
exercise could not have been undertaken by the Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
24. Referring to the decision of this Court in Central Bureau of
Investigation & Anr. Vs. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi @
T.H. Vijayalakshmi & Anr.4, Mr. Hegde submitted that a similar exercise
that was undertaken by the relevant high court was held to be
impermissible by this Court.
25. The decisions of this Court in R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab5
and State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors.6 were next cited for
highlighting the categories of cases where inherent jurisdiction can and
should be exercised by the high courts to quash proceedings; however,
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case presented
before the High Court by AS and YS, Mr. Hegde contended that the
court ought to have declined interference.
26. Mr. Hegde further relied on the decision of this Court in Rajesh
Bajaj Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)]7 for the proposition that if the factual
foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint, the court should
not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely
on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with
4 (2021) SCC OnLine SC 923
5 (1960) 3 SCR 388
6 1992 SUPP. (1) SCC 335
7 (1999) 3 SCC 259
THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR. v. AMAN KUMAR
SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
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details. According to him, quashing of a first information report is a step
which is permitted only in extremely rare cases such as, the information
in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are
absolutely necessary for making out the offence. The FIR, in the present
case, does contain definite particulars making out the offences complained
of. That apart, the preliminary inquiry carried out before registration of
the FIR has revealed disproportionate assets to the tune of 20% of the
income of AS; hence, it was not an appropriate case where the power to
quash the FIR should have been exercised.
27. While concluding, Mr. Hegde submitted that the High Court
having travelled beyond the well-settled parameters of exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the impugned judgment
and order merits to be set aside.
28. Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, learned senior counsel appearing for
AS and YS, opposed the appeals. Reiterating the contentions that found
favour with the High Court, he contended that the High Court rightly
concluded that investigation of the FIR, which did not prima facie disclose
commission of any cognizable offence by either AS or YS, would be
nothing but an abuse of the process of law and compelling AS and YS to
join the investigation would amount to undue and unnecessary harassment.
29. By referring to the facts preceding registration of the FIR,
Mr. Jethmalani sought to impress us that ever since the political
dispensation underwent a change in the State of Chhattisgarh, AS and
YS have been the target of the new dispensation. Misusing the police
machinery, no stone has been left unturned to falsely implicate AS and
YS. Initially a departmental inquiry was initiated against YS vide an
order dated 10th May, 2019 and no sooner had the High Court by an
order dated 21st October, 2019 granted interim protection to YS, further
action was taken to initiate a preliminary inquiry against AS and YS on
11th November, 2009. That apart, quite mischievously, the FIR was
suddenly registered during the pendency of WPCR 88/2020 to render
the same infructuous.
30. It was thereafter contended by Mr. Jethmalani that a bare
perusal of the FIR would reveal non-disclosure of the 'check period'
which is a sine qua non in a case of disproportionate assets. Further,
the FIR did not disclose the basic ingredients of establishing an offence
under section 13(1)(b) read with section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. The FIR
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also did not disclose the extent of alleged investment either in figures or
in percentage.
31. Referring to the decision in T.H. Vijayalakshmi (supra), it
was Mr. Jethmalani's endeavor to show that the investigating agency in
that case had set out/specified the extent of disproportionality in a tabular
form, in rupees and percentage, in the first information report therein.
The High Court, therefore, was not in error when it required the State to
produce the case diary as well as figures in tabulated form showing
income and expenditure for perusal by the Court by its interim order
dated 6th September, 2021.
32. Mr. Jethmalani further urged that no material being there to
justify registration of the FIR is borne out from the fact that the State
had applied for exemption from complying with the High Court's order
dated 6th September, 2021.
33. It was next argued by Mr. Jethmalani that a first information
report based on sheer conjectural possibility of finding some more assets
in future is wholly impermissible. Law, according to him, is well settled
that a mere mention of the possibility will not entitle the ACB/EOW of
the State to lodge a first information report and conduct investigation.
Unless the first information report discloses cognizable offence, such
report based on possibilities would become a tool of witch hunting and
consequently harassment, which would be a clear violation of Article 21
of the Constitution. It was also argued that there is a casual allegation of
a criminal conspiracy between AS and YS without there being a whisper
about its basic elements.
34. Mr. Jethmalani further contended that even if it is assumed
that 2004 to 2018 is the check period, it is clear that a fishing inquiry is
intended by the State and its officers with a view to scandalize AS and
YS.
35. It was also the contention of Mr. Jethmalani that there has
been no disproportionality at all, which would warrant an investigation
even into the allegations leveled by US in the complaint, or for that matter,
the FIR, and the High Court was right in its interference to prevent
abuse of the process of law.
36. The contention of the respondents that the High Court had
applied a 'non-existent legal test' was refuted by terming it as entirely
misleading. Passages from the impugned judgment were referred to, to
THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR. v. AMAN KUMAR
SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
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show how the High Court was right in returning the finding that the FIR
did not disclose any offence rendering it liable to interdiction.
37. While concluding, Mr. Jethmalani contended that there was
no material to justify registration of the FIR and that there being no
'legitimate prosecution', the same has rightly been quashed and set aside
by the impugned judgment; hence, the appeals are liable to be dismissed.
38. The High Court did not in the impugned judgment assign mala
fide as a ground for quashing the FIR. In course of hearing before us,
Mr. Jethmalani attempted to build up a case of mala fide by referring to
how the incumbent Chief Minister perceived AS to be a 'super CM' and
also that AS has become the victim of political vendetta, being caught in
the crossfire between the incumbent Chief Minister and the former Chief
Minister. Reference was made to clause (7) of paragraph 102 of the
decision in Bhajan Lal (supra), where it was held that a first information
report could be quashed by the high courts "where a criminal
proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him
due to private and personal grudge".
39. In his rejoinder, Mr. Hegde canvassed that there are no
pleadings to this effect in the writ petition filed before the High Court
and, therefore, a new case ought not to be allowed to be set up de hors
the pleadings. The immediate reaction of Mr. Jethmalani was that the
writ petitions are replete with allegations of mala fide, which form the
plinth for registration of the FIR as well as the departmental inquiry
against YS.
40. Before reserving judgment, we had permitted Mr. Jethmalani
to file short written notes of arguments within a week together with a
few other relevant documents which he intended to file though not part
of the pleadings before the High Court or this Court.
41. The written notes together with documents annexed thereto
marked as annexures R/1A to R/1K have been considered.
42. In Part 1 of the written notes, reference has been made to
Circular No. 29/2020 of the Central Bureau of Investigation (hereafter
'CBI', for short) providing the methodology for registering first
information reports in cases of disproportionate assets and for conducting
investigation. The contention advanced is that the FIR, in the present
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case, does not conform to the guidelines laid down by the CBI in Circular
No. 29/2020 (hereafter 'CBI Circular', for short). Part II centers around
the contention that the FIR contains several statements styled as facts,
which were false to the knowledge of the ACB/EOW of the State. The
third and final part is dedicated to "fabrications and manipulations" in
the FIR which were the result of political vendetta against AS, who was
the Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister in the previous regime.
43. We ought to place on record that little over a week of reserving
judgment, on 20th January, 2023 to be precise, Mr. Vikas Singh, learned
senior counsel mentioned the criminal appeals and prayed for recall of
the order reserving judgment on the ground that an application for
directions was in the process of being filed by AS and YS and that the
same ought to be considered before the judgment on these appeals is
pronounced. Orally, we permitted the application to be filed for being
taken into consideration at an appropriate time.
44. The application, which has since been filed on 20th January,
2023, refers to certain newspaper reports and WhatsApp messages/
chats exchanged allegedly between important functionaries of the
Government of Chhattisgarh and based thereon it has been the contention
that there exists conclusive material in public domain establishing that
the FIR against AS and YS has been registered at the behest of one Sri
Anil Tuteja and other high- ranking public officials in the State, at the
instance of the present Chief Minister. Since the materials brought on
record by such application are sufficient to drive home the conclusion
that political vendetta is the real cause for registration of the FIR, to
tarnish the reputation of AS and YS, it has been urged that all the evidence
ought to be summoned by this Court for just disposal of the present
proceedings. Such application contains the following prayers:
"PRAYER
In the facts and circumstances stated hereinabove, this Hon'ble
Court may graciously be pleased to:
a) Direct to take on record the new facts and materials, as has
emerged from the news report dated 18.01.2023 (titled "The
Chhattisgarh Files: Docs, Chats show how prime accused was
himself 'managing' NAN scam investigation, Baghel issued
hitlist' to implicate Raman Singh, others') in the web news
portal www.opindia.com and direct further hearing in the present
THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR. v. AMAN KUMAR
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case; and/or
b) Direct to summon the records pertaining to the 'WhatsApp'
Chats relating to the conspiracy to implicate the Respondent Nos.
1 & 4 from the Enforcement Directorate; and/or
c) Direct to summon the records of the Preliminary Enquiry bearing
No. 35 of 2019 initiated by the Petitioner- State's EOW/ACB in
respect to the complaint made by Respondent No. 2 on 11.10.2019;
and/or
d) Direct to tag the present special leave petition with W.P. (Crl)
No. 506 of 2021 titled 'Directorate of Enforcement v. Anil Tuteja
& Ors.' Pending before this Hon'ble Court; and/or
e) Pass such other or further order (s) as may be deemed fit and
appropriate by this Hon'ble Court in the facts and circumstances
of the present case."
45. We have heard the parties, perused the materials on record,
and considered the decisions cited at the bar.
46. The High Court, upon perusal of the FIR and consideration of
the arguments advanced by the parties as well as the decisions cited at
the Bar, recorded in the impugned judgment, inter alia, as follows: -
"49. From bare perusal of the FIR, the allegation of disproportionate
income is made out or not, it is expedient for this Court to examine
whether from bare perusal of the contents of FIR, offence said to
have been committed is made out or not, then only the FIR can be
quashed by this Court. Therefore, whether the prima facie case
is made out or not, has to be seen. This Court in foregoing
paragraphs has extensively quoted the FIR, which clearly
demonstrates that the FIR is based on probabilities with regard to
disproportionate income. The FIR is silent with regard to quantum
of the disproportionate income, which is the paramount factors
for involving any person in implicating any person for commission
of offence under Section 13(1)(b), 13(2) of the Act, 1988. These
basic ingredients are not reflected from the bare perusal of the
FIR.
***
56. The FIR further states that there is possibility of having various
properties in the name of the petitioner and his wife.