# The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 1122
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-09-16
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014
- **Bench:** B.R. Gavai, Prashant Kumar Mishra, K.V. Viswanathan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-state-of-haryana-v-jai-singh-and-others-38627
- **Pages:** 37

## Headnote

The issue pertains to assail the correctness of the Judgment and
Order passed by the Full Bench of High Court wherein the writ
petition preferred by the proprietors/landowners, (Respondents
herein), challenging the amendments carried out in the Punjab
Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, as inserted by the
Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 was partly allowed.
Headnotes†
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 -
sub-clause (6) to s.2(g) - East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation
And Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Constitution of
India - Art.31-A - The State of Haryana inserted sub-clause
(6) to s.2(g) of the 1961 Act along with an Explanation to the
said sub-clause - In the said sub-clause, it was laid down that
lands reserved for the common purposes of a village u/s.18
of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, the management and control
whereof vests in the Gram Panchayat u/s.23-A of the aforesaid
Act - Aggrieved by the aforementioned amendment, the
respondent-landowners who held land in various villages and
had contributed a share of their holdings to form a common
pool of land called 'shamilat deh', which was meant exclusively
for the common purposes of the village inhabitants, filed
Writ Petitions before the High Court - After various rounds
of litigation, a Full Bench of the High Court by way of the
impugned judgment and final order, examined the legality
of sub-clause (6) of s.2(g) of the 1961 Act as inserted by the
Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 and partly allowed the writ petitions
preferred by the respondent-landowners - Appellant-State filed
* Author
[2025] 9 S.C.R.
1017
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
appeal against the same before the Supreme Court - Vide
judgment and order dated 07.04.2022, this Court allowed the
civil appeal - Review petition filed - Allowed - The judgment
and order of this Court dated 07.04.2022 in Civil Appeal No.
6990 of 2014 is recalled and the appeal is restored to the file:
Held: No error in the impugned judgment and final order of the Full
Bench of the High Court to the extent that it holds that the lands
which have not been earmarked for any specific purpose do not
vest in the Gram Panchayat or the State - It is settled that the land
which remains unutilized after utilizing the land for the common
purposes so provided under the consolidation scheme vests with
the proprietors and not with the Gram Panchayat - The unutilized
land i.e., the bachat land, left after utilizing the land earmarked
for the common purposes, has to be redistributed amongst the
proprietors according to the share in which they had contributed
the land belonging to them for common purposes - The Full Bench
of the High Court in the impugned judgment and final order in the
alternative held that, a consistent view has been taken in more
than 100 judgments by the Punjab and Haryana High Court and
applying the doctrine of stare decisis, such a view cannot be
upset - The doctrine of stare decisis lays importance on stability
and predictability in the legal system and mandates that a view
consistently upheld by courts over a long period must be followed,
unless it is manifestly erroneous, unjust or mischievous - No error
in the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in applying the
doctrine of stare decisis to the facts of the present case inasmuch
as it followed the law which was consistently applied in more than
100 judgments. [Paras 53, 56, 59, 62]

## Text

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[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1016 : 2025 INSC 1122
The State of Haryana
v.
Jai Singh and Others
(Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014)
16 September 2025
[B.R. Gavai,* CJI, Prashant Kumar Mishra and
K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The issue pertains to assail the correctness of the Judgment and
Order passed by the Full Bench of High Court wherein the writ
petition preferred by the proprietors/landowners, (Respondents
herein), challenging the amendments carried out in the Punjab
Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, as inserted by the
Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 was partly allowed.
Headnotes†
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 -
sub-clause (6) to s.2(g) - East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation
And Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Constitution of
India - Art.31-A - The State of Haryana inserted sub-clause
(6) to s.2(g) of the 1961 Act along with an Explanation to the
said sub-clause - In the said sub-clause, it was laid down that
lands reserved for the common purposes of a village u/s.18
of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, the management and control
whereof vests in the Gram Panchayat u/s.23-A of the aforesaid
Act - Aggrieved by the aforementioned amendment, the
respondent-landowners who held land in various villages and
had contributed a share of their holdings to form a common
pool of land called 'shamilat deh', which was meant exclusively
for the common purposes of the village inhabitants, filed
Writ Petitions before the High Court - After various rounds
of litigation, a Full Bench of the High Court by way of the
impugned judgment and final order, examined the legality
of sub-clause (6) of s.2(g) of the 1961 Act as inserted by the
Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 and partly allowed the writ petitions
preferred by the respondent-landowners - Appellant-State filed
* Author
[2025] 9 S.C.R.
1017
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
appeal against the same before the Supreme Court - Vide
judgment and order dated 07.04.2022, this Court allowed the
civil appeal - Review petition filed - Allowed - The judgment
and order of this Court dated 07.04.2022 in Civil Appeal No.
6990 of 2014 is recalled and the appeal is restored to the file:
Held: No error in the impugned judgment and final order of the Full
Bench of the High Court to the extent that it holds that the lands
which have not been earmarked for any specific purpose do not
vest in the Gram Panchayat or the State - It is settled that the land
which remains unutilized after utilizing the land for the common
purposes so provided under the consolidation scheme vests with
the proprietors and not with the Gram Panchayat - The unutilized
land i.e., the bachat land, left after utilizing the land earmarked
for the common purposes, has to be redistributed amongst the
proprietors according to the share in which they had contributed
the land belonging to them for common purposes - The Full Bench
of the High Court in the impugned judgment and final order in the
alternative held that, a consistent view has been taken in more
than 100 judgments by the Punjab and Haryana High Court and
applying the doctrine of stare decisis, such a view cannot be
upset - The doctrine of stare decisis lays importance on stability
and predictability in the legal system and mandates that a view
consistently upheld by courts over a long period must be followed,
unless it is manifestly erroneous, unjust or mischievous - No error
in the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in applying the
doctrine of stare decisis to the facts of the present case inasmuch
as it followed the law which was consistently applied in more than
100 judgments. [Paras 53, 56, 59, 62]
Case Law Cited
Bhagat Ram and Others v. State of Punjab and Others [1967] 2
SCR 165 : 1966 SCC OnLine SC 264 - followed.
Ranjit Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Others [1965] 1
SCR 82 : 1964 SCC OnLine SC 182 - held inapplicable.
Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay [1975] 1 SCR 1 : (1974) 2 SCC 402; Waman Rao v.
Union of India [1981] 2 SCR 1 : AIR 1981 SC 271 - relied on.
Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab and Another [1967] 2 SCR 143 :
1966 SCC OnLine SC 192; State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, 1998
SCC OnLine SC 8; Sarat Chandra Mishra and Others. v. State of
1018
[2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Orissa and Others [2006] 1 SCR 116 : (2006) 1 SCC 638; Ramesh
Chand Daga v. Rameshwari Bai [2005] 2 SCR 927 : (2005) 4 SCC
772; Gajraj Singh and Others v. State of U.P. and Others [2001]
3 SCR 344 : (2001) 5 SCC 762; K.T. Plantation Private Limited
and Another v. State of Karnataka [2011] 13 SCR 636 : (2011)
9 SCC 1; State of Punjab v. Gurjant Singh, Civil Appeal Nos.
5709-5714 of 2001 - referred to.
Suraj Bhan and Others v. State of Haryana and Another, CWP No.
314 of 2001; Jai Singh and Others v. State of Haryana, CWP No.
5877 of 1992 - referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation)
Act, 1961; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation And Prevention
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948.
List of Keywords
Doctrine of stare decisis; Shamilat deh; Consolidation scheme;
Unutilized land; Bachat land; Redistribution of land; Land earmarked
for the common purposes; Stability and predictability in the
legal system; Amendment to the Punjab Village Common Lands
(Regulation) Act, 1961; Insertion of sub-clause (6) to s.2(g) to the
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961; Common
pool of land; Review.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2003 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana At Chandigarh in CWP No. 5877 of 1992
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
B.K. Satija, A.A.G., Vinay Navare, Sr. Adv., Samar Vijay Singh,
Gautam Sharma, Ms. Sabarni Som, Fateh Singh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Manoj Swarup, Rameshwar Singh Malik, Narender Hooda, Sr.
Advs., Ankit Swarup, Mrs. Anubha Agarwal, Neelmani Pant, Rishi
Bhargava, Yash Singhal, Hamad Tariq, Jitesh Malik, Ms. Anisha
[2025] 9 S.C.R.
1019
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
Dahiya, Jatin Hooda, Tarjit Singh Chhikara, Abhaya Nath Das,
N D Kaushik, Satish Kumar, Pardeep Gupta, Parinav Gupta, Mrs.
Mansi Gupta, Dr. Mrs. Vipin Gupta, Dr. Surender Singh Hooda,
Ravindra Bana, Rajesh Kumar, Karan Kapoor, Manik Kapoor,
Shrey Kapoor, Chander Shekhar Ashri, Ashok Kumar Singh,
Tejaswi Kumar Pradhan, Manoranjan Paikaray, Aniket Gupta,
A. Venayagam Balan, Gaurav Pal.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
INDEX
I.
BACKGROUND
Paras 1 to 3
II.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
Paras 4 to 23
III.
CONSIDERATION
Paras 24 to 62
(a)
Consideration of the Constitution Bench
Judgments of this Court in Ranjit Singh,
Ajit Singh and Bhagat Ram
Para 24 to 53
(b)
Consideration of the judgment of the Full
Bench of the High Court in impugned
judgment and final order referring its earlier
judgment in Gurjant Singh and several
other judgments
Para 54 to 57
(c)
Applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis
to the facts of the present case.
Para 58 to 62
IV.
CONCLUSIONS
Para 63 to 64
B.R. Gavai, CJI
I.
BACKGROUND
1.
This appeal takes exception to the judgment and final order passed by
a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh1
1
Hereinafter referred to as the 'High Court'.
1020
[2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
in Civil Writ Petition No. 5877 of 1992 wherein the High Court partly
allowed the writ petition preferred by the proprietors/landowners,
(Respondents herein), challenging the amendments carried out in the
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 19612, as inserted
by the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992, published on 11th February 1992
after the assent of the President of India.
2.
The facts which give rise to the present proceedings are as follows:
2.1 The State of Haryana, by way of Government Gazette
Notification dated 11th February 1992 inserted sub-clause (6) to
Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act along with an Explanation to the
said sub-clause, which received the assent of the President on
14th January 1992. Sub-clause (6) to Section 2(g) of the 1961
Act reads thus:
"2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requiresxxx xxx xxx
(g) "shamilat deh" includesxxx xxx xxx
(6) lands reserved for the common
purposes of a village under Section 18 of
the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation
and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act,
1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948), the
management and control whereof vests in
the Gram Panchayat under section 23-A
of the aforesaid Act.
Explanation - Lands entered in the column
of ownership of record of rights as "Jumla
Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hassab
Rasad", "Jumla Malkan" or "Mushtarka
Malkan" shall be shamilat deh within the
meaning of this section."
2.2 The respondent-landowners along with several other similarlysituated landowners who held land in various villages and had
2
Hereinafter referred to as '1961 Act'.
[2025] 9 S.C.R.
1021
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
contributed a share of their holdings to form a common pool of
land called 'shamilat deh', which was meant exclusively for the
common purposes of the village inhabitants, filed Writ Petitions
before the High Court being aggrieved by the aforementioned
amendment.
2.3 When the batch of Writ Petitions first came up before the High
Court, upon considering the important questions of law involved
in the matter, which were likely to arise in a large number of
cases and affect a huge chunk of land, the Division Bench
which was seized of the matter vide order dated 1st June, 1993
directed the papers of the case to be placed before the Hon'ble
Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench of the High Court for
determination of the vires of the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992.
Thereafter, a Full Bench of the High Court heard the matter at
length and vide judgment dated 18th January 1995, reported
as Jai Singh and Others v. State of Haryana3, allowed the
writ petitions and struck down the amendments carried out by
way of the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992.
2.4 The State of Haryana4, Appellant herein, challenged the decision
of the Full Bench of the High Court before this Court vide Civil
Appeal No. 5480 of 1995 titled as State of Haryana v. Jai
Singh5. This Court by order dated 6th August, 1998 held that
certain essentials of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India
had been overlooked and accordingly, the civil appeal came
to be allowed and the matter was remanded to the High Court
for reconsideration of the issues in light of Article 31-A of the
Constitution of India.
2.5 Accordingly, a Full Bench of the High Court by way of the
impugned judgment and final order, examined the legality of
sub-clause (6) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act as inserted by the
Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 and partly allowed the writ petitions
preferred by the respondent-landowners. The Full Bench of the
High Court vide the impugned judgment and final order also
3
CWP No. 5877 of 1992.
4
Hereinafter referred to as 'appellant-State'.
5
1998 SCC OnLine SC 8
1022
[2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
issued certain consequential directions with regard to certain
mutation entries made by the Revenue Authorities.
2.6 Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant-State filed a Civil Appeal
No. 6990 of 2014 before this Court. Vide judgment and order
dated 7th April 2022, this Court allowed the civil appeal in the
following terms:
"128.Consequently, we hold that Act 9 of 1992, the
amending Act is valid and does not suffer from any
vice of constitutional infirmity. The entire land reserved
for common purposes by applying pro rata cut had
to be utilised by the Gram Panchayat for the present
and future needs of the village community and that
no part of the land can be re-partitioned amongst
the proprietors.
129. With the aforesaid discussion and findings, the
appeals filed by the State and Panchayats are allowed
and those filed by the proprietors are dismissed.
Consequently, the writ petitions filed before the High
Court shall also stand dismissed."
2.7 Seeking review of the aforementioned judgment of this Court,
one Karnail Singh, being Respondent No. 28 in the present
proceedings, preferred Review Petition (C) No. 526 of 2023
before this Court.
2.8 After a thorough consideration of the issue at hand, this Court
vide order dated 16th May 2024 allowed the Review Petition in
the following terms:
"69. In the result, we pass the following order:
The Review Petition is allowed.
The judgment and order of this Court dated 7th April
2022 in Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014 is recalled
and the appeal is restored to the file.
The appeal is directed to be listed for hearing
peremptorily on 7th August 2024 at Serial No.1"
2.9 After the review was allowed, we have heard the appeals afresh.
[2025] 9 S.C.R.
1023
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
3.
We have heard Shri Vinay Navare, learned Senior Counsel, appearing
on behalf of the appellant-State as well as Shri Manoj Swarup, Shri
Narender Hooda and Shri Rameshwar Singh Malik, learned Senior
Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent-landowners.
II.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
4.
Shri Navare appearing for the appellant-State submitted that
the impugned judgment and final order of the High Court is selfcontradictory in nature. He submitted that despite holding that
lands reserved for common purposes as per the consolidation
scheme, whether utilized or not, would vest with the State or Gram
Panchayat, the High Court directed cancellation of mutations made
in favour of the appellant-state. He further submitted that in light
of a categorical finding to the effect that the amended provisions
were merely elucidations of the already existing provisions, the High
Court ought not to have cancelled or set aside the mutations which
were a necessary consequence of Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 which
amended the 1961 Act.
5.
The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the liberty granted
by the High Court to the State or Gram Panchayat to file an application
for eviction or title suit for those lands which had been earmarked
for common purposes, would run contrary to the very purpose and
objective of the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 and would introduce
the same mischief which the said Act sought to do away with. He,
therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment and final order
being self-contradictory and erroneous to the above extent deserves
to be set aside and/or modified.
6.
Shri Navare further submitted that the lands contributed by the
respondent-landowners on pro-rata basis during consolidation
proceedings as carried out under the East Punjab Holdings
(Consolidation And Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 19486 would
fall within the definition of 'shamilat deh' under the Haryana Act No.
9 of 1992. Such lands, he submitted, would vest in the State or
Gram Panchayat, irrespective of whether they have been reserved
for common purposes or not. He submitted that vesting of such
lands in the State or Gram Panchayat is complete as soon as
6
Hereinafter referred to as the 'Consolidation Act of 1948'.
1024
[2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the consolidation scheme attains finality and once so vested, the
proprietors lose all rights and interests. Shri Navare further submitted
that once the land has been recorded as 'shamilat deh', there would
be no need to prove as to whether it had been earmarked or used
for common purposes.
7.
Shri Navare submitted that since the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 did
not exclude unutilized lands i.e. bachat lands, the said lands could not
be given back to the respondent-landowners. He submitted that before
the High Court, the only claim raised by the respondent-landowners
was qua land reserved for the income of the Gram Panchayat as
well as land which had been reserved for common purposes but
had not been utilized. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that all
such lands which had been reserved for common purposes vested
with the Gram Panchayat and further that, the concomitant Rule
16(ii) of the Consolidation Rules would cover all such lands which
had been taken over for common purposes as per the consolidation
scheme under the Consolidation Act of 1948. Therefore, Shri Navare
submitted, the High Court had erred in holding that bachat lands
not reserved for common use would remain with the proprietors in
proportion to their contribution.
8.
Shri Navare further submitted that Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 did
not alter or affect the rights of the respondent-landowners, as their
ownership had already been extinguished under the Consolidation
Act of 1948 and its concomitant Rules upon the finalization of the
consolidation proceedings thereunder. He submitted that the Haryana
Act No. 9 of 1992, enacted as an agrarian reform to strengthen
Gram Panchayat control, is merely clarificatory and does not divest
proprietors of any ownership rights and therefore, it would not be hit
by the rigours of Articles 31-A and 300A of the Constitution of India.
9.
With regard to the decision of this Court in Bhagat Ram and Others
v. State of Punjab and Others7, Shri Navare submitted that the
judgment supports the proprietors only to the extent that land cannot
be reserved solely to generate income for the Gram Panchayat.
However, he submitted that this Court deliberately refrained from
ordering the return of land to proprietors to avoid disrupting the
consolidation scheme under the Consolidation Act of 1948. He
7
1966 SCC OnLine SC 264 : [1967] 2 SCR 165
[2025] 9 S.C.R.
1025
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
submitted that returning bachat land to the proprietors would cause
fragmentation and reverse the landholding structure to a pre-1948
scenario, which the Act expressly prohibits. Therefore, he submitted,
what the Supreme Court consciously avoided in Bhagat Ram (supra)
could not have been directed by the High Court. To substantiate
his contention, Shri Navare placed reliance on the decisions of this
Court in the cases of Sarat Chandra Mishra and Others. v. State
of Orissa and Others8, Ramesh Chand Daga v. Rameshwari
Bai9 and Gajraj Singh and Others v. State of U.P. and Others10
to submit that a judgment cannot be read as a statute and it may be
presumed that the same has been rendered in accordance with law.
10. In the result, Shri Navare submitted that the civil appeals deserve
to be allowed and the High Court's order ought to be set aside only
to the extent that it directs the cancellation of mutations made in
the appellant's favour.
11. Per contra, Shri Manoj Swarup, learned Senior Counsel, appearing
on behalf of some of the respondent-landowners submitted that
the concerned land has been in their possession and under their
cultivation from the very inception. As such, he submitted that, the
respondent-landowners are the absolute owners of the land and
they could not have been deprived of their proprietary rights without
acquisition of the land through due process of law.
12. Shri Swarup submitted that the insertion of Clause 2(g)(6) with the
Explanation in the 1961 Act, by way of the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992,
arbitrarily expanded the definition of 'shamilat deh'. He submitted
that the land of the respondent-landowners was neither reserved
under the provisions of Section 18 of the Consolidation Act of 1948
for utilization for common purposes nor used for common purposes,
but remained under their cultivation making them the absolute owners
of the land. He, therefore, submitted that the amendment amounts
to compulsory acquisition without compensation, thereby violating
Article 31-A of the Constitution of India.
13. He further submitted that the unutilized land i.e. bachat land ought
to be revested with the respondent-landowners as such land does
8
(2006) 1 SCC 638
9
(2005) 4 SCC 772
10
(2001) 5 SCC 762
1026
[2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
not fall within the ambit of 'shamilat deh'. He submitted that the
management and control of the bachat land would also not vest with
the Gram Panchayat under the provisions of Sections 18 and 23-A
of the Consolidation Act of 1948 and Rule 16(ii) of the Concomitant
Consolidation Rules. The learned Senior Counsel further clarified
that before the High Court, the respondent-landowners had only
joined issues with regard to unutilized lands, since after an exchange
of affidavits, the appellant-State had taken a similar stance. He,
therefore, submitted that since the land has neither been utilized
nor reserved for any specific common purpose, it ought to revest
with the proprietors. To bolster his submission, Shri Swarup placed
reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhagat Ram
(supra) which has been relied upon by the High Court in the impugned
judgment and final order.
14. Even insofar as the direction of the High Court with regard to vesting
of utilized or unutilized land with the Gram Panchayat is concerned,
Shri Swarup submitted that it has been set aside by a judgment
passed by a 5-Judge Bench of the High Court dated 22nd July 2016
in Suraj Bhan and Others v. State of Haryana and Another in
CWP No. 314 of 2001, which has otherwise upheld the judgment of
the Full Bench impugned before us, in toto.
15. Shri Swarup, in the result, submitted that decision of the High Court
be upheld and the civil appeals be dismissed with costs.
16. Shri Narender Hooda, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
some of the respondent-landowners submitted that though the right to
property is no more a fundamental right, it is still a constitutional right.
It is submitted that in view of the law laid down by this Court in the
cases of Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab and Another11 and Bhagat
Ram (supra), the land cannot be acquired where the beneficiary is
the State. He submits that where the reservation of land is for the
purpose of generating revenue for the State, it constitutes taking
away the land for the State and attracts protection granted under the
second proviso to Article 31A of the Constitution mandating payment
of compensation at market value. It is, therefore, submitted that the
High Court has rightly considered this legal position and held that
the lands which are not earmarked for a particular purpose would
revest in the proprietors.
11
1966 SCC OnLine SC 192 : [1967] 2 SCR 143
[2025] 9 S.C.R.
1027
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
17. Shri Hooda further submitted that the Constitution Bench of this Court
in the case of K.T. Plantation Private Limited and Another v. State
of Karnataka12 has reaffirmed the legal position that even after the
deletion of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution of India, the
deprivation of a property of a citizen must conform to foundational
constitutional requirements. He submits that the Constitution Bench
of this Court has clearly held that the public purpose is a precondition
for deprivation of a person from his property under Article 300-A
and that the State has to justify both - the public purpose as well
as compensation for such deprivation.
18. He submits that the Constitution Bench has further held that the
statutes authorizing deprivation of property are amenable to judicial
review, and must satisfy constitutional standards of non-arbitrariness,
proportionality, and the rule of law.
19. Shri Hooda further submitted that the Constitution Bench held
that though a full market value compensation may be no longer a
constitutional mandate, the obligation to pay compensation - whether
nominal, partial or otherwise - still exists. He further submitted that
such a compensation has to be "just, fair and reasonable" within the
meaning of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
20. Shri Hooda further submitted that this Court in the Constitution Bench
Judgments in the cases of Ranjit Singh and Others v. State of
Punjab and Others13, Ajit Singh (supra) and Bhagat Ram (supra)
on an interpretation of the Consolidation Act of 1948, in unequivocal
terms, held that the lands whose possession was never given in
implementation of the Consolidation Scheme do not vest in the Gram
Panchayat but continue to belong to the original proprietors. It has
further been held that such lands which have not been earmarked
for any specific purpose under the Scheme, which are commonly
known as bachat lands, must revert to the proprietors. He submitted
that the doctrine of stare decisis, when the aforesaid legal position
has been in vogue for a long period, would not permit the same to
be reversed.
12
(2011) 9 SCC 1
13
1964 SCC OnLine SC 182 : [1965] 1 SCR 82
1028
[2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
21. Shri Hooda further submitted that the Consolidation proceedings in
the State of Haryana happened in and around 1960. It is submitted
that, over the past 65 years, the possession of the bachat land
remained undisturbed, despite earmarking, with the proprietors. He
submitted that in some instances, the original proprietors remained
in settled occupation. In many cases, bona fide transactions
have taken place through registered sale deeds. In several other
instances, statutory authorities have effected partitions between
joint owners and/or vendees. It is submitted that these persons
have invested labour, capital and generations of time on the footing
that their possession was lawful and secure. He submitted that,
disturbing such long-settled rights would be manifestly unjust.
He, therefore, submits that it would be just and necessary in the
interests of justice that even if such bachat lands are earmarked
for some purposes but their possession has not been taken for
long years, they need to be protected, and such lands need to be
revested in the proprietors.
22. Shri Rameshwar Singh Malik, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of some of the other respondent-proprietors submitted that,
the case of the respondent-proprietors is squarely covered by the
decisions of this Court in the cases of Ajit Singh (supra), Bhagat
Ram (supra) and State of Punjab v. Gurjant Singh14.
23. In light of the same, he submitted that the civil appeals be dismissed
and the States of Punjab and Haryana and the UT of Chandigarh
be directed to re-partition the bachat land amongst the respondentproprietors in the same proportion in which they had contributed
their land during the consolidation proceedings.
III.
CONSIDERATIONS
(a) Consideration of the Constitution Bench Judgments of
this Court in Ranjit Singh (supra), Ajit Singh (supra) and
Bhagat Ram (supra)
24. For considering the controversy, a reference to three Constitution
Bench Judgments of this Court would be necessary.
14
Civil Appeal Nos. 5709-5714 of 2001
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1029
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
25. The first one is in the case of Ranjit Singh (supra). In the said
case, the Constitution Bench of this Court was concerned with the
consolidation proceedings in which portions of land from those
commonly owned by the appellants therein as proprietors, had been
reserved for the village Panchayat and handed over to it for diverse
purposes; whereas, other portions had been reserved either for nonproprietors or for the common purposes of the villages. In the said
case, in the village Virk Kalan, 270 kanals and 13 marlas had been
given to the village Panchayat for management and realization of
income, even though the ownership was still shown in village papers
as 'shamilat deh' in the names of the proprietors; 10 kanals and 3
marlas had been reserved for abadi to be distributed among persons
entitled thereto, and 3 kanals and 7 marlas had been reserved for
manure pits. Similarly, in village Sewana, certain lands were set
apart for the village Panchayat for extension of the abadi and to
enable grants of certain land to be made to each family of nonproprietors and certain lands had been reserved for a primary school
and some more for a phirni. Similarly, in village Mehnd, land had
been reserved for the village Panchayat, a school, tanning ground,
hospital, cremation ground and for non-proprietors. The proprietors
were not paid compensation for the lands and as such, taking away
and allotment of the lands was the subject matter of challenge in
those appeals in the said case.
26. The appeals before this Court were heard and closed for judgment
on 27th April 1964. The judgment had to be postponed till after the
vacation. However, before the Court could reassemble after the
vacation on 20th July 1964, the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)
Act, 1964 received the assent of the President i.e. on 20th June,
1964. Vide the said Amendment, a new sub-clause (a) in clause (2)
of Article 31-A was substituted retrospectively and added a proviso
to clause (1). The appeals were set down to be mentioned on July
20/23, 1964, and counsel were asked if, in view of the amendment,
they wished to say anything. However, neither of parties wished to
argue. The appeals were thus decided on the old arguments, though
it was clear to the Court that the amendment of Article 31-A, which
had a far-reaching effect, and it must have affected one or other of
the parties. The Constitution Bench upheld the judgment of the High
Court which had held that the transfer of 'shamilat deh' owned by the
proprietors to the village Panchayat for the purposes of management
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Supreme Court Reports
and the conferral of proprietary rights on non-proprietors in respect
of lands in abadi deh was not ultra vires of Article 31 inasmuch as,
no compensation was payable.
27. It must be noted that the judgment of the High Court was rendered
by interpreting Article 31-A as it existed prior to the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. This Court though called upon
the parties to address the Court on the effect of the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, no arguments were advanced.
As such, in Ranjit Singh (supra), this Court did not have the occasion
to consider the effect of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)
Act, 1964 by which the second proviso was added to Article 31-A
of the Constitution of India. In that view of the matter, the judgment
of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ranjit Singh (supra) will
not have a bearing on the present matter.
28. In the case of Ajit Singh (supra), again the challenge was to the
scheme made under the provisions of the Consolidation Act of 1948.
One of the grounds raised before the High Court as well as this
Court was that the compensation must be paid to the appellant for
the land reserved in the scheme for various purposes in accordance
with the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) inserted by the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964.
29. It will be relevant to refer to the following paragraphs in Ajit Singh
(supra):
"6. Coming now to the third point raised by Mr Iyenger, we
may first mention that it was held by this Court in Ranjit
Singh v. State of Punjab [(1965) 1 SCR 82] that the Act was
protected from challenge by Article 31-A. It is necessary to
set out the relevant constitutional provisions. The relevant
portion of Article 31-A reads as under:
"31-A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained
in Article 13, no law providing for-
(a) the acquisition by the State of any
estate or of any rights therein or the
extinguishment or modification of any
such rights..........
shall be deemed to be void on the
ground that it is inconsistent with, or
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The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
takes away or abridges any of the
rights conferred by Article 14, Article
19 or Article 31:
Provided that * * *
Provided further that where any
law makes any provision for the
acquisition by the State of any estate
and where any land comprised therein
is held by a person under his personal
cultivation, it shall not be lawful for
the State to acquire any portion of
such land as is within the ceiling limit
applicable to him under any law for
the time being in force or any building
or structure standing thereon or
appurtenant thereto, unless the law
relating to the acquisition of such
land, building or structure, provides
for payment of compensation at a
rate which shall not be less than the
market value thereof.
(2)(b) the expression 'rights' in relation
to an estate shall include any rights
vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor,
under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat,
under-raiyat or other intermediary and
any rights or privileges in respect of
land revenue."
Relevant portions of Articles 19 and
31 may also be set out because the
learned counsel have laid stress on
the language employed therein.
"19. (1) All citizens shall have the right-
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of
property.
31. (1) No person shall be deprived of
his property save by authority of law.
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Supreme Court Reports
(2) No property shall be compulsorily
acquired or requisitioned save for
a public purpose and save by
authority of a law which provides for
compensation for the property so
acquired or requisitioned and either
fixes the amount of the compensation
or specifies the principles on which,
and the manner in which, the
compensation is to be determined
and given; and no such law shall be
called in question in any court on
the ground that the compensation
provided by that law is not adequate.
(2-A) Where a law does not provide
for the transfer of the ownership or
right to possession of any property to
the State or to a corporation owned or
controlled by the State, it shall not be
deemed to provide for the compulsory
acquisition or requisitioning of
property, notwithstanding that it
deprives any person of his property."
7. It would be noticed that Article 31-A(1)(a) mentions
four categories; first acquisition by the State of an estate;
second, acquisition by the State of rights in an estate;
third, the extinguishment of rights in an estate, and,
fourthly, the modification of rights in an estate. These four
categories are mentioned separately and are different.
In the first two categories the State "acquires" either an
estate or rights in an estate. In other words, there is a
transference of an estate or the rights in an estate to the
State. When there is a transference of an estate to the
State, it could be said that all the rights of the holder of
the estate have been extinguished. But if the result in the
case of the extinguishment is the transference of all the
rights in an estate to the State, it would properly fall within
the expression "acquisition by the State of an estate".
Similarly, in the case of an acquisition by the State of a
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The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
right in an estate it could also be said that the rights of
the owner have been modified since one of the rights of
the owner has been acquired.
8. It seems to us that there is this essential difference
between "acquisition by the State" on the one hand and
"modification or extinguishment of rights" on the other
that in the first case the beneficiary is the State while in
the latter case the beneficiary of the modification or the
extinguishment is not the State. For example, suppose the
State is the landlord of an estate and there is a lease of
that property, and a law provides for the extinguishment
of leases held in an estate. In one sense it would be
an extinguishment of the rights of a lessee, but it would
properly fall under the category of acquisition by the State
because the beneficiary of the extinguishment would be
the State.
9. Coming now to the second proviso to Article 31-A, it
would be noticed that only one category is mentioned in
the proviso, the category being "acquisition by the State of
an estate". It means that the law must make a provision for
the acquisition by the State of an estate. But what is the
true meaning of the expression "acquisition by the State
of an estate". In the context of Article 31-A, the expression
"acquisition by the State of an estate" in the second proviso
to Article 31-A(1) must have the same meaning as it has
in clause (1)(a) to Article 31-A. It is urged on behalf of the
respondents before us that the expression "acquisition
by the State of any estate" in Article 31-A(1)(a) has the
same meaning as it has in Article 31(2-A). In other words,
it is urged that the expression "acquisition by the State
of any estate" means transfer of the ownership or right
to possession of an estate to the State. Mr. Iyengar on
the other hand urges that the expression "acquisition by
the State" has a very wide meaning and it would bear
the same meaning as was given by this Court in State of
West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose [(1964) SCR 587] ,
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning &
Weaving Co. Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791 : (1954) SCR 674]
Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. [(1955) 1 SCR 707] and
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Supreme Court Reports
Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of
Bombay [(1958) SCR 1122] . In these cases this Court
had given a wide meaning to the word "acquisition". In
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning &
Weaving Co. Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791 : (1954) SCR 674]
Mahajan, J., observed at p. 704 as follows:
"The word 'acquisition' has quite a wide concept,
meaning the procuring of property or the taking
of it permanently or temporarily. It does not
necessarily imply the acquisition of legal title by
the State in the property taken possession of."
He further observed at p. 705:
"I prefer to follow the view of the
majority of the Court, because
it seems to me that it is more in
consonance with juridical principle
that possession after all is nine-tenths
of ownership, and once possession
is taken away, practically everything
is taken away, and that in construing
the Constitution it is the substance
and the practical result of the act of
the State that should be considered
rather than its purely legal aspect."
Bose, J., observed at p. 734 as follows:
"In my opinion, the possession and
acquisition referred to in clause
(2) mean the sort of 'possession'
and 'acquisition' that amounts to
'deprivation' within the meaning of
clause (1). No hard and fast rule
can be laid down. Each case must
depend on its own facts. But if there
is substantial deprivation, then clause
(2) is, in my judgment, attracted. By
substantial deprivation I mean the sort
of deprivation that substantially robs a
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The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
man of those attributes of enjoyment
which normally accompany rights to,
or an interest in, property. The form is
unessential. It is the substance that
we must seek."
10. Let us now see whether the other part of the second
proviso throws any light on this question. It would be
noticed that it refers to ceiling limits. It is well known that
under various laws dealing with land reforms, no person
apart from certain exceptions can hold land beyond a
ceiling fixed under the law. Secondly, the proviso says
that not only the land exempted from acquisition should be
within the ceiling limit but it also must be under personal
cultivation. The underlying idea of this proviso seems to
be that a person who is cultivating land personally, which
is his source of livelihood, should not be deprived of that
land under any law protected by Article 31-A unless at
least compensation at the market rate is given. In various
States most of the persons have already been deprived
of land beyond the ceiling limit on compensation which
was less than the market value. It seems to us that in the
light of all the considerations mentioned above the words
"acquisition by the State" in the second proviso do not have
a technical meaning, as contended by the learned counsel
for the respondent. If the State has in substance acquired
all the rights in the land for its own purposes, even if the
title remains with the owner, it cannot be said that it is
not acquisition within the second proviso to Article 31-A.
11.