# The State of Lttar Pradesh v. Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co., Ltd •• and Another

- **Citation:** [1958] 1 S.C.R. 973
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1958
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals .Nos. 14 and 15 ·of 1955
- **Bench:** Bhagwati, Jafer Imam, Gajendragadkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-state-of-lttar-pradesh-v-swadeshi-cotton-mills-co-ltd-and-another-1448
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Industrial Dispute-Awards made beyond specified
time-Validity-Provision for· ~nlargement of time and
1957
November, 20.
1957
The State of
Lttar Pradesh
v.
Swadeshi Cotton
Mills Co., Ltd ••
and Another
974
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958 Ji
validation-Construction-Uttar Pradesh Industrial .Dis--
putes Act, 1947 (U.P. 27 of 1947), s. 6-A-Utta'I' Pradesh
Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance, 1953 (U.P.
Ordinance I of 1953) s. 3.
Clause 16 of the General Order No. 615 made by the
Governor on March 15, 1951, under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, provided that the decision of
the Tribunal or Adjudicator shall be pronounced within
40 days from the date of reference. By orders dated August
19, 1952, and January 20, 1953, the Governor referred two
industrial disputes for adjudication. The references did not
specify the time within which the awards were to be submitted but stated that the disputes were to be adjudicated
in accordance with the provisions of Order No. 615. In
the first reference the period for making the award was
extended from time to time up to March 10, 1953, but in
the second reference the time was not extended. On
February 18, 1953, before the awards were made, cl. 16 of
Order No. 615 was amended and the time of 40 days wns
altered to 180 days. The award in the first case was made
on April 17, 1953, beyond 180 days of the reference, and in
the second case on June 26, 1953, beyond 40 days of lhe
reference but within 180 days thereof. On May 22, 1953,
the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance, 1951, came into force which conferred, with retros~
pective effect, power on the State Government to enlarge,
from time to time, the period for making an award and
which also validated certain awards not made within the
time originally fixed for making them. The Labour
Appellate Tribunal held that the two awards were not valid
in law as they had not been made within time. It was
contended by the appellant that as cl. 16 of the Order
No. 615 had been amended the orders of reference must
be construed as specifying 180 days within which the awards
were to be submitted, and that, in any case, the awarde
were validated by s. 3 of the Ordinance.
Held, that the award in the first case was submitted
beyond time and was invalid and could not be validated
by s. 3 of the Ordinance but that the award in the second
case, though submitted beyond time, was validated by
s. 3 (2) of the Ordinance.
The Act required the awards to be submitted within a
specified time and although the orders of reference specified no time it was stated therein that the references were
to be decided in accordance with the provisions of Order
No. 615, and as such the orders must be read as specifying
40 days as the time within which the awards had to be
submitted. The subsequent amendment of cl. 16 whereby180 days were substituted for 40 days could not affect an
order of reference previously made a·s cl. 16, as amended.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
975
could not be held to have retrospective operation.
1!157
On a true construction of s. 3 of the Ordinance cl. (1)
The State of
must be held to validate all orders of extension of time
Utttu Pradesh
for submission of awards made prior to the commencement
v.
of the Ordinance,. cl. (3) applies to proceedings pending at Swadeshi Cotton
the commencement of the Ordinance and makes s. 6lA of Mills Co., Ltd.,
the Act, introduced by the Ordinance, applicable to such
and .Another
proceedings and cl. (2) validates awards against which no
judicial proceedings were pending at the commencement
of the Ordinance and not only awards which had become
final. Consequently, the award in the first case against
which an appeal had been filed before the commencement
of the Ordiilance and to which cl. (3) of s. 3 of the Ordinance applied was bad as it was made beyond the last
date of the enlargement of time. But the award in the
second case against which the appeal was filed after the
commencement of the Ordin

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
973
to record any judgment of acquittal or conviction.
1957
We, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside the
Sashi Mohan
judgment of the High Court and hold that the refer-Debnath and Other
-ence under s. 307 to the High Court was incompetent.
Th .. vt.t if
A
t.
h
.
h
t' 1
e .,, a e o
ques ion
as arisen as to w at consequen 1a
West Bengal
·order should be passed by this Court as the result of
Imam J.
-0ur conclusion that the reference under s. 307 to the
High Court was incompetent and the appeal succeeding. The High Court should have rejected the refer-
.ence as incompetent and remitted the case to the
Additional Sessions Judge for disposal according to
law. We emphasise the absolute need for making a
<:ompetent reference under s. 307 of the Code and the
-case being remitted to the Court making the reference
.as soon as :possible if an incompetent reference is made
in order to avoid legal complications, , unnecessary
waste of time and money and harassment to the ac-,
-cused. In this case the letter of reference is dated
.June 7, 1954, that is, more than three years ago. The
-occurrence took place on October 21, 1953. After such
lapse of time we will not order that the case be returned to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge
10f Alipur for disposal according to law, particularly
as we are informed that the Judge who made the reference to the High Court has retired from service and
it is doubtful whether, in law, his successor can at all
deal with the case. In the circumstances of this partiicular case, therefore, the only order which we pass is
:that the reference being incompetent is rejected.
Appeal allowed.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
v.
:M/S. SWADESHI COTTON MILLS CO., LTD.,
AND ANOTHER
(and connected appeal)
(BHAGWATI, JAFER IMAM and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Awards made beyond specified
time-Validity-Provision for· ~nlargement of time and
1957
November, 20.
1957
The State of
Lttar Pradesh
v.
Swadeshi Cotton
Mills Co., Ltd ••
and Another
974
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958 Ji
validation-Construction-Uttar Pradesh Industrial .Dis--
putes Act, 1947 (U.P. 27 of 1947), s. 6-A-Utta'I' Pradesh
Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance, 1953 (U.P.
Ordinance I of 1953) s. 3.
Clause 16 of the General Order No. 615 made by the
Governor on March 15, 1951, under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, provided that the decision of
the Tribunal or Adjudicator shall be pronounced within
40 days from the date of reference. By orders dated August
19, 1952, and January 20, 1953, the Governor referred two
industrial disputes for adjudication. The references did not
specify the time within which the awards were to be submitted but stated that the disputes were to be adjudicated
in accordance with the provisions of Order No. 615. In
the first reference the period for making the award was
extended from time to time up to March 10, 1953, but in
the second reference the time was not extended. On
February 18, 1953, before the awards were made, cl. 16 of
Order No. 615 was amended and the time of 40 days wns
altered to 180 days. The award in the first case was made
on April 17, 1953, beyond 180 days of the reference, and in
the second case on June 26, 1953, beyond 40 days of lhe
reference but within 180 days thereof. On May 22, 1953,
the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance, 1951, came into force which conferred, with retros~
pective effect, power on the State Government to enlarge,
from time to time, the period for making an award and
which also validated certain awards not made within the
time originally fixed for making them. The Labour
Appellate Tribunal held that the two awards were not valid
in law as they had not been made within time. It was
contended by the appellant that as cl. 16 of the Order
No. 615 had been amended the orders of reference must
be construed as specifying 180 days within which the awards
were to be submitted, and that, in any case, the awarde
were validated by s. 3 of the Ordinance.
Held, that the award in the first case was submitted
beyond time and was invalid and could not be validated
by s. 3 of the Ordinance but that the award in the second
case, though submitted beyond time, was validated by
s. 3 (2) of the Ordinance.
The Act required the awards to be submitted within a
specified time and although the orders of reference specified no time it was stated therein that the references were
to be decided in accordance with the provisions of Order
No. 615, and as such the orders must be read as specifying
40 days as the time within which the awards had to be
submitted. The subsequent amendment of cl. 16 whereby180 days were substituted for 40 days could not affect an
order of reference previously made a·s cl. 16, as amended.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
975
could not be held to have retrospective operation.
1!157
On a true construction of s. 3 of the Ordinance cl. (1)
The State of
must be held to validate all orders of extension of time
Utttu Pradesh
for submission of awards made prior to the commencement
v.
of the Ordinance,. cl. (3) applies to proceedings pending at Swadeshi Cotton
the commencement of the Ordinance and makes s. 6lA of Mills Co., Ltd.,
the Act, introduced by the Ordinance, applicable to such
and .Another
proceedings and cl. (2) validates awards against which no
judicial proceedings were pending at the commencement
of the Ordinance and not only awards which had become
final. Consequently, the award in the first case against
which an appeal had been filed before the commencement
of the Ordiilance and to which cl. (3) of s. 3 of the Ordinance applied was bad as it was made beyond the last
date of the enlargement of time. But the award in the
second case against which the appeal was filed after the
commencement of the Ordinance was validated by cl. (2)
of s. 3 of the Ordinance.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals
.Nos. 14 and 15 ·of 1955.
Appe~ls by special leave from the decision dated
September 30, 1953, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow in Civil Appeals Nos. III-198 of
1953 and III-321 of 1953.
S. S. Dnawan, G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the
appellants and respondent No. 2 (Unions) in oath the
Appeals.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India
and S. P. Varma, for the respondent No. 1 in C. A.
No. 14 of 1955.
N. C. Chatterjee and Radhey Lal Aggarwala,
for the respondent No. 1 in C. A: 15 of 55.
1957 .. November 20. The following Judgment of
the Court was delivered by
IMAM J.-These two appeals by special leave have
been heard together as they arise out of a single .judgment of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India,
Lucknow, dated September 30, 1953, passed in seven
appeals before it. As the question for consideration
in the appeals before this Court is the same, this judgment will govern both the appeals before us. Civil
Appeal Nos.' 14 and 15 of 1955 arise out of Appeal
Nos .. III-198 of 1953 and III-321 of 1953 respectively
before the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
Imam J.
976
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
19s1
The question for consideration before the Labour
The State •f Appellate Tribunal was whether the awards from
Uttor Pradt1h which the seven appeals had been filed before that
Swa4 ~·c 11
Tribunal were valid in law and made with jurisdicM//l:'c •. , ud.~ tion. It is this very question which arises in. the apand Anoth<r
peals before us.
1,,.,,m J.
Before dealing with the question raised in these
appeals it is necessary to state certain facts. On
March 15, 1951, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh made
a General Order consisting of numerous clauses under
powers conferred on him by els. (b), (c), (d) and (g)
of s. 3 and s. 8 of the Uttar Prll_desh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XXVIII of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the Act, in supersession of the general
Order No. 781 (L)/XVIII dated March 10, 1948. The
Order of March 15, 1951, was numbered 615 (LL)/
XVIII-7(LL) of 1951, hereinafter referred to as Order
No. 615. Under cl. 16 of Order No. 615, the decision
of the Tribunal or Adjudicator was to be pronounced
within 40 days, excluding holidays but not annual
vacations observed by courts subordinate to the High
Collrt, from the date of reference made tO it by the
State Government concerning any industrial dispute.
The proviso to it authorised the State Government to
extend the period for the submission of the award
from time to time. On February 18, 1953, this clause
was amended and the time of 40 days was altered to
180 days. On December 17, 1952, the judgment of
this Court in the case of Strawboard Manufacturing
Co., Ltd., v. Gutta Mm Workers' Union ( 1 ), was pronounced. In consequence of this decision the Act was
amended by the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1953 (Ordinance No. 1 of
1953), hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, promulgated by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh. The
Ordinance came into force on May 22, 1953. By the
provisions of s. 2 of the Ordinance s. 6-A was introduced into the Act. Section 2 of the Ordinance states :
"After section 6 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Principal
(I) [19S3) S. C.R. 439.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
977
Act), the following shall and be deemed always to
have been added as section 6-A.
"6-A. Enlargement of time for submission of
awards. Where any period is specified in any order
made under or in pursuance of this Act referring any
industrial dispute for adjudication within which the
award shall be made, declared or submitted, it shall
be competent for the State Government, from time to
time, to -enlarge such period even though the period
originally fixed or enlarged may have expired."
Section 3 of the Ordinance states :
"Removal of doubts and validation-For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that :
(1) any order of enlargement referred to in section 6-A made prior to the commencement of this Ordinance under the Principal Act or any order passed
thereunder which would have been validly and properly made under the Principal Act if section 6-A had
been part of the Act shall be deemed to be and to have
been validly and properly made thereunder;
(2) no award whether delivered before or after
the commencemertt of this Ordinance in any industrial dispute referred prior to the said commencement
for adjudication under the Principal Act shall be invalid on the ground merely that the period originally
specified or any enlargement thereof had already expired at the date of the making, declaring or submitting of the award and any action or proceeding taken,
direction issued or jurisdiction exercised in pursuance
of or upon such award be good and valid in law as
if section 6-A had been in force at all material dates;
(3) every proceeding pending at the commencement of this Ordinance before any court or tribunal
against an award shall be decided as if the provisions
of section 6-A had been in force at all material dates."
The following chart will show the date of reference,
the date on which the period of 40 days expired, the
dates and the periods of enlargement, the date of submission of the award and the date of filing of the
appeal, in the seven appeals before the Labour Appellate Tribunal;
1957
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
v.
Swadeshi Cotton
Mills Co., Ltd.,
and Another
Imam J.
x9s1
Th~·Sitlte .~!
'tJttdT·Pi'iiae~h
-~.
' '
SUPREl\IE 'COURT REPORTS
in the order. Order No. 615 was a general order made
by virtuA of these provisions. Clause 10 of that Order
authorized the State Government to refer any dispute
to the Industrial Tribunal or if the State Government,
'SiiiaatsliiCOiion considering the nature of the dispute or the con-
. ·'J.!iu.ca:. iii. veriience of the party, so decided, to any other person
'oiii!1nolhh
specifieu in tnat behalf for .adjudication. Clause 16
s{fecified the time. \vithin .which the decision of the
Tribunal or the Adjudicator had to be pronO'on:ced,
·provided the State Government could extend the
period from tiine to time. ' Section. 6(1) of the Act
specifically stated that when :an authority to which an
industrial dispute had been referred for: award ·or
adjudicaticin had completed its enquiry, it should, within such time as may be specified, submit its award to
the State Goverifrnent. It wo'uld appear therefore, that
the Act required the submission of the award to be made
within a specified time, which time, in the absence of
a special order of reference· of an industrial dispute
. -for conciliation or adjudication under s. 3 of the Act,
would be determined by' the provisions of a general
. 'order ·made by the Government in that behalf. An
order of reference of an industrial dispute for adjudication ·without specifying the time within which the
award had to be submitted would be an invalid order
of reference. ·In fact, the orders of reference in the
- cases under appeal specified no time within which the
award had to be submitted. ·All that they directed was
that the dispute shall be adjudfoated in accordance
_ with the .provisiiins of Order No. 615. If these orders
of iefererice are read along with cl. 16 ·of Order
No. 615, then it must be deemed that they specified the
time within which the award had to be submitted as
40 days from the dates of reference.
. .
The proV:iso to cl. 16 of Order No. 615 empiiwering the State Government to extend the period from
time to time within which the award had to be ·sub-
.. ·mitted was found to be an invalid provision, having
cregard to s. 6(1) of the Act, by this Court in the case
·of Strawboard J,Janujacturing Co. Ltd. v. ·Gulla :Mill
'Workers' Union('). If the matter had stood there
'(i) '[i9s3J S.C.R.'439.
'
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
979
The Labour Appellate Tribunal found that the award
in appeal No. III-198 of 1953 was made not only on
the expiry of the period of enlargement but also long
after the expiry of 180 days from the date of reference.
In the case of the other appeals the awards were made
on the expiry of 40 days but within 180 days of the
reference. Appeals Nos. III-321 and 323 of 1953 were
filed after the commencement· of the Ordinance and
the others before its commencement.
In the case of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co., Ltd.
(Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1955), the Governor by an
order dated August 19, 1952, referred the dispute
between the said Mills and its workmen to the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer, Kanpur for adjudication, on the issue stated therein, in accordance
with the provisions of Order No. 615. In the case of
Kamlapat Motilal Sugar Mills (Civil Appeal No. 15 of
1955), the Governor by his order dated January 28,
1953, referred the dispute between the said Mills and
its workmen, on the issue mentioned therein, to the
Regional Conciliation Officer, Lucknow for adjud,ica-
. tion in accordance with the provisions of Order No.
615. In both these orders of reference no date was
specified within" which the Regional Conciliation
Officers of Kanpur and Lucknow were· to submit their
awards. All that was stated in these orders was that
they shall adjudicate the dispute in accordance with
the provisions of Order No. 615. It is only by reference to cl. 16 of 01'.der No. 61f) that it is possible to
say that the decisions of these Conciliation Officers
were to be pronounced within the time specified in the
• Orders of reference and that would be 40 days from
the date of reference. In the case of the Swadeshi
Cotton Mills, there were several periods of enlargement of time but in the case of the Kamlapat Motilal
Sugar Mills there was no enlargement of time, as will
appear from the above-mentioned chart.
Under s. 3 of the Act the State Government, for
the purposes mentioned therein, could, by general or
special order, make provisions for appointing Industrial Courts and for referring any industrial dispute
1957
The State of
Uttlll' Pradesh
v.
Swadeshi CottotP
Mills Co.,.Lld.,
and Another
Imam.I.
980
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1957
for conciliation or adjudication in the manner providTire state of ed in the order. Order No. 615 was a general order
Uttar Pradesh made by virtue of these provisions. Clause 10 of that
s ad, ;: c
Order authorized the State Government to refer any
;;m,"c;., £:~~ dispute to the Industrial Tribunal or if the State Govand Another
ernment, considering the nature of the dispute or the
Imam J.
convenience of the party, so decided, to any other
person specified in that behalf for adjudication. Clause
16 specified the time within which the decision of the
Tribunal or the Adjudicator had to be pronounced,
provided the State Government could extend the
period from time to time. Section 6(1) of the Act
specifically stated that when an authority to which an
industrial dispute had been referred for award or adjudication had completed its enquiry, it should, within
.such time as may be specified, submit its award to
the State Government. It would appear therefore,
that the Act required the submission of the award to
be made within a specified time, which time, in the
absence of a special order of reference of an industrial
dispute for conciliation or adjudication under s. 3 of
the Act, would be determined by the provisions of a
general order made by the Government in that behalf.
An order of reference of an industrial dispute for adjudication without specifying the time within which
the award had to be submitted would be an invalid
order of reference. In fact, the orders of reference in
the cases under appeal specified no time within which
the award had to be submitted. All that they directed
was that the dispute shall be adjudicated in accordance
with the provisions of Order No. 615. If these orders
of reference are read along with cl. 16 of Order No.
615, then it must be deemed that they specified the
time within which the award had to be submitted as
40 days from the dates of reference.
The proviso to cl. 16 of Order No. 615 empowering the State Government to extend the period from
time to time within which the award had to be submitted was found to be an invalid provision, having
regard to s. 6(1) of the Act, by this Court in the case
of Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd., v. Gutta Mm
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
981
"\Vorkers' Union ( ·1). If the matter had stood there
only, the awards, having been submitted beyond forty
days from the dates of.reference, would be invalid as
the periods of extension granted from time to time by
the State Government for their submission could not
be taken "into consideration. The Act, however, was
amended by the Ordinance and s. 6-A was added to the
Act and according to the provisions of s. 2 of the Ordinance, s. 6-A of the Act must be deemed to have formed a part of the Act at the time of its enactment.
Section 6(1) and s. 6-A of the Act must therefore be
read together. Section 6(1) of the Act specifically
stated that the award must be submitted within a specified date in an industrial dispute referred for adjudication after the completion of the enquiry. Under s.
6-A, however, the State Government was empowered
from time to time to enlarge the period even though
the period originally fixed or enlarged might have expired. The orders of reference in these appeals, as
stated above, specified 40 days within which the
awards had to be submitted. The State Government
could, however, enlarge the periods within which the
awards had to be submitted under s. 6-A by issuing
other orders in the case of each reference extending
the time within which the awards had to be submitted.
Admittedly, no such order was, in fact, passed in the
case which is the subject of Civil Appeal No. 15 of
1955, and in the case which is the subject of Civil
Appeal No. 14 of 1955, although orders extending the
time for the submission of the award were made and
the last order extended the time to March 10, 1953,
yet the award was submitted on May 13, 1953. The
awards in these cases were, therefore, made in the one
case ·beyond the time specified in the order of reference and in the other beyond the extended period
within which the award had to be submitted.
It was urged on behalf of the appellant, the State
of Uttar Pradesh, that as cl. 16 of Order No. 615 had
been amended whereby 180 instead of 40 days had
been provided as the period within which an award
(1) [1953] S.C.R. 439.
1951
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
v.
Swadeshi Cotlotr
Mills Co., Ltd.,
and Another
Imam/.
982
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
19;1
had to be submitted, the orders of reference in the
The State of · cases before us must be construed as specifying 180
Vttar Pradesh days within which the awards had to be submitted.
5 ad ;: c
In other words, cl. 16, although amended on February
Mills"c!., 'L~~: 18, 1953, was retrospective in operation. Order No.
and Another
615 is a general order under which conciliation boards
Imam 1.
and industrial tribunals may be set up to deal with
industrial disputes. It is true that cl. 16 enjoins that
the decisions by the tribunal or the adj'udicator must
be pronounced within a specified number of days but
this is a general direction. An order of reference is a
.special order. It could have stated the manner in
which the industrial dispute was to be adjudicated and
it could also have specified the time within which the
.decision had to be pronounced. As the orders of reference in the cases before us merely stated that they
were to be decided in accordance with the provisions
of Order No. 615, the disputes had to be adjudicated
in the manner so provided and the order.s of reference
must, accordingly, be read as having specified 40 days
as the time within which the awards had to be submitted. Subsequent amendment of cl. 16, whereby 180
days instead of 40 days was provided as the time within which the award had to be submitted, could not
affect an order of reference previously made according to which the award had to be submitted within
-40 days. We cannot agree with the submission made
on behalf of the appellant that cl. 16, as amended,
must be given retrospective effect and the orders of
reference previously issued must be regarded as specifying the time of 180 days for the submission of the
awards. Section 6(1) of the Act is to the effect that
the authority to which an industrial dispute has been
referred for adjudication must submit its award within
.such time as may be specified. This section read
with s .. 6-A of the Act, on a proper interpretation of
their provisions, makes it clear that the time within
which the award shall be submitted is the period specified in the order of reference. Mere amendment of
cl. 16 would not, therefore, affect the period already
specified in the order of reference. It seems to us,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
983
therefore, that the amendment to cl 16 did not materially affect the position and the awards in the cases
before us had to be submitted within 40 days from the
dates of the orders of reference or within the enlarged
time for the submission of the awards.
What is the effect of s. 3 of the. Ordinance is a matter which now remains to be considered. This section
purported to remove doubts and to validate orders of
extension of time for the submission of an award. It
also purported to validate certain awards. There is
no difficulty in construing cl. (l) of this section. It
validates all orders of extension made prior to the
commencement of the Ordinance as if s. 6-A of the Act
had been a part of the Act always. In other words,
orders of extension of time made under the general
order, promulgated under s. 3 of the Act, would be
regarded as made under s. 6-A. Clause (3) of s. 3 of
the Ordinance also does not present any difficulty in
construing its provisions. It directs that every proceeding pending before any Court or Tribunal .at the
commencement of the Ordinance against an award
shall be decided as if s. 6-A of the Act had been in force
at all material dates. Clauses ( 1) and ( 3) of this section merely re-emphasise the provisions of s. 6-A of
the Act, which, in our opinion, are clear enough even
in the absence of the aforesaid clauses.
It is cl. (2) of s. 3 of the Ordinance which requires
careful examination. Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that cl. (2) was sufficiently wide in its
terms to include all awards and not merely awards
which had become final as held by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The words at the end of the clause
"as if s. 6-A had been in force at all material dates"
were redundant and they should be ignored. Indeed,
according to him, there was no need for the existence
of cl. (3) in view of the provisions of cl. (2). Clause
(2) validated all awards whether made before or. after
the commencement of the Ordinance even if the period
specified within which they were to be submitted or
any enlargement thereof had already expired in so far
as they could not be questioned merely on that ground
1957
The Stale of
·Uttar Pradesh
v.
Swadeshi Cotton
Mll/8 Co., Ltd.,
and .Another
Imam J.
1957
'11le State of
Uttar Pradesh
v.
Swadeshi Cottott
Mills Co., Ltd.,
and Another
Imam J.
984
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
alone and this would cover even a proceeding pending
in any Court or Tribunal at the commencement of the
Ordinance against an award.
Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, appearing for respondent No.
1, in Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1955, contended that the
Labour Appellate Tribunal took the correct view
that cl. (2) of s. 3 of the Ordinance covered cases where
the awards had become final. He further developed
his argument in support of the decision of that Tribunal on the following lines. Such clarification, as
was sought to be made, by s. 3 of the Ordinance must
be construed in relation to s. 6-A of the Act and not
independently of it. If an award were made outside
the ambit of s. 6-A then the whole of s. 3 of the Ordinance could not apply to such a case. Section 3(1)
of the Ordinance validated all orders of enlargement
of time which were made prior to the commencement
of the Ordinance. Such orders should be deemed to
have been validly made as if s. 6-A had been a part of
the Act. Section 3(2) of the Ordinance was enacted
to prevent the validity of an award being questioned
when it had been submitted after the specified period
for its submission or any enlargement thereof. The
words "as if section 6-A had been in force at all material dates" merely connote that there must be an
order of enlargement made by the Government in the
exercise of its powers under s. 6-A of the Act. Section 3(2) of the Ordinance had no application to a case
where an award was made independently of the exercise of the powers of the Government under s. 6-A.
Section 3(2) and (3) of the Ordinance were subservient to s. 6-A of the Act.
The Tribunal apparently took the view that there
was repugnance between sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 3
of the Ordinance and so it made an attempt to ave1t
that repugnance by putting an artificial restriction on
the scope of sub-s. (2) of s. 3. In holding that s. 3(2)
applied only to awards that have become final, the
Tribunal overlooked the fact that this sub-section referred to awards which may be made even after the
commencement of the Ordinance and it is not easy to
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
985
appreciate how finality could be said to aitach to these
awards on the date when the Ordinance was promul1955
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
v.
-gated. The Tribunal also felt impressed by the argument that if s. 6-A applied to appeals or proceedings
against awards pending at the date of the commencement of the Ordinance, there Was no reason why the
same provision should not apply to appeals or proceedings which may be taken against the awards after the
commencement of the Ordinance. In giving expression to this view, however, the Tribunal clearly overlooked the fact thats. 3(3) is deliberately confined to
proceedings against an award pending at the commencement of the Ordinance and no others.
Swadeshi Co/loll
Mills Co., Ltd.,
and AllOther
There can be little doubt, in our opinion, that the
main purpose of the Ordinance was to validate orders
of extension of time within which an award had to be
submitted as well as to prevent its validity being
questioned merely on the ground that it had been submitted beyond the specified time or any enlargement
thereof. Apart from an order of extension of time
the Ordinance purported to deal with at least three
situations so far ·as the submission of an award was
concerned. One was where an award was submitted before the commencement of the Ordinance and against
which no proceeding was pending before any Court or
Tribunal at the commencement of the Ordinance; another was where an award was submitted after the
Ordinance came into force. These cases were dealt
with by cl. (2) of s. 3 of the Ordinance. The third
was the case where an award was submitted before
the commencement of the Ordinance against which a
proceeding was pending before a Court or a Tribunal
before the Ordinance came into force. Section 3(3)
of the Ordinance was so drafted that it should not interfere with judicial proceedings already pending
against an award. It merely directed that such a proceeding mu~t be decided as if s. 6-A had been a part of
the Act from the date of its enactment. Where, however, no judicial proceedings against an award were
pending it was the intention of the Ordinance that the
125
LISup. Court-7
Imam J.
986
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958J
1957
award shall npt be questioned merely on the ground
ne State of that it was submitted after the specified period for its
Uttar Prode1h submission or any enlargement thereof. Although s.
s ode ~c
3(2) of the Ordinance is not happily worded and ap-
,:;llb co .. z:~:n pears to have been the result of hasty legislation, we
"""Another
think, that upon a reasonable construction of its proImam J.
visions its meaning is clear and there is no real conflict between its provisions and the provisions of cl.
(3) of the section. The words "as if section 6-A had
been in force at,all material dates" have to be given
some meaning and they canno.t be regarded as redundant as suggested on behalf cif the appellants. GrammatiCally they should be regarded as referring to any
action or proceeding taken, direction issued or j urisdiction exercised in pursuance of or upon an award,
Section 6-A of the Act, however, has nothing to do
with this.and these words cannot apply to that part of
the clause. These words also cannot refer to a case
where the award has been made beyond the specified
period and in which there has bee.n no order of enlargement of time as s. 6-A of the Act does not apply to
such a case. The words in question, therefore, can
only apply to that part of the clause which refers to
an enlargement of time for the submission of the
award, which is the only purpose of s. 6-A of the
Act. In our opinion, if s. 3(2) of the Ordinance is
read in this way an intelligible meaning is given to it
which is consistent with s. 6-A of the Act and not in
conflict withs. 3(3) of the Ordinance. The awards
referred to in s. 3(2) are awards against which no
judicial proceeding was pending at the commencement of the Ordinance. In our opinion, the provisions
of s. 3(2) and (3) are not in conflict with each other.
We cannot accept the view of the .Labour Appellate
Tribunal thats. 3(2) refers only to awards that had
become final.
Having construed the provisions of s. 3 of the Ordinance, it is now necessary to deal specifically with the
appeals before us. Appeal No. 111-198/53 of the
Labour Appellate Tribunal, out of which Civil Appeal
No. 14 of 1955 arises, was filed before the commence-
S.C.R.
SUPREM'.E COURT REPORTS
987
ment of the Ordinance and by vjrtue of s. 3(3) of the
Ordinance the appeal had to be decided as if the provisions of s. 6-A had been in force at all material
dates. To such an appeal the provisions of cl. (2) of
s. 3 of the Ordinance would not apply. This ap!*al
would, therefore, be governed by cl. (3). As in this
case, the award had been submitted on May, 13, 1953,
and the last date of enlargement gave titne for the
submission of the award up to March 10, 1953, the
award was submitted beyond titne and, therefore, was
invalid as having been made without jurisdiction.
In Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1955, arising out of
Appeal No; 111.:.321 of 1953 of the .Labour Appellate
Tribunal, the appeal was filed before thai Tribunal
· afte:rthe commencement of the Ordinance. The award
was submitted long after the period, namely, 40 days,
within which it had to be submitted and there were
no'orders-of enlargement of time. Section 3(2) of the
Ordinance and nots. 3(3) would, therefore, apply to
this appeal. The award in this case consequently has
been validated by virtue of-the provisions-of s. 3(2) of
the Ordinance and its validity cannot be questioned
merely on the ground that it was submitted.· after the
period within which it should have been submitted.
In the-result, Civil Appeal No. 14of1955 is dismisseci'with costs and Civil Appeal No. 15 ot1955 iS allow•
ed with costs and the decision of the Labour Appellate
Tribup.al in Appeal No. III-321/53 before it is set
aside.
Appeal No. 14 of 1955 dismissed.
Appeal No. 15 of 1955 allowed;
19S7
77re State of
Uttar Pradesh
v.
Swadeshi Cotton
MUii Co., Ltd.,
allll Another
Imam J.