# The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 261
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-02-24
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2012
- **Bench:** J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-v-balveer-singh-38788
- **Pages:** 82

## Headnote

Does the Evidence Act, 1872 prescribe any particular age as a
determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent witness;
Does the Evidence Act treat evidence of a child on the same footing
as any other witness; Before the evidence of the child witness is
recorded, is it necessary for the Trial Court to record its opinion and
satisfaction that the child witness understands the duty of speaking
the truth; Whether the Court should apply s.106 of the Evidence Act
in criminal cases with care and caution; Does s.106 of the Evidence
Act absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was
committed; In the instant case, whether the High Court committed
any error in acquitting the respondent of offences u/ss. 302, 201,
and 34 of Penal Code, 1860.
Headnotes†
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.118 - No prescription of any particular
age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a
competent one:
Held: The Evidence Act does not prescribe any particular age as a
determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one - On
the contrary, s.118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all persons
shall be competent to testify, unless the court considers that they
are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or
from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender
years, extreme old age, disease - whether of mind, or any other
cause of the same kind - A child of tender age can be allowed to
testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and
give rational answers thereto. [Para 26]
* Author
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
837
The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh
Evidence Act, 1872 - Principles pertaining to the appreciation
of evidence of a child witness - Discussed. [Para 34]
Evidence Act, 1872 - Child witness is deemed to be on the
same footing as any other witness - Precaution needs to be
taken by the Court:
Held: The evidence of a child witness for all purposes is deemed
to be on the same footing as any other witness as long the child
is found to be competent to testify - The only precaution which
the court should take while assessing the evidence of a child
witness is that such witness must be a reliable one due to the
susceptibility of children by their falling prey to tutoring - However,
this in no manner means that the evidence of a child must be
rejected outrightly at the slightest of discrepancy, rather what is
required is that the same is evaluated with great circumspection -
While appreciating the testimony of a child witness the courts are
required to assess whether the evidence of such witness is its
voluntary expression and not borne out of the influence of others
and whether the testimony inspires confidence - At the same time,
one must be mindful that there is no rule requiring corroboration
to the testimony of a child witness before any reliance is placed
on it. [Para 35]
Evidence - Tutored testimony - Two broad effects in testimony;
(i) improvisation or (ii) fabrication - Discussed. [Paras 50-54]
Evidence - Testimony - Classification of categories:
Held: Irrespective of whether the testimony of a witness is tutored
or not, the same, generally may be classified into three categories: -
(i) wholly reliable; (ii) wholly unreliable; (iii) neither wholly reliable
nor wholly unreliable. [Para 55]
Evidence - Appreciation of testimony - The judicially evolved
principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal
case - Discussed. [Para 56]
Evidence - Assessing the value of the evidence of the
eyewitnesses - Two principle considerations:
Held: In assessing the value of the evidence of the eyewitnesses,
two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of
838
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of
occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them
to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there
is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence -

## Text

_Characters 0–39,841 of 178,905. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39841 for what follows._

[2025] 2 S.C.R. 836 : 2025 INSC 261
The State of Madhya Pradesh
v.
Balveer Singh
(Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2012)
24 February 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and Manoj Misra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Does the Evidence Act, 1872 prescribe any particular age as a
determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent witness;
Does the Evidence Act treat evidence of a child on the same footing
as any other witness; Before the evidence of the child witness is
recorded, is it necessary for the Trial Court to record its opinion and
satisfaction that the child witness understands the duty of speaking
the truth; Whether the Court should apply s.106 of the Evidence Act
in criminal cases with care and caution; Does s.106 of the Evidence
Act absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was
committed; In the instant case, whether the High Court committed
any error in acquitting the respondent of offences u/ss. 302, 201,
and 34 of Penal Code, 1860.
Headnotes†
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.118 - No prescription of any particular
age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a
competent one:
Held: The Evidence Act does not prescribe any particular age as a
determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one - On
the contrary, s.118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all persons
shall be competent to testify, unless the court considers that they
are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or
from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender
years, extreme old age, disease - whether of mind, or any other
cause of the same kind - A child of tender age can be allowed to
testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and
give rational answers thereto. [Para 26]
* Author
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
837
The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh
Evidence Act, 1872 - Principles pertaining to the appreciation
of evidence of a child witness - Discussed. [Para 34]
Evidence Act, 1872 - Child witness is deemed to be on the
same footing as any other witness - Precaution needs to be
taken by the Court:
Held: The evidence of a child witness for all purposes is deemed
to be on the same footing as any other witness as long the child
is found to be competent to testify - The only precaution which
the court should take while assessing the evidence of a child
witness is that such witness must be a reliable one due to the
susceptibility of children by their falling prey to tutoring - However,
this in no manner means that the evidence of a child must be
rejected outrightly at the slightest of discrepancy, rather what is
required is that the same is evaluated with great circumspection -
While appreciating the testimony of a child witness the courts are
required to assess whether the evidence of such witness is its
voluntary expression and not borne out of the influence of others
and whether the testimony inspires confidence - At the same time,
one must be mindful that there is no rule requiring corroboration
to the testimony of a child witness before any reliance is placed
on it. [Para 35]
Evidence - Tutored testimony - Two broad effects in testimony;
(i) improvisation or (ii) fabrication - Discussed. [Paras 50-54]
Evidence - Testimony - Classification of categories:
Held: Irrespective of whether the testimony of a witness is tutored
or not, the same, generally may be classified into three categories: -
(i) wholly reliable; (ii) wholly unreliable; (iii) neither wholly reliable
nor wholly unreliable. [Para 55]
Evidence - Appreciation of testimony - The judicially evolved
principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal
case - Discussed. [Para 56]
Evidence - Assessing the value of the evidence of the
eyewitnesses - Two principle considerations:
Held: In assessing the value of the evidence of the eyewitnesses,
two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of
838
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of
occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them
to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there
is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence -
In respect of both these considerations, the circumstances either
elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other
evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the
veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value
which a Court would attach to their evidence. [Para 57]
Evidence - Evidence of child witness - Opinion and satisfaction
of trial Court:
Held: Before the evidence of the child witness is recorded, the
Trial Court must record its opinion and satisfaction that the child
witness understands the duty of speaking the truth and must clearly
state why he is of such opinion - The questions put to the child in
the course of the preliminary examination and the demeanour of
the child and their ability to respond to questions coherently and
rationally must be recorded by the Trial Court - The correctness
of the opinion formed by the Trial Court as to why it is satisfied
that the child witness was capable of giving evidence may be gone
into by the appellate court by either scrutinizing the preliminary
examination conducted by the Trial Court, or from the testimony
of the child witness or the demeanour of the child during the
deposition and cross-examination as recorded by the Trial Court.
[Paras 58 (iii), (iv)]
Evidence - Circumstantial Evidence:
Held: In a case of circumstantial evidence, the judgment remains
essentially inferential - The inference is drawn from the established
facts as the circumstances lead to particular inferences - The Court
has to draw an inference with respect to whether the chain of
circumstances is complete, and when the circumstances therein are
collectively considered, the same must lead only to the irresistible
conclusion that the accused alone is the perpetrator of the crime
in question - All the circumstances so established must be of a
conclusive nature, and consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused. [Para 64]
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.106 - Burden of proving fact especially
within knowledge:
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
839
The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh
Held: S.106 of the Evidence Act provides that when any fact
is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden
of proving that fact is upon him - The word "especially" means
facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge
of the accused - The ordinary rule that applies to the criminal
trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused is not in any way modified by the rule of facts
embodied in s.106 of the Evidence Act - s.106 of the Evidence
Act is an exception to s.101 of the Evidence Act - S.101 with its
illustration (a) lays down the general rule that in a criminal case
the burden of proof is on the prosecution and s.106 is certainly
not intended to relieve it of that duty - On the contrary, it is
designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would
be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the
prosecution to establish the facts which are, "especially within
the knowledge of the accused and which, he can prove without
difficulty or inconvenience". [Para 68]
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.106 - Application with care and caution:
Held: The court should apply s.106 of the Evidence Act in criminal
cases with care and caution - It cannot be said that it has no
application to criminal cases - The ordinary rule which applies to
criminal trials in this country that the onus lies on the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by
the provisions contained in s.106 of the Evidence Act. [Para 75]
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.106 - s.106 does not absolve the
prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was
committed:
Held: Section 106 cannot be invoked to make up the inability of
the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to
the guilt of the accused - This section cannot be used to support
a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by
proving all the elements necessary to establish the offence - It
does not absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a
crime was committed even though it is a matter specifically within
the knowledge of the accused and it does not throw the burden
on the accused to show that no crime was committed - To infer
the guilt of the accused from absence of reasonable explanation
in a case where the other circumstances are not by themselves
enough to call for his explanation is to relieve the prosecution of its
840
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
legitimate burden - So, until a prima facie case is established by
such evidence, the onus does not shift to the accused. [Para 76]
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.106 - Explanation by accused:
Held: s.106 obviously refers to cases where the guilt of the accused
is established on the evidence produced by the prosecution unless
the accused is able to prove some other facts especially within his
knowledge which would render the evidence of the prosecution
nugatory - If in such a situation, the accused offers an explanation
which may be reasonably true in the proved circumstances, the
accused gets the benefit of reasonable doubt though he may
not be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the truth of the
explanation - But if the accused in such a case does not give any
explanation at all or gives a false or unacceptable explanation, this
by itself is a circumstance which may well turn the scale against
him. [Para 77]
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.106 - Crimes committed in secrecy:
Held: The crimes that are generally committed in complete secrecy
inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to
lead evidence - No member of the family like in the case on board,
even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose
against another family member - If an offence takes place inside
the four walls of a house and in such circumstances where the
accused has all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at
the time and in the circumstances of its choice, it will be extremely
difficult for the prosecution to lead direct evidence to establish the
guilt of the accused - It is to resolve such a situation that s.106 of
the Evidence Act exists in the statute book. [Paras 86, 87]
Penal Code, 1860 - ss.302, 201 and 34 - Evidence Act, 1872
- ss.118, 106 - Prosecution case was that on the night of
incident respondent-accused killed his wife by choking her
neck with his leg - Thereafter, he cremated the body in the
night itself - Prosecution examined 8 witnesses - PW-6 (minor
daughter of deceased) was examined as a sole eye-witness
to the incident - Trial Court convicted respondent u/ss. 302,
201 r/w. s.34 of the IPC relying on the testimony of PW-6 -
However, the High Court acquitted the respondent discarding
the testimony of PW-6 - Correctness:
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
841
The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh
Held: There is nothing on record to indicate that PW-6 was a
tutored witness - Trial Court recorded in its judgment, wherein
it has been noted that PW-6 was cross examined at length for
approximately 1.5 hours, and her demeanour throughout the same
was believable, with nothing to indicate that she had been tutored
or was deposing falsely - It also has taken note of the fact that
in the entire cross examination no significant contradictions were
found - Thus, the High Court committed an egregious error in
discarding the testimony of PW-6 - The incriminating circumstances
emerging from the evidence on record are (i) The failure on the
part of the respondent accused in not explaining in any manner
as to what had actually happened to his wife i.e., the deceased or
how she died on the fateful night of the incident, more particularly
when he did not dispute that he was in the company of his wife
at the relevant point of time; (ii) The unnatural conduct of the
respondent accused in not informing the family members either
about the death of their daughter or the cremation of her body,
despite the fact that her family members were residing in the
very same village; (iii) The fact that the respondent-accused after
clandestinely cremating the deceased's body fled away and could
not be found either at the house or in the field where the body
had been burnt as stated by PW-3 and PW-6, respectively, again
raises suspicion about the cause of death of the deceased; (iv) The
suspicious circumstances under which the deceased died coupled
with the fact that the accused had a fight with the deceased two to
three days before the incident; their strained relationship and the
accused frequently treating the deceased cruelly, as deposed by
PW-3, PW-4, PW-5, and PW-6, respectively, further raise concerns
and points towards the involvement of the respondent accused in the
alleged crime; (v) It is also not the case of the respondent accused
that the deceased was suffering from any ailment nor is there any
evidence worth the name to suggest the possibility of her death
occurring due to any health issue - Thus, in this regard, it was all
the more important for the respondent accused to explain in what
circumstances and in what manner his wife suddenly died on the
fateful night of the incident - The aforementioned circumstances
constitute more than a prima facie case to enable the prosecution
to invoke s.106 of the Evidence Act and shift the burden on the
accused husband to explain what had actually happened on the
day & date his wife died - Thus, the impugned judgment and order
of acquittal passed by the High Court is hereby set aside, and
842
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court is
restored. [Paras 59, 65, 89, 91]
Evidence Act, 1872 - Delay in recording police statement -
The High Court, in the impugned judgment allowed the appeal
of the accused and acquitted him holding that the testimony
of PW-6 did not inspire confidence particularly in view of the
inordinate delay of 18-days in recording her police statement -
Correctness:
Held: There is nothing on record that would lead to the inference
that the delay in recording the statement of PW-6 was done
deliberately in order to manipulate or concoct the case against
the respondent accused herein, and rather such delay appears
to be inadvertent with no sinister motive or design in mind - The
statement of PW-6 was recorded on the same date as the statement
of PW-5 - If at all the investigating agency intended to allow the
doctoring of the testimony of PW-6 then it would have only delayed
the examination of the child witness (PW-6) and not of PW5 aswell, thus this delay in examination appears to be attributable to
the routine manner in which the IO proceeded with the course of
investigation and the overall investigation inertia and not to give
effect to any unfair practice. [Para 44]
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.165 - Duty of Judge - There was delay
in recording statement of PW-6 by IO - Accused also failed in
putting a question in regard to delay in examination of PW-6:
Held: While it is true that primarily it was for the accused to question
the IO to explain the delay in recording the statement of PW-6,
but at the same time the Trial Judge should not have remained
a mute spectator, acting like a robot or a recording machine to
just deliver whatever stands feeded by the parties - The role of a
judge in dispensation of justice after ascertaining the true facts no
doubt is very difficult one - Thus, even if the accused had failed in
putting a question in regards to delay in examination of PW-6, the
presiding judge was duty bound to put this question to the IO in
exercise of his powers u/s. 165 of the Evidence Act. [Paras 42, 43]
Case Law Cited
Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra (1997) 5 SCC 341;
Pradeep v. State of Haryana [2023] 10 SCR 1021 : 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 777; Ratansinh Dalsukhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
843
The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh
(2004) 1 SCC 64; Panchhi v. State of U.P [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 40:
(1998) 7 SCC 177; Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka [2001] 1
SCR 1 : (2001) 9 SCC 129; Arbind Singh v. State of Bihar (1995)
Supp 4 SCC 416; Digamber Vaishnav v. State of Chhattisgarh
[2019] 2 SCR 844 : (2019) 4 SCC 522; State of M.P. v. Ramesh
(2011) 4 SCC 786; Ranbir & Ors. v. State of Punjab [1974] 1 SCR
102 : (1973) 2 SCC 444; State of U.P. v. Satish [2005] 1 SCR
1132 : (2005) 3 SCC 114; Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of
Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404; Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar (2021)
10 SCC 725; Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi and Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra [2012] 7 SCR 1083 : (2012) 10 SCC 373; Trimukh
Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra [2006] Supp. 7 SCR 156 :
(2006) 10 SCC 681; State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and
Ors. [2000] Supp. 2 SCR 712 : (2000) 8 SCC 382; Ram Gulam
Chaudhary & Ors. v. State of Bihar (2001) 8 SCC 311 - relied on.
Munna Pandey v. State of Bihar, 2023 INSC 793 : [2023] 11 SCR
1005; V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand (2015) 9 SCC 588;
Ramratan and others v. State of Rajasthan [1962] 3 SCR 590 :
AIR 1962 SC 424; Guli Chand and others v. State of Rajasthan
AIR 1974 SC 276; Badri v. State of Rajasthan [1976] 2 SCR
339 : AIR 1976 SC 560; Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State
of Gujarat [1983] 3 SCR 280 : AIR 1983 SC 753; Leela Ram v.
State of Haryana [1999] Supp. 3 SCR 435 : AIR 1999 SC 3717;
Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 875 : AIR
1959 SC 1012; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
(1984) 4 SCC 116; Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand [2023] 12
SCR 815 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1261; Anees v. State Govt. of
NCT 2024 INSC 368 : [2024] 6 SCR 164; Dharm Das Wadhwani
v. State of U.P. (1974) 4 SCC 267 - referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
A Treatise on Judicial Evidence, Jeremy Bentham; An Essay on
the 'Principles of Circumstantial Evidence' by William Wills by T.
and J.W. Johnson and Co. 1872; Professor Glanville Williams -
Proofs of Guilt; Kenny's outlines of Criminal Law, 17th Edn. 1958;
Webster's Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.) - referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Evidence
Act, 1872.
844
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
List of Keywords
Death under suspicious circumstances; Unnatural death report;
Child witness; Sole eye-witness; Morgue enquiry proceedings;
Morgue enquiry report; Cremation in clandestine manner; Tutored
testimony; Deposing falsely; Delay in recording witness statement;
Testimony of witness who is at inimical terms with accused;
Preliminary examination of child witness; Competent to testify;
Dangerous witness; Witnesses liable to be influenced easily;
Tutored part separated from untutored part; Trial judge not a mute
spectator; Delay due to routine manner of investigation; Evidence
not to be discarded on procedural technicalities; Improvisation;
Fabrication; Doctored or false statement; Twin conditions of
fabrication; Reasonable likelihood of tutoring; Opportunity of
tutoring child witness; Wholly reliable testimony; Wholly unreliable
testimony; Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable testimony;
Ocular evidence; Minor discrepancies; Photographic memory;
Power of observation; Witness not a human tape recorder; Piercing
court examination; Rule of prudence; Minimum age of witness;
Demeanour of child witness; Factum probandum; Factum probans;
Circumstantial evidence; Chain of evidence; Ex vi termini; Unnatural
conduct of accused; Absconding accused; Facts especially in
knowledge of the accused; Shifting of burden of proof; Evidential
burden; Persuasive burden; Positive and negative facts; Prima
facie case; Crimes committed in secrecy of the house; Crimes
committed in four walls of the house; Crime against women.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1669 of 2012
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.06.2010 of the High Court
of M.P. at Jabalpur in CRLA No. 524 of 2004
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Sarthak Raizada, Mirza Kayesh Begg,
Ms. Maitreyee Jagat Joshi, Ms. Akanksha Tomar, Argha Roy.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Lakhan Singh Chauhan, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, Akhileshwar Jha,
Amit Kumar Chawla, Anil Shrivastav.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
845
The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J.B. Pardiwala, J.
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:-
INDEX*
A.
CASE OF THE PROSECUTION ......................................
2
i.
The Incident. ..............................................................
2
ii.
Oral Evidence on Record. ........................................
6
iii. Trial Court's Judgment & Order. .............................
18
B.
IMPUGNED ORDER .........................................................
28
C.
ANALYSIS ........................................................................
34
i.
Evidence of Child Witness and Test for parsing
Tutored Testimony. ...................................................
35
ii.
Principles of Law relating to appreciation of
Circumstantial Evidence. ........................................
70
a. Incriminating Circumstances emerging from the
evidence on record. .............................................
73
iii. Principles of Law governing the Applicability of
Section 106 of the Evidence Act. ............................
76
iv. What is "prima facie case" (foundational facts) in
the context of Section 106 of the Evidence Act? .
88
D.
CONCLUSION ..................................................................
93
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
846
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
1.
This appeal is at the instance of the State of Madhya Pradesh and
is directed against the judgment and order dated 29.06.2010 passed
by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh of judicature at Gwalior in
Criminal Appeal No. 524 of 2004 ('Impugned Order') whereby the
High Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondent herein and
acquitted him of the offence under Section(s) 302, 201 and 34
respectively of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, the 'IPC').
A.
CASE OF THE PROSECUTION
2.
The deceased, namely, Birendra Kumari was married to the
respondent accused. In the wedlock, two sons and a daughter
named Rani were born. Rani at the time of the incident in 2003,
was seven years of age.
i.
The Incident.
3.
On 15.07.2003 sometime during the midnight, Bhoora Singh alias
Yashpal i.e., the complainant along with his father Bharat Singh; the
maternal cousin brother of the deceased's father, heard cries and
screams of the deceased coming from the house of the accused.
After some time, the screams of the deceased stopped. At about
in the morning, they learnt from the other inhabitants of the village
that the deceased had died during the night and that her body had
been cremated.
4.
Accordingly, the complainant along with his father went to the Indar
Police Station at around 9:00 AM and lodged an unnatural death
report / information under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short, the 'Cr.P.C.') in connection with the
death of the deceased under suspicious circumstances, which was
registered in entry no. 404 of the general diary as Morgue No. 07
of 2003 dated 16.07.2003. In the said report, the Complainants
stated that on the fateful night of the incident, at around 12:00 AM,
they heard the cries and screams of the deceased which eventually
ceased. Shortly, thereafter they saw the accused along with his
family members cremating the deceased in their field. It was further
stated that when they went to the house of the accused to inquire
about the incident, the daughter of the deceased (Rani) informed
that her mother had died. The said unnatural death information
report reads as under: -
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
847
The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh
"Informant Bhoora @ Yashpal along with his companion
father Bharat Singh came to the police station and orally
reported that tonight at around 12 o' clock from the house
of Balveer Yadav of their village, the noise of her wife
Virendra Kumari crying and screaming were coming out,
after some time, the noise stopped coming, thereafter,
around 3 o'clock in the night Balveer and his family
members were cremating Virendra Kumari in their field,
then I went to Balveer's house and inquired from her
daughter Rani why dear, what happened, then she told
that Mummy has died, then I got to know that Virendra
Kumari has died, her body has been burnt, therefore I am
reporting that an investigation be conducted. The report
was read over and heard and has been written in the
same manner as it was stated.
Based on the aforesaid statement, Marg No. 7/03
under Section 174 Cr.P.C. was registered, taken under
investigation, and the investigation was entrusted to ASI
MP Singh."
5.
Upon receiving the information, enquiry was undertaken by ASI
Mahendra Singh Chauhan. In the course of the enquiry, it was
revealed that the respondent accused on the night of the incident
had killed his wife i.e., the deceased in the porch on the first floor
by throwing her to the ground and thereafter choking her neck with
his leg. The enquiry further revealed that thereafter the body was
cremated in the night itself with the help of his sister, Jatan Bai.
6.
In view of the aforesaid, first information report bearing no. 142 of
2003 dated 20.07.2003 came to be registered against the respondent
accused herein and her sister, Jatan Bai for the offence punishable
under Section(s) 302, 201 read with 34 respectively of the IPC. The
relevant contents of the FIR are reproduced below: -
"I am posted as Station in charge at Police Station Indar.
On 16/7/03, on the basis of information received from
Informant Bhoora @ Yashpal S/o Bharat Singh Yadav R/o
Village Singharai, Marg No. 7/03 was registered in the
General Diary Entry No. 404 and taken under investigation.
Its investigation was conducted by ASI Mahendra Singh,
on receiving the investigation report, it was attested by
848
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
me, where offence under Section 302, 201, 34 IPC were
found proven against Balvir Singh Yadav and Jatan Bhai,
therefore, Crime No. 142/03 registered against both the
accused under relevant offence sections and taken under
investigation. Copy of Marg Intimation and Inquiry Report
is as follows:
Informant Bhoora @ Yashpal along with his companion
father Bharat Singh came to the police station and orally
reported that tonight at around 12 o' clock from the house
of Balveer Yadav of their village, the noise of her wife
Virendra Kumari crying and screaming were coming out,
after some time, the noise stopped coming, thereafter,
around 3 o'clock in the night Balveer and his family
members were cremating Virendra Kumari in their field,
then I went to Balveer's house and inquired from her
daughter Rani why dear, what happened, then she told
that Mummy has died, then I got to know that Virendra
Kumari has died, her body has been burnt, therefore I
am reporting that an investigation be conducted. The
report was read over and heard and has been written in
the same manner as it was stated. Sd/- Yashpal Singh.
Based on above information, Marg No. 7/03 under Section
174 Cr.P.C. was registered and taken under investigation
and investigation was entrusted to ASI M.S. Chauhan.
Investigation Report - Respected SO Police Station Indar
Subject: In relation to the commission of offence under
Section 302, 201, 34 IPC on the investigation of Marg
No. 7/03 Section 174 Cr.P.C., it is stated that on the basis
of order issued by his good-self, I ASI Mahendra Singh
conducted the investigation of Marg No. 7/03 under Section
174 Cr.P.C. after reaching the spot Village Singharai,
during the course of investigation, recorded the statement
of complainant Bhoora @ Yashpal Singh Yadav, Kumari
Rani, D/o Balvir Singh Yadav, Bharat Singh Yadav R/o
Village Singharai and Badal Singh Yadav, Police Station
Badarvas. On spot map of the place of incident was
prepared and seizure proceedings were conducted, from
the investigation up till now and the statement of Kumari
Rani Yadav, it has been found that Balvir Singh Yadav
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
849
The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh
husband of the deceased Virendra Kumari murdered her
by slamming Virendra Kumari on the floor of the porch of
the house and choked her neck by pressing his foot and
Kumari Jatan Singh helped her brother Balvir Singh in
the murder, later on, during the night itself, Balvir Singh
Yadav took the dead body of his wife on his shoulders to
his field and discreetly burnt it. Therefore, prima facie the
offence under Section 302, 201, 34 IPC has been found to
be proven against Balvir Singh Yadav S/o Samadar Singh
Yadav, Jatan Bhai D/o Samadar Singh Yada, residents
of Singharai. Therefore, it is requested, the investigation
report for further action along with case diary is forwarded
to you. Mahendra Singh ASI Police Station Indar."
7.
In the course of the investigation, the statement of the complainant
and his father were recorded, spot map / site plan of the place of
occurrence was prepared along with the seizure memo for the bones
and burnt bangles found at the place of cremation of the deceased
along with a plastic diesel can in the presence of the complainant
and the village watchman; Narain Singh. Accordingly, on 22.07.2003
the respondent accused was arrested.
8.
Upon conclusion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed on
30.07.2003 against the respondent accused, Balveer Singh and
the co-accused; Jatan Bai for the offences Section(s) 302, 201
read with 34 of the IPC. On 03.08.2003, the police statement of the
child witness; Rani i.e., the daughter of the respondent accused
and deceased was recorded. The investigation revealed that the
co-accused at the time of incident was a juvenile, accordingly, her
trial was separated. The case against the respondent accused was
committed for trial to the Court of Session and registered as S.T. No.
197 of 2003. Charge was framed against the respondent accused for
the offence enumerated above by the Addl. Session Judge to which
the respondent accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
ii.
Oral Evidence on Record.
9.
The prosecution examined a total of 8 witnesses in support of
the charge. Narain Singh (PW2) the watchman of the village was
examined as a panch witness to the seizure memo and for establishing
the accounts of the fateful night of the incident. Bhoora Singh alias
850
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Yashpal (PW3) and Bharat Singh (PW4) were examined to establish
the chain of events when the incident occurred along with Badal
Singh (PW5), the father of the deceased to prove the harassment
caused by the respondent accused towards his deceased wife. Rani
(PW6) the daughter of the respondent accused and the deceased was
examined as the sole eye-witness to the incident. Mahender Singh
Chauhan (PW7) and Rajender Kumar Chhari (PW8) were examined
to prove the contents of the unnatural death report, the FIR and the
seizure memos. Mahesh Kumar Mishra (PW1) the Patwari of the
village was also examined to establish the place of occurrence and
cremation of the deceased.
10. Rani (PW6), the daughter of the accused and deceased and the
sole eye-witness to the incident deposed that on the fateful night
of the incident, the deceased was sleeping in the open courtyard
of the house. She deposed that at that time, the deceased, her
two infant brothers and her aunt Jatan i.e., the co-accused were
present in the house. At that time, the respondent accused came
and grabbed the deceased from her neck and hit a blow on her
body with a stick causing her to fall. Thereafter, the respondent
accused exerted pressure on her neck with his feet and as a result
the deceased screamed for help. When she ran to help her mother,
the respondent accused slapped her and the co-accused pulled her
away. She deposed that she did not witness what happened next
but later she saw her mother dead and her body being taken by the
respondent accused to the barn. She further deposed that early in
the morning she found the body of her mother burning. She deposed
that she had informed Bhoora Singh (PW3) in the morning that the
deceased had been killed. In her cross examination, she denied the
suggestion of being tutored at the instance of PW3 or PW4. She
denied that Bhoora Singh and Bharat Singh had told her to repeat
or memorize the police statement given by her. She admitted not
having told the police about the respondent hitting the deceased
with a stick before attempting to choke her. She further denied the
suggestion that the deceased was suffering from ailment, clarifying
that her mother had fallen sick only once i.e., three-months before
the incident took place. She further revealed that when her mother
asked the respondent accused to take her for treatment, the accused
hit her. Apart from this, nothing substantial was elicited through her
cross-examination.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
851
The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh
11. Mahesh Kumar Mishra (PW1), the village patwari deposed that he
had assisted the police in preparation of the site-map of the place of
incident and identified his signatures on the same. In his cross, he
stated that there are around 5-6 houses between the house of the
Complainant and the accused. He further stated that there is also
a Basti between the two houses where approximately 100 people
live. In the last, he admitted that cremations are often done by the
people of the village in their own fields or barns, wherever they find
space. Apart from this, nothing substantial could be elicited from his
cross-examination.
12. Narain Singh (PW2), the village chowkidar deposed that when the
police checked the verandah of the deceased, they could find nothing
and that the bangles belonging to the deceased were recovered and
collected from the place where the body was burnt. He identified
his signatures on the seizure memo drawn of the ashes, bones and
bangles belonging to the deceased as-well as a green coloured diesel
cannister. In his cross, he stated that the house of the Complainant
is 5-6 furlongs away from the accused's house making it impossible
for any noise of shouting to travel between them. He further admitted
that there are houses of 150 people approx. between the two places.
In his cross he also stated that, 4-5 years ago, there had been a
dispute between the complainant and the accused, because of which
they were not on talking terms. He also deposed that there is no
designated area for cremation, and people usually hold it in their
own fields. In the last, he also admitted that when he went to the
house of the accused, nothing incriminating was noticed.
13. Bhoora Singh (PW3) deposed that the respondent accused and the
deceased got married sometime in 1990 but their relationship turned
sour about a year later. He deposed that the respondent accused
had demanded a motorcycle, for which the deceased's father i.e.,
PW5 had arranged a certain sum of money. He further deposed
that the deceased had also previously instituted a case seeking
maintenance from the accused. He deposed that he lived near the
house of the deceased and the accused and that on the fateful
night of the incident, he and his father heard the cries and screams
of the deceased for about an hour, and assumed that there had
been a quarrel between the two. When the screams stopped, they
thought that the altercation had ended. However, the next morning
they came to learn that the deceased had died in the night and that
852
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
her body had been cremated in the accused's field. When he along
with his father reached the spot where the body of the deceased
was burning, the other inhabitants of the village gathered around.
He deposed that the cremation of the deceased was unusually
suspicious as typically the entire village would be called to attend
the cremation, which was not the case here. He also recounted
that two-three days before the incident, he had met the deceased
who in turn had requested him to inform her father that there had
been a fight between her and the accused. In the last, he deposed
that, when the police reached the place of incident, they collected
the ashes and remains of the deceased, her bangles and a diesel
canister. In the cross, he denied the suggestion that he could not
have heard the cries of the deceased due to the distance between
their houses, and stated to have heard the screams between 12:00
to 1:00 AM. He admitted not calling the other village inhabitants
upon hearing the screams as it was common for the accused and
the deceased to often fight. He denied having gone to the house
of the accused at 3:00AM in the night and further denied stating so
when confronted with his statement recorded in the morgue enquiry
proceedings. He deposed that he came to know that the deceased
had died only in the morning after he was informed by other people
residing in the village at around 5:00 AM. He further deposed that
when he reached the spot at around 6:00 AM with his father, the
accused was not present however, he noticed that the other village
inhabitants had already gathered. He admitted that he was not
able to remember their names. He further deposed that the body of
the deceased had been burned in the night itself but admitted not
knowing who was responsible for it. He deposed that he only saw
the burnt body of the deceased in morning and further admitted that
none of the other villagers raised any issue. He stated that he met
the daughter of the deceased i.e., PW6 after returning from the field.
He in the last denied the suggestion that he was falsely deposing
on account of an ongoing enmity.
14. Bharat Singh, PW4, deposed that within two years of marriage the
relationship between the deceased and accused turned sour. The
accused would often harass the deceased with demands for dowry.
The accused had already obtained a ring and a sum of money for
a motorcycle from her father. He further deposed, that on the date
of incident, they had heard cries and screams of the deceased in
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
853
The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh
the night. When the screams eventually stopped, he along with his
son went off to sleep. Later they came to know that the deceased
had been killed. He deposed that they saw the wood and ashes
lying near the field of the accused from a distance. He deposed that
they then went to the police to file a report, after which he spoke to
the deceased's daughter who informed that the accused had killed
the deceased. In the last, he deposed that usually cremation is not
performed during the night hours and that all the inhabitants of the
village would join the funeral. However, that was not the case and
the accused surreptitiously burnt the body of the deceased on the
fateful night of the incident. In his cross when confronted with his
police statement, he denied the suggestion that he had not stated
before police about the ring given to the accused. He admitted that
he had not personally seen the money being given to the accused
and rather had only heard about it from PW5. He acknowledged that
there are a couple of houses between his place and the accused's
house. He further admitted that, he could not identify whose screams
they heard on the night of the incident, but later came to know from
other villagers that it was the deceased. He denied the suggestion
that he and his son had gone to the accused's house at night and
reiterated that they learnt about the incident only in the morning.