# THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DHRUV GURJAR AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [2019] 4 S.C.R. 433
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2019-02-22
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 336 of 2019
- **Bench:** L. Nageswara Rao, M. R. Shah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-v-dhruv-gurjar-and-another-33652
- **Pages:** 21

## Headnote

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 320 and 482 - In
SLP (Crl.) No.9859/13, FIR was lodged against the accused persons
for offences punishable u/ss. 307, 294 and 34, IPC - Accused filed
petition u/s.482, CrPC before the High Court for quashing the
criminal proceedings arising out of the said FIR on the basis of a
compromise arrived at between the accused and the complainant -
High Court quashed the criminal proceedings - In SLP (Crl.)
No.9860/13, FIR filed against the accused persons for offences
punishable inter alia u/s.394, IPC and 25/27, Arms Act - Accused
approached the High Court for quashing said FIR - High Court
quashed the criminal proceedings - On appeal, held: High Court
has not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged were
non-compoundable offences as per s.320, CrPC - It did not at all
consider the seriousness of the offences, its social impact and
mechanically quashed the respective FIRs - High Court did not
consider the distinction between a personal or private wrong and a
social wrong and its social impact - Without proper application of
mind to the relevant facts and circumstances, the High Court
materially erred in quashing the respective FIRs observing that in
view of the compromise, there are no chances of recording conviction
and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility - In SLP(Crl.)
No.9860/2013, all the accused were absconding - After a period
of approximately three months after the incident, alleged to happen
on 21.12.12, accused approached the High Court u/s.482, Cr.P.C.,
on 12.03.2013 - In the meantime, the accused managed to get the
affidavits of the complainant and the two witnesses dtd. 09.02.2013
and the High Court quashed the FIR on 15.03.2013, within three
days from the date of filing the petition - Accused persons were
facing number of trials for the serious offences - High Court did
not consider the antecedents of the accused - It ought to have been
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more vigilant and consider facts and circumstances under which
the accused entered into the settlement - Impugned judgments set
aside- Respective FIRs/investigation/criminal proceedings be
proceeded against the respective accused - Penal Code, 1860 -
ss. 34, 294 307 and 394 -Arms Act- ss.25 and 27.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The High Court has not at all considered the
fact that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences
as per Section 320, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. From the
impugned judgments and orders, it appears that the High Court
has not at all considered the relevant facts and circumstances of
the case, more particularly the seriousness of the offences and
its social impact. From the impugned judgments and orders
passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has
mechanically quashed the respective FIRs, in exercise of its
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all
considered the distinction between a personal or private wrong
and a social wrong and the social impact. In the case at hand, the
High Court has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entire
conspectus of facts in proper perspective and has quashed the
criminal proceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of the
respective FIRs by the High Court in the present cases inter alia
for the offences under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and
394 of the IPC and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act respectively,
and that too in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
is just contrary to the law laid down by Supreme Court in a catena
of decisions. [Para 16.1][444-E-G; 445-A, B]
1.2 The High Court ought to have appreciated that it is not
in every case where the complainant has entered into a
compromise with the accused, there may not be any conviction.
Such observations are presumptive and many a time too early to
opine. In a given case, it may happen

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 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
v.
 DHRUV GURJAR AND ANOTHER
(Criminal Appeal No. 336 of 2019)
FEBRUARY 22, 2019
[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 320 and 482 - In
SLP (Crl.) No.9859/13, FIR was lodged against the accused persons
for offences punishable u/ss. 307, 294 and 34, IPC - Accused filed
petition u/s.482, CrPC before the High Court for quashing the
criminal proceedings arising out of the said FIR on the basis of a
compromise arrived at between the accused and the complainant -
High Court quashed the criminal proceedings - In SLP (Crl.)
No.9860/13, FIR filed against the accused persons for offences
punishable inter alia u/s.394, IPC and 25/27, Arms Act - Accused
approached the High Court for quashing said FIR - High Court
quashed the criminal proceedings - On appeal, held: High Court
has not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged were
non-compoundable offences as per s.320, CrPC - It did not at all
consider the seriousness of the offences, its social impact and
mechanically quashed the respective FIRs - High Court did not
consider the distinction between a personal or private wrong and a
social wrong and its social impact - Without proper application of
mind to the relevant facts and circumstances, the High Court
materially erred in quashing the respective FIRs observing that in
view of the compromise, there are no chances of recording conviction
and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility - In SLP(Crl.)
No.9860/2013, all the accused were absconding - After a period
of approximately three months after the incident, alleged to happen
on 21.12.12, accused approached the High Court u/s.482, Cr.P.C.,
on 12.03.2013 - In the meantime, the accused managed to get the
affidavits of the complainant and the two witnesses dtd. 09.02.2013
and the High Court quashed the FIR on 15.03.2013, within three
days from the date of filing the petition - Accused persons were
facing number of trials for the serious offences - High Court did
not consider the antecedents of the accused - It ought to have been
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more vigilant and consider facts and circumstances under which
the accused entered into the settlement - Impugned judgments set
aside- Respective FIRs/investigation/criminal proceedings be
proceeded against the respective accused - Penal Code, 1860 -
ss. 34, 294 307 and 394 -Arms Act- ss.25 and 27.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The High Court has not at all considered the
fact that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences
as per Section 320, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. From the
impugned judgments and orders, it appears that the High Court
has not at all considered the relevant facts and circumstances of
the case, more particularly the seriousness of the offences and
its social impact. From the impugned judgments and orders
passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has
mechanically quashed the respective FIRs, in exercise of its
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all
considered the distinction between a personal or private wrong
and a social wrong and the social impact. In the case at hand, the
High Court has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entire
conspectus of facts in proper perspective and has quashed the
criminal proceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of the
respective FIRs by the High Court in the present cases inter alia
for the offences under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and
394 of the IPC and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act respectively,
and that too in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
is just contrary to the law laid down by Supreme Court in a catena
of decisions. [Para 16.1][444-E-G; 445-A, B]
1.2 The High Court ought to have appreciated that it is not
in every case where the complainant has entered into a
compromise with the accused, there may not be any conviction.
Such observations are presumptive and many a time too early to
opine. In a given case, it may happen that the prosecution still
can prove the guilt by leading cogent evidence and examining
the other witnesses and the relevant evidence/material, more
particularly when the dispute is not a commercial transaction and/
or of a civil nature and/or is not a private wrong. [Para 18]
[451-F, G]
1.3 Without proper application of mind to the relevant facts
and circumstances, the High Court has materially erred in
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435
mechanically quashing the respective FIRs, by observing that in
view of the compromise, there are no chances of recording
conviction and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility.
Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of the case of the
appeal arising from SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013, the High Court has
erred in quashing the FIR. It is required to be noted that the FIR
was lodged on 21.12.2012 for the offence alleged to happen on
21.12.2012. All the accused were absconding. After a period of
approximately three months, they approached the High Court by
way of filing a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., i.e., on
12.03.2013. The Chief Judicial Magistrate issued a proclamation
under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the accused persons on
14.03.2013. In the meantime, the accused managed to get the
affidavits of the complainant and the two witnesses dated
09.02.2013, and the High Court quashed the FIR on 15.03.2013,
i.e., within a period of three days from the date of filing the petition.
The High Court has also not considered the antecedents of the
accused. It has come on record that the accused persons were
facing number of trials for the serious offences. The aforesaid
would be relevant factors, while exercising the inherent powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C and while considering the application
for quashing the FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings. In fact, in
such a situation, the High Court ought to have been more vigilant
and ought to have considered relevant facts and circumstances
under which the accused got the settlement entered into. The
High Court has not at all considered the aforesaid relevant
circumstances, while exercising the power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. The impugned judgments and orders passed by the High
Court are set aside, and the respective FIRs/investigation/
criminal proceedings be proceeded against the respective
accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law.
[Paras 18.1, 18.2, 19][452-H; 453-A-F]
Shiji @ Pappu and others v. Radhika and another
(2011) 10 SCC 705 : [2011] 13 SCR 135 - held
inapplicable.
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303
: [2012] 8 SCR 753; State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Deepak (2014) 10 SCC 285; State of Madhya Pradesh
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DHRUV GURJAR
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v. Manish (2015) 8 SCC 307 : [2015] 8 SCR 723;
Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641;
2019 SCC Online SC 7; State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Kalyan Singh [2019] 1 SCALE 165; State of
Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi (2014) 15 SCC
29; Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC
466 : [2014] 4 SCR 1012 - relied on.
J. Ramesh Kamath v. Mohana Kurup (2016) 12 SCC
179; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajveer Singh
(2016) 12 SCC 471 : [2016] 2 SCR 1047; Jitendra
Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi (2013) 4 SCC
58 : [2013] 2 SCR 921; Anita Maria Dias v. State of
Maharashtra (2018) 3 SCC 290; Social Action Forum
for Manav Adhikar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC
443 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2011] 13 SCR 135
held inapplicable
Para 5
[2012] 8 SCR 753
relied on
Para 13.4
(2014) 10 SCC 285
relied on
Para 13.4
[2015] 8 SCR 723
relied on
Para 13.4
(2016) 12 SCC 179
referred to
Para 13.4
[2016] 2 SCR 1047
referred to
Para 13.4
[2019] 1 SCALE 165
relied on
Para 13.4
[2013] 2 SCR 921
referred to
Para 14.1
(2018) 3 SCC 290
referred to
Para 14.1
(2018) 10 SCC 443
referred to
Para 14.1
(2014) 15 SCC 29
relied on
Para 16.1
[2014] 4 SCR 1012
relied on
Para 16.3
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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 336 of 2019
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.04.2013 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Case
No. 2572 of 2013
With
Criminal Appeal No. 337 of 2019.
Varun K. Chopra, Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi, B. N. Dubey,
Mukesh Kumar, Gurtej Pal Singh, Ms. Indira Bhakar, Ms. Aparna Trivedi,
Santanu Singh Advs. for the Appellant.
Lakhan Singh Chouhan, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, Narender Singh,
Baby Devi Bonia, Binay Kumar Das, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M.R. SHAH, J. 1. Leave granted in both the special leave
petitions.
2. As common question of law and facts arise in both these appeals,
they are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.
Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013
3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 8.4.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Petition No. 2572/2013, by
which the High Court has allowed the said application preferred by the
respondents herein/original accused (hereinafter referred to as the
'Accused'), and in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, has quashed the proceedings against the accused
for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC,
the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.
4. The facts leading to this appeal are, that an FIR was lodged
against the accused at police station, Kotwali, District Datia for the
offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC, which
was registered as Crime No. 552/2012. It was alleged that at about 8:00
p.m. in the night on 17.12.2012 when after distributing the milk, Cheeni
@ Devasik Yadav came in front of his house situated at RajghatViram,
at the same time, Dhruv Gurjar (accused) being armed with 12 bore
gun, Sonu Khamaria, Rohit Gurjar, Avdhesh Tiwari and 3 to 4 other
persons came there and asked him to take out his nephew, and they will
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kill him as on account of enmity of scuffle took place between his nephew
Anand and the accused persons. When complainant told them that my
nephew is not here at the same time all of them started to abuse the
complainant with filthy language and when he asked them not to do so,
at the same time, Sonu Khamaria, Rohit Gurjar, Avdhesh Tiwari and 3-4
other persons spoken that "kill this bastard", at the same time, Dhruv
Gurjar made a fire with intention to kill him, whose pellets struck on
three places of his body, i.e., on his forehead, left shoulder and left ear,
due to which, he sustained injuries and blood started oozing from it.
According to the complainant, Rampratap Yadav and Indrapal Singh
were present on the spot, who had witnessed the incident. On hearing
the noise of fire, when other people of vicinity reached there, then, all of
these persons fled away from the spot of the incident.
4.1 On the basis of a report, a DehatiNalishi bearing No. 0/12
was registered under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC. As the
complainant sustained injuries, his MLC was performed. On the basis
of the contents of the said report, a Crime bearing No. 552/2012 was
registered under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and the criminal
investigation was triggered. Thereafter, the investigation team reached
the spot and prepared the spot map and articles were seized.
4.2 That on 18.12.2012, the statements of the witnesses were
recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. That on 21.03.2013, the
police arrested the accused.
4.3 The accused filed Miscellaneous Criminal Petition No. 2572
of 2013 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior for quashing the criminal proceedings against
the accused arising out of the FIR, on the basis of a compromise arrived
at between the accused and the complainant.
5. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, in
exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has quashed the
criminal proceedings against the accused on the ground that the accused
and the complainant have settled the disputes amicably. While quashing
the criminal proceedings against the accused, the High Court has
considered and relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji
@ Pappu and others vs. Radhika and another, (2011) 10 SCC 705.
6. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment
and order, quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused for the
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offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC, the
State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.
Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9860/2013
7. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 15.3.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Petition No. 1936/2013, by
which the High Court has allowed the said application preferred by the
respondents herein/original accused (hereinafter referred to as the
'Accused'), and in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, has quashed the proceedings against the accused
for the offences punishable under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of
M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act, the State of Madhya
Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.
8. The facts leading to this appeal are, that on 21.12.2012 one
truck driver by name Janki Kushwah informed the complainant - Malkhan
Singh Yadav, who is also a truck driver that his truck was having some
problem and he is near Sitapur village. The complainant reached there
and found that his brother Mangal had also reached there with his truck.
It is alleged that when they were busy in repairing the truck, four persons
at around 5:00 a.m. came from the Sitapur village and they had beaten
all of them with legs and fists and snatched cash of Rs.7,300/- and two
Nokia mobiles having Sim Nos. 9411955930 & 7599256400 from the
complainant - Malkhan Singh Yadav, Rs.19,000/- from Mangal and
Rs.16,500/- from Janki Kushwah and a Spice mobile having Sim No.
8756194727. That the complainant is driving on that route since last 7 to
8 years and sometimes also stayed in Sitapur village. According to the
complainant, all the four persons were known to him and one of them,
namely, accused Tinku Sharma was having 'Addhi' in his hand, the second
one was Ravi Sharma, who was having gun in his hand, and the other
two were Babloo Sharma and Bhurerai. All the accused persons after
robbing the complainant, Mangal and Janki Kushwah, went towards
Sitapur village.
8.1 That at 6:30 a.m., the complainant went to Goraghat Police
Station, District Datia and lodged the first information report, which was
registered as Crime No. 159 of 2012 against the accused under Section
394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act.
Thereafter, the investigation was started and the police reached the spot
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DHRUV GURJAR
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of the incident and prepared spot map and also recorded the statement
of witnesses. Thereafter, they sent the complainant and two other persons
to the District Hospital, Datia for medical examination, where the Medical
Officer found simple injuries on various body parts of them.
8.2 The police on 27.01.2013 reached to the house of the accused
persons and in the village but could not found them and ultimately prepared
the ascendance panchnama. On 14.03.2013, the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Datia issued proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C.
against the accused persons to appear before him on 16.04.2013.
Meanwhile, on 12.03.2013, the accused persons approached the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior for quashing of FIR No.
159/2012, registered against them at Police Station Goraghat, District
Datia for the offences punishable under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of
M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act.
9. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, in
exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has quashed the
criminal proceedings against the accused on the ground that the accused
and the complainant have settled the disputes amicably. While quashing
the criminal proceedings against the accused, the High Court has
considered and relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji
(supra).
10. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment
and order, quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused for the
offences punishable under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K.
Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act, the State of Madhya Pradesh has
preferred the present appeal.
11. So far as the criminal appeal arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.
9859/2013 is concerned, it is required to be noted that the accused were
facing the criminal proceedings for the offences punishable under Sections
307, 294 and 34 of the IPC. It was alleged against the accused that at
the time of commission of the offence, the accused Dhruv Gurjar fired
from his fire arm on the original complainant with an intention to kill him,
and the original complainant sustained serious injuries and the pellets
struck on three places of his body, i.e., on the forehead, left shoulder and
left ear. That incident took place on 17.12.2012 and the investigating
officer commenced the investigation, recorded the statement of the
witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. on 18.12.2012. The
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investigating officer also seized the articles. The Investigating officer
also collected the medical evidence. It appears that one of the coaccused, namely, Rohit Gurjar was arrested on 21.03.2013. Nothing in
on record to show, whether in fact the respondent no.1 herein, the main
accused - original accused no.1 was arrested or not. It appears that
during the investigation, immediately, the original accused no.1 - Dhruv
Gurjar approached the High Court on 5.4.2013 by filing an application
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR. Immediately on
the fourth day of filing of the application, by the impugned judgment and
order dated 8.4.2013, the High Court has quashed the FIR solely on the
ground that there is a settlement arrived at between the complainant and
the accused. While quashing the FIR, the High Court has relied upon
the decision of this Court in the case of Shjji (supra), specially the
observations recorded by this Court "that where there is no chance of
recording conviction against the accused persons and the entire exercise
of a trial destined to be exercise of futility, the criminal case registered
against the accused persons, though it may not be compoundable, can
be quashed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C".
12. Now so far as the criminal appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/
2013 is concerned, original accused were facing the criminal proceedings
for the offences under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K.
Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act. The incident was alleged to
happen on 21.12.2012. Immediately, the investigating officer started the
investigation. All the accused were absconding. That when the
investigation was in progress, the original accused approached the High
Court by way of an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. on
12.03.2013 and prayed for quashing of the FIR. That on 14.03.2013, the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate issued proclamation under Section 82
of the Cr.P.C. against the accused persons to appear before him on
16.04.2013. That, by the impugned judgment and order dated 15.03.2013,
the High Court has quashed the FIR solely on the ground that the original
complainant and the accused has entered into a compromise. Hence,
the present appeals.
13. Shri Varun K. Chopra, learned advocate appearing on behalf
of the State of Madhya Pradesh has vehemently submitted that in both
these cases, the High Court has committed a grave error in quashing the
respective FIRs which were for the offences under Sections 307, 294
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DHRUV GURJAR
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
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and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and
Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act respectively.
13.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant-State that in the present cases the High Court
has quashed the respective FIRs mechanically and solely on the basis of
the settlement/compromise between the complainant and the accused,
without even considering the gravity and seriousness of the offences
alleged against the accused persons.
13.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant-State that while exercising the powers under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and quashing the respective FIRs, the High
Court has not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged were
against the society at large and not restricted to the personal disputes
between the two individuals.
13.3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant-State that the High Court has misread the decision
of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the respective
FIRs. It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel that the High
Court ought to have appreciated that in all the cases where the complainant
has compromised/entered into a settlement with the accused, that need
not necessarily mean resulting into no chance of recording conviction
and/or the entire exercise of a trial destined to be exercise of futility. It
is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant-State that in a given case despite the complainant may not
support in future and in the trial in view of the settlement and compromise
with the accused, still the prosecution may prove the case against the
accused persons by examining the other witnesses, if any, and/or on the
basis of the medical evidence and/or other evidence/material. It is
submitted that in the present cases the investigation was in progress and
even the statement of the witnesses was recorded and the medical
evidence was also collected. It is submitted that therefore in the facts
and circumstances of the case, the High Court has clearly erred in
considering and relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of
Shiji (supra).
13.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant-State that as such in the appeal arising out of
SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013, in fact, the accused were absconding from
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the day of the commission of the offence and, in fact, the learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Datia issued a proclamation under Section 82 of the
Cr.P.C. against the accused persons to appear before him. It is submitted
that in between the day of the alleged commission of the offence and
filing of the application before the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
and while they were absconding, the accused managed to get the affidavits
of the complainant and other witnesses, which were dated 9.2.2013. It
is submitted that all these aforesaid circumstances and the conduct on
the part of the accused were required to be considered by the High
Court while quashing the FIR in exercise of its inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and more particularly when the offences
alleged were against the society at large, namely, robbery and under the
Arms Act, and in fact non-compoundable. In support of his submissions,
learned counsel for the appellant-State has placed reliance on the
decisions of this Court in the cases of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab
(2012) 10 SCC 303; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Deepak (2014)
10 SCC 285; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Manish (2015) 8 SCC
307; J.Ramesh Kamath vs. Mohana Kurup (2016) 12 SCC 179;
State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rajveer Singh (2016) 12 SCC 471;
ParbatbhaiAAhir vs. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641; and2019
SCC Online SC 7, State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kalyan Singh,
decided on 4.1.2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 14/2019.
13.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid
decisions of this Court, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant-State has prayed to allow the present appeals and quash and
set aside the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court
quashing and setting aside the respective FIRs, in exercise of its inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
14. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused
has supported the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High
Court.
14.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned advocate appearing
on behalf of the accused that in the facts and circumstances of the case
and when the complainant and the accused entered into a compromise
and settled the disputes amicably among themselves, and therefore when
the High Court found that there is no chance of recording conviction
against the accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial would be
an exercise of futility, the High Court has rightly exercised the powers
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under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has rightly quashed the respective FIRs.
In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the accused has placed
reliance on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Jitendra
Raghuvanshi vs. Babita Raghuvanshi (2013) 4 SCC 58; Anita Maria
Dias vs. State of Maharashtra (2018) 3 SCC 290; and Social Action
Forum for Manav Adhikar vs. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 443.
14.2 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid
decisions of this Court, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeals.
15. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length.
16. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present
appeals, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C. has quashed the FIRs for the offences under Sections 307,
294 and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act
and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act respectively, solely on the basis of a
compromise between the complainant and the accused. That in view of
the compromise and the stand taken by the complainant, considering the
decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), the High Court has
observed that there is no chance of recording conviction against the
accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial would be exercise in
futility, the High Court has quashed the respective FIRs.
16.1 However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact
that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per Section
320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgments and orders, it appears
that the High Court has not at all considered the relevant facts and
circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness of the
offences and its social impact. From the impugned judgments and orders
passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has mechanically
quashed the respective FIRs, in exercise of its powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all considered the distinction
between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong and the social
impact. As observed by this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra
vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29, the Court's principal
duty, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash
the criminal proceedings, should be to scan the entire facts to find out
the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement. As observed,
it is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and the said
experience should be used with care, caution, circumspection and
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courageous prudence. In the case at hand, the High Court has not at all
taken pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of facts in proper
perspective and has quashed the criminal proceedings mechanically.
Even, the quashing of the respective FIRs by the High Court in the
present cases for the offences under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the
IPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27
of the Arms Act respectively, and that too in exercise of powers under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is just contrary to the law laid down by this
Court in a catena of decisions.
16.2 In the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 61, this
Court has observed and held as under:
"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be
summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a
criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a
criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320
of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline
engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases
power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may
be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their
dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise
of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature
and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be
fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the
offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private
in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any
compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to
the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption
Act or the offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing
criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal
cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour
stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly
the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil,
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partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where
the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties
have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the
High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view,
because of the compromise between the offender and the victim,
the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation
of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by
not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement
and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court
must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest
of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation
of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process
of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim
and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is
appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer
to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall
be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
16.3 In the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014)
6 SCC 466, after considering the decision in the case of Gian Singh
(supra), in paragraph 29, this Court summed up as under:
"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down
the following principles by which the High Court would be guided
in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties
and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while
accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing
to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal
proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under
Section 482 of the
Code, the High Court has inherent power
to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are
not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter
between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised
sparingly and with caution.
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29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that
basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the
guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion
on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions
which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity
or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly,
for the offences alleged to have been committed under special
statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that capacity are
not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between
the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly
those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when
the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine
as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great
oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused
to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category
of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally
treated as crime against the society and not against the individual
alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely
because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the
High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected
sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the
charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open
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to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether
such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature
of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered
by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of
this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether
there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of
conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse
to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings
whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High
Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on
complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court
can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the
parties is going to result in harmony between them which may
improve their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section
482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role.
Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after
the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under
investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the
settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is
because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on
and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those
cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start
or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show
benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima
facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above.
On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost
complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at
the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain
from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in
such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case
finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the
offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in
those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial
court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High
Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a
ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender
who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is
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proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded
of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing
a convict found guilty of such a crime."
16.4 In the case of ParbatbhaiAahir (supra), again this Court
has had an occasion to consider whether the High Court can quash the
FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Considering a catena of decisions of this
Court on the point, this Court summarised the following propositions:
 "(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the
High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to
secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new
powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in
the High Court.
 (2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to
quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the
ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender
and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for
the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an
offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of
Section 320 CrPC.