# THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. VISHNU RAMCHANDRA

- **Citation:** [1961] 2 S.C.R. 26
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1958-11-25
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 78 of 1959
- **Bench:** M. Hidayatullah, J. c. SHAH
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-state-of-maharashtra-v-vishnu-ramchandra-2225
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Externment-Order, if can relate to antecedents of convicted
offenders-Statute, if prospective or retrospective-Bombay Police
Act, r95r (n of r95r), ss. SJ(I), r4z-Indian Penal Code, ss. II4,
380, 4rr.
· On November 16, 1949, the respondent was convicted under
ss. 380 and II4 of the Indian Penal Code. On October 15, 1957•
the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay, acting under s. 57(1)
of -the Bombay Police Act passed an order externing him. from
the limits of Greater Bombay. Later he was prosecuted and
convicted under . s. 142 of the Bombay Police Act by the
Presidency Magistrate for returning to the area from which he
was externed. On an application for revision the High Court
acquitted the respondent upholding his contention that s. 57 of the
Bombay Police Act was not retrospective and was not applicable
unless the conyiction on which the externment was based took
place after the Act came into force. On appeal by the appellant
with the special leave of this Court it was
·
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
27
Held, that though statutes must ordinarily be interpreted
1960
. prospectively unless the langua~e ~ak~s them retrospective,
either e,xpressly or by necessary 1mphcahon, and penal statutes
Thi s1at1 of
creating new offences are always prospective, penal statutes
Maharashtra.
creating disabilities though ordinarily interpreted prospectively
v.
are sometimes. interpreted retrospectively when the intention
Vishnu
is not to punish but to protect the public from undesirable
Ramehandra
persons whose past conduct is made the basis of future action.
Mid.land Ry. Co. v. Pye, IO C.B. (N.S.) I79. Re:x v. Birthwhistle, (188g) 58 L.J. (N.S.) M.C. 158, Queen v. Vine, [1875] IO
Q.B. 195, E:x parte Pratt, [1884] 12 Q.B. 334, Bourke v. Nutt,
[1898] l Q.B. 725, Ganesan v. A.K. Joscelyne, A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 33,
Taher Saifuddi11 v. Tyebbhai Moosaji, A.LR. 1953 Born. 183, Tlte
Queen v. Inhabitants of St. Mary Whitechapel, [1t!48] 12 Q.B. 120
(E) : u6 E.R. Su and Re:x v. Austin, [1913] l K.B. 551, considered and applied.
Section 57 of the Bombay Police Act did not create a new
offence but was designed to protect the public from the activities of undesirable persons convicted of particular offences and
enabled the authorities .to take note of their activities in order
to put them outside the areas of their activities for preventing
any repetition of such activities in the future.
The verb "has been" as used in s. 57 meant "shall have
been". Legislation which takes note of a convicted offender's
antecedents for restraining him from his acts cannot be said to
be applied retrospectively as long as the action taken against
him is after the Act comes into force. The Act in question was
thus not applied retrospectively but prospectively.
An externment order must be bona fide and must relate to a
conviction which is sufficiently proximate in time.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 78 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated November 25, 1958, of the former Bombay
High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 1393
of 1958 a.rising out of the judgment and order dated
September 18, 1958, of the Presidency Magistrate II
Class, Ma.za.gaon a.t Bombay in Case No. 1101/P of
1958.
R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant.
The respondent did not appear.
1960. October 18. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
.1960
Tht Slate of
M aharashfra
v.
Vishnu
Ramchafo:dra
Hidayatullah J.
28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
HIDAYATULLAH J.-This is an appeal by the Sta.te
of Bombay, with the specie.I leave of this Court,
against the omer of acquittal by the High Court of
Bombay of the respondent, Vishnu Ramchandra,
who was prosecuted under s. 142 of the Bombay
Police Act and sentenced to six months' rigorous im·
pris011ment by the Preside11cy Magistrate, 2nd Court,
Mazagaon, Bombay.
On November 16, 1949, Vishnu Ramchandra was
convicted under ss. 380 and 114 of the Indian Penal
Code, and sentenced to one month's rigorous imprisonment. On

## Text

26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
r960
From the contents of this invoice it would be seen
-
that the appellant has charged a price inclusive of
M1/.'-dT•,•gabLh•,dd'.a the railway freight and would therefore be outside the
""'"".
f
(1)()
h'h
.
h.
d
v.
terms o r. 5
g w 1c
reqmres t at m or er to
The Commercial enaple a dealer to claim the deduction it should be
r. .. Officer,
charged for separately and not included in the price
Kurnool
of goods sold. The conditions of the rule not having
been complied with, the appe. Hant was not entitled to
·Ayyangar ].
the deductio.n in respect of freight.
1960
October :i8.
,
The result therefore is that the appeal is allowed in
part and 'the order of the High Court in so far as it
denied to the appellant the benefit of the deduction in
the turnpver provided by r. 18(2) of the Turnover and
Assessment Rules is set aside.
In view of the appellant having succeeded only in
part, there will be no order as to costs in this appeal.
Appeal allowed in part.
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
v.
VISHNU RAMCHANDRA
(M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. c. SHAH, JJ.)
Externment-Order, if can relate to antecedents of convicted
offenders-Statute, if prospective or retrospective-Bombay Police
Act, r95r (n of r95r), ss. SJ(I), r4z-Indian Penal Code, ss. II4,
380, 4rr.
· On November 16, 1949, the respondent was convicted under
ss. 380 and II4 of the Indian Penal Code. On October 15, 1957•
the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay, acting under s. 57(1)
of -the Bombay Police Act passed an order externing him. from
the limits of Greater Bombay. Later he was prosecuted and
convicted under . s. 142 of the Bombay Police Act by the
Presidency Magistrate for returning to the area from which he
was externed. On an application for revision the High Court
acquitted the respondent upholding his contention that s. 57 of the
Bombay Police Act was not retrospective and was not applicable
unless the conyiction on which the externment was based took
place after the Act came into force. On appeal by the appellant
with the special leave of this Court it was
·
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
27
Held, that though statutes must ordinarily be interpreted
1960
. prospectively unless the langua~e ~ak~s them retrospective,
either e,xpressly or by necessary 1mphcahon, and penal statutes
Thi s1at1 of
creating new offences are always prospective, penal statutes
Maharashtra.
creating disabilities though ordinarily interpreted prospectively
v.
are sometimes. interpreted retrospectively when the intention
Vishnu
is not to punish but to protect the public from undesirable
Ramehandra
persons whose past conduct is made the basis of future action.
Mid.land Ry. Co. v. Pye, IO C.B. (N.S.) I79. Re:x v. Birthwhistle, (188g) 58 L.J. (N.S.) M.C. 158, Queen v. Vine, [1875] IO
Q.B. 195, E:x parte Pratt, [1884] 12 Q.B. 334, Bourke v. Nutt,
[1898] l Q.B. 725, Ganesan v. A.K. Joscelyne, A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 33,
Taher Saifuddi11 v. Tyebbhai Moosaji, A.LR. 1953 Born. 183, Tlte
Queen v. Inhabitants of St. Mary Whitechapel, [1t!48] 12 Q.B. 120
(E) : u6 E.R. Su and Re:x v. Austin, [1913] l K.B. 551, considered and applied.
Section 57 of the Bombay Police Act did not create a new
offence but was designed to protect the public from the activities of undesirable persons convicted of particular offences and
enabled the authorities .to take note of their activities in order
to put them outside the areas of their activities for preventing
any repetition of such activities in the future.
The verb "has been" as used in s. 57 meant "shall have
been". Legislation which takes note of a convicted offender's
antecedents for restraining him from his acts cannot be said to
be applied retrospectively as long as the action taken against
him is after the Act comes into force. The Act in question was
thus not applied retrospectively but prospectively.
An externment order must be bona fide and must relate to a
conviction which is sufficiently proximate in time.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 78 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated November 25, 1958, of the former Bombay
High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 1393
of 1958 a.rising out of the judgment and order dated
September 18, 1958, of the Presidency Magistrate II
Class, Ma.za.gaon a.t Bombay in Case No. 1101/P of
1958.
R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant.
The respondent did not appear.
1960. October 18. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
.1960
Tht Slate of
M aharashfra
v.
Vishnu
Ramchafo:dra
Hidayatullah J.
28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
HIDAYATULLAH J.-This is an appeal by the Sta.te
of Bombay, with the specie.I leave of this Court,
against the omer of acquittal by the High Court of
Bombay of the respondent, Vishnu Ramchandra,
who was prosecuted under s. 142 of the Bombay
Police Act and sentenced to six months' rigorous im·
pris011ment by the Preside11cy Magistrate, 2nd Court,
Mazagaon, Bombay.
On November 16, 1949, Vishnu Ramchandra was
convicted under ss. 380 and 114 of the Indian Penal
Code, and sentenced to one month's rigorous imprisonment. On October 15, 1957, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay, acting under s. 57(a) of the
Bombay Police Act (22 of 1951), passed an order
against Vishnu Ramchandra which was to operate for
one year, externing him from the limits of Greater
Bombay. At that time, a prosecution under s. 411 of
the Indian Penal Code was pending against Vishnu
Ramcha.ndra, and he was not immediately externed,
to enable him to. attend the case. This prosecution
ca.me to an end on July 10, 1958, and resulted in his
acquittal. Immediately afterwards, a constable ·took
him outside the limits of Greater Bombay, and left him
there. The prosecution caile was that he returned to
Greater Bombay, and was arrested at Pydhonie on
August 24, 1958. He was prosecuted under s. 142 of
the Bombay Police Act. His plea that he was forcibly
brought back to Pydhonie and arrested was not accep·
ted by t.he Presidency Magistrate, and he was convicted.
He filed a revision application, which was heard by
a learned single Judge of the High Court of Bombay .
. Three contentions were raised before the High Court.
The first was that the Deputy Commissioner of Police
had not applied his mind to the facts of the case
before making the order of externment. The second
was that s. 57 of the Bombay Police Act was prospective, and could not be made applicable, unless the
conviction on which the action of externment was
based, took place after the coming into force of that
Act. The third was that the belief entertained by the
Deputy Commissioner that Vishnu Ramchandra was
.
,..
•
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
29
likely to engage himself in the commission of an
Ig6a
offence similar to that for which he was prosecuted
The State of
was based on the prosecution which was then pending,
Maharashtra
a.nd that that ground disappeared after his acquittal.
v.
The High Court did not consider the first and the
Vishnu
third grounds, because it held that the second ground
Ramchandra
was good.
Section 57 of the Bombay Police Act reads as folHidayatullah 1
lows:
"Removal of persons convicted of certain offencu.-If a person has been convicted-
(a) of an offence under Chapter X IT, XVI or
XVII of the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), or ·
(b) twice of a.n offence under section 9 or 23 of
the Bombay Beggars Act, 1945 (Born. XXIII of 1945,)
or under the Bombay Prevention of Prostitution Act,
1923 (Bom. XI of 1923), or
(c) thrice of a.n offence within a period of three
years under section 4 or 12A of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 (Bom. IV of 1887), or under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (Bom. XXV of
1949) the Commissioner, the District Magistrate or the
Sub-Divisional Magistrate specially empowered by the
State Government in this behalf, if he has reason to
believe that such person is likely again to engage himself in the commission of an offence similar to that for
which he was convicted, may direct such person to
remove himself outside the area. within the local
limits of his jurisdiction, by such route and within
such time as the said officer may prescribe and not to
enter or return to the area from which he was directed
to remove himself ".
In reaching his conclusion, the lea.rued single Judge
observ·ed that the legislature had used the present
participle " has been " and not the past participle in
the opening portion of the section, and that this indicated that the section was intended to be used only
where a person was convicted subsequent to the com-·
ing into force of the Act.
He further observed that
being a penal s(lction, it had to be interpreted prospectively.
He repelled an argument of the Assistant
Igfio
The St.ate of
llJ aharashtra
v.
Vishnu
Ramchandra
, Hidayatullah .J.
30
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
Government Pleader that s. 57 merely re-enacted the
provisions of s. 27 of the City of Bombay Police Act,
1902, and that a liability incurred under the older Act
was preserved by s. 167 of the Bombay Police Act of
1951. Observing further that the Deputy Commis·
sioner of Police at the time of the passing of the order
could not be said to have entertained a belief about
the activities of Vishnu Ramchandra based upon his
conviction in the year 1949, he held that the order of
externment must be rega.rded as invalid for that reason and also-on the ground that the conviction was
· not after the coming into force of the Act.
At the hearing before us, the respondent was not
represented. We have heard Mr. Dhebar in support
of the appeal, and, in our opinion, the High Court was
not right in the view it had taken of s. 57 of the Act.
The question whether an enactment is meant to ope·
rate prospectively or retrospectively has to be decided
in accordance with well-settled principles. The cardinal principle is that statutes must always be interpreted prospectively, unless the language of the statutes
makes them·retrospective, either expressly or by necessary implication. Penal statutes which create new
offences are always prospective, but penal statutes
which create disabilities, though ordinarily interpreted
prospectively, are sometimes interpreted retrospectively when there is a clear intendment that they are
to be applied to past events. The reason why penal
statutes are so construed was stated by Erle, C. J., in
Midland Rly. Co. v. Pye(') in the following words:
"Those whose duty it is to administer the law
very properly guard against giving to an Act of Parliament a retrospective operation, unless the intention
of the legislature that it should be so construed is
expressed in clear, plain and unambiguous language;
because it manifestly shocks one's sense of justice that
an act, legal at the time of doing it, should .be made
unlawful by some new enactment".
This principle has now been recognised by our Constitution and established as a Constitutional restriction
on legislative power.
(I) IO C.B. (N.S.) 179, 191.
•
{
' l
I
i
!
\
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
31
There are, however, statutes which create no new
punishment, but authorise some action based on pa.st
conduct. To such statutes, if expressed in language
showing retrospective operation, the principle is not
applied. As Lord Coleridge, C. J., observed during the
course of arguments in Rex v. Birtkwkistle (1):
"Scores of Acts are retrospective, and may without express words be taken to be retrospective, since
they a.re passed to supply a cure to an existing evil."
Indeed, in that case which a.rose under the Married
Women (Maintenance in Case of Desertion) Act, 1886,
the Act was held retrospective without express words.
It was said :
" It was intended to cure an existing evil and to
afford to married women a remedy for desertion,
whether such desert.ion took place before the passing
of the Act or not."
Another principle which also applies is that .an Act
designed to protect the public against acts of a harmful
character may be construed retrospecti;rely, if the
language admits such an interpretation, even though
it may equally have a prospective meaning. In Queen
v.
Vine(~), which dealt with the disqualification of
persons selling spirits by retail if convicted of felony,
the Act was applied retrospectively to persons who
were convicted before the Act ca.me into operation.
Cpckburn, C. J., observed:-
"If one could see some reason for thinking that
the intention of this enactment was merely to aggravate the punishment for felony by · imposing this
disqualification in addition, I should feel ~he force of
Mr. Poland's argument, founded on the rule which
has obtained in putting a construction upon statutes-·
that when they a.re penal in .their nature they are not
to be construed retrospectively, if the language is
capable of having a. prospective effect given to it and
is not necessarily retrospective. But here the object
of the enactment is not to punish offenders, but to
protect the public against public houses in which
spirits a.re retailed being kept by persons of doubtful
~ cha.ra.cter ... On looking at the Act, the words used seem
(1) (1889) 58 L.J. (N.S.) M.C. 158.
(2) [1875] 10 Q.B. 195.
The State of
Maharashtra
v.
Vishnu
Ramchandra
Hidayatullah J.
32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
'960
to import the intention to protect the public against
The State of
persons convicted in the past as well as in future; the
Maharashfra
words are in effect equivalent to 'every convicted
v.
felon '."
Vishnu
In the same case, Archibald, J., expressed himself
Ra,.cAa...ira
forcefully when he observed :-
Hidayatullah J.
" I quite . agree, if it were simply a penal enactment, that we ought not to give it a retrospective
operation ; but it is an enactment with regard to public
and social order, and infliction of penalties is merely
collateral."
·
Similarly, in Ex Parte Pratt('), which dealt with the
words "a debtor commits an act of bankruptcy" to
enable the Court to make a receiving order, Cotton,
L. J., gave the words a retrospective operation, observing:-
" I think that no reliance can be placed on the
words ' commits ' as showing that only acts of bankruptcy committed after the Act ca.me into operation
a.re intended."
In the same case, the observations of Bowen, L. J .,
were:-
" I think that the more the Act is studied the
more it will be found that it is framed in a very
peculiar way. I do not mean to say that it is inartistically framed. I think it is framed on the idea. that a.
bankruptcy code is being constructed, and when the
present tense is used, it is used, not in relation to time,
but as the present tense of logic."
Fry, L. J., added:-
" I entirely agree with Bowen, L. J ., as to the
meaning of the present tense in the section ; it is used,
I think, to express a hypothesis, without regard to
time."
In Bourke v. Nutt('), Lord Esher, M. R., speaking of
these observations of Bowen and Fry, LL. J., observed:-
" ... the case seems to show that when the present
tense is used in this statute (s. 32 of the Bankruptcy
Act, 1883) the time to be considered is the time at
(t) [1884] 12 Q.B. 334·
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
33
which the Court has to act, and not the time at which
the condition of things on which it has to a.ct ca.me
into existence."
Applying the above principles, Lord Esher, M. R., held
that the section was not retrospective but prospective,
because the important time was that at which it had
to be considered whether the person was disqualified
and it related to a time after the passing of the Act.
He, however, added that "even if it could be said
that it is retrospective, its enactments a.re solely for
the public benefit, and the rule that restricts the
operation of a. penal retrospective statute does not
apply, because this statute is not penal."
These principles, though not unanimously expressed, have been accepted in later oases both in England
and in India. In Ganesan v. A. K. Joscelyne (1 ),
Chakrava.rti, C. J., observed, Sarkar, J. (as he then
was), concurring:-
"I may state, however, that in spite of the
ordinary and I might almost say cardinal rule of construction that statutes, particularly statutes creating
liabilities, ought not to be so construed as to given
them a. retrospective operation unless there is a. clear
provision to that effect or a. necessary intendment.
implied in the provisions, there is another principle
on which Courts have sometimes acted. It ha.s been
held that where the object of a.n Act is not to inflict
punishment on anyone but to protect the public from
undesirable persons, bearing the stigma. of a conviction or misconduct on their character, the ordinary
rule of construction need not he strictly applied."
In Taker Saifuddin v. Tyebbkai Moosaji e), the
same principles were applied by Cha.gla., C. J. and
Bhagwati, J. (as he then was), and reference was
ma.de also to The Queen v. Inhabitants of St. Mary
Whitechapel (8) where Lord Denman, C. J., in his judgment observed :-
" ... it was said that the operation of the statute
was confined to persons who bad become widows after
(1) A.IR. 1957 Cal. 33, 38.
(2) A.I.R. 1953 Born. t83, 186, t87.
(3) [1848} 12 Q.B. 120 (B): 116 E.R. 811.
The State of
Maharashtra
v.
Vishnu
Ramc/iandra
Hidayatullah ].
The State of
M aharashlra
v.
Vishnu
Ramchandra
Hidayatulltih ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
the Act passed, and that the presumption against a
retrospective statute being intended supported this
construction; but we have before shown that the
statute is in its direct operation prospective, as it
relates to future removals only, and that it is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of
the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing."
Now, s. 57 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, does
not create a new offence nor makes punishable that
which was not an offence. It is designed to protect
the public from the activities of undesirable persons
who have been convicted of offences of a particular
kind. The section only enables the authorities to take
note of their convictions and to put them outside the
area of their activities, so that the public may be protected against a repetition of such activities. As
observed by Phillimore, J ., in Rex v. A '118tin (1 ),
"No man' has such a vested right in his past
crimes and their consequences as would entitle him to
insist that in no future legislation shall any regard
whatever be had to his previous history."
An offender who has been punished may be restrained
in his acts and conduct by some legislation, which
takes note of his antecedents; but so long as the action
taken against him is after the Act comes into force,
the statute cannot be said to be applied retrospectively. The Act in question was thus not applied
retrospectively but prospectively.
It remains only to consider if the language of the section bars an action based on past actions before the
Act was passed. The verb " has been " is in the
present perfect tense, and may mean either " shall
have been " or-" shall be ". Looking, however, to the
scheme of the enactment as a whole and particularly
the other portiOns of it, it is manifest that the former
meaning is intended. The verb " has been " describes
past actions, and, to borrow the language of Fry, L.J.,
in Ex Parte Pratt (9), " is used to express a hypothesis,
without regard to time ".
An externment order, however, to satisfy the
l•l (1913) • K.B. ss•. ss6.
l>l [18841 •• Q.B. 334.
I
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
35
requirements of s. 57 of the Bombay Police Act, must
be made bona fide, taking into account a conviction
which is tmfficiently proximate in time. Since no
absolute rule can be laid down, each case must depend
on its own facts.
In the result, we set aside the acquittal, and remit
the case to the High Court for disposal on the other
points urged before it and in the light of observations
ma.de here by us.
Appeal allowed.
PANNALAL NANDLAL BHANDARI
v.
THE COMMISSIONEE OF INCOME-ll' AX,
BOMBAY CITY, BOMBAY.
(S. K. DAS, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. c. SHAH, JJ.)
Income-tax-General notice-Non-resident liability to submit
return-Period of Limitation-Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (XI of
1922), s. 22(1) & (2), s. 34(1)(a) & (b).
The appellant, a non-resident for the purfoses of the Indian
Income-tax Act, did not submit returns o certain dividend
income accruing to him within the taxable territory. The
Income-tax Officer served upon him notices under s. 34 read
with s. 22(2) of the Act for assessment of tax in respect of those
years. The notices in question were issued within eight years
from_ the end of the years of assessment and were within the
period prescribed by s. 34(1)(a). The appellant contended that
notices for assessment were governed by cl. (1)(b) of s. 34 and
not by cl. (1)(a), even though the appellant had not made a
return of his income for the years in question as a general notice
under s. 22(1) did not give rise to a liability to submit a return
and his inaction did not amount to omission or failure to submit
a return as he was a non-resident, and the assessment proceedings were barred by limitation.
Held, that the expression "every person" in s. 22(1) of the
Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, includes all persons who are liable
to pay tax and non-residents are not exempted from liability to
submit a return pursuant to the general notice thereunder.
Once a notice is given by publication in the prescribed
manner under s. 22(1), every person whether resident or nonresident whose income exceeds the maximum amount exempt
from tax is obliged to submit a return and if he does not do so,
The Stale of
M aharas/itra
v.
Vishnu
Ramchandra
Hidayatullah ].
October I8.