# • THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS P. J. RATNAM v. D. KANIKARAM AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1964] 3 S.C.R. 1
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Bench:** B. P. SINHA a. J, ]. c. SHAH, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-supreme-court-reports-p-j-ratnam-v-d-kanikaram-and-others-2880
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

Professional miscmuluct-Complaint--Bnquiry--Advowte
U!i•appropriating clitnt's money-If yuilty of
profeBPional
miaconduct-Proceeding in respect of professional miscaruluct
and prnceeding in a criminal Court-Object af-DifjerentiationP·unishmtnt-,-Legal Practiti•nere Act, 187.? (18 of 1879), ss. 12,
13-Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (3~ of 1926), s. 10 (2).
The respondents and one other Kagga Veeraiah, were
plaintiffs in a suit for possession of certain lands and the
appellant was their Advocate. The suit was di•missed and
an appeal was preferred therefrom to the Subordinate Judge.
Pending the disposal of the appeal, the court directd the sale
proceeds of the standing crops on the suit land to he deposited
into court, and a sum of Rs. J ,600/- was so deposited. The
plaintiff's appeal was allowed and the defendants preferred
a second appeal to the High Court. Pending disposal of the
second appeal, plaintiff's application for
withdrawing the
amount was allowed by the court on
furnishing security of
immovable property. A cheque petition was filed which was
allowed and thereafter a cheque for
Rs. l,452/4/- was issued
in favour of the appellant. The appellant an
Advocate
admitted that he had received and had cashed the cheque on
behalf of his clients who were
entitled to be paid this sum.
The second appeal was allowed by the High Court and the
plaintiff's suit was dismissed, as a result of which the plaintiffs had to refund the sum of the defendants in the suit.
The plaintiffs made a written demand on the appellant for the
proceeds of the cheque that had been cashed by him and not
paid over to them. The appellant in reply claimed to have
paid over the sum to them on their passing a receipt which
happened to be in the bundle of case-pap"rs returned to
1963
April JO.
'
1963
P. J. Rolo•m
v.
D. T.aailat.,,.
2
SUPRE~E COURT REPORTS [1964] V0]}.~
them. The respondents filed
a complaint under ss. 12 aad
13 of the Legal Practitioners Act. The explanation of tlte
Advocate was called for and the District Judge was directed te
bold an enquiry and forward his report to the High· Court.
His report was that the appellant's ca•e was not unbelievable
and he was entitled to the benefit of doubt. The matter was
heard by a Bench of three Judges of the High Court, who acid
him guilty of professional misconduct and suspended him for
five years from practice. In this Court the
appellant
contended, (I) that the Bar Council had not been consulted
before the case was referred to the learned District Judge for
inquiry and report and this vitiated the legality of the entire
proceedings against the appellant.
(?.) That the complaint
filed by the resμondents on the basis of which action was
taken against the appellant was not shown to have been signed
by them, nor properly verified by them as required by the rules
of the High Court. (3) That as in substance the charge
against the appellant
was misappropriation
of moneys
belonging to the clients, the High Court should have left the
complainants to their remedy of prosecuting the appellant and
should not have proceeded to deal with him under s. IO of
the Bar Councils Act.
(4) That there was a procedural
irregularity in the mode in which the case against the appellant
was conducted. (5) That one of the plaintiffs-Kagga Veeraiah
had himself admitted in his evidence that he and others had
received the proceeds of the cheque which the appellant had
cashed and that in the face of this admission the High Court
was clearly wrong in finding that the appellant had failed to
pay over the money to his clients.
Held
(I) that the fact that in the order of reference of
the proceedings under s. 10(2) of the Bar Councils Act, to the
District Judge, there is no explicit statement that the liar
Council had previously been consulted, is not decisive on the·
point. There would be a presumption of regularity in respect
of official and judicial acts and it would be for the party who
challenges such regularity to plead and prove his cas

## Text

,., •
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS
P. J. RATNAM
v.
D. KANIKARAM AND OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA a. J., ]. c. SHAH and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)
Professional miscmuluct-Complaint--Bnquiry--Advowte
U!i•appropriating clitnt's money-If yuilty of
profeBPional
miaconduct-Proceeding in respect of professional miscaruluct
and prnceeding in a criminal Court-Object af-DifjerentiationP·unishmtnt-,-Legal Practiti•nere Act, 187.? (18 of 1879), ss. 12,
13-Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (3~ of 1926), s. 10 (2).
The respondents and one other Kagga Veeraiah, were
plaintiffs in a suit for possession of certain lands and the
appellant was their Advocate. The suit was di•missed and
an appeal was preferred therefrom to the Subordinate Judge.
Pending the disposal of the appeal, the court directd the sale
proceeds of the standing crops on the suit land to he deposited
into court, and a sum of Rs. J ,600/- was so deposited. The
plaintiff's appeal was allowed and the defendants preferred
a second appeal to the High Court. Pending disposal of the
second appeal, plaintiff's application for
withdrawing the
amount was allowed by the court on
furnishing security of
immovable property. A cheque petition was filed which was
allowed and thereafter a cheque for
Rs. l,452/4/- was issued
in favour of the appellant. The appellant an
Advocate
admitted that he had received and had cashed the cheque on
behalf of his clients who were
entitled to be paid this sum.
The second appeal was allowed by the High Court and the
plaintiff's suit was dismissed, as a result of which the plaintiffs had to refund the sum of the defendants in the suit.
The plaintiffs made a written demand on the appellant for the
proceeds of the cheque that had been cashed by him and not
paid over to them. The appellant in reply claimed to have
paid over the sum to them on their passing a receipt which
happened to be in the bundle of case-pap"rs returned to
1963
April JO.
'
1963
P. J. Rolo•m
v.
D. T.aailat.,,.
2
SUPRE~E COURT REPORTS [1964] V0]}.~
them. The respondents filed
a complaint under ss. 12 aad
13 of the Legal Practitioners Act. The explanation of tlte
Advocate was called for and the District Judge was directed te
bold an enquiry and forward his report to the High· Court.
His report was that the appellant's ca•e was not unbelievable
and he was entitled to the benefit of doubt. The matter was
heard by a Bench of three Judges of the High Court, who acid
him guilty of professional misconduct and suspended him for
five years from practice. In this Court the
appellant
contended, (I) that the Bar Council had not been consulted
before the case was referred to the learned District Judge for
inquiry and report and this vitiated the legality of the entire
proceedings against the appellant.
(?.) That the complaint
filed by the resμondents on the basis of which action was
taken against the appellant was not shown to have been signed
by them, nor properly verified by them as required by the rules
of the High Court. (3) That as in substance the charge
against the appellant
was misappropriation
of moneys
belonging to the clients, the High Court should have left the
complainants to their remedy of prosecuting the appellant and
should not have proceeded to deal with him under s. IO of
the Bar Councils Act.
(4) That there was a procedural
irregularity in the mode in which the case against the appellant
was conducted. (5) That one of the plaintiffs-Kagga Veeraiah
had himself admitted in his evidence that he and others had
received the proceeds of the cheque which the appellant had
cashed and that in the face of this admission the High Court
was clearly wrong in finding that the appellant had failed to
pay over the money to his clients.
Held
(I) that the fact that in the order of reference of
the proceedings under s. 10(2) of the Bar Councils Act, to the
District Judge, there is no explicit statement that the liar
Council had previously been consulted, is not decisive on the·
point. There would be a presumption of regularity in respect
of official and judicial acts and it would be for the party who
challenges such regularity to plead and prove his case. Since,
this objection was not raised in the High Court, even wheu the
appellant applied for a certificate, this Court will not entertain
this objection which rests wholly upon a question of fact.
·
(2) The complaint petition had been signed by the
respondents and properly verified and even otherwise since the
High Court was competent to initiate these proceedings au.
motu under s. 10(2) of the Act, the point raised is wholly
without·substance.
(3) There is a clear distinction between £SICS wherco
the misconduct is one in relation to the practitioner's duty to·
~. '
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3
ltia client and other cases where it is not so.
In the former
class of cases the court would be exercising its discretion pro·
porly if it proeeded to deal with the charge as a piece of pro·
fessional misconduct without driving the co1nplainant to seek
his remedy in a criminal court. So far as the facts and circum•
stances of the present case are concerned, it must be held,
tlaat the High Court was fully justified in proceeding against
the appellant under the provisions of s. 10
of the Bar
Council; Act.
Chandi Charan Mitter a Pleader, In re. (1920) I. L. R. 47
_.
Cal. 1115 and Emperor v. Satuh Chandra Singha, (1927) I.L.R.
54 Cal. 721, distinguished,
-
("
St<7/1en1 v. HilU, [1842] 152 E. R. 368, referred to.
(4)
No complaint, that the appellant was prejudiced by
the manner in which the inquiry was conducted in the matter
of the order in which the evidence was adduced, was made
either before the Di;trict Judge or before the High Court and
there is nothing on the record to suggest that any prejudice
had. occurred to the appellant.
(5) The evidence of Kagga Veeraiah was correctly
characterised by the High Court as devoid of truth and the
appellant, therefore, cannot rely on any admission of this
witness as evidence of the plaintiffs having received the sum.
Having regard to the gravity of the offence, there is no
justification for reducing the period of suspension. The appeal
therefore, must be dismissed.
CrvIL APPELLATE J U.RISDIOTION : Civil Appeal
No. 321 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment
and ord('rdated August 4, 1959 of the Andhra Pradesh
Hi1h Court in Referred Case No. 29 of 1957.
M. Rajagopalan and K. R. Ohoudh,ri, for the
appellant.
The respondent did not appear.
1963. April 10. The Judgment of the Court
wa, delivered by
AYYANG.A.B J .-This appeal has been filed by
special leave of this Court against the judgment of
1.951>
P. J. Ratnam
v.
D, Konikaram
JIU
P,/, 8-
\'
. v.
D.X..U-0
""'~'·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) voi.
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by which the.
appellant who is an Advocate was held guilty of
professional misconduct and had been suspended from
practice for five years.
'
The facts relating to the misconduct charged
were briefly these:
The three respondents before us
and one other-Kagga Veeraiah-were plaintiffs in
O. S. 432 of 1951 on the file of District Munsiff,
Guntur in which a claim was made for possession of
certain lands. The appellant was the Advocate for
these plaintiffs. The suit was dismissed by the Trail
Court and an appeal was filed therefrom to the
Subordinate Judge, Guntur and pending the disposal
of the appeal there was a direction by the Court that
the crops standing on the suit-land be sold' and the
proceeds deposited into Court. In pursuance of
this order a sum of about Rs. 1,600/- was deposited
into Court on December 19,. 1951. The appeal by
the plaintiffs was allowed by the Subordinate Judge.
The unsuccessful defendants preferred
a second
appeal to the High Court, but meanwhile the
plaintiffs made an application for withdrawing the
amount desposited in Court. By virtue of interim
orders passed by the Court they were granted liberty
to withdraw the sum pending disposal of the second
appeal in the High Court filed by the defendants on
furnishing security of immovable property. The
security was furnished and the withdrawal was
ordered. A cheque petition E. A. 250 of 1952 was
accordingly filed which was allowed and thereafter
a cheque was issued in favour of the Advocate-the
appellant before us -for Rs. 1,452/4/-, this being
the sum remaining to the credit of the plaintiffs after
deduction of poundage etc. It was admitted that
this cheque was cashed by the appellant on April
23, 1953.
The appellant did not dispute that he
cashed this cheque on behalf of his clients· or that
the latter were entitled to be paid this sum and the
charge of professional misconduct against the
/-
.. .
..
.... -
•
A
i
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
5
appellant was that the Advocate had not made this
payment in spite of demands but that on the other
hand he falsely claimed to have paid them this sum.
To resume the narrative of the matters leading
to these proceedings, the second appeal before the
High Court was disposed of in August, 1955 and by
the judgment of that Court the appeal was allowed
an'1 the plaintiff's suit dismissed. The plaintiffs had
therefore to refund the sum to the defendants in the
suit. On February 8, 1956 the plaintiffs made a
written demand on the appella'lt for the sum
complaining that the cheque had been cashed by him
but that its proceeds had not been paid over. On
April 14, l!J56 the appellant replied to this notice
claiming to have paid over the sum to them on their
passing a receipt and stating that the receipt
happened to be in the bundle of case-papers which
had been returned to them.
But even before the receipt of this reply the
three respondents before us filed a complaint under
ss. 12 and 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act ·alleging
the non-payment of the money and charging the
Advocate with professional misconduct in respect of
it, and praying for an enquiry into his conduct. The
appellant was an Advocate and hence the complaint
was treated as one under s. 10 ( 2) of the Indian Bar
Councils Act, 1926. The explanation of the Advocate
was called for and thereafter the District Judge,
Guntur was directed to h0ld an inquiry into the
allegations of professional misconduct against the appellant and forward his report to the High Court. An
elaborate inquiry was thereafter held by the learned
District Judge who, after considering the evidence,
submitted a report recording his conclusion "that
the appellant's case was not unbelievable" and that
on that ground he was entitled to · the benefit of
doubt. The matter then came up before the High
Court for consideration 1.m this report. Some point
19"
P,J. &Iv.
D. Jr ..a.,,.,
dJ!1.., ... /.
1963
I'. J. Rotn•~
v.
D. KtJnik~ram
·--
6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
appears to have been made before the Court that
certain material witnesses had not been examined.
Agreeing with the submission they directed the
District Judge to summon and examine them and
this was accordingly done, their evidence was
recorded and submitted to the High Court.
The
matter was thereafter heard by a Bench of 3 Judges
and the learned Judges being of the opinion that
the charge against the appellant viz., that he did
not pay over the amount of the cheque to his clients
was clearly made out, held him guilty of professional
misconduct and imposed the punishment of suspension
from practice, as stated earlier. The appellant then
applied and obtained leave of this court-special
le-ave under Art. 136 to challenge the correctness
of these findings and that is how the matter is
before us.
Before proceediug further we desire to indicate
the nature of the jurisdiction of this Court in such
matters and in broad outline the principles which it
would observe in dealing with them. The jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court 'in cases of
professional mis<mnduct is neither civil nor criminal
as these expressions are used in Arts. 133 and 134 of
the Constitution. In one aspect it is a jurisdiction over
an officer of the Court and the Advocate owes
a duty to the Court apart from his duty to his
clients.
In another aspect it is
a
statutory
power and we would add a duty vested in the
Court under s. 10 of the Bar
Councils Act
to ensure that the highest standards of proressional
rectitude are maintained, so that the Bar can render
its expert service to the public in general and the
litigants in particular and thus discharge its main
function of co-operating with the judiciary in the
administrance of justice according to law.
This
task which is at once delicate and responsible
the statute vest in the High Court and therefore the
primary responsibility of ensuring it· rests with it.
-'
•
- .
•
)
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
7
This Court is in consequence most reluctant to
interfere with the orders of High Courts in this field,
save in exceptional --cases when any question of
principle is involved or where this Court is persuaded
that any violation of the principles of natural justice
has taken place or that otherwise there has been a
miscarriage of justice. Where however none of these
factors are present, it is not the practice of this
Court to permit the canvassing of the evidence on
the record either for reappraising it or to determine
whether it should be accepted or not. The findings
of the High Court therefore on questions of fact
are not open before us and this Court would only
consider whether on the facts found, the charge of
professional misconduct is established.
Learned Counsel for the appellant urged before
us several grounds in support of the appeal but we
consider that none of them merits serious attention.
It was first submitted that the Bar Council had not
been consulted before the case was referred to the
learned District Judge for inquiry and report and
that this vitiated the legality of the entire proceedings
against the appellant. Our attention was drawn to
the terms of s. 10 ( 2) of th~ Indian Bar Councils
Act reading :
"10. (2) Upon receipt of a complaint made
to it by any Court or by the Bar Council, or
by any other person that any such Advocate
has been guilty of misconduct, the High Court
shall, if it does not summarily reject the
complaint, refer the case for inquiry either to
the Bar Council, or, after' consultation with the
Bar Council, to the Court of a District Judge
(hereinafter referred to as a District Court) and
may of its own motion so refer any case in
which it has otherwise reason to believe that
any such advocate has been so guilty."
and the argument was that the matter could not
have been remitted for inquiry to a District Judge
1969
P. I. R•tn""'
v.
D . .Kaihr•
1963
P. J. Ralnam
v.
D. Kanitaram
Ayy.:ingar J.
8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
unless the statutory pre-condition of consultation
with the Bar Council had taken place. It is not
necessary to consider in this case whether this
provision for consultation is mandatory or not but
we shall assume that it is so.
There was however
no hint of this objection to the
validity of the
proceedings up to the stage of the appeal in this
Court. The question whether there has or has not
been a consultation is one of fact and if this point
had been raised in the High Court we would have
information as to whether there had been
such
consultation or not, and if not why there was none.
Even when the appellant applied to the High Court
for a certificate of fitness
under Art. 133 (l) (c)
this objection was not suggested as a ground upon
which the validity of the proceedings would be
impugned.
In
these
circumstances
we
are
not disposed to entertain this objection which rests
wholly upon a question of fact.
The fact that
in the order of reference of the proceedings under
s. 10 (2) to the District Judge there is no explicit
statement that the Bar Council had previously been
consulted is not decisive on the point. There would
be a presumption of regularity in respect of official
and judicial acts and it would be for the party who
challenges such regularity to
plead and
prove
his case.
It was next contended that the complaint
filed by the respondents on the basis of which action
was taken against the appellant was not shown to
have been signed by them, nor properly verified by
them as required by the rules of the High Court.
We consider this objection frivolous in the extreme.
It was argued by the appellant before the High
Court that there was d1ssimil!lrity
between the
several signatures of the three respondents found in
the petition sent by them and that to be found !n the
plaint etc., of O.S. 432 of 1951 and that this was
some proof that it was not the respondents who were
;
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_,..
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
9
really responsible for the petition but that someone
inimically disposed towards
the
appellant. The
learned Judges of the High Court rejected this
submission in these words :
"For one thing, we are unable to find any such
dissimilarity. Even so, that has not much of a
bearing on the question whether the respondent
(appellant) bad discharged the burden viz., of
proving that he had made tJ:i.e payment to the
petitioners.
This argument would have had
some force if the petitioners had not given
evidence against the
respondent.
Further,
no such suggestion was put to any of the
plaintiffs."
This is on the question of the dissimilarity of the
signatures on which rests the argument that the
respondents were not the
complainants. Coming
next to the point about the
verification of the
complaint the matter stands
thus : The three
complainants (the respondents before us) originally
filed a petition on March ~6, I 956 before the District
Judge but this did not bear the
attestation of a
gazetted officer or other authority as required by
the rules.
This defect was made good by a fresh
petition which they filed before the District Judge
on April 16, 1956.
After the petition was signed by
the three petitioners they added
a verification in
these terms :
"We do hereby state that the facts stated above
are true to the best of our knowledge, information and belief,"
and then they signed again. These three signatures
they made before the District Judge who attested
their signatures on the same day and whrn for·
warding this complaint to tbc High Court on
196J
P. J. Rllln4m
••
[), Kamlcaram
Ayy••t• /,
t-.J. J!.tMm
••
D. Jr.,.ik.,..,,.
.4)1.1 .. ,., J.
10
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
April 18, 1956 the learned District Judge stated these
facts and added :
"The
petitioners
appeared before me on
April 16, 1956. I got them sign the petition
in my presence and I attested the same."
It is thus clear that they made three signatures in
token of their signing the petition, the verification
and a further affirmation before the District Judge
who attested the same. Learned Counsel did not
suggest before us that the District Judge was in
error about the identity of the parties who appeared
before him and affixed the signatures in three places
in the complaint before him. It is because of these
circumstances that we have stated that this objection
was most frivolous.
It is only necessary to add that
seeing that the High Court is competent to initiate
these proceedings suo motu under s. 10 (2) the
point raised is wholly without substance.
The next submission of learned Counsel was
that as in substance the charge against the appellant
was misappropriation of money belonging to the
clients, the learned Judges of the High Court should
have left the complainants to their remedy of prosecuting the appellant and should not have proceeded
to· deal with him under s. 10 of the Bar Councils
Act. In suppo.rt of this submission learned Counsel
referred us in particular to two decisions of the
Calcutta High Court reported in Ghandi Charan
Mitter, a Pleader, In re (1), and Emperor v. Sati1h
OhanrZra Singha (').
We do not consider that the case before us
furnishes an occasion for any exhaustive review of
the decisions upon the subject or formulating finally
the principles which govern the exercise of the dis·
cretion by a Court to which a complaint is made
under s. 10 of the Bar Councils Act whether it should
(I) (1920) l.L.R. t7 Cal. 1115.
12) (1927) l.L.R. 5t Cal, 721.
,.. .
•
"" '-v
3 S.C.R.
SUPREEE COURT REPORTS
11
'
-'
J.
proceed under it or leave the complainant to launch
a prosecution against the advocate and await the
result of such criminal proceedings.
We consider it sufficient to state this. The
object of a proceeding in respect of professional
misconduct differs totally from the object of a proceeding in a criminal court. Proceedings under the Bar
Councils Act and similar statutes are taken in order
to ensure that the highest standards of professional
conduct are maintained at the bar. These proceedings, though in a sense penal, are solely designed for
the purpose of maintaining discipline and to ensure
that a person does not continue in practice who by
his conduct has shown that he is unfit so to do. It
is not a jurisdiction which is exe1cised in aid of the
Criminal law for the only question for the court to
consider is whether the practitioner has so misconducted himself as no longer to be permitted to continue a member of an honourable and responsible
profession. The object of Criminal proceedings, on
the other hand, is to enforce the law of the land
and to secure the punishment of an offender.
No
doubt, if a criminal prosecution is initiated in respect of the subject matter of the complaint and the
charge is held proved the conviction might be a
ground for a later proceeding under the Bar Councils
Act. No doubt, also, if the practitioner is acquitted
or discharged by a criminal court on the merits, the
facts would not be reinvestigated for the purpose of
foundin1: a charge of professional misconduct on
those very facts. The object of the two proceedings
being thus different, it is not any rule of law but
merely a matter of discretion depending on the facts
of each case as to whether the Court would straightaway proceed to enquire into the allegation of professional misconduct or leave it to the complainant
to prosecute the practitioner and await the result of
such a proceeding. It was not suggested by Counsel
for the appellant that it was incompetent for or
JJfj'
P. J. Ratnem
·~.
v;
D, Kaniki1ram
1!6S
P. J. ll11:tnam
.:_V.
D. Jr1mkaram
An .. ltJTJ.
12
SUPREJ.l:IE COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, to proceed with
an enquiry in a case where the misconduct charged
against the advocate or practitioner amounted to
an offence under the
ordinary
criminal law.
Neither of the cases relied on -Jay down any such
. proposition and is not of much assistance to the
appellant in the present case. It is sufficient to
extract the head ·note to the report of the decision in
Chandi Charan Mitter ('), indicate that it bears no
analogy to the case now on hand. The relevant
portion of the head-note reads ;
"Where the misconduct alleged has no direct
connection with the conduct of the pleader
in his practical and immediate relation to the
court, ordinarily, there should be a trial and
conviction for criminal misconduct
before
disbarment will be ordered."
The charge agaiost the practitioner in that case
related to a matter which had nothing to do with
his relationship to hi§ clients, or the court, and in the
circumstances it was held that the direction would
be properly exercised if the initiation of professional
misconduct proceedings awaited the result of the
prosecution. It is obvious that the case before us
is far
different. Emperor
v.
Satish Chandra
8ingha ('), was also a similar case. The charge
against the practitioner was of forging court records
by interpolating some words in an original plaint.
In the case now before us, however, the misconduct charged is intimately connected with and
arises out of the duty which the Advocate owed to
his client. This distinction between misconduct
which is intimately connected with the duties which
the practitioner owes to his clients and cases where
it is not so connected as bearing upon the exercise
of the Court's discretion to proceed or not to proceed straightaway with an ir.quiry into the advocate's
professional misconduct was emphasised by Lord
(I) 11920) l,L,R, t7 Cal, JllJ,
(ii (19J7j l,L,ll, M Cal, 7.;J,
,.._, -
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'\:.._,
-
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3 s.a.R.
SUPRENfE COURT REPORTS
13
Abingcr in SUphens v. Hill (1), which dealt with a
case of professional misconduct against an attorney
in England. The learned Judge said :
"If the attorney has been guilty of something
indictable in itself but not arising out of the
cause (in which he is engaged professionally)
the Court would not inquire into that with a
view to striking him off the roll but would
leave the party aggrieved to his remedy by a
criminal prosecution."
There is thus a clear distinction between cases where
the misconduct is one in relation to the practitioner's
duty to his client and other cases where it is not so.
In the former class of cases the court would be ex·
crcising its discretion properly if it proceeded to deal
with the charge as a piece of professional misconduct
without driving the complainant to seek his remedy in
a Criminal Court. So far as the facts of the present
case are concerned the appellant got his
client's
money in his hands in the course of the proceedings
of a suit in which he was engaged and the charge
against him was that he failed to repay the money.
In the circumstances we consider that the High Court
was fully justified in proceeding against the appellant under the provision of s. 10 of the Bar Councils
Act.
The next complaint of the learned Counsel was
that there was a procedural irregularity in the mode
in which the case against the appellant was conducted. This was said to ·consist in the fact that some
evidence on behalf of the complainants (the respond.
dents before us) was permitted to be led after the
appellant had examined himself and it was urged
that thereby the complainants had been afforded an
opportunity of fi !ling up any lacuna in their case.
We consider that th ere is no substance in this
objection. No complaint that the appel!ant was
(I) (llU) 10 M. & W1 28"612 B,R, &tit.
llfl
P.J. Roy,
D. K.aAa ..
.1.,,..,., '·
',\'
P. J. Ratnam
._. . ., ;V,'
D. KartiktJrtJm
'
.
·-
A.yy«nzar J.
l4
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.'
prejudiced by the . manner in whieh the inquiry was
conducted in the matter of the order in which the
evidence was adduced, was made either before the
District Judge who conducted the inquiry or before
the High Court when the report of the District Judge
was considered. We have ourselves examined the
record and find that there is no basis for any suggestion that any prejudice had occurred by reason
of the order in which the witnes5es were examined.
It was then suggested that one of the plaintift'sKagga Veeraiah-had himself admitted in his evidence before the District Judge that he and others
had received lhe proceeds of the cheque which the
appellant had cashed and that in the face of this
admission the learned Judges of the High Court were
clearly wrong in finding that the appellant had failed
to pay over the money to his clients. A few facts
have to be mentioned to appreciate this contention as
well as the answer to it. As stated earlier, there
were four plaintiffs in the suit-0.S. 432 of 1951 and
plaintiffs 1 to 3 are the complainants-now
respondents l to 3 before us. The fourth plaintiff was
one Kagga Veeraiah. It was the case of the appellant that this money was paid to all the four plaintiffs i. e., was paid to the plaintiffs when all the four
of them were present. It was the case of the complainants that Kagga Veeraiah-the 4th plaintiff died
in 1957. It was in these circumstances that the
appellant alleged that Kagga Veeraiah was alive
and a man claiming to be Kagga Veeraiah Was
produced before the District Judge who examined
him as court witness No. 7.
The man who was
examined did depose that the money was paid to the
plaintiffs in his presence and, no doubt, if that statement along with the identity of the deponent was
accepted the appellant's defence would have been .
made out. The case of the complainants, however,
Was that the man examined as court witness No. 7
was an impersonator. To prove the death of the
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•
l
,
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_,.\ ,
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
HI
real Kagga
Veeraiah an extract from the death
certificate was produced in court by the complainants.
The attention of court witness No. 7 was drawn to
the fact that in another proceeding (0. S. 732 of
1955) to which Kagga Veeraiah was a party a memo
was filed into Court stating that he was dead.
The
witness's explanation for this was that as he was not
available the memo to that effect was filed.
The
witness was severely cross examined about his identity
and in particular, questioned about the details of the
parties and other details regarding the subject-matter
ef 0. S. 432 of 1951 and his answers were most
unsatisfactory, to say the least. The Learned Judges
of the High Court considered all this evidence and
recorded two alternative findings : (1) that the person
examined as C. W. 7 was not Kagga Veeraiah but
was an impersonator seemed to accord with the
probabilities, and (2) that even if C. W. 7 be in truth
Kagga Veeraiah as he claimed, they would not accept
hii evidence as there was not 'even a modicum of
truth in his deposition' and they would unhesitatingly
reject it. The submission, however, of learned
Counsel was that there was before the High Court
the thumb impression of this witness to his deposition
before the District Judge as C. W. 7 and the thumb
impression of the 4th plaintiff in O. S. 432 of 1951
and that on a comparison of these two the court
should
have accepted the identity of C. W. 7 as
Kagga Veeraiah-the 4th plaintiff. It is really not
necessary to pursue this matter or the details of the
evidence relating to it because there is no ground at
all for interfering with the appreciation by the
learned Judges of the High Court of the credi9ility
of this witness's deposition apart altogether from the
question as to whether Kagga Veeraiah was dead and
if he was not, whether C. \V. 7 was Kagga Veeraiah.
The admissions that this witness made and the ignorance that he displayed about the proceedings in
the suit stamped him as a witness of untruth and the
learned Judges correctly charactcri11ed his evidence
J96J
p, J. R«IM•'11
••
D . .Kaikaram
Ayy••I"' J.
JIU
P. J. Ratnam
v.
D it"arai.ta:ram
.1,,..,., J.
i6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964JVOL.
as devoid of "even a modicum of truth." The
appellant cannot therefore rely on any admission on
the part of this witness as evidence of the plaintiffs
having received the sum which was admittedly in his
hands .
Lastly, it was urged that the order directing the
suspension of the appellant for a period of five years
was too severe and that we should reduce the period
of suspension even on the basis that the charge against
the appellant be held to be established. We can only
express surprise that Counsel should have made bold
to make this submission.
The appellant had got
into his hands a considerable sum of money belonging to his clients and, on the finding of the High
Court, had failed to pay it back when demanded.
Not content with this he had put forward a false
defence of payment and had even sought to sustain
his defence by suborning witnesses.
In the circumstances, even if the learned Judges of the High Court
had struck off the name of the appellant from the roll
of advocates we would have considered. it a proper
punishment having regard to the gravity of the
offence.
The order now under appeal therefore errs,
if at all, on the side of leniency and there is no justi·
fication for the
request made on behalf of the
appellant.
The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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