# THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS RAM KRI&SEN SINGH v. DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER BANKURA DIVISION & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1965] 1 S.C.R. 1
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-08-04
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-supreme-court-reports-ram-kri-sen-singh-v-divisional-forest-officer-bankura-3347
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

A
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS
RAM KRI&SEN SINGH
v.
DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER
BANKURA DIVISION & OTHERS
B
August 4, 1964
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(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. WANCHOO,
M. HmAYATULLAH, J. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR Jl.)
West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 ·(West Bengal Act 1 of
1954) as amended by West Bengal Act (25 of 1957)-Section 5(aa)-
Eltates-Acquisition of-Es.tates 'and rights of intermediaries in
~states
vatlng in State from date specified in notification by State GovernmentRW/tt to cut zamindar.i trees granted by intermediary to third person whether
would also vest in State by virtue of amended law--Construction and va/iciity of am_endment.
The appellant had been granted by the Zamindar of Simlapal in West
Bengal a right to cut trees in certain forests of the zamindari.
The exercise
of this ri1!11t was interrupted by action taken against him under the West
Bengal Private Forests Act, 1948. The appellant filed a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the meantime, the West
:lengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, (Act 1 of 1954) was passed.
This
Act provided that from the date specified in a notification under section 4
of the Act, property and interests specified in section S of the Act would
vest in the State Government. According to the Forest Department Iba
right to cut trees enjoyed by the appellant was within the purview of
section 5 of the Act and, therefore, had become vested in the State Government.
Certain decisions of the Calcutta High Court, however, went against
this interpretation; it was held therein that a right to cut trees granted by an
intermediary to a third person was not within the terms of section 5. Thereupon the State Legislature of West Bengal passed Act 25 of 1957 which
by adding section S(aa) to the Act provided that upon the due publication
of a notification under section 4, on !llld from the <fate of vesting, all lands
in any estate comprised in a forest together with all rights to trees therein
or the produce thereof and held by an intermediary or any other person
shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment,
decree or order of any Court or Tribunal, vest in the State. The appellant's
writ petition, coming up for hearing after this amendment, was dismill8Cd.
An appeal !:> the Division Bench. also failed. Appeal before the Supreme
Court came by virtue of a certificate of fitness under Article 133 (I)( c) of
the Constitution.
The question for consideration was whether the terms of section 5(aa)
were sufficient and apt to provide for the vesting of the right to cut the
r.- when such right belonged, on the date of vesting, not to the intermediary or zamindar but to another person to whom it bad been granted
under a contract with the said intermediary.
HELD: (i) The words "together with" used in section 5(aa), on the
basis <if which it was contended by counsel for the appellant that it wns
only where the right to the trees constituted an integral part of the right to
the land that ·a vesting was effected of the latter right, meant in the context
of the section no more than the expression 'as well as'. and imported no
condition that the right to the trees shoulll also belong to the owner of the
land. Also, it was not possible to read the words uheld by an intermediary
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965) l Sf.R.
or any other person" to mean rhat they were applicable only to cases where
the entirety of the inletcst--to the land, to the trees, and to the produce--
were vested in a single person-be he the intermediary or another penon.
These words would obviously apply equally to cases where the land belonged
to an intermediary and the right to the trees or to the produce of the trees
to anolher peI"on. In con•truing the section, moreover, the fact that ii
\\'as amended to overcome certain decisions rendered under the original
enactment was not an irrelevalll factor to be rakcn into account. (4E-G;
58-D, 5G].
(ii) From the mere fac

## Text

A
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS
RAM KRI&SEN SINGH
v.
DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER
BANKURA DIVISION & OTHERS
B
August 4, 1964
c
D
E
r
G
H
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. WANCHOO,
M. HmAYATULLAH, J. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR Jl.)
West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 ·(West Bengal Act 1 of
1954) as amended by West Bengal Act (25 of 1957)-Section 5(aa)-
Eltates-Acquisition of-Es.tates 'and rights of intermediaries in
~states
vatlng in State from date specified in notification by State GovernmentRW/tt to cut zamindar.i trees granted by intermediary to third person whether
would also vest in State by virtue of amended law--Construction and va/iciity of am_endment.
The appellant had been granted by the Zamindar of Simlapal in West
Bengal a right to cut trees in certain forests of the zamindari.
The exercise
of this ri1!11t was interrupted by action taken against him under the West
Bengal Private Forests Act, 1948. The appellant filed a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the meantime, the West
:lengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, (Act 1 of 1954) was passed.
This
Act provided that from the date specified in a notification under section 4
of the Act, property and interests specified in section S of the Act would
vest in the State Government. According to the Forest Department Iba
right to cut trees enjoyed by the appellant was within the purview of
section 5 of the Act and, therefore, had become vested in the State Government.
Certain decisions of the Calcutta High Court, however, went against
this interpretation; it was held therein that a right to cut trees granted by an
intermediary to a third person was not within the terms of section 5. Thereupon the State Legislature of West Bengal passed Act 25 of 1957 which
by adding section S(aa) to the Act provided that upon the due publication
of a notification under section 4, on !llld from the <fate of vesting, all lands
in any estate comprised in a forest together with all rights to trees therein
or the produce thereof and held by an intermediary or any other person
shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment,
decree or order of any Court or Tribunal, vest in the State. The appellant's
writ petition, coming up for hearing after this amendment, was dismill8Cd.
An appeal !:> the Division Bench. also failed. Appeal before the Supreme
Court came by virtue of a certificate of fitness under Article 133 (I)( c) of
the Constitution.
The question for consideration was whether the terms of section 5(aa)
were sufficient and apt to provide for the vesting of the right to cut the
r.- when such right belonged, on the date of vesting, not to the intermediary or zamindar but to another person to whom it bad been granted
under a contract with the said intermediary.
HELD: (i) The words "together with" used in section 5(aa), on the
basis <if which it was contended by counsel for the appellant that it wns
only where the right to the trees constituted an integral part of the right to
the land that ·a vesting was effected of the latter right, meant in the context
of the section no more than the expression 'as well as'. and imported no
condition that the right to the trees shoulll also belong to the owner of the
land. Also, it was not possible to read the words uheld by an intermediary
2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965) l Sf.R.
or any other person" to mean rhat they were applicable only to cases where
the entirety of the inletcst--to the land, to the trees, and to the produce--
were vested in a single person-be he the intermediary or another penon.
These words would obviously apply equally to cases where the land belonged
to an intermediary and the right to the trees or to the produce of the trees
to anolher peI"on. In con•truing the section, moreover, the fact that ii
\\'as amended to overcome certain decisions rendered under the original
enactment was not an irrelevalll factor to be rakcn into account. (4E-G;
58-D, 5G].
(ii) From the mere fact that there was no provision in the Acr for
compensating the interest of persons like the appellant, the Court could
not hdld that such an interest was not within fie vesting section--11ection
S(Oll). The absence of a provision for compcnsarion might render the
vesting section unconstitutional, but it could not detract from the clear
operation of the words US<"d in section 5(aa). After the rassing Of the
17tb Amendment to the Coosritution and the inclusion o West Bengal
Act I of 1954 among those specified in Schedule IX, the absence of a ptovision for compensation for the acquisition of the appellant's rights would
not render the West Bengal Act or the acquisit'on thereunder, unconsrirutional. (6B; 6E].
CtvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 781 to
784 of 1963.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated March 17, 196 l
of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original orders Nos.
212, 433, 435 and 436 of 1959 respectively.
D. N. M11kherjee, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 781/63).
N. C. Chatterjee, Ramkrishna Pal, Taraknath Roy and D. N.
Mukherjee, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 782-784/63)
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, S. C. Bose and P. K.
Bose, for respondents Nos. I to 3 (in C.A. No. 781/63).
B. Sen, S. C. Bose and P. K. Bose, for respondents Nos. 1 to
3 (in C.As. Nos. 782 to 783/63) and respondents (in C.A.
No. 784163).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Ayyangar J, These . appeals arc bt:fore us
by virtue of
certificates granted by the High Court under Art . .133(1 )(c) of
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t11e Constitution and they raise for consideration the question of G
the proper construction of s. 5(aa) of the West Bengal Estates
Acquisition .4-ct, 1953 (West Bengal Act I of 1954) as amended
by West Bengal Act 25 of 1957.
The relevant fact~ in these four appeals are analogous and
they raise the common question of law which we have already
indicated. For the disposal of these appe3ls it is sufficient thereH
fore to refer to the'facts of any one of them. We propose to set
out those of Civil Appeal 781of1963.
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A
RAM KRISSEN v. FOREST OFFICER (Ayyangar J.)
3
The Zamindar of Simlapal in the ·Collector.ate. of Bankura
entered into a contract with the app.ellant Ram K.rissen Singh
and by a document dated September 3, 1946, granted him the
right to cut the trees, in certain demarcated areas, .of certain
forests of the Zamindari on payment of a sum of Rs. 7,131/8/-.
Under the terms of the said document the period during which
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the appellant was given this right to cut tr.ees was to end on
April 14, 1955.
The appellant started the cutting operations
and cut only for the first few years, but thereafter action was
taken by the Forest Officers of the State to prevent him from
further cutting under the powers vested in them by the West
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Bengal Private Forests Act,
1948.
Thereupon, the appellant
filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a wrii of
certiorari for quashing the ord~rs passed against him and also
for an injunction restraining the Forest Officers from
taking
delivery of possession and from cutting and disposing of the
forests covered by his agreement.
By the time the petition was
filed the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Aot, 1953 (Act I of
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1954), (hereafter referred to as the Act) had been passed and
in the counter-affidavit which was filed to this petition reliance
was placed upon its provisions for contending that the "estate"
belonging to the Zamindar in which the forest lay as well as all
the rights to the trees therein, to whomsoever belonging, had
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vested in the State under s. 5 of the Act by reason of a notification issued by the State Government under s. 4.
By the date the
writ petition came to be heard the West Bengal Legislature had,
in view of certain decisions
rendered by the Calcutta High
Coult which held that the terms of s. 5 of the Act which specified the property or interest in property which would vest in the
F
Government did not include the right to cut trees in a forest
which had been granted to a third person by the proprietor or
intermediary before the date of the vesting, amended the said
vesting section by introducing s. 5 ( aa) to have retrospective effect
from the date of the commencement of the principal Act. Section
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5(aa) read:
"5. Upon the due publication of a notification under
section 4, on and from the date of .vesting-
( aa) all lands in any estate comprised in a foreRt
together with all rights to the trees therein or
to the produce thereof and held by an intermediary or any other person shall, notwith·
standing anything to the contrary contained in
any judgment, decree or order of any court or
Tribunal, vest in the State";
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965) I S.C.R.
After this amendment was brought to the notice of the Court
A
the petitioner was allowed tO amend his writ petition by adding
allegations (a) regarding the construction of the said section, and
( b) its constitutional validity.
The petition then came on for
hearing in December, 1958, and the learned Single Judge, by his
judgment dated December 24, 195 8 discharged the rule follow-
' r.5 certain earlier decisions of his on the same point.
An appeal
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tiled to the Division Bench under the Letters Patent was also
dilmissed but the learned Judges granted a certificate under Art.
133 (I)( c) and that is how the appeal is before us.
The first, and possibly the only, question that now calls for
consideration is whether the terms of s. 5 ( aa) are sufficient and
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apt to provide for the vesting of the right to cut the trees when
such right belonged, on the date of the vesting, not to the iqtermcdiary or Zamindar but to another person to whom it had been
granted under a contract
with the said
intermediary.
The
argument addressed to us by Mr. Chatterjee-learned counsel
0
for the appellant-was that it was only the land held or other
rights ·possessed by an intermediary that became vested in the
State and that cl. (aa) did not deal with those cases where .the
right to the trees had been severed from the right to the land and
belonged to a third person on the date of the vesting.
For this
purpose learned counsel laid stress on two features of the clause.
E
The first was the use of the words "together with" and the second
the words "and held by an intermediary or any other person".
Taking up, first, the word "together with" the submission was that
it- was only where the right to the trees constituted an integral
part of the right to the land that a vesting was effected of the
latter right and that where there had been a severance of the two
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rights it was only the land that remained in the intermediary that
became vested and not the right to the trees.
We feel unable
to accept this argument
We consider that the expression
"together" is obviously used to denote not the necessity for integrality between the land and the right to cut trees by way of
common ownership but as merely an enumeration of the items
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of property which vest in the State. In the context, the word
means no more than the expression "as well as" and imports no
condition that the right to the treeS should also belong to the
owner of the land. It may be added that the words "or to the
produce thereof' occurring next also emphasise what we have
juat now pointed out, for if these words are read disjunctively,
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as tlley must, ·in view of the conjunction wcr", the wordi would
indicate that not merely lands itl the estate and the right to the
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RAM KRISSEN v. FOREST OFFICER (Ayyangar 1.)
5
A trees but independently of them the right to the produce of the
trees on the hind would also vest in the State.
Coming next to the words "and held by an intermediary"
learned counsel could not justifiably submit an argument that
both the land and the right· to the trees should inhere in the
B intermediary to attract the operation of the clause, be.cause the
words "held ]ly an intermediary" are followed by "any other
peoon". Obviously, that other person i.e., person other than
the intermediary, could have the right either to the land, a· right
to the trees or a. right to the produce.
By the use of the expression "or any other person" therefore the legislature could
c obviously have intended only a person like Jhc appeliant who
might not have any right to the lands which are held by the
intermediary but has a right to the trees in that land.
Besides,
it is not possible to read the words ·"held by an int!lrmediary or
any other person" to mean that they are applicable only to cases
where the entirety of the interest-to the land, to the trees and
D to the produce-are 'vested in a single person-be he the intermediary or another person.
These words would obviously apply
cqu4lly to cases where the land belongs to an intermediary and
the right to the trees or to the produce of the trees to another
person.
This apart, there is one further aspect of the matter to which
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also reference might be made.
The amendment effected by the
addition of cl. (aa) to s. 5 was admittedly necessitated by certain
decisions of the High Court of Calcutta which held that where
an intermediary had granted a right to cut trees or to forest
produce, the rights so conferred were unaffected by the vr.sting
F provision in s. 5 of the Act as it stood before the amendment. If
the argument now put forward by Mr. Chatterjee is accepted it
woold mean that the amendment has achieved no pu!'POse.
Undoubtedly, if the words of the amendment, on their plain reading,
are insufficient to comprehend the case now on hand the fact
that the legislature intended to overcome a decision of tl..e High
G Court could not be any determining consideration but, if as we
find, the words normally bear that construction, the <;ircumstance
that the amendment was effected with a view to overcome certain
decisions rendered under the original enactment is not an irrelevant factor to be taken into account.
Mr. Chatterjee next submitted that the scheme of the Act
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was the provision of compensation for every interest acquired. by
the State by virtue of the vesting under s. 5 and that as there was
no provision in. the Act for compensating . the interest of persons
6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] I S.C.R.
like the appellant, the Court should bold that such an interest
A
was not within the vesting section--s. 5(aa). This is, of course,
a legitimate argument, and if there had been any ambiguity in
the construction of s. 5(aa), the circumstance referred to by
learned counsel would certainly have great weight.
But in view
of the plain words of s. 5(aa) which we have discussed earlier,
we do not find it possible to accept the argument.
The absence
B
of a provision for compen;ation migjit render the vesting section
unconstitutional, and that inde00 was the argument addrassed
to the High Court and a matter which we shall immediately
consider, but it cannot detract from the clear operation of the
words used ins. 5(aa).
A further point that was urged before the High Court was
that the enactment was unconstitutional in that no provision was
made for the award of compensation to persons in the position
of the appellant whose rights to cut trees became vested in the
State.
Mr. Cha!terjee pointed out that the learned judges of
the High Court had upheld the validity of the enactment by
holding that compensation had, in fact, been provided.
Learned
counsel drew our attootion to the provisions quoted and submitted that the
learned judges erred in their co1191ruction of
these provisions and that, in fact, no compensation was provided,
but this question about the constitutional validity of the amending Act does not really fall for consideration because learned
counsel for the appellant did not contest the position that after
the enactment of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution, and
the inclusion of West Bengal Act I of 1954 among those specified in Schedule IX, the absence of a provision for compensation
for the acquisition of the appellant's rights would not render the
West Bengal Act or the acquisition thereunder unconstitutional.
These appeals fail but in the circumstances of the case there
will be no order as to costs.
Appeals dismissed.
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