# THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS T. P. DAVER v. LODGE VICTORIA NO. 363, S. C. BELGAU~f

- **Citation:** [1964] 1 S.C.R. 1
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Bench:** S. J. Imam, J. L. Kapur, K. SunnA RAo, J. R. MuDHOLKAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-supreme-court-reports-t-p-daver-v-lodge-victoria-no-363-s-c-belgau-f-2885
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

Domestic Tribunal-Masonic Lodge-So.,rce of power to
expel 111e11,bers-Contract by which they become tnember.<-Rules
must be strictly obsert•td-Must act honestly and in good faithi'thould nnt exceed its jurisdiction-Jurisdiction of Civil Courts.
There is a Scotish Masonic institution known as Grand
Lodge of Scotland.
Under this institution there are District
Grand Lod1.;es.
Under its superintendence there are Daughter
Lodges.
l~hese institutions are governed by their own constitu·
tions and la\\'S.
Under those lavvs a member against whom
disciplinary action htls been taken by a Daughter Lodge can
appeal to the District Grand Lodge and there is a ri~ht of second appeal to the Grand Lodge of Scotland. The appellant was
a member of one of the Daughter Lodges at Bdgaum known
as Lodge \ 1ictoria.
The second respondent made a complaint
against the appellant alleging that he has committed 12 maso·
nic offences.
A notice was issued to the appeUant liy the Sec~
retary of the Victoria
I~odge alleging the commission of these
offences and requiring him to reply within 14 days.
The appe·
llant submitted his answer in extenso to the various charges.
A special meeting of the Lodge was held at which each charge
was rea<l, members gave their coniments and each charge was
put to vote and it was unanimou.<ly decided that the appellant
was guilty of each charge. By a resolution the oppcllant was
expelled subject to the confirmation of the District Grand Lodge.
The decision was cornrnunicated to the appellant who therefore
filed an appeal to the District Lodge which body after giving
him adjournment to appear in person dismissed the appeal at
the 11ext meeting at which the appellant absented himself. A fur·
ther appeal was filed to the Grand Lodge which was also dismissed.
'.!:'he1·eafter the appellant filed a suit before the Civil
Judge, Belgaum for a dedaration that the resolution of the
1962
1962
T. ,P. Drt1•tr
v.
1.-lt.e Vfrtoria .Na.
303, S.C. B1Lgc11m
2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Lodge \'ictoria expelling him was void and that he still contin\1ed to be a inember of that Lodge.
The Civil Judge dismissed
the suit.
'f'herc11pon an appeal was filed before the Hh:;h Court
of Mysore. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The present
appeal is by way of a certificate granted by the High Court.
The appellant contended that the Lodge Victoria had
IJ('I jurh:d ictim1 to try Masonic offences since such offences
were within the jurisdiction of the District G1and Lodge,
Bombay.
.
Secondly, it was contended that the disciplinary proccechngs prescribed by law 198 which governs such proceedings
were not strictly complied with. It was further contended
'r
that the fourteen days to which he was entitled after he filed
his answer were not granted to hint.
Lastly, it was argued
that the decision to expel him was wrong on merits.
Held, that the source of the power of associations, clubs
and Lodges to expel their members is the contract on the basis
of which they become members.
Bonsor v. Musicians Union, [1956] A. C. 104, followed.
A member of a Masonic Lodge is bound to abide by the
rules of the Lodge; and if the rules provide for expulsion, he
shall be expelled only in the manner provided by the rules.
Maclean v. The Worker.f Union [1929] 1 Ch. 602 and
Ezra v. Mahenr!.ra "Nath Banerji, l.L.R. [1946] 2Cal.88, approved.
The Lodge is bound to act strictly according to the rules;
whether a particular rule is mandato1y or directory falls to be
decided in each case, having regard to the well settled rules of
construction in that ·regard. The jurisdiction of the Civil
Court is rather limited; it cannot ohviou:cily sit as a court of
appeal from the decision of ~uch a 1Jocly, it can set aside the
order of such a body if the said body acts without jurisdiction
or does not act in good faith or acts in violation of natural
~
justice.
Maclean v. Tlte 1V orktrs Union, [l 929] 1 Ch. 623 and
L.A.P.O' Bei!ly v.
C. C. Grtten•, A LR. (1949) P. C. 313,
referred to.
The rule

## Text

1
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS
T. P. DAVER
v.
LODGE VICTORIA NO. 363, S. C. BELGAU~f
(S. J. IMAM, J. L. KAPUR, K. SunnA RAo,
and J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Domestic Tribunal-Masonic Lodge-So.,rce of power to
expel 111e11,bers-Contract by which they become tnember.<-Rules
must be strictly obsert•td-Must act honestly and in good faithi'thould nnt exceed its jurisdiction-Jurisdiction of Civil Courts.
There is a Scotish Masonic institution known as Grand
Lodge of Scotland.
Under this institution there are District
Grand Lod1.;es.
Under its superintendence there are Daughter
Lodges.
l~hese institutions are governed by their own constitu·
tions and la\\'S.
Under those lavvs a member against whom
disciplinary action htls been taken by a Daughter Lodge can
appeal to the District Grand Lodge and there is a ri~ht of second appeal to the Grand Lodge of Scotland. The appellant was
a member of one of the Daughter Lodges at Bdgaum known
as Lodge \ 1ictoria.
The second respondent made a complaint
against the appellant alleging that he has committed 12 maso·
nic offences.
A notice was issued to the appeUant liy the Sec~
retary of the Victoria
I~odge alleging the commission of these
offences and requiring him to reply within 14 days.
The appe·
llant submitted his answer in extenso to the various charges.
A special meeting of the Lodge was held at which each charge
was rea<l, members gave their coniments and each charge was
put to vote and it was unanimou.<ly decided that the appellant
was guilty of each charge. By a resolution the oppcllant was
expelled subject to the confirmation of the District Grand Lodge.
The decision was cornrnunicated to the appellant who therefore
filed an appeal to the District Lodge which body after giving
him adjournment to appear in person dismissed the appeal at
the 11ext meeting at which the appellant absented himself. A fur·
ther appeal was filed to the Grand Lodge which was also dismissed.
'.!:'he1·eafter the appellant filed a suit before the Civil
Judge, Belgaum for a dedaration that the resolution of the
1962
1962
T. ,P. Drt1•tr
v.
1.-lt.e Vfrtoria .Na.
303, S.C. B1Lgc11m
2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Lodge \'ictoria expelling him was void and that he still contin\1ed to be a inember of that Lodge.
The Civil Judge dismissed
the suit.
'f'herc11pon an appeal was filed before the Hh:;h Court
of Mysore. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The present
appeal is by way of a certificate granted by the High Court.
The appellant contended that the Lodge Victoria had
IJ('I jurh:d ictim1 to try Masonic offences since such offences
were within the jurisdiction of the District G1and Lodge,
Bombay.
.
Secondly, it was contended that the disciplinary proccechngs prescribed by law 198 which governs such proceedings
were not strictly complied with. It was further contended
'r
that the fourteen days to which he was entitled after he filed
his answer were not granted to hint.
Lastly, it was argued
that the decision to expel him was wrong on merits.
Held, that the source of the power of associations, clubs
and Lodges to expel their members is the contract on the basis
of which they become members.
Bonsor v. Musicians Union, [1956] A. C. 104, followed.
A member of a Masonic Lodge is bound to abide by the
rules of the Lodge; and if the rules provide for expulsion, he
shall be expelled only in the manner provided by the rules.
Maclean v. The Worker.f Union [1929] 1 Ch. 602 and
Ezra v. Mahenr!.ra "Nath Banerji, l.L.R. [1946] 2Cal.88, approved.
The Lodge is bound to act strictly according to the rules;
whether a particular rule is mandato1y or directory falls to be
decided in each case, having regard to the well settled rules of
construction in that ·regard. The jurisdiction of the Civil
Court is rather limited; it cannot ohviou:cily sit as a court of
appeal from the decision of ~uch a 1Jocly, it can set aside the
order of such a body if the said body acts without jurisdiction
or does not act in good faith or acts in violation of natural
~
justice.
Maclean v. Tlte 1V orktrs Union, [l 929] 1 Ch. 623 and
L.A.P.O' Bei!ly v.
C. C. Grtten•, A LR. (1949) P. C. 313,
referred to.
The rules governing tribunals cannot mutatis mutanr!.is J;>e
applied to such bodies as Lodges.
One has t? s~e broadly m
the circumstances of each case whether the prmc1ples of natural justice has been applied. In the circumstances of this case,
,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOkTS
3
particularly when it is found that the appellant bad not raised
any objection, it cannot be said that the resolution passed by the
Lodge \'ictoria ;, bad for violating any principles of natural
justice.
·
Maclean v. Tke Workers Union, [1929] I Ch. 602, referred to.
Law 198 expressly confers :i jurisdiciion ,on a Daughter
Lodge to try a member if he commits an offence, the iurisdiction conferred on it cannot be excluded by Law 128 wl1ich is a
general law. The word 'offence'
in the context 11f Law 198
can only n·1ean the infringement of laws of thr. Dt}ngbter J.JOdge.
In the present case' the rules relat.ing- <to ~he disciplinary
proceedings have been strictly complied with.
With regard to
the contention that the ~idditiona'.l frn1rtren days, to "·hirh he is
entitlerl to ft]e
hi~ case, were not !'.!ranted to him it is held that
tht"r~ Wd.'> 110 r.rej11dice caused to hiln hy iltis failf1rt: anc\ since
hr. nevrr n1arle a rrnnpla111t of jt before any of.. the f\VO appellate bodies, he has waivf'U thf' rrquiren1t'!nt o'f the rule.
From
the facts nntl circu1hsta11ces of thr. ca~ ... ', partic11larly wh~n it is
fourid that the appellant did not..faise any o:ljection, tt .-nnnot
he said that the
re.~olution passed';by the Lodge \Tirt0ria is bad
for viola.ting natural justice.
Sine~ Civil Courts have no jur1s ..
diction to decide on the nu~rit8...Q._f a decision given hy a domestic tribunal and since bnth courts below have found concurrently that the Dani:hter Lodge has :icied in g-ood faith and
since no cxcCptionaI1 circumstance has been shown, this Court
\vill not examine th~ merits of the decision.
/
•
CIVIL APPELLATE ]URISDtCTION: Civil Appeal
No. 414ofl960.
Appeal from the judgmen,t ·and decree. date1
September 25, 1958, of the Myso~e High Court in
Regular Appeal (B) No. 256 ol 1956.
Naraindas G. Mc1lkani and G. Gopalakrishnan,
for the appellant.
Bishan Namin and 8. P. Ve1·ma, for the respondent No. I.
1962. December 12.
The Judgment of the
Court Wl\S delivered by
SuBBA RAO, J.-This appeal on certificate re-
)atcS' to an internal dispute of the rncmllers of 1!
1962
~
T.P. D«Olr
v.
IA4• J'itt•ia No
363, S.C. Belgaum
'
1962
T.P.Dawi
'"
LoJ11 Victoria No.
363, S.C. B1/gaum
Sulla fl<>•, J.
4
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Masonic Lodge called tl1e "Lodge Victoria No. 363
S. C." at Belgaum.
·
There is a Scotish institution known as "Grand
Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of
Scotland" at
Edinburgh, hereinafter called the
"Grand Lodge of Scotland". Under its supervision
there arc Provincial or District Grand Lodges spread
throughout the world.
There are Daughter Lodges
under the superintendence of the District Grand
Lodges.
The Grand Lodge of Scotland is governed
by its own written Constitution and Laws.
There is
also a srparate Constitution and Laws for every
District Grand Lodge.
One such District Grand
Lodge known as "The Grand Lodge of All Scotish
Freemasonary in
India and Pakistan"
has
its
headquarters at Bombay. The aforrsaid daughter
Lodge at Bclgaum is directly under the said District
Grand Lodgr and is governed by the Constitution and
Laws of the latter.
The appellant was a mrmber of the Lodge
Victoria, having joined it in the year 1948.
On
October 16, 1952, the srcond respondent made a
complaint against the appellant to the Master, Lodge
Victoria, alleging that the appellant was guilty of
12 masonic offences.
It was alleged therein that, as
the appellant had committed masonic offences, he
should be tried by the Lodge for the charges levelled
against him under Law 198 of the Constitution. On
October 20, 1952, notice of the said complaint was
issued to the appellant and he was required to send
to the Secretary of the Lodge his answers to the
charges within 14 days from the date of the notice.
He was also informed that he was entitled to be
present and to state his defence at the special meeting
to be held on November 8, 1952. On the same day,
the Secretarv of the Lodge sent notices to all the
members or' the Lodge asking them to attend the
said special meeting convened for considering and
)
·{
I s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
5
passing
judgment
on the said complaint. On
October 'L7, 1952, the appellant submitted his answer
in extenso to the various charges levelled against him
in the complaint; in that answer he requested that
"my complete replies be read in toto to the brethren
assembled to decide this matter. and I be informed
of the total number of brethren present and the
number of votes cast one way or the other."
A
perusal of that reply also shows that the appellant
understood the charges levelled against him as relating to certain offences alleged to have been committed by him and his reply proceeded on that basis.
On November 8, 1952, the special meeting of the
Lodge was held and the minutes show that 18 mem·
bers attended the meeting, that each charge was read
at the meeting, that comments of the members were
invited and that decision was taken on each of the
charges.
Each of the charge was put to vote and
tlie members present unanimously held that every one
of the charges levelled against the appellant was
established. In the result they passed a resolution
excluding the appellant from the Lodge until the
exclusion was confirmed
by the District Grand
Lodge under Law 199 of the Constitution.
On
November 15, 1952, the said decision was communi·
cated to the appellant. On November 24, 1952, the
appellant preferred an appeal against that order to
the District Grand Lodge.
On October 5, 1953, a
meeting of the District Grand Lodge was convened
to
consider
the
appeal and
the appeal was
dismissed.
It was noted in the proceedings of the·
District Grand Lodge that though earlier an adjourn·
ment was given to enable the appellant to appear in
person at the meeting, he remained absent.
On a
farther appeal to the Grand Lodge of Scotland, the
said Lodge considered the sentence imposed on the
appellant as one of "suspension sine
die" and
recommended to the Lodge Victoria to review the
suspension after a period of 12 months. if the
appellant applied for reinstatement.
It does not
1962
T. P. Darer
••
Lodge Victoria No.
363, S.C. Belgaum
Subba Rao, J,
· 1962
T. P. Da1"1
!
v.
' Lodgt Victoria NrJ.
363, s.c. e,lgaum
Sub!• Rao, J.
I
' I
I
I
I
t
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
appear that the appellant filed any application for
review. On September 7, 1954, the
appellant
. instituted a suit in the Court. of the Civil Judge,
Senior Division, Belgaum, for a declaration that the
resolution of the Victoria Lodge dated November 8, .
1952, was illegal and void and that he continued to
be a member of the Lodge despite the resolution,
for an injunction to restrain the officers and servants
of the said Lodge from preventing him from exercising his rights therein, and for recovery of damages.
To that suit he made· the ·Victoria Lodge, the first
·defendant ; the complainant, the second defendant ;
·the Secretary of the Lodge, the third defendant ; and ·
the District Grand Lodge, . Bombay, the· fourth
defendant. The defendants contested the suit. The
.learned Civil Judge dismissed the suit. c--The appeal
filed by the appellant to the High Court of Mysore
was also dismissed~ The . present appeal has been
filed on a certificate issued by the-said High Court.
'· '
Learned counsel for the appellant raised before
us all the contenti'Jns which his client ·had unsuccessfully raised in the courts below. Before we advert to
the said contentions it would be convenient to
notice briefly the law on the subject relevant to the
present enquiry.
The source of the power of associations like
clubs and lodges to expel·_. their members is the
contract on the . basis of _ which they become
members. This principle has been restated by Lord
Morton in Bonsor v . .Jiusicians' Union,('). There,
one . Bonsor, who. became a member of a trade
union, was expelled. In that context Lord Morton
. observed :
·
"\Vhen 1-fr. Bonsor applied to join the respondent union, and his application was accepted,
a contract
came · into
existence
between
·--1'.lr. Bonsor and the respondent, whereby Mr.
Bonsor agreed to abide by the, rules of the
(I) (1956] A.C.104, 127.
Lf'l_
1 S.C.R.
_ SUPREME COURT REPORTS
- 7
•
•
respondent union, and the unio~-impli~dly
agreed that 1fr. Bonsor would not be e:i,cluded
by the union or its officers otherwise than in
accordance with the rules".
This contractual origin of the rule of expulsion has
its corollary in the cognate rule that in expelling a
member the conditions laid down in the rules must
be - strictly -complied·with. In .Maclean v. The
Workers' Union, (1), the contractual foundation of
the power is described thus :
"In such a case as the present, where the
tribunal is the result of rules adopted by persons
who have formed the association known as a
trade union, it seems to me reasonably clear -
that the rights of the plaintiff against the
defendants must depend simply on the contract,
-and that the matenal terms of the contract must
be found in the rules".
Proceeding on that basis, the learnedJudge observed:
"It is : certain, therefore, that a domestic
tribunal is. bound to act strictly according to
its rules and is under an - obligation to act
honestly and in good faith." -
The same idea was expressed by the Calcutta High
Court in Ezra v. l,fahendra Nath Banerji(') th_us: _
" •••...... \Vhere the rule provides in .any particular respect - that some condition must be
fulfilled, then that condition must be strictly
complied with, since the power of expulsion is
itself dependent on the terms of the rule."
The next question is whether
the -doctrine
of strict compliance with the rules implies that every
,_v
minute deviation from the rules, whether substantial
or not, would render the act of such a body void.
The answer to this -question will depend _ upon the
(1) (1929] I Ch. 602, 623.
(2) I.L.R. (19W) 2 Cal. 88, 109,
1902
T. P. Dtwer
v.
L.ige Vict11ri•
•
383, S.C. Belgaum.
Subht1 Ra.11, J.
1952
T. P. Dai·er
••
Lod;1 Victoria }lo.
363, S.C. Bdgaum
suiba R.u, J.
' .
""/, ·,,..,.-_- ·,.. '\
~ •
I
8 ..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
.
. '
nature 'of the rule infringed ; whether a rule is
mandatory or directory depends upon each rule,
the purpose for which it is · made and the setting in
which it appears. We shall consider this aspect of
the doctrine when we deal with.the argument of the
learned counsel thaf in the present case the rules have
not been complied with.
·
The scope of the jurisdiction of a civil court
vis-a-vis·· the· decisions of tribunals is also well
settled. In Maclean v. ·The Workers'
Union (1),
Maugham,J., observed:
"It appears to me. tbat we have no power to
review the· ~vidence any . more .. than have a
power to say whether the tribunal i::ame to a
right conclmion." :-\,.-,
Much to the same effe~t the Judicial Committee
observed in L.A.P.O' Beilly v. 0.0. Gittens, (').
..
" ..................... It is important to bear in
'
mind that neither the learned judge nor their
Lordships' Board is entitled to sit as a Court
of appeal from the· decisions of a domestic
tribunal such as r the Stewards of the Trinidad
Turf Club".
Later on the Privy Council stated:
"All these matters, however, · are essentially
matters· for the domestic tribunal to decide as it
thinks right. Provided that the tribunal does
not exceed its jurisdiction and acts honestly
and in good faith, the Court cannot intervene,
even· if it thinks that· the penalty is severe or
that a very strict standard has been applied". ·· ·
'
,
. .
Another aspect which niay also be noticed is how far
and to what extent the doctrine of bias may be
(I) [1929] l Ch, 602, 628. ·
(2) A.I.R.11949) P.C. 313, 316, 317.
_j
?.._
' '
t6"·~
...
;
! '
I
,
•
...
••
' ---- -...
1 S.C.R. ·
SUPREME COUF .. T REPORTS
9
---~---
invoked in · the case of domestic tribunals like those
of clubs.
The observations of 11augham .J. in
.Maclean'B case(') in· this context may· be noticed.
The learned Judge observed in that case. thus :
.
"A ·person who joins an association governed
by rules under which he may. be expelled, ... : .•
.......•..... : ...•...... has in my judgment no legal
right of redress if he be expelled according to
the ·rules, ·however ·unfair and unjust the rules ·
or the action of the expel\jng tribunal may be
provided that it acts in good faith ........... : .. .
. ....................... The phrase, "the principles
of natural justice," can only ·mean in this
connection the principles of fair play so deeply
rooted in the minds of modem Englishmen that ·
a provision for an inquiry necessarily imports
that the accused should be given his chance of
defence and explanation. On that point there
is no difficulty. Nor do I doubt that in most
· . cases it is a reasonable inference from the rules
that if there is anything of the nature of a lis
between two persons, neither of them should
sit on the tribunal."··.· · · ·
· · ·
·
'·
!
i
Another difficulty that one is 'confronted with in
proceedings held by committees constituted by clubs .
is to demarcate precisely the line between the prosecutor and the Judge. ·
Maugham, J. noticed this.
difficulty and observed in ]}faclean's case (1) at p. 626 ·
thus:
·
"In many cases the· tribunal . is necessarily
entmsted. with the duty of appearing to, act
as· prosecutors as wen as that of judges;" for
there is no one else· to prosecute .. For example:
in a case where a council is charged with the
duty of considering the conduct of any member
whose conduct is disgraceful! and of expelling
him if found guilty of such an offence, it constantly occurs that the matter is brought to· the
. (1) (1929] I Ch. 602, 628.
1962
T. P. Dar:1r
v.
Lndge Victoria J{o.
363, S.C. B,/gaum •
Suh6a Rao, J.
' ~
'
.
\
'
T. P. Dt1rer \
v.
LDtige Victoria No.
363, S.C. Bel;aum
Su5ba Rao, J.
10
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19G4] VOL.
attention of the council by· a "report of ·legal
proceedings in the press.
The member is
summoned to appear before the council. The
council's duty is to cause him to appear and
to explain his conduct. It ·may be that in so
acting the council are the prosecutors. · In one
.. sense they are; but if the regulations show that
the council is bound to act as I have mentioned
and to that extent to act as prooecutors, it
seems to be clear that the council is not disqualified from taking the further steps which the
rules require."
Though it is advisable for a club to frame rules to
avoid conflict of duties, if the rules sanction such a
procedure, the party, · who has bound· hiffiself by
those rules, cannot complain, unless the enquiry held
pursuant to such rules discloses . malafides or •unfair
treatment.
·
The following principles may be gathered from
the above discussion .. (1) A member of a masonic
lodge is bound to abide by the rules of the lodge; and
if the rules provide for expulsion, he shall be expelled
only in the manner provided by the rules. (2) The
lodge is bound to act strictly according to the rules,
whether a particular rule is mandatory or directory
falls to be decided in each case, having regard to· the
well settled rules of construction in that regard. . (3)
The jurisdiction of a civil court is rather limited; it
cannot obviously sit as a court of appeal from decic
sions of such · a body; it can set aside the order of .
such a body, if the said body acts without jurisdiction
or does not act in good faith or acts in violation of
the principles of natural justice as explained in the
decisions cited supra.
.
.. •
Bearing the said principles in mind; we shall
now proceed to consider the arguments of learned
counsel for the appellant.
J·
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11
The first contention is t-hat Lodge Victoria has
nu jurisdiction to decide on the question whether a
member committed a masonic offence, for, it is said,
,ud: ·,ffcnu> arc within the jurisdiction of a District
Grand L'ldgc-. lbrnb,ty.
The question falls to be
decided on a comtruction of the relevant Laws of the
Lodge:
The said Laws read :
'
Lmo l!JS,.
Every Daughter Lodge shall be
entitled to try any member accused of any
offence.
A complaint, in writing, shall be
served on
the accused brother, by registered
letter posted to his last known address, specifying the offence of which he is charged, which
he shall be entitled to answer in writing within
fourtccu <lays of the date of posting of the
complaiut, or within such longer time as may
be specified in tlte complaint. On the answer
being lodged, or on the expiry of the time for
doing so, the matter of the compl<,int shall be
brought bdorc the Lodge for consideration and
judgment, either at a special meeting called for
th<tt pt11puse, or at a regular meeting of the
Ludgc,
The meeting ;it which it is to be
consickrcd must be called by circular sent by
the Secretary, which shall state the fact that
the complaint, and answer, if any, are to be
brought before the Lodge for consideration and
judgment. In the case of a Lodge which does
'not convene its meetings by circular, the
meeting shall be called in such manner as may
be ordered by Grand Committee, or by Grand
Secretary on its behalf. Notice of the meeting
shall be sent to the accused brother by registered
letter posted to his last known address at least
fourteen clear days prior to the day of the
meeting and that whether he has lodged a
written answer or not, and he shall be entitled
1962
T. P. Daver
v.
/.,ridJ!.t Victorio No.
363, S.C. Belg _um
Subbo Rae. .i.
196~
T. P. nactr
v.
/Met Vfrto1ia ,Vo.
36.1~ S.C. /Jtfgaum
Subha Rao, J,
12
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
to appear at the meeting- and any adjournment
thereof and state his defence.
After the case
has been considered, the Lodge shall give its
deciiion.
Such decision shall be by votes of a
majority of the qualified members voting thereon
and only those present throughout the hearing
of the case shall be entitled to vote.
If the
complaint be sustained, the Lodge shall pronounce su'ch admonition or sentence as shall be
decided by the majority of votes as aforesaid.
A Daughter Lodge may not, however, pronounce a sentence of expulsion as power to
expel is vested in Grand Lodge alone; but,
if the circumstances arc deemed of sufficient
.~ravity, a Daughter Lodge may recommend to
(;rand Lodge that a brother be expelled from
tl1c craft.
The judgment pronounced shall be
intimated forthwith in writing by registered
letter to the said brother, who shall therein be
apprised that it shall be final unless appealed
against to
the Provincial or District Grand
Lodge, or to Grand Lodge in the case of a
Daughter Lodge not within the jurisdiction of a
Province or District within one month after the
date of posting the said intimation.
In special
circumstances,
Grand
Committee, through
Grand Secretary, may extend the period
within which an appeal may be made.
Li£1c 128: A Provincial or District Grand Lodge
shall hear and determine all subjects of masonic complaint, dispute, or difference initiated
before or appealed or remitted to it respecting
Daughter Lodges or brethren of the Scotish
Craft within the Province or District, and may
admonish, or pronounce a sentence of suspension, and, in the case of a Lodge, may suspend
its Charter. The procedure in all such subjects
of complaint, dispute, or difference shall be reI
•
•
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
13
gulated mutatis muta.ndis by Laws 104 to Ill
inclusive.
Law 56: The Grand Lodge shall hear and determine, through its Grand Commi1tee as here·
inbefore provided, all subjects of Masonic complaint or irregularity respecting Lodges or Brethren within the jurisdiction, and may proceed
to admonish, or fine, or suspend, or expel.
Under Law 198, every Daughter Lodge will be
entitled to try any member accused of an offence;
under Law 128, a Provincial or District Grand
Lodge shall hear and determine all subjects of masonic
dispute or difference initiated before it respecting the
brethren of the Scotish Craft; and Law 56 provides
that the Grand Lodge shall hear such complaints and
inflict suitable punishments in respect thereof. It will
be seen that two different expressions are used: the expression "offence" is used in Law 198, while the e~
pression "masonic complaint" is used in Law 128. It
is, therefore, said that, as in the complaint the appellant is alleged to have committed masonic offences,
the proper forum is the District Grand Lodge and not
the Daughter Lodge. It is common case that the
expressions "offence" and "masonic complaint" have
not been defined in the Laws.
In its legal significance an offence means an act or omission made
punishable by any law for the time being in force.
The expression "masonic complaint" is a comprehensive term;.it may mean any complaint pertaining to
masonic matters. It is not necessary to decide whether the expression "masonic complaint" is wide
enough to take in an "offence". But Law 1!18 expressly confers a jurisdiction on a Daughter Lodge to
try a member if he commits an offence; the jurisdiction conferred on it cannot be excluded by law 128,
which is a general law.
The question therefore is
whether the allegations made against the appellant
constituted "offences" within the meaning of law 198.
1962
T.P. Dcwr
v.
Lodge Victoria No.
363, S.C. Bilgaum
S11bba Rao, J.
I
.::.::.. .\,
T.P. Dair
v.
Udg1 Vietoria No.
363, S.C. Btlgaum
tubba RaO, J.
·14
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
_,..
',
The _ \vord "offence" in the context of that Law can
only mean the infringement of the La\\•s of the Dau-
' ghter, L_odge., , As all th; Laws ~~ve not been placed
-, before us, we are not m a postt10n to hold whether
the allegations amounted -to "offence" or not in the
aforesaid sense. - But the complainant, the appellant
and the members of the Lodge, inchiding its officebearers, proceeded ·on the basis that the appellant
committed ,'_'offences". The complaint disclo.ses as
many as_ 12 charges. The appellant answered them
seriatim. _._Indeed, in his an·sw'cr he , specifically
stated:
-;
· ; -· -
.
-
'
•••
'
<
'\
'
"F~her 'if my: accuser and others of his mind
have thought _this alleged_ "offence" serious en-
-ough to be induded in this complaint,, why did
__ they not take any action in the matter_imme-
. '_diately instead of -taking it up after sleeping
over_it for no less than 3-4 years?", - ' :
TuiS shows that even : the appellant proceeded on th~
basis that the- allegations, if established, _would
amount to "offences" within the meaning of the said
law. -_ In the .special meeting of the Lodge it was
-
held that the charges have been established; and on
.that basis punishment was imposed oii the appellant.
· -The appellant did not take any objection either that
the_ allegations did not amount to "offences" within
the 'meaning oflaw 198 or that the Lodge had no jurisdiction to decide whether he committed the offences.
It is, therefore, manifest that all the parties concerned
in the matter accepted· the -position_ that if the acts
alleged to have been committed by the, appellant
were established, he would have' committed "offences"
under the laws. If the allegations against the appellant
amounted to "offences" Law 198 is immediately attracted. -If that -be so, neither -Law 128 nor Law 56, -
-which deal with the jurisdiction of a District Grand -
Lodge in :es£ec~ c;if. ''mas~nic complaints", _ can
piμt the J unsd1ct1on expressly -co pf err~d op
t,h~
•
•
1 S.C.R. · SUPREME COURT REPORTS
15
Da~ghter Lodge .. We, therefore, hold-iliar-tlle
Daughter Lodge ·had . jurisdiction to . entertain the.
·complaint filed by the 2nd respondent against the ·
appellant and decide it on merits.
· ..
. . ·
. · The ~ext question is, whether Law 198 has
been 'strictly complied with. Relevant part of Law
108 reads:
"On th.e ·answer being lodged, or on the expiry
'of the time for doing so, the matter of the
complaint shall be brought before the Lodge
for consideration
and judgment, either at a
·special meeting called for that purpose, or at
a regular meeting of the Lodge. The meeting
at which it is to be considered must · be called
by circular sent by the Secretary, which shall
state the fact that the complaint, and answer,
if any, are to be brought before the lodge for
consideration and judgment."
·
As
we have already 'indicated in · the narration
of facts, notice was . issued to the members fixing
the date of the special meeting along with the notice
issued to the appellant i. e., the notice was issued
to the . members .· before the
appellant filed his
answer in respect of the· allegations made against
him in the complaint. · It is, therefore, contended
that the· notice of the special meeting issued to the
members was not in strict compliance with the said
Law. 'Ve do not see any contravention of the Law.
The Law does uot say that notice .to the members
should be issued only after the answer was lodged
by the person against ·whom a complaint was made.
But what it says is that the matter of the complaint
shall be brought before the Lodge for consideration
after the answer was lodged or on the expiry of the
time for doing so. It also does not prescribe that the
answer should be communicated to the members, but
only indic11tes that the notice shall state ·the fact that
/9$2
T.P. Dai11
..
lodge Victoria No.
353, S.C. Belgaum
Slihba Rao, J •
1962
T.P.D"""
v.
Lodgt Victoria JVn.
31i3, S.C. Btlt·mm
Su6! a Rao, J.
16
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
the complaint and the answer, if anv, will be
brought before: the Lodge for consideration and
judgmrnt. To put it in other words, the gist of the
relevant part of the law is that in the special meeting
convened for the purpose or at a regular meeting of
the Lodg<', the matter of the complaint shall be
brought for
consideration and judgment. In the
present case it is not disputed that the prescribed
notice was given to the members and at the meeting
all of them had considered the complaint as well as
the answer lodged by the appellant. Therefore, the
law in this regard has heen strictly complied with.
The next contention relates to the following
part of Law 198 : "Notice of the meeting shall be
sent to the accused brother by registered letter posted
to his last known address at least fourteen clear days
prior to the day of the meeting anrl that whether he
has lodged a written answer or not, and he shall be
entitled to appear at the meeting and any adjournment thereof and state his defence." It is contended
that under the said part of the Law, the accused is
entitled to have another 14 days after he filed his
answer to t>nable
him to file his case before the
Lodge and that in the instant case no such additional
period w:is given to him.
That is so.
The position,
therefore, is that the appellant was given notice of
the hearing as required by the law, but he was not
given the entire period prescribed thereunder. The
question is whether this error in the proced11re
vitiated the trial.
It is obvious that the appellant
wa> not prejudiced.
He never mad.: a complaint of
it.
Indeed in his answer he made it clear that he
would not be present at the inquiry.
The Law itself
enabled him to apply for further time, but he did
not ask for it, as he did n0t want to appear at the
meeting.
He did not raise this objection either in
the appeal before the District Grand Lodge or in
the second appeal before
the Grand Lodge of
Scotland. Before the said appellate Lodges he took
•
1 $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
17
the decision on merits.
Indeed, by his answer and
subsequent conduct he clearly waived the said
I( requirement of the Law. Can he now be allowed to
rely upon a breach of the procedural rule to invalidate the proceeding ? In our view, he cannot do so.
There is a distinction between the jurisdiction of
a Lodge and the irregular exercise of it in the matter
of the taking of p!Ocedural steps.
A party to a
dispute can certainly waive his objections to some
defects in procedure.
In this case, the appellant
could have taken objection for his being given a
1 shorter period of notice than prescribed under the
Law for his appearance before the meeting of the
Lodge.
He did not do so. The appellant has, by
his aforesaid conduct, clearly waived his right under
the said Law. Having waived it, he is now precluded
from relying upon the said defect. We, therefore,
hold tha~ it is not open to the appellant to rely upon
the said defect for invalidating the proceeding.
The argument that the members of the Lodge
were both the prosecutors and the judges, and therefore the principles of natural justice have been violated has not much force in the context of the present
enquiry. We are dealing with a case of a Lodge and
not with that of a tribunal or a court. It is true that
the earlier resolution, Ex. 1 H, shows that 11 members
of the Lodge , were not well disposed towards the
appellant; but here we are concerned with the complaint filed by the 2nd respondent. Notice of the
complaint was given to all the members of the Lodge.
~ It may be that some of them did not like the appellant, and one of them is the complainant himself.
But 22 members of the. Lodge met and unanimously
held, after considering the complaint and the answer
given by the appellant .. that he was guilty. If the
appellant had any objection for one or some of the
members taking part in the meeting, he could have
" raised an objection, but he did not do so.
The rules
1962
T.r. vv.
Lodg1 Victoria "Vo.
363 J C. Blliaum
Subba Rao, J.
1962
T·P. Dacer
••
Uxlge Vicloria No.
353, S.C. Btlgawn
Subba Rao, J.
18
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
governing tribunals ·and courts
cannot mutatis
mutandi8 be applied to such bodies as Lodges.
We
have to sec broadly in the circumstances of each case
whether the principles of natural justice have been
applied. In the circum,tarces of this case, particu·
larly when we find that the appellant had not raised
any objection, we cannot say that the resolution
passed by the L'.ldgc Victoria is bad for violating any
principles of natural justice.
Lastly an attempt was made to persuade us to
resurvey the entire matcri<il to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the Lodge.
A,
we have pointed out earlier, civil courts have no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of a decision given by
a private a5sociation like a Lodge.
Both the courts
below have held that the Daughter Lodge has acted
in good faith in the matter of the complaint -against
the appellant. That is a concurrent finding of fact;
and it is the practice of this Court not to interfere
ordinarily with concurrent findings of fact.
There
are no exceptional circumstances for our departing
from the ~aid practice.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
No costs.
'
,
•
• ..