# THE UNION OF INDIA v. RAM KANWAR AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1962] 3 S.C.R. 313
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** P. B. Ga.Tendragadkar, K. SuBBA RAO, M. HrnAYATULLAH
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-union-of-india-v-ram-kanwar-and-others-2448
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Letters Patent Appeal-Limitation for filing-Requi"ition
and de-Requi,,;tion of building-Indian Limitation Act, 1908
(.9 of 1908), s.2.9 (2) Art. 157-Punjab High Court Rules, r. ~
D~fence of India Rules, r. 75A-Requisitioning and Acquisitwning qf Jmmorable Property Act, 1952 (30 of 19.52), u, 3, 24 (2)-
Tlequisitioned Land
(Continuance
ef
Powers)
Act,
1947
(XVII of 1947).
A building belonging to the respondents was requisitioned
by the Government of India
under r. 75-A (1)
of the
Defence of India Rules originally for the purpose of occupation by a certain officer of the Indian National Air\.vays
and afterwards by the officers of the Central Government.
After the building was vacated by the said officers it was put in
the po'5ession of Tribeni Kala Sangam which was a private
dance and music school. The respondent's appeal to the
Central Government for de-requisitioning the building having
failed he filed a petition for mandamus for that purpose in the .
High Court which was allowed. The appellant's appeal under
the Letters Patent filed within 30 days under the rules of the
High Court but beyond 20 days as prescribed by the Limitation Act from the judgment of the single Judge was dismissed
a s barred by time and also on the merits. On appeal by
special leave.
Held, that r. 4 of the High Court Rules which allows
Letters Patent appeals to be filed within 30 days from the
date of the judgment of the single Judge is a special law within
the meaning of s.29(2) of the Limitation Act and such appeals
may be filed within the said period of 30 days and not 20 days
as prescribed by Art. 151 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act.
Punjab Co-operativt Bank Ltd.
v. Official Liquidator.,
A.LR. 1941 Lah. 57, approved.
Held, further, that under s.24(2) of the Requisitioning and
Acquisitioning of Immovable Property Act, 1952, which repealed
the Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Powers) Act, 1947,
a fiction was created to the effect that properties requisitioned
under the earlier Act should be deemed to be requisitioned
under s.3 of the Act. The effect of the fiction was that the
requisition made under r. 75-A of the Defence of India Rules
was a requisition under s.3 of the 1952 Act, that is, the
1961
Augu•t 29.
1161
fht Union of l1rli l
v.
T:ain Kanwar
StAbba Rao J.
:ll4
SUPRE:\fE COURT REPORTS
(1062)
purpose mentioned in r. 7j-A shall be deemed to be a publi~ •
purpose of the Union ,,·ithin the n1eaning of s.3 of the ,\c~
In the present ca:;c as the building i11 qucstipn \\'ac; being use(l
for a purpose other than that for ,,·hich it \vas originallv
requisitioned u11drr r. 75-A it \\·as liable to he de-requisitioned'.
CrnL APPELLATE .JnusJ>J('TIOX: ri\·il Appeal
X o. 3::::? of I !JGO.
Appeal by 8]>C('ial lean' from tlw jwlgmcnt
11.ml order dater! Ko\·cmbcr :!I, ]\);)i, of the Punjab-.t
High Court (Cin.'uit He11d1) at ll<'lhi in L.P.A. ~o. J
of 1955.
JI. C. Sr:/1tlnvl,
Atloo,r<y·I•'< nu11l of Inrlin,
R. SP.n, H. II. /)fte/mr and '/' . .ll. Sr-u, for the
appellant.
A. r. J'is1rmu1tlw S"slr·i a111l S1ml<1r TJril1ri1!1tr,
for the responrlents Xos. l to (i.
~
S. X. Andley, Rt1nw.,lwr1r Xath an<! T'.L !'ohm,
for the respondm1t Xo. 7.
l!JGI. August :!!l. The Juclgment of the Court
was clelh'<'rcd 1.Jy
SuBBA H..1.0, J.-This appeal by spceial leave
is preferred against the judgment of a division lwnch
of tho Circuit Benrh oft.he Punjab High Court at 4t
Delhi confirming that of a single ,Judge of that
High Court i.isuing a writ of mnnrlam·us against the
Union of India dii:ecting it to rc$tore possession of
the flat requisitionrd by the s11icl Government to
the respondents.
Ono Ba.bu ltam was the owner of Flat No. 5,
Aggarwal Building, Connaught Circus, New Delhi;•
respondents l to u are hiA sons and widow.
By ari""'
order dated April 14, HJ43, the Government of
India requisitioned the said flat under r.iii-A(I) of
tho Def en co of India Rules for a period of one year
from April 15,
19~3 to April l·I, 19-14.
The saicl
flat was put in tho occupation

## Text

•
.. ii'--
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
313
THE UNION OF INDIA
v.
RAM KANWAR AND OTHERS
(P. B. GA.TENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAO and
M. HrnAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Letters Patent Appeal-Limitation for filing-Requi"ition
and de-Requi,,;tion of building-Indian Limitation Act, 1908
(.9 of 1908), s.2.9 (2) Art. 157-Punjab High Court Rules, r. ~
D~fence of India Rules, r. 75A-Requisitioning and Acquisitwning qf Jmmorable Property Act, 1952 (30 of 19.52), u, 3, 24 (2)-
Tlequisitioned Land
(Continuance
ef
Powers)
Act,
1947
(XVII of 1947).
A building belonging to the respondents was requisitioned
by the Government of India
under r. 75-A (1)
of the
Defence of India Rules originally for the purpose of occupation by a certain officer of the Indian National Air\.vays
and afterwards by the officers of the Central Government.
After the building was vacated by the said officers it was put in
the po'5ession of Tribeni Kala Sangam which was a private
dance and music school. The respondent's appeal to the
Central Government for de-requisitioning the building having
failed he filed a petition for mandamus for that purpose in the .
High Court which was allowed. The appellant's appeal under
the Letters Patent filed within 30 days under the rules of the
High Court but beyond 20 days as prescribed by the Limitation Act from the judgment of the single Judge was dismissed
a s barred by time and also on the merits. On appeal by
special leave.
Held, that r. 4 of the High Court Rules which allows
Letters Patent appeals to be filed within 30 days from the
date of the judgment of the single Judge is a special law within
the meaning of s.29(2) of the Limitation Act and such appeals
may be filed within the said period of 30 days and not 20 days
as prescribed by Art. 151 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act.
Punjab Co-operativt Bank Ltd.
v. Official Liquidator.,
A.LR. 1941 Lah. 57, approved.
Held, further, that under s.24(2) of the Requisitioning and
Acquisitioning of Immovable Property Act, 1952, which repealed
the Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Powers) Act, 1947,
a fiction was created to the effect that properties requisitioned
under the earlier Act should be deemed to be requisitioned
under s.3 of the Act. The effect of the fiction was that the
requisition made under r. 75-A of the Defence of India Rules
was a requisition under s.3 of the 1952 Act, that is, the
1961
Augu•t 29.
1161
fht Union of l1rli l
v.
T:ain Kanwar
StAbba Rao J.
:ll4
SUPRE:\fE COURT REPORTS
(1062)
purpose mentioned in r. 7j-A shall be deemed to be a publi~ •
purpose of the Union ,,·ithin the n1eaning of s.3 of the ,\c~
In the present ca:;c as the building i11 qucstipn \\'ac; being use(l
for a purpose other than that for ,,·hich it \vas originallv
requisitioned u11drr r. 75-A it \\·as liable to he de-requisitioned'.
CrnL APPELLATE .JnusJ>J('TIOX: ri\·il Appeal
X o. 3::::? of I !JGO.
Appeal by 8]>C('ial lean' from tlw jwlgmcnt
11.ml order dater! Ko\·cmbcr :!I, ]\);)i, of the Punjab-.t
High Court (Cin.'uit He11d1) at ll<'lhi in L.P.A. ~o. J
of 1955.
JI. C. Sr:/1tlnvl,
Atloo,r<y·I•'< nu11l of Inrlin,
R. SP.n, H. II. /)fte/mr and '/' . .ll. Sr-u, for the
appellant.
A. r. J'is1rmu1tlw S"slr·i a111l S1ml<1r TJril1ri1!1tr,
for the responrlents Xos. l to (i.
~
S. X. Andley, Rt1nw.,lwr1r Xath an<! T'.L !'ohm,
for the respondm1t Xo. 7.
l!JGI. August :!!l. The Juclgment of the Court
was clelh'<'rcd 1.Jy
SuBBA H..1.0, J.-This appeal by spceial leave
is preferred against the judgment of a division lwnch
of tho Circuit Benrh oft.he Punjab High Court at 4t
Delhi confirming that of a single ,Judge of that
High Court i.isuing a writ of mnnrlam·us against the
Union of India dii:ecting it to rc$tore possession of
the flat requisitionrd by the s11icl Government to
the respondents.
Ono Ba.bu ltam was the owner of Flat No. 5,
Aggarwal Building, Connaught Circus, New Delhi;•
respondents l to u are hiA sons and widow.
By ari""'
order dated April 14, HJ43, the Government of
India requisitioned the said flat under r.iii-A(I) of
tho Def en co of India Rules for a period of one year
from April 15,
19~3 to April l·I, 19-14.
The saicl
flat was put in tho occupation of one Hardie of the
Indian National Airways.
The period of requisition was extended from time to time, ancl fmally
1.Jy an order dated April 2, 1946, the flat was requi~ •
sitioncd from April 15, 1!!46, until further orders
r
•
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
315
of the Central Government. After Mr. Hardie
vacated the flat, it was allotted to other officers.
Babu Ram requested the Government from time to
time to de-requisition the said flat for his personal
use. He represented that he was s11ffering from heart
trouble and was continuously keeping indifferent
health, that two of his sons had got married, and
_ that in those circumstances it had become impossible
for him to continue to live in their small house in
a narrow lane ; but the Government of India rejeoted his request on the ground that on surrender by
the officers of the Indian National Airways it would
be required for allotment to Central Government
officers. Babu Ram "died on October 24, 1951. It
appears that four or five months in 1947 the flat
was vacant and thereafter it was occupied by refugees from West Pakistan. It was afterwards given to
the present respondent No. 7, Triveni Kala Sangam.
On November 4, 1952, respondent No. 1 again requested the Government to de-requisition the flat mainly on the ground that the said flat was not in use
of the officers of the Central Government but wa~
put in possession of Triveni Kala Sangam, which
was a private dance and music school. As no reply
. was given to that request, the saill respondent sent
a reminder on ,June 26, 1953, and to that he received a reply to the effect that "the matter is receiving attention and further communication will follow
in due course." On September 16, l 95:l, the 'Government informed the first respondent that he could
execute a lease deed in favour of t,he Government
in respect of the said flat. As the appellants did
not put the respondents in possession of the said
flat, they had no alternative but to file a petition
for a writ of manrlanws in the High Court of
P11njab. 'rhe petition was heard by Falshaw, J., and
the learned Judge issued a writ of mandcim1ts on
October 19, 1954, directing the appellants to put
the respondents in possession of the flat. Against
the said order, on November 26, 1954, the appellants filed a Letters Patent appeal in the Circuit
1961
The Union of India
v.
Ram Kanwar
Subba Ra• J.
1961
Tht Ur~iCtll of ln·fi,~
v.
llani Kanu:ar
Subba Rao J.
3Hi
SUPRE:.\lE COl:RT REPORTS
[HHi~J
Rench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi. The
appeal was filed within :lO clays frvm the date of
the said order after cxclnrling th" time taken for
obtaining certified copies of the ncc·c•ssary docnment.s
hut more than :!O rla~·s thereafter. The appeal \l":lS
heard by a di\·ision LcnC"h of the saicl High Court
consistiug of the Chief .Justice ancl :\!char Singh, .T. ~
The learned .Tudgcs held that tho appeal was filed
out of time and that there was not sufficient rc·:ison
for excusing the delay.
They also \\'t'lll into the
merits of the case and agn•ccl with Fabh:nv, J.,
that a case had Leen nm.de nut for is.,uing :i writ.
\Vith the result that the app~al mts dismissed.
Hence the prnsPnt appeal.·
Learned
At.torncy-Gcncrnl,
allJH::iring
for A.
the appellants, C'ontrnds, that th" Ll'ltcrn Patc·ntappeal, it ha Ying Lcl'n filed within :10 rl:iys from the
date of tho judgment of Fa"11aw, .L. was within
time, and that, in an~· vie\\', lun·ing rPgard to the
fluid stat-0 of the law on the quPstion whether tho
period prescribed hy the Limitation Act or the rule
made by the High Court woulcl go\·cm that appeal, 4'
there was sufficient cause for Pxcusi11g tho delay.
On the merits hr' argues that. the requisition ma(]c,
under r.ii).A of the Defew·c of fndia Ru!Ps (lwreinafter C"alled the Ru lei') was ('Ontimwd 11mlcr s.:~ of
the Requisitioned Land (Continnanr·c of Pm\C,rs)
Ad, J!J47 (Act No. li of l!14i) (hereinafter callc·cl
the l!l4'i Act), wherPunclPr tlw appropriMe Gm·cm- ..
ment was given the powt•r to use or dc·al with a
requisit ionecl lancl in suC'h nmnner as may appear to
it to be expedient, thiit in exercise of the saicl pmrcr
the said Government put Trirn11i Kala Sangam in
possession of the same, and that unckr s.~4(:.!) of the
lfoquisitioning and Acqubitin11ing of ImmornblP
Property Act, 11Jii2 (hereiuafu-r callecl the ]().);! Act).
the said requisition shall be clccm(•cl to he pror.erty
~
requisit ionccl under s.:l of th" saicl ,\('t and that nndcr;,;
the said section the s<tid purpose must be dc('mcd
to be a public purpose, Lcing the purpose· of the
Union and, as that purpose did not l'Caso to exist,
:l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
317
the respondents are not entitled to ask for de-requi·
·.Alli. sition of the said flat.
•
-
-
Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel
for the respondents, seeks to sustain the order of
the High Court both on the question of limitation
as well as on merits.
Three questions fall to be considered in this
appeal, namely ( 1) what is the period of limitation
prescribed for an appeal against an order of a
Single Judge of the Punjab High Court to a division
bench of the same High Court ? (2) if the appeal
was preferred out of time, was there a sufficient
cause for excusing the delay in preferring the
appeal ? (3) are the respondents now legally entitled
to ask the Central Government to de-requisition
the said premises under the 1952 Act?
To appreciate the first contention it is necessary to read the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act, the clauses of the Letters Patent and the
rules made by the High Court.
:L'he Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
"Section 29. (2) Where any special or
local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different
from the period prescribed therefor by the
First Schedule, the provisions of section 3
shall apply, as if such period were prescribed
therefor in that_ Schedule, ........................ "
The First Schedule
Description of appeal Period
of
limitation
151. From a decree
or order of any of the
High Courts of Judicature at Fort William,
Time from
which
period begins to run.
1961
Thf: Union OJ India
v.
Rarn Kanwar
Subba Rgo J,
1111
n. llnivn. ef lmliu
v.
J.',,m J,.f11oru.r
SUPHE!IIE COUlt'l' REPOHTS
[ HHl~J
The cliitc of
the <lccrce
or order.
:lfa<lras and llomlmy,
or of the High Court
uf Punjab in the
exercise of its ori«inal
"
juris<licl ion.
'l\n·nt\·
days.
Ll~T'l'HllS l'ATAS'l' FOJI Till~ JI JUI!
l'Ol.JIT OF Lll/OJt/':.
('fo11sc :!7. And WE <ln further ordain Lhat
it shall be lawful for the High Court of Judicature at Lahurc from time (() tinw to make'
rules and onkrs for regulating the practice of
the Court and for tlw purpose of :1dopli11g a:<
far as pussihl<' the pruYisions of the Code of
Ci,·il Prucedm·<', bcin.'1 an Al"t, .No. V of ID08,
passed by the Govcruor .. Gc11eral in Council
and tho proYiHions of any law whic:h has been
or may lie m:tde, amcn<ling or altering the
same, by competent lcgislatirn authority for
In<lia, to all pru<'ce<lings in its testamentary,
intcsUi.tc and ma trimouial jurisdiction res pee·
tively.
(.'fo11sc JI'. An<l \Ve clo futhcr onb.in a.Ill!
cleclarc that all th<' lll'oyi;;ions of thc,;e Our
Ldtcrs l'atent am suhjcd· tu the lcgislatin:
po\n:rs of the Gon·rnor-(;eucrnl in Legislative
Council, aml also of the Co\·eruor-Genernl in
Council uncle1· scc:tifJll sev"11t.y-une of the Uovcrnmcut of India Ad, l!Jl5; aml abo of the
UO\·ernor-Gc1wral in eases of emcrge11cy under
section seyc11ty-two of that Ad, a11c.l may uo
in all rc,;pectK arucndecl aml altBrecl thercl,y.
H1de6 cind Urda.; of the Iriyh Cuurt of l'll11jctb.
Huie 4: ~o nwn1ornnclum ofnppcal prcf«rred uu<lcr <'lansc IO of the Letters Patent shall
Lo enkrtaincd if presented after th" cxpirntion of 30 days from the date of the judg!llent
appealed from, unless the a<lrnitting Bewh in
its cliscrctio11, for good cause shown, gra11ts
further time for the presentation.
3 S.C.R SUPREME COURT REPO!tTS
319
1901
~!t is clear from the aforesaid provisions that while
under Art. 151 of the Limitation Act a period of 20 The Union of Indio
davs is prescribed for preferring an ap1JCal from an
v.
J
'-'
Ram Jtanwar
order of the High Court of Punjab in the exercise
of its Original Jurisdiction, under r. 4 of High Court
Rules for an appeal under cl. 10 of the Letters
Patent a period of limitation of 30 days is provided.
If Art. 151 applies, the Letters Patent appeal in the
'7 persen t case was cfoar!y barred. But if r. 4 could be
invoked, then the appeal was well within time. The
combined effect of the provisions may be stated
thus: Under cl. 27 of the Letters Patent, the High
Court of Judicature of Lahore has the power to
make a rule prescribing the period of limitation in
respect of appeals from orders made by that Court
•
in exercise of its Original Jurisdiction to a division
bench of that High Court. Under cl. 37 thereof,
the provisions of the Letters Patent arc subject to
the legislative powers of the Governor-General in
Legislative Council and, therefore, any rule made
in exercise of a power conferred under the Letters
Patent must necessarily be subject to the provisions
of the Limitation Act which is a law made by the
-
1'.Logislative Council. Article 151 of the Limitation
Act prescribes the period of limitation of 20 days for
preferring an appeal against an order made by the
High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction,
and if there is no other limitation on that section,
r. 4 of t,he High Court Rules must give way to
,..,. the said Article. But s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act ·
.limits the scope of that section, for it says that
where a special or local law prescribes for an appeal
a. period prescribed therefore in the said Schedule,
the provisions of s. 3 shall apply as if such period
were prescribed therefor in that Schedule, that is,
if there is a special or local law prescribing a.
period of limition, it will be deemed to be the period
of limitation prescribed by the First Schedule to the
... -Limitation Act in respect of an appeal covered by
that rule. To stfLte it differently, if r. 4 is a special
law, the Limitation Act itself must be deemed to
Subbd Ra• J.
19GJ
v.
Subba Uao J.
3:!0
SUPREME COURT HEl'OltTS
[Hl62]
preseriLc the period of limitation mentioned umler
that rule for the cla.as of cases covered bv the sai<l
rule, and to that extent the rnlc derogates from
Art. 151 of the First f)chedule tn the Limitation Act.
Article 151 must be read subject. to the special law.
In this ,·icw, th" "rgument that d. :{i of the Lett l'l'8
l'at~mt nmkt.·s the rule m,;dc by the High Court 'uLj"d
to the Limitatiun Act. 'lml, thl'rcfore, that. Art. J[,l
shall prev<Lil ornr r.-! has no furce. Briofly 'tatc<l, the
h-gal position is this: · Und"r d. :!i of the Letters
1\1 tent, the High Court-. has pownr to make a rule
prcio:cr'hintr tlw 1wriod of limitation for a Letters
Patent. app<'al again,;f. an ord"r of a singl<' Judge
made in exen·isc of tll<' original jurisdir·t.ion of the
High Court., and L:v 1·easun ;,f cl.:!7 then·of, the said
rule ie subject to the pro,·i,;ionH of the Limitation
A"t; but the Limitation ,\.,t itself saves th'' opera·
tion of the i;aid rule.
With tlw r<'oult that r. 4. applies to such au appl'al, whcn·a,; Art. Iii! of the Limitation Act will goycrn appeal8 not covered Ly r. -1
or appeals, from unlero ma<le by other High Court8
in exercise ()f their original jurisdiction, if no rule
similar tor. 4 is made by the said High Court or
High Courts.
In the premises t-hc only quest ion tu be decided i:; whether r. -! is a i;peci•Li law within t.he meaning of i;, :!\!(~)of the Limitation Act. Huie~ j,; nrnrle
hy the High Court in exercis<' of the lcgi,;l<Lti\'l•
power eonfcne<l upon the said Hi!(h Comt umler
. 'f ..
el. 2i of the Letter:; Patent. As tlw said rnlc is ;~ ..,..
law made in respect of speci1d "ascs eo,·crcd hy it,
it would certainly be a spedal law withi11 the• meaning of s. 29(2) oft.he Limitation Act.
This view was accepted hy the PunjaL High
Court in Punjnb Co-opemtz:i·e Bmz/; LM. '" Offici<il
Liguidators, l'unjcib Cotton Press Company, Ltd. (in
lfrtciidation) (').
There, a full bench of that High
·_·ourt held that the statutory rnles framed Ly
the~ •
tl) A.l.R. l\tll Lahore 57 ,1-. II./.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
321
High Court under cl. 27 of the Letters Patent under
the authority delegated to it by His Majesty who, in
turn, was acting under the powtlt's conferred on him
by Act of Parliament, are a "special law". We
agree with this view. It is not necessary to deal
with other decisions cited at the Bar, for in none
of them the scope of s. 29 of the Limitation Aet
was considered. Indeed, Mr. A.V. Viswanatha Sastri
has not contended that r. 4 is not a special law within the meaning of s. 29 of the Limitation Act. If
so, it follows that under r. 4 an appeal could be filed within 30 days from the date of the order of
Falshaw, J., and the appeal having been filed on
the twenty-third day, it was well within time.
In this view, the second question does not fall
to be considered in this appeal.
On merits, the question turns upon the construction of the relevent provisions of the Defonce of
India Rules, the 1947 Act and the 1952 A~t. For
easy reference and comparison, the relevant provisions may be read at one place.
The Defence of India Ru lea
Rule 75-A.
(1) If in tho opinion of the
Central Government or the Provincial Government it is necessary or expedient so to do
for securing the defence of British India, public safety, the maintenance of public order or
efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the
life of the community, that Government may ·
by order in writing requisition any -property,
movable or immovable, and may make such
further orders as appear to that Government
to be necessary or expedient in connection
with the requisitioning.
x
x
x
x
x
(2} Where .the Central Governn:.e;1t or the
Provincial Government has requisitioned any
property under sub-rule ( 1) that Government
1961
The UniOn of Inilia
v.
Ram Kanwar
Svlia Rao J.
)!Hi I
The Un;u11 c~f [,,./,c;
\.
Hatll kaN<C•1r
Su&ba 1:~10 J.
3.,,,
-~
8Ul'H.Eil!E COUHT HEl'OH'l'::l
[1962]
may u:;c or d('al \\ ith t.ho property in 8t1Ch
mau11er as may appear to it to Lie cx1ieuient,
aml may
ac·11nir" it
J,y
Ht·n-in« on
the
•
•
b
"" n<:r thereof, l!l' where th<" owner
is
not
rc;iuily tract>alik or tho ownership i:; in dispute, liy pul1liohi11g i11 the oJlicial Gazette, a
not.ice stat.iug th,n the Ceut ral or l'rovi11cial
(;,ivernu1eut. a' the u1~e may L<', ha~ dt'ciued
to acquire it i11 pur"uan"c of tl1is rule.
The Rtgui"ilio11inr1 mul Acqui.,itioniny of
I n1111ornofr Proz1erly Act, l!J(j2 (-\XX uj l!Jii2).
81 ctiuJt 2·1.
(I) The Hc<]ui~itioucd ] .and
(Contiuuancc of l'mrern) Act, l!J4i (XVII of
I !Hi), the Delhi l'n·mi,cs (Hequisition and
E,·iction) Act, l!Hi (XLIX of l!J.!i) and the
Hequisitio11ing and Aequisitioni11g of Jnuno,·-
aulo Prop<'rt.y Ordi1w11ec, l!J5:! (III of I !l;i:!)
arc hereby repcakd.
(:!) For tlw n•mo\·al uf duulit:;, it. is h<'rtLy dcdared that any property 1r}1ich immediately Lefore sueh repeal was subject tu requisitiun uuckr the pro,·isiu11s of either of the
said Ads or tlw said Ordinance Kha!!, 011 the
commc·uccmcnt uf thi8 Act, be deemed to L1·
property requisitioned u11der SPctio11 3 of thi8
Act, and all the provi;;ions of thiti Act Hhall
apply accordingly.
Scctiou 3. (!)Where tL<' competent authority is of upil1ion tlwt auy prop<'rt.y is needed
or likely to be needed for any puLlic pt1rposc,
bci11g a. purpose of the L nion, a.11d that the
property should bo requisitioned, the competent
authority-
( a) shall call upon the owner or any
other perso11 who may be in possession
of tho property J,y notice in writing specifying therein the purpose of the re4uisition to show cause, withi11 fifteen days
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME· COURT ,REPOR'rS
'
,
'
~
323
of the date of the service of s"uch IfOtice
on him, why tho property shall i:iot be requisitioned;
x
x
x
x
Section 6. (1) The Central Government
may at·a11y time nilease from requisition any
property requisitioned under this Act an?
shall, as far as possible, restore the property m
as good a condition as jt was when possession
thereof was·taken subject only to the change
caused hy reasonable wear and tear and
irresistible force :
Provided that where the purpose for which
any requisitioned prpperty was being used ceased to exist, the Central G:JVernment shall, un:
less 'tfie propert.y 'is acquireJ l\nder section 7,
release that property, as soon as may be, from
requisition.
The Defence of India Rules 'vere issued under theDefence of India Ordinance, 1939, which was repealed by the ·Defence of India Act, 1939, but the
said:rules were kept a1ive by virtue of the provisions-of s. 21 of the said Act. 'Under r.75-A of the
said Rules, the ,power to Fequisition a property was
cond\tio4ed by the pu11p'oses fol: which it could be so ·
requisitioned; though it was left to the subjective
satisfaction of .the Gove.rnment to decide whether it
was necessary or .expedient to do so. After ri;iquisition, the . Central Government was authOl:'iZcd
to deal with the property in such manner as might
appear tp it to be exp\ldient. The expediency in
the context can only mean expediency in relation
to the purposes for which the property 'rns requisitioned. The wide import of the. word "expedient"
in Sub-s. (2) must necessarily be limited to.the purposes under sub-s. (.1) -as otherwise. we would be
attributing to the Legislatvre an.intention to confer
a power- on the Goverrtm!(nt toi:equisiticm 11 proJlerty
on false pretences.,. Act- l 1 of 1.94 7 '~as enacted to
prov'fde for tlie qo~tinuapce oJ cei;tain. emergency
1~61
--·-
The U11iol} qf l:1:iic.
v.
Raml)anwar
~ubba Ro,o J,
J9GJ
T!it (J11iori of ]1;r./ia
v.
R11111 1,·u11war
Su.l,lo Rao J.
324
SUPHE~IE COGRT HEPORTS
[l!J62]
JHlwcr~ in relation tu land which, when tho Defonce
pf India Act expired, was sulijc·ct to requisition
cffcct.cd under the rules mado und1·r that Act.
"Rc-
<JUitiitioncd land" was chefined tu mean an immovable property which at the commcriecmcnt. of the
said Act was sul.>ject. tu any rer1uisit ion effected
under tht> said rule,,
t:mler s. :~ thereof notwit.hstanding the expiration of tho said Act and the rules
made thereunder, the requisitioned land was continued to be suhjoct to rec1uisit.io11 until the expiry of
the saicl Act, am! it authoriwcl the ;1ppropriate
(;o,·erm1wnt "to use or deal with any requi~itioncd
land in such manner as may ap1x·ar to it to he expedient". The object of the Act was only tu 0011tinuo tho requisition after the expiry of the life of
the Defence of India Act and not to eJllargo the
powcrs of the GO\·ernment in respect of the r"quisitioned land. The land rcquisitionl'd under tho
Ordinance continued to be subject to the• requisition.
The expression "continue"" elcarly brings out tho
iclea that the scope of the sect.ion was only to give a
further lease of life to the order which otherwise
would have expired. Tho words "may use or deal
with any requisitioned laud in such manner as may
appear to it to be expedient" were only a repetition
of the words in r. i5-A (2) of the Rules conferring
authority on the Government to do certnin things in
respect of requisition ; and t.he scope of the authority under s.3 of the l!J4 7 Act must be similar to
that under r.7ii-A(2) of the l{ules. Under s.24 (!) of
the Hlii2 Act, the 1947 Act was repealed.
Under
sub-s. (2) thereof, it was provided that on the commencement of the Act the properties which were
subject to roquisition under the provisions of the earlier Act shall be deemed t-0 l.>e property requisitioned under s.3 of the Act and that all tho provisions of the Act shall apply accordingly.
Relying upon the clooming clause, it is contended th11t the requisition of the land and the user
of the same by the Government under the 1947 Act
should be deemed to be a requisition made, under
..
,
.,..,
....
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
325
s. 3 of the 1952 Act, for a public purpose, being the
purpose of the Union, and as that purpose, namely
user by the Triveni Kala Sangam, had not ceased,
the appellants were not bound to de-requisition
imder s. 6 of the Act.
But the fiction created by
s. 24 (2) of the Act would operate only upon the requisition already m~de. The fiction could not validate any illegal act of the Government. Therefore,
the question is what was the effect of the earlier re-
•1uisition urnler the Rules as well as under the 1947
Act. If the requisition orginally made was for purposes mentioned in r.75 of the Rules and continued
under s.3 of the 194 7 Act only for the said purposes,
under s. 3 of the 1952 Act the requisition of the
property m'lde for the said purposes would be
deemed to be a requisition for a public purpose
being a purpose of the Union. But the validitv of
the requisition could be judged on the basis or' the
pre-existing statutes and not on the basis of the
provisions of the sections of the 19.52 Act.
The
result is that the rPquisition of a property made for
public purposes under r. 75-A of the Rules would be
deemed to l-e a requisition under s. 3 of the Act and
all the provisions of the Act would apply accordingly. It is said that under the Rules a requisition
need not have been made for a public purpose ; but
the express provisions of r, 75-A of the Rules flCgative this contention. Though no notice statinrr the"
-
n
purpose is contemplated under r. 75-A of the Rules
the requisition could have been made only for th~
four public purposes mentioned in r. 7/i-A of the
Rulee.
We have poip.ted out that the requisition
for the said purposes only continued under the
1947 Act.
The purposes for which it was requisitioned must, therefore, he deemed to be the purposes mentioned in r. 75-A of the Rules.
Even if
s. 5 of the Act was excluded on the ground that no
notice wae issued under r. 75-A of the Rules, the
proviso to s. 6 of the Act would be attracted.
Under that proviso, where the purposes for which
19fiJ
The Union of [ndin
v.
Ram Kaiiwar
Subba Raa J.
1961
Tht Union of l1"1ia
v.
!lam 1.·amFu
Subf,(J Rao ,1.
326
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
any requisitioned property was being used ceased
to exist, the Central Governm<'nt shall release the
property, as soon as may hP, from requisition. In
the prcsrnt case, on thP facts it is manifest that tho
flat was not 11"ecl for :my of thP puq>oses for which
it was rcqnisitir,nccl for a numhPr of year;;; and
indc<>d, wh<>n the A('t came into force, it "·as used
only for loPating the Tri\'cni Kain Sangam, which
is clearly not one of the purposes for which the flat
was requisitioned. If so, it mnst be hclu that the
purpoHe for which the property was requisitioned
ccasNl to rxi:;t ancl the r<>spondcnts luwo acquired
a right to be put. in posst>s~ion thereof unclcr tho
Raicl proviso.
Evon so, the leamcd Att.omev·Gcncral contends that the pnrpos!' for which tJu(buildin~ is now
utilised, namely, for the Tri1·cni Kal;L Sangam, is a
piiblic purpose, being the purpose of the Union,
within the meani11g of s. :l of the Act, and, therefore, the respondents arc not entitled for cle·rerp1isition unclcr the pro,·iso to s. tl of the Ad.
It is argued that every Union purpose is a
public purrose. The argument prorecds that under
the Constitution tho Parliament may make la\1·s
with respect to any of the matter; enumerated in
List I of the Seventh Scbcclulc to the Constitution,
ancl also in rl'SJlCCt of any mattPrs c>numernted in
List III thereof, that under Art. 73 the executive
power of the Union extends to the said matters and
that, therefore, the requisition of property made
for any of the purposes connected with such
mattcrn, whether in rPgard !'hereof laws were made
or not woulcl boa requisition for a public purpose,
being~ purpo"c of the l)nion, within the meaning
of s. :l( 1) of the 1!)52 Act. In support of this contention rnliance is placed upon the decision of this
Court in The Sfote of Rom/my v. Al·i Ui!lslum (').
There i8 a fallat;y underlying this argument. The
(ll [1955] 2 S. C.R. 867.
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!: S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS · 327
effect of the fiction is that the requisition made
under r. 75-A of the Rules is a requisition under
s. 3 of the 1952 Act, that is, if the requisition was
made for purposes mentioned in. r. 75-A of the
Rules, it would be deemed to be one for a public
purpose, being the purpose of the Union, within the
meaning of s. 3 of the 1952 Act. The criterion is
not, therefore, whether a particular purpose for
which a building was used when the Act came into
force was a public purpose, being the purpose ~f
the Union, within the meaning of s. 3 of the 1952
Act, but whether it was requisitioned for one of
the purposes mentioned in r, 74-A of the Rules. If
those purposes ceased to exist, the proviso to
s. 6 of the 1952 Act made it obligatory for the
Government to release the property. As the flat
was being used for a purpose other ~han that for
which it was requisitioned, the respondents were
entitled to be put in possession thereof. In this ·
view, we do not propose to express our opinion on
the validity of the contention raised by the learned
Attorney-General based upon the decision of thi~
Court.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Costs will be governed by tho order dated 11-8-61.
Appeal d£.sniissed.
1961
Tht Union of lnd·ia
v.
Ram Kanwar
Subba Raf J.