# THE VISHNU PRATAP SUGAR WORKS (P) LTD v. THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF STAMPS, U.P

- **Citation:** [1967] 3 S.C.R. 920
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967-05-04
- **Case number:** Civil Revision No. 1095 of 1965
- **Bench:** R. S. Bachawat, J. M. Shblat, V. Bh>, Rgava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/the-vishnu-pratap-sugar-works-p-ltd-v-the-chief-inspector-of-stamps-u-p-4039
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Court Fees Act, 1870 (8 of 1870), S. 7 (Iv-A), (a) and S. 7 (iv-B)
(b)-Acts impositing tax-Suit for injunction on the ground that Acts
void-Court Jee pt>yab/e.
The appellant-company filed a suit against the State ·of U.P. and
Union of India for a permanent injunction restraining the State from proceeding to realise cess and tax under the U .P. Sugar Cane Cess Act
1956 read with U.P. Sugar Cane Cess (Validation) Act, 1961 and the
Sugar Cane Purchase Tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the Acts were
invalid and void. On its plaint, the appellant paid court-fees under subs, (iv-B) (b) of s. 7 on the footing that the relief sought was an injunction.
The respondent the Chief Inspector of Stamps objected, contmding that court-fees payable were under sub-11. (iv-A) of s. 7 on the
ground that the suit was for a declaratory decree,
where consequential
relief prayed for was an injunction or Of adjudging void an instrument
securing money or other property havina such value.
The trial Court
rejected the respondent's objection, which the High
Court
revened.
In appeal, this Court,
HELD : The court-fees payable on the plaint were under cl. (b)
of sub-s. (iv-B) of s. 7 and neither cl. (a) of sub-5, (iv-A) of s. 7 nor
sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7 applied.
The plaint when read as a whole showed that though the appellant
alleged that the Acts were void and therefore non-est for the reasons
set out therein, it did not seek any declaration that they were void. The
plaint proceeded on the footing that the said Acts were void and that
therefore the State of U .P. or its authorities had no power to realise
the tax and the cess. It may be that while deciding whether to grant
the injunction or not, the court might have to consider the question as to
the validity or otherwise of the said Acts.
But that must happen in
almost every case where an injunction is prayed for.
If for the mere
reason that the court might have to go into such a question, a pr8fer
for injunction were to be treated as one for a declaratory decree of which
the consequential relief is injunction all suits where in1unction is prayed
for would have to be treated as falling under cl. (a) of sub-s. (iv) of s. 7
and in that v~w cl.
(b) of sub-I.
(iv) of s, 7 would be superfluous.
[924E-H!
B
c
D
E
F
Ramanbhal Ashabhal Patel v. Dabhl A/ltkumar Fulsln;I,
[1965] 1
G
S.C.R. 712 : referred to.
Ordinarily a statute is not an instrument unless as in the case
of
Conveyancing Act, 1881, the definition includes it or as in the case of
s. 205 (I) (viii) of the Law of Property Act, 1925, tho statute crootes
a settlement and such statute is for that reason trea.OOd as an instrument,
~o. the Acts alleged in the plaint to be void are not instruments within
t
'..he meaning of sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7. [923 G-H]
H
Mohan Chowdhury v. ·The Chief Commissioner [1964]
3
S.C.R.
442, and Emperor v. Ravango11da Lingangouda Patil;
A.I.R.
1944
Born. 259. referred to.
VISHNU PRATAP LTD. v. CHIEF INSPECTOR (She/at, J.) 92 I
A

## Text

THE VISHNU PRATAP SUGAR WORKS (P) LTD.
v.
THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF STAMPS, U.P.
May 4, 1967
(R. S. BACHAWAT, J. M. SHBLAT AND V. BH>,RGAVA, JJ,)
Court Fees Act, 1870 (8 of 1870), S. 7 (Iv-A), (a) and S. 7 (iv-B)
(b)-Acts impositing tax-Suit for injunction on the ground that Acts
void-Court Jee pt>yab/e.
The appellant-company filed a suit against the State ·of U.P. and
Union of India for a permanent injunction restraining the State from proceeding to realise cess and tax under the U .P. Sugar Cane Cess Act
1956 read with U.P. Sugar Cane Cess (Validation) Act, 1961 and the
Sugar Cane Purchase Tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the Acts were
invalid and void. On its plaint, the appellant paid court-fees under subs, (iv-B) (b) of s. 7 on the footing that the relief sought was an injunction.
The respondent the Chief Inspector of Stamps objected, contmding that court-fees payable were under sub-11. (iv-A) of s. 7 on the
ground that the suit was for a declaratory decree,
where consequential
relief prayed for was an injunction or Of adjudging void an instrument
securing money or other property havina such value.
The trial Court
rejected the respondent's objection, which the High
Court
revened.
In appeal, this Court,
HELD : The court-fees payable on the plaint were under cl. (b)
of sub-s. (iv-B) of s. 7 and neither cl. (a) of sub-5, (iv-A) of s. 7 nor
sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7 applied.
The plaint when read as a whole showed that though the appellant
alleged that the Acts were void and therefore non-est for the reasons
set out therein, it did not seek any declaration that they were void. The
plaint proceeded on the footing that the said Acts were void and that
therefore the State of U .P. or its authorities had no power to realise
the tax and the cess. It may be that while deciding whether to grant
the injunction or not, the court might have to consider the question as to
the validity or otherwise of the said Acts.
But that must happen in
almost every case where an injunction is prayed for.
If for the mere
reason that the court might have to go into such a question, a pr8fer
for injunction were to be treated as one for a declaratory decree of which
the consequential relief is injunction all suits where in1unction is prayed
for would have to be treated as falling under cl. (a) of sub-s. (iv) of s. 7
and in that v~w cl.
(b) of sub-I.
(iv) of s, 7 would be superfluous.
[924E-H!
B
c
D
E
F
Ramanbhal Ashabhal Patel v. Dabhl A/ltkumar Fulsln;I,
[1965] 1
G
S.C.R. 712 : referred to.
Ordinarily a statute is not an instrument unless as in the case
of
Conveyancing Act, 1881, the definition includes it or as in the case of
s. 205 (I) (viii) of the Law of Property Act, 1925, tho statute crootes
a settlement and such statute is for that reason trea.OOd as an instrument,
~o. the Acts alleged in the plaint to be void are not instruments within
t
'..he meaning of sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7. [923 G-H]
H
Mohan Chowdhury v. ·The Chief Commissioner [1964]
3
S.C.R.
442, and Emperor v. Ravango11da Lingangouda Patil;
A.I.R.
1944
Born. 259. referred to.
VISHNU PRATAP LTD. v. CHIEF INSPECTOR (She/at, J.) 92 I
A
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1668 of
B
c
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
November 2, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision
No. 1095 of 1965.
G. N. Dixit, for the appellant.
Bishan Narain and 0. P. Rana, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shelat, J,
The appellant-company filed suit No. 16 of 1963
against the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Union of India, inter
alia, praying for a permanent injunction restaining the State of
Uttar Pradesh, its servants and agents from realising or from proceeding· to realise sugarcane cess and purchase tax amounting to
Rs. 33 lakhs and odd charged under the U.P. Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, the Sugar Cane Cess
Act, 1956 read with the U.P. Sugar Cane Cess (Validation) Act,
1961 and the U.P. Sugar Cane Purchase Tax Act, IX of 1961.
o In the said suit, the appellant-company, inter-a/ia, alleged that
the Acts for the diverse reasons set out therein were invalid and
void and therefore the State was not entitled to levy, collect or
recover the said cess or the purchase tax and prayed, as aforesaid.
that the State should be restrained from proceeding to realise the
said cess or tax.
The appellant-company paid court-fees on its
said plaint under sub-s. (iv-B)(b) of s. 7 on the footing that the
relief sought in the suit was an injunction.
The Chief Inspector
of Stamps objected to the court-fees being paid under cl. (b) of
sub-s. ( iv-B) of s. 7 contending that the court-fees payable were
as provided under sub-s. (iv) (a) of s. 7 or under sub-s. (iv-A)
of s. 7, that is to say, on the footing that the suit was for a
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declaratory decree where consequential relief prayed for was an
injunction or on the footing that the suit involved cancellation
of .or of adjudging void an instrument securing money or other
property having such value.
The trial Judge rejected the objections and ~eld that the court:fees payable were adequate as cl. (b)
of sub-s. (1v-B) of s. 7 applied.
The Chief Inspector of Stamps
thereupon filed a revision application before the High Court' reiterating the said objections.
The High Court rejected the con·
tention ~at s. 7(iv)(~) applied but. held that sub-s. (iv-A) of
s .. 7. applted as .the said Acts were mstruments securing money
w1thm the meanmg of that sub-section and that though the relief
cl~ed in the ~uit was injunction, in substance and effect the
suit mvolved ad1udgment of the said Acts as void.
Hence this
appeal by special leave.
Sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7 reads as follows:-
"For cancellation or adjudging void
instruments
and decree-In suits for or involving cancellation of or
92~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967} 3 S.C.R.
adjudging void or voidable .......•.... an instrument
securing money or other property having such value".
The question which falls for determination is whether an Act
pas>ed by the Central or the State Legislature can be said to be
an instrument and, if so, an instrument securing money or other
property having such value. The Court-fees Act does not define
the word 'instrument'. That being so we have to turn for the
connotation of the word 'instrument' to its ordinary dictionary
meaning.
According to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Ed.
Vol. II, p. 1472, 'instrument' means 'a writing, and generally
imports a document of a formal legal kind.
Semble, the word
may include an Act of Parliament (see Deed of Settlement) so
in the Trustee Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 18), s. 68 .......... .
(11) Conveyancing Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Viet. c. 41) s. 2(xiii),
" 'instrwnent' includes deed, will, inclosure, award, and Act of
Parliament".
Thus, an 'instrument' may include a statute enacted by Parliament if the particular statute in its context includes
it as an instrument.
According to Jowitt's Dictionary of English
Law, p. 984 "instrument' means "a formal legal writing, e.g., a
record, charter, deed of transfer or agreement". It is, however,
observed that under the Law of Property Act, 1925, s. 205(1)
(viii), 'instrument' for the purposes of this Act does not include
a statute unless the statute creates a settlement.
"An instrument
is a writing and generally means a writing of a formal nature.
But where there is a power to appoint by any deed or instrument
or by will, any writing, such as a letter, which refers to the power,
or which can have effect only by operating on the fund (such
as a cheque or other order for payment), is an instrument. A
telegram is an instrument within the meaning of the Forgery
Act, 1912, s. 7, and so is an envelope with a postmark falsified
· for the purposes of a betting fraud".
According to the same
dictionary, the word 'enact' means to act, perform or effect; to
establish by law; to decree and an 'enactment' means an Act of
Parliament or statute or any part thereof.
A statute, according
to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Ed. p. 1 is the will
of the Jeg.isJ.ature, i.e. an edict of the legislature.
A statute is.
howe1·er, different from a statutory instrument as defined by the
Statutory Instruments Act (9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 36) 1946 where
power to make, confirm, or approve orders, rules, regulations or
other subordinate legislation is conferred on His Ma.iesty in Council or on any Minister of the Crown, a document by which that
power is exercised is a statutory instrument.
Similarly, where
bv an Act passed before the enactment of the Statutory Instru1n'ents Act, 1946, power to make statutory-rules is conferred on
any rule-making authority, any document by which that power is
exercised is a statutory instrument.
Thus, whereas a statute is an
edict of the le~islature, a statutory instrument as distinguished
from such an edict is a document whereby the rule making power
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VISHNU PRATAP LTD. v. ClllEF INSPECTOR (Shelat, J.) 9 23
is expressed. Jn Mohan Chowdhury v.
The Chief Commis·
.1icmer, Tripura('), the question· arose whether the order dated November 3, 1962, passed by the President under Art. 359(1) of the
Constitution suspending the right of any person to move any court
for the enforcement of rights conferred by Arts. 21 and 22 during
the Proclamation of Emergency was an instrument within the
meaning of s. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In considerin~ that question this Court approved the meaning of :he
word 'instrument' given by Stroud and observed :-
"The expression is also used to signify a deed interpartes or a charter or a record or other writing of a
formal nature.
But in the context · of the General
Clauses Act, it has to be understood
as
including
reference to a formal legal writing like an Order made
under a statute or subordinate legislation or any document of a fonnal character made under constitutional
or statutory authority.
We have no doubt in our mind
for the expression 'instrument' in s. 8 was meant to
include reference to the Order made by the President in
exercise of his constitutional powers".
The President's Order having been made under power conferred
upon him by Art. 359 that Order would have the same connota·
tion as the Statutory instrument defined by the statutory Instru·
ments Act, 1946 and therefore was an instrument within the
meaning, of s. 8 (1) of the General Clauses Act.
That does not
mean that a statute like the U.P. Court-fees Act which is an edict
of the legislature is an instrument.
In Emperor v. Rayangouda
Lingangouda Patil(") the High Court of Bombay considered
whether an order of the Government delegating its power to Dis·
trict Magistrates under the Defence of India Rules was an instrument within the meaning of s. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act.
The High Court held that an instrument, generally speaking, means
a writing usually importing a document of a fonnal legal kind,
but it does not include Acts of Parliament unless there is a statutory definition to that effect in any Act.
There is thus ample
authority to hold that ordinarily a statute is not an instrument
unless as in the case of Conveyancing Act of 1881, the definition
includes it or as in the case of s. 205(1 )(viii) of the Law of
Property Act, 1925, the stature creates a settlement and such
statute is for that reason treated as an instrument. It would not
therefore be correct to say that the Acts alleged in the plaint to
be void are. ins~rum~nts within the meaning of sub-s. (iv-A) of
s. 7. In thts view, 1t does not become necessary to decide whe·
ther the Acts are instruments securing money or other property
having such value.
Sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7 would not therefore
apply and the High Court was not right in calling 'upon
th~
(1) [19641 3 S C.R. 442.
(2} A.1.R. 1944 Bom. 159.
924
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 3 S.C.R
appellant-company to pay additional court-fees under that subA
section.
Mr. Bishan Narain, however, argued that even if these Acts
are not instruments, the plaint if read in substance rather than
in form is for a declaratory decree with injunction as the consequential relief and therefore sub-s. (iv) (a) of s.
7 would apply
and the court-fees paid merely on the footing of the suit being
for an injunction would not be adequate. As stated earlier, the
High Court rejected this contention as untenable. Mr. Bishan
Narain, contended that he was nonetheless entitled to argue that
the High Court was in error and that sub-s. (iv)(a) would apply
and not cl. (b) of sub-s. (iv-B).
For this purpose he relied on
some observations in Ramanbhal Ashabhai Patel v. Dabhi Ajit·
kumar Fulsinjl('), where it has been held that as soon as special
leave is granted this Court has the power to decide all the points
arising from the judgment appealed against and even In the
absence of an express provision like 0. X:LI, r. 22 of the Code
of Civil Procedure it can devise appropriate procedure to be
adopted at the hearing.
Assuming that Mr. Bishan' Narain can
urge the contention that !',. 7(iv) (a) applies in the present case
the contention still fails. It is true that for purposes of the Court·
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fees Act; it is the substance and not the form which has to be
considered while deciding which particular provi~ion of the Act
applies.
It cannot, however, be gainsaid that the actual relief
prayed for in the plaint was an injunction restraining the State and
its authorities to realise from the appellant-company the aforesaid
cess and the purchase tax.
It is clear from the plaint when read
as a whole that though the appellant-company alleged that the
Acts were void and therefore non-est for the reasons set out there·
in, it did not seek any declaration that they were void.
The
plaint proceeds on the footinp; that the said Acts were void and
that therefore the State of U.P. or its authorities had no power r
to realise the said tax and the said cess. It may be that while
deciding whether to grant the injunction or not, the court might
have to consider the question as to the validity or otherwise of
the said Acts.
But that must happen in almost every case where
an injunction is prayed for. If for the mere reason that the court
might have to go into such a question, a prayer for injunction
were to be treated as one for a declaratory decree of which the
consequential relief is injunction all suits where injunction
is
prayed for would have to be treated as falling under cl. (a) of
sub-s. (iv) of s. 7 and in that view cl. (b) of sub-s. (iv-B) of
s. 7 would be superfluous. The contention urged by Mr. Bishan
Narain, therefore, cannot be accepted.
For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that neither
cl. (a) of sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7 nor sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7 would
(I) [1965] 1 S.C.R 712.
G
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VISHNU PRATAP LTD. v. CHIEF INSPECTOR (She/at, J.) 925
A
apply and the court-fees payable on the plaint were under cl.
(b) of sub-s. (iv-B) of s. 7.
The appeal, therefore, has to be
allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and the order
of the trial court is restored. The respondent will pay the appellant-company the costs of this appeal.
B
Y.P.
Appeal allowed.