# therefore, be dismissed with costs. Costs one set. Appeals dismissed. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA v. RAM NARAIN. MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA, V1v1AN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS

- **Citation:** [1955] 1 S.C.R. 697
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1954-11-28
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 1952
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/therefore-be-dismissed-with-costs-costs-one-set-appeals-dismissed-central-bank-381
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
which
declares that none
of the
provlSlons of the
specified Acts shall be deemed to be void or ever to have
become void on the ground of the alleged violation of
the rights
indicated and "notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal." That
intention is also . emphasised by the positive declaration
that "each of the said Acts or
Regulations shall, subject
to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or
amend it, continue in force."
Vve are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the
challenge
to
the validity of the Bombay Taluqdari
Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 on the ground put forward
was
not
open.
The
appeals
must,
therefore,
be
dismissed with costs.
Costs one set.
Appeals dismissed.
CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA
v.
RAM NARAIN.
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA,
V1v1AN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS
and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Offence committed by a person in Pakistan-Migration to India
and acquiring
domicil
therein-Courts in
lndia-/urisdictionTrial-Indian Penal Code
(Act XLV of 1860)
s. 4-Criminal
Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 188-Whether apply under the
circumstances-Domicil, definition of.
A person accused of an offence under the Indian Penal Code
and committed in a
district which
after the partition of
India
became part of
Pakistan cannot be tried for that offence by a
Criminal Court in India after his migration to India and acquiring
thereafter the status of a citizen of India.
The fact that after the
comm1ss10n
of an
offence a person
becomes domiciled in another country, or acquires citizenship of
time when that person was neither the national of that country
retrospectively for trying offences committed and completed at a
time when that person was neither the national of that country
nor was he domiciled there.
According to section 4 of the Indian Penal Code and section
J 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if at the time of the commission of the offence the person committing it is a citizen of India
then even if the offence is committed outside India he is subject to.
1954
Dhirubha
Devsingh Gohil'
v.
The State of
Bomb/!Y.
Jagannadhodasj..
1954
October 12'
1954
Central Bank of
India Ltd.
v.
Ram Narain.
698
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the jurisdiction of the Courts in India, as qua citizens the jurisdic·
tion of Courts is not lost by reason of the venue of an offence. · If,
however, at the time of the commission of the offence the accused
person is not a citizen of India these . sections have no applicati~n
at all.
The term "domicil" does not admit of an absolute definition.
The simplest definition of don1icif is : That place is properly the
domicil of a person in \vhich his habitation is fixed \Vithout any
present intention of removing therefron1.
The
fact is that
the
tenn domicil can be illustrated but cannot be defined.
Craignish v. Craignish (11892] 3 Ch. 180, 192) referred to.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Criminal
Appeal No. 90 of 1952.
Appeal under article 134(1) (c) of the Constitution
of India from the
Judgment and
Order, dated 28th
November, 1954, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal
Revision No. 865 of 1951, arising out of the Judgment,
dated 2nd August, 1951, of the Court of Additional
Sessions Judge, Rohtak, Gurgaon, in Criminal Revision
No. 4 of 1951.
M. C. Seta!vad,
Attorney-General
Chand and Rajinder
Narain,
with
appellant.
for
India
him) for
(Tek
the
Copa! Singh and K. L. Mehta for the
respondent.
S. M. Sikri,
Advocate'General for
the
State of
Punjab (Jinder Lal and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for
the Intervener (The State of Punjab).
1954. October 12. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J.-This appeal, by leave
of the High Court of Judicature at Simla, raises a novel
and interesting question of law, viz., whether a person
accused of an offence under the Indian Penal . Code
and committed' in a district which after the
part1t10n
of
India became
Pakistan,
could
be
tried for that
offence by a Criminal Court in India after

## Text

-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
which
declares that none
of the
provlSlons of the
specified Acts shall be deemed to be void or ever to have
become void on the ground of the alleged violation of
the rights
indicated and "notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal." That
intention is also . emphasised by the positive declaration
that "each of the said Acts or
Regulations shall, subject
to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or
amend it, continue in force."
Vve are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the
challenge
to
the validity of the Bombay Taluqdari
Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 on the ground put forward
was
not
open.
The
appeals
must,
therefore,
be
dismissed with costs.
Costs one set.
Appeals dismissed.
CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA
v.
RAM NARAIN.
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA,
V1v1AN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS
and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Offence committed by a person in Pakistan-Migration to India
and acquiring
domicil
therein-Courts in
lndia-/urisdictionTrial-Indian Penal Code
(Act XLV of 1860)
s. 4-Criminal
Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 188-Whether apply under the
circumstances-Domicil, definition of.
A person accused of an offence under the Indian Penal Code
and committed in a
district which
after the partition of
India
became part of
Pakistan cannot be tried for that offence by a
Criminal Court in India after his migration to India and acquiring
thereafter the status of a citizen of India.
The fact that after the
comm1ss10n
of an
offence a person
becomes domiciled in another country, or acquires citizenship of
time when that person was neither the national of that country
retrospectively for trying offences committed and completed at a
time when that person was neither the national of that country
nor was he domiciled there.
According to section 4 of the Indian Penal Code and section
J 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if at the time of the commission of the offence the person committing it is a citizen of India
then even if the offence is committed outside India he is subject to.
1954
Dhirubha
Devsingh Gohil'
v.
The State of
Bomb/!Y.
Jagannadhodasj..
1954
October 12'
1954
Central Bank of
India Ltd.
v.
Ram Narain.
698
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the jurisdiction of the Courts in India, as qua citizens the jurisdic·
tion of Courts is not lost by reason of the venue of an offence. · If,
however, at the time of the commission of the offence the accused
person is not a citizen of India these . sections have no applicati~n
at all.
The term "domicil" does not admit of an absolute definition.
The simplest definition of don1icif is : That place is properly the
domicil of a person in \vhich his habitation is fixed \Vithout any
present intention of removing therefron1.
The
fact is that
the
tenn domicil can be illustrated but cannot be defined.
Craignish v. Craignish (11892] 3 Ch. 180, 192) referred to.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Criminal
Appeal No. 90 of 1952.
Appeal under article 134(1) (c) of the Constitution
of India from the
Judgment and
Order, dated 28th
November, 1954, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal
Revision No. 865 of 1951, arising out of the Judgment,
dated 2nd August, 1951, of the Court of Additional
Sessions Judge, Rohtak, Gurgaon, in Criminal Revision
No. 4 of 1951.
M. C. Seta!vad,
Attorney-General
Chand and Rajinder
Narain,
with
appellant.
for
India
him) for
(Tek
the
Copa! Singh and K. L. Mehta for the
respondent.
S. M. Sikri,
Advocate'General for
the
State of
Punjab (Jinder Lal and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for
the Intervener (The State of Punjab).
1954. October 12. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J.-This appeal, by leave
of the High Court of Judicature at Simla, raises a novel
and interesting question of law, viz., whether a person
accused of an offence under the Indian Penal . Code
and committed' in a district which after the
part1t10n
of
India became
Pakistan,
could
be
tried for that
offence by a Criminal Court in India after his migration
to that
country, and
thereafter
acquiring the status
of a citizen.
The material facts relevant to this enquiry are these :
The respondent, Ram Narain, acting on behalf of his
firm, Ram Narain Joginder Nath, carrying on business
at Mailsi in Multan District, was allowed a cash credit
limit of rupees three lakhs by the Mailsi branch of the
Central Bank of India Ltd. (the appellant) on the 23rd
-
-
,
-
-
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
December, 1946, shortly before the partition of British
India.
The account was secured against stocks which
were
to remain
in possession of the borrowers
as
trustees on behalf of the bank. On 15th August, 1947,
when British India was split into two Dominions, the
amount due to the bank from Ram
Narain
was over
Rs.
1,40,000, exclusive of interest, while the value of
the goods pledged under the cash credit agreement was
approximately in the sum of Rs. 1,90,000.
On account
of the disturbances that followed in the
wake
of the
partition of the country, the bank's godown-keeper at
Mailsi left
Mailsi some time in September, 1947, and
the cashier, who was left in charge, also was forced to
leave that place in October, 1947, and thus no one was
in Mailsi
to safeguard the bank's godowns after that
date. It is
alleged
that
in
January, 1948,
when,
Mr. D. P. Patel, Agent of the Multan branch of the
appellant bank, visited Mailsi, he discovered that stocks
pledged by Messrs. Ram Narain Joginder Nath, against
the cash credit agreement had disappeared. On inquiry
he found that 801 cotton bales pledged with the bank
had been
stolen, and
booked by, Ram Narain to
Karachi on the 9th November, 1947, and that he had
recovered a sum of Rs. 1,98,702-12-9 as price of these
bales
from
one Durga<las D. Punjabi.
The bank
claimed
this amount from Ram Narain but with no
result.
It then applied under section 188,
Criminal
Procedure Code, to the East
Punjab
Government for
sanction
for the prosecution of Ram Narain for the
offences committed in
Pakistan in
November,
1947,
when he was there, in respect of these bales. The
East
Punjab Government, by its order dated 23rd February,
1950, accorded
sanction for the
prosecution of Ram
Narain, under sections 380 and 454, Indian Penal Code .
Ram Narain, at this time, was
residing
in Hodel,
District Gurgaon, and was carrying on business under
the name and style of Ram Narain Bhola Nath, Hodel..
In pursuance of this sanction, on 18th April, 1950, the
bank filed a complaint against
Ram
Narain
under
sections 380 and 454, Indian Penal Code, and also.
under section
412
of the Code before the District
Magistrate of Gurgaon.
1954
Central Bank of
India Ltd.
v.
Ram Narain.
Mahqjan C. J-
1954
'Central Bank of
India Ltd.
v.
Ram Narain
Mahajan C. J.
700
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1955]
Ram
Narain, when he appeared in Court, raised a
preliminary objection that at the time of the alleged
occurrence he was a national of Pakistan and therefore
the East Punjab Government
was not competent to
grant
sanction
for
his
prosecution
under
section
188,
Criminal Procedure
Code, read with section 4,
Indian
Penal
Code. This
objection was not decided
at
that moment,
but after evidence m
the
case
had
been
taken at the
request of
both
sides the
Court heard
arguments
on
the
p,rliminary
point
and overruled it on
the finding
that Ram
Narain
could not be said to have acquired Pakistan nationality
by merely staying on there from 15th August, till 10th
November, 1947, and that all this time
he
had the
desire
and intention to
revert to Indian nationality
because he sent his family out to India in October,
1947, wound up his business there and after his migration to India in November, 1947, he did not return to
Pakistan. It was also said that in those days Hindus
and Sikhs were not safe m Pakistan and they were
bound to come to India under the inveitable pressure
of circumstances over which they had no control. Ram
Narain applied to the Sessions Judge, Gurgaon, under
sections 435 and 439, Criminal Procedure Code, for
setting aside
this order and for quashing the charges
framed
against him. The
Additional Sessions
Judge
dismissed this petition and affirmed the decision of the
trial magistrate.
Ram
Narain
then
preferred an
application in revision to the High Court, Punjab, at
Simla, and with. success. The High Court allowed the
revision and quashed the charges and held that the
triai of respondent, Ram Narain, by a magistrate m
India was without jurisdiction. It was held that until
Ram
Narain actually left Pakistan and came to India
he could not possibly be said to have
become a citizen
of India,
though undoubtedly he never intended to
remam m Pakistan for any length of time and wound
up his business as quickly as he could and came ta
India in November, 1947, and settled in Hodel. It was
further held that the Punjab
Government had no
power m February, 1950, to sanction his prosecution
under section 188, Criminal Procedure Code, for acts
-
..
•
.,.
... -
#
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
701
committed in Pakistan in November, 1947. The High
Court also repelled the further contention of the appellant bank that in any case Ram Narain could be tried
at
Gurgaon for the possession or retention by him at
Hodel of the sale proceeds of the stolen cotton which
themselves constitute stolen property. Leave to appeal
to this Court was granted under article 134(1) (c) of
the Constitution.
The sole question for determination in the appeal is
whether on a true construction of section 188, Criminal
Procedure Code, and section 4 of the Indian Penal Code,
the East
Punjab
Government had
power
to grant
sanction
for the
prosecution of
Ram
Narain for
offences committed in Pakistan before his migration to
India.
The relevant portion of section 4, Indian Penal Code,
before its amendment read thus :
"The provisions of this Code apply also to any
offence committed by-
(1) any Native Indian subject of Her Majesty in
any place without and beyond British India ; .... "
Since 1950, the wording is :
"Any citizen of India in any place without :md
beyond India .... "
Section 188, Criminal Procedure Code, formerly read
thus :
·
"When a Native Indian subject of Her Majesty
commits an offence at any place without and beyond
the limits of British India .... he may be dealt
with in
respect of such offence as if it had been
committed at
any place within British India at which he may be
found."
These wordings were subsequently adapted after the
formation of two Dominions and read as follows :-
"When a British subject domiciled in India commits an offence at any place without and beyond
all
the limits of the provinces .... he may bee dealth with in
respect of such offence as if it had been
committed at
any place within the Provinces at which he may be
. found."
After 1950, the adapted section reads as follows :
"When an offence is committed by1954
Central Bank of
India Ltd.
v.
Ram Narain.
Mahajan C. J.
1954
Central, Bank of
India Ltd.
v.
Ram Narain
!Jahajan C. J.
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
(a) any citizen of India in any place without and
beyond India .... he may be
dealt with m
respect of
such offence as if it had been committed at any place
within_ India at which he may be found."
The learned Attorney-General contended that Ram
Narain was, at the time when sanction for his prosecution was
given by the East Punjab Government, a
citizen of India residing in Hodel and that being so, he
could be tried in India being a citizen of_ India, at that
moment, and having committed offences outside India,
and that the provisions of section 4, Indian Penal Code,
and section 188, Criminal Procedure Code,
were fully
attracted to the
case. In our opinion, this contention
is not well founded. The
language of
the sections
plainly means that if at the time of the commission of
the offence, the person committing it is a citizen of
India, then even if the offence is
committed outside
India he is subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in
India.
The rule enunciated in ihe sectio1l is based on
the principle that qua citizens the jurisdiction of
Courts
is not lost by reason of the venue of the offence. If,
however, at the time of the commission of the offence
the accused person is not a citizen of India, then the
provisions
of
these
sections
have
no
application
whatsoever. A foreigner was not liable to be dealt with
in British India for an offence committed and completed
outside
British
India
under the provisions
of the
sections as they stood before the adaptations made in
them after the partition of India. Illustration (a) to
section 4, Indian Penal Code, delimits the scope of the
section.
It indicates the extent
and the ambit of this
section. It runs as follows :-
•
"(a) A, a coolie, who is a Native Indian subject
commits a murder in Uganda.
He can be tried and
convicted of murder in any place in
British
India in
which he may be found."
In the
illustration, if (A) was not a. Native Indian
subject at the time of the commission of the murder,
the provisions of section 4,
Indian Penal Code,
could
not apply to his case. The circumstance that after the
commission of the offence a person becomes domiciled
in another country, or acquires citizenship of that
•
,•
-
•
•
-
..
}
S.C.R,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
701
State, cannot confer jurisdiction on the Courts of that
territory retrospectively for trying
offences committed
and
completed at a time
when
that
person was
neither the · national
of that country nor was he
domiciled there.
The question of nationality of Ram Narain really
does not anse m the case.
The real question to be
determined here is, whether Ram
Narain had Indian
domicile at the time of the commission of the offence.
Persons domiciled in India at the time of commg into
force of our Constitution
were given the status of
citizens and they thus acquired Indian nationality. If
Ram Narain had Indian
domicile at the time of the
conumss1on of the
offence, he would certainly come
within the ambit of section 4, Indian Penal Code, and
section 188, Criminal Procedure Code. If, on the other
hand, he was not domiciled in India at the relevant
moment, those sect\ons would have no application to
his case. Writers on Private International Law are
agreed that it is impossible to lay down an absolute
definition of 'domicil.'
The simplest
definition of this
expression has been given by Chitty J. in Craignish v.
Craignish(1), wherein the learned Judge said :
"That place is properly the domicil of a person in
which his habitation is
fixed
without any present
intention of removing therefrom."
But even this definition is not an absolute one. The
truth is ·that the term 'domicil' lends itself to illustrations but not to definition. Be that as it may, two
constituent elements that are necessary by English Law
for the existence of domicil are: (1) a residence of a
particular kind, and (:) an
intention of a particular
kind. There must be 1 '1e factum and there must be the
<i.mmus. The residence need not be continuous but it
must be
indefinite, not purely fleeting.
The intention
must be a present intention to reside for ever in the
country where the residence has been taken up. It is
also a well established
proposition
that a person may
have no home but he cannot be without a domicil and
the law may attribute to him a domicil m a country
where in reality he has not. A person may be a vagrant
(1) (1892] 3 Ch. 180, 192.
7-88 S. C. India/59.
195.j,
Central Bank of
India Ltd.
-'I;.
Ram Narain.
Mahajan C. J,
1954
1--
CentTal Bank ef
India Ltd.
'fl
Ram Narain.
Maha;anC.J.
704
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
as when he lives in a yacht or wanderer
from one
European hotel to another, but nevertheless the law
will arbitrarily
ascribe to him a domicil in one particular territory. In order to make the rule that nobody
can be without a domicil effective, the law assigns
what is called a domicil of origin to every person at his
birth. This prevails until a new domicil has been
acquired, so that if a person leaves the country of his
origin with an undoubted intention of never returning
to it again, nevertheless his domicil of origin adheres to
him until he actually settles with the requisite intention in some other country.
It has been held by the
High
Court that Ram
Narain
remained in Multan
District
of
the West
Punjab, where he and his ancestors had lived till his
migration to India. The contention that as no Hindu
or Sikh could possibly remain in Pakistan and therefore
every such person must have been bound upon making
his way to India as quickly as possible and that merely
by forming an intention to come to India he became
an Indian subject and was never even for a moment a
subject of Pakistan, was negatived, and it was said
that "though there is no doubt that so far as Punjab
is concerned the vast majority
of
Hindus
and Sikhs
came to India but even in the Punjab the exodus has
not been complete and in East Bengal
there
are a
considerable number of non-Muslims who no doubt by
now have become full citizens of Pakistan." In view
of these findings it was concluded that
the only
possible way by which a resident of
the territories
which became
Pakistan
could
become
an
Indian
subject was by actually
coming to India
and unless
and until any such person did come to India he retained
Pakistan <lomicil, and was not covered by the words
"Native Indian subject of Her Majesty" in the meaning which they automatically acquired as from the 15th
August; 1947, and he certainly could not be described
as a citizen of India in November, 1947,
The learned
Attorney-General
combated this
view of the learned
Judge and laid considerahle emphasis on his following
observations :
-
•
•
-
-
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
705
"There does not seem
to be
any doubt m the
evidence produced that Ram Narain
never intended
to remain in Pakistan for any length of time. In fact,
he wound up his business
a~ quickly as he could and
{:ame to India later in November 1947 and settled in
Hodel"
and he further emphasized the circumstance relied
upon by the trial magistrate and Sessions Juqge that
Ram Narain had sent his family to India in October,
!947.
In our opinion, none of these circumstances conclusively indicate an intention in Ram Narain of permanently removing himself
from Pakistan and taking up
residence 111 India. It has to be remembered that 111
October or
November, 1947, men's minds were in a
state
of flux. The partition of
India and
the events
that followed in its wake in both Pakistan and India
were unprecedented
and
it 1s difficult to cite any
historical precedent for the situation that arose. Minds
uf people affected by this partition and who were living
m
those
parts
were
completely
unhinged
and
unbalanced and there was hardly any occasion to form
intentions requisite for acquiring domicil in one place
or another.
People vacillated and altered their
programmes from day to day as events happened. They
went backward and forward ; families were sent from
one place to another for the sake of safety.
Most of
those displaced from West Pakistan had no permanent
homes in India where they could go and take up abode.
They overnight became refugees, living
111
camps m
Pakistan or in India.
No o_ne, as a matter of fact, at
the
moment
thought
that
when he was leaving
Pakistan for India e>r vice versa that he was doing so
for ever or that he was for ever abandoning the place
-0f his ancest0rs. Later policies of the Pakistan Government that prevented people from going back to their
homes cann(l)t
be taken into consideration in determining the intention of the people who migrated at the
relevant
moment. Ram Narain may well have sent
his family to India for safety. As pointed out by the
learned Judge below, he and his ancestors lived in the
Multan District.
He had c0nsiderable business there.
1954
Central Bank of
India Ltd.
v.
Ram Narain.
Mahajan C.J.
1.954
Central Bank Bf
India Ltd.
v.
Ram Narain.
Mahajan C. J.
706
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
The bank had given him a
cash credit of rupees three
lakhs on the security of goods. He had no doubt some
business in Hodel
also
but that was
comparatively
small. There is no evidence that he
had any home in
India and there. is no reason to go behind the finding
of the learned Judge below that he and his ancestors
had been living in Mailsi.
In these
circumstances, if
one may use the expression, Ram Narain's domicil of
origin was in the district of Multan and when the
district
of
Multan fell by the partition of India in
Pakistan,
Ram
Narain had to be assigned Pakistan
domicil
till
the time he expressed his unequivocal
intention
of giving up that
domicil
and
acquiring
Indian domicil and also took up his residence in India.
His domicil cannot be
determined by his family coming to India and without any finding that he had
established a home
for himself.
Even if the animus
can be ascribed to
him the
factum
of residence is
wanting in his case ; and in the absence of that fact,
an Indian domicil cannot be ascribed to Ram Narain.
The subsequent acquisition by Ram
Narain of Indian
domicil cannot affect the question of jurisdiction of
Courts for trying him for
crimes committed by him
while he did not possess an Indian domicil. The question in this case can be posed thus : Can it be said
that Ram Narain at the time of the commission of the
offence was domiciled in
India ?
That question
can
only be answered in one way, viz., that he
was not
domiciled in India.
Admittedly, then he was not a
citizen of India because that status was given by
the
Constitution
that
came
into force in January, 1950.
He had no residence or home in the Dominion of India.
He may have had the animus to come to India but
that animus was also indefinite, and uncertain.
There
is no evidence at all that at the moment he committed
the offence he had finally made up his mind to take up
his permanent residence in India, and a matter of this
kind cannot be decided on conjectural grounds. It is
impossible to read a man's mind but it is even more
than impossible to say how the minds of people worked
during the great upheaval of 1947.
'
-
-
-
· S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
707
The learned
Attorney-General
argued that Ram
Narain was a native Indian subject of
Her
Majesty
before the 15th August, 1947, and
that description
continued to apply to him after the 15th
August, 1947,
whether he was in India or in Pakistan, but we think
that the. description 'Native subject of
Her Majesty'
after the 15th of August, 1947, became
applicable m
the territory now constituted India only to residents
of provinces
within the boundaries of India, and in
Pakistan to residents of provinces within the boundaries
of
Pakistan and till the time that Ram Narain actually
landed on the soil of India
and
took up permanent
residence therein he cannot be described to be domiciled
m
India or
even a
Native
Indian subject of
His
Majesty domiciled in India.
For the reasons given above we are of the opinion
that the decision of the High Court that Ram Narain
could not be tried in any Court in India for offences
committed in Mailsi in November, 1947, is right and
that the Provincial
Government had no power
under
section 188, Criminal Procedure Code, to accord sanction
to his prosecution.
The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
SAGHIR AHMAD
ti.
THE STATE OF U. P. AND OTHERS.
(With Connected Appeal)
[M1mR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1) (g), 19(6), 31(2), 301Highway-lts origin and use-Citizen's rights in respect of highways-Vis-a-vis the State-State's right to
control highway-Limit
of such control-Constitution of India (First Amendment) Act, 1951
"'"
-U. P. Road Transport Act, 1951 (U. P. Act II of 1951)-Whether
ultra vires the Constit,~tion-Subsequent amendment of Constitution
if can validate a prior unconstitutional Act.
1954
Central Bank of
India Ltd.
v.
Ram Narain.
Mahajan C. ],
1954
October I3f