# Thi State of Rajasthan v. Tht Mewar Tex· tile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara and OtTMrs. Ghulam HaJan ]

- **Citation:** [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1129
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1951-08-10
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 103 of 1952
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/thi-state-of-rajasthan-v-tht-mewar-tex-tile-mills-ltd-bhilwara-and-ottmrs-250
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
tJ.
THE MEWAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD.,
BHIL W ARA AND OTHERS.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MUKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN
Bos'.E and
GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
U29
Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947), s. 7(3) (a), and
(b) as amended by s. 34 of the
Industrial
Disputes
(Appellate
Tribunal) Act (XLVlll of 1950)-A fudge of a High Court and a
District fudge-Whether includes a fudge of the High Court and a
District fudge in the former State of fodhpur.
Held, that under s. 7(3) (a) and (b) of the
Industrial Disputes
Act (XIV of 1947) as amended by s. 34 of the Industrial Disputes
(Appellate Tribunal) ~ct (XLVIII of 1950) the phrase "a Judge of
a High Court and a District Judge" includes a Judge of the High
Court and a District Judge in the former State of Jodhpur.
C1v1L
Ai>PELLATE
JuR1so1cTtoN :
Civil
Appeal
No. 103 of 1952.
Appeal under article 133 ( 1) ( c) of the
Constitution
of India from the Judgment and Order, dated the 10th
August, 1951, of the
High
Court of
Judicature
for
Rajasthan at Jodhpur (Wanch6o
and
Bapna
JJ.),
in D. B.
Civil
Miscellaneous
Application
No.
21
of 1951.
K. S. Hajela,
Advocate-General
of Rajasthan,
for
the appellant.
No appearance for the respondents.
1954. March 17. The Judgment of the
Court was
delivered by
GHULAM HASAN J.-This appeal is brought under
a certificate granted by the
High Court of Rajasthan
under article 133 ( c) of the Comtitution of India against
a judgment and order
of that
High
Court in writ
petition under article 226 holding the appointment
of
one Shri Sukhdeo Narain as invalid and directing that
all proceedings taken by him as the
Industrial
Court
under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act (No. XIV
of 1947) are null and void.
1954
Marth 17
1954
Thi State of
Rajasthan
v.
Tht Mewar Tex·
tile Mills Ltd.,
Bhilwara
and OtTMrs.
Ghulam HaJan ].
1130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
We are informed that Shri Sukhdeo Narain has
ceased to work as
an Industrial Tribunal
and the".
present appeal, therefore, becomes infructuous,
but we
are invited by the Advocate-General on behalf of the
State of Rajasthan who is the appellant before us to
decide the question as to the validity of the appointment, as it is likely to affect other awards
made by
tribunals
under
the
Industrial
Disputes
Act.
We
according! y proceed to give our decision.
The question involved in the case is whether
the
appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain is invalid because
he does not fulfil the
qualifications laid down for a
tribunal
under section 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes
Act.
Section 7(3) hereinafter referred to as the Industrial
Act says:-
"Where a tribunal consists of one member only,
that member, and where it
consists of two
or more
members, the
chairman of the
tribunal, shall be a
person who-
(a) is or has been a Judge of a High Court; or
(b) is or has been a District Judge ;
"
The Industrial Act was applied to Rajasthan by the
Rajasthan
Adaptation of
Central
Laws
Ordinance,
1950 (Ordinance IV of 1950), by the
Rajpramukh on
January 24, 1950.
By this adaptation section 7 of the
Industrial Act came to be applied to
Rajasthan.
Shri
Sukhdeo Narain was appointed on October 9, 1950, by
a notificati<;m which ran as follows :-
"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) the
Government of
Rajasthan is pleased to constitute
an
Industrial Tribunal consisting of Shri Sukhdeo Narain,
a retired Judge of the
High
Court
of the erstwhile
Jodhpur
State for the adjudication of an
Industrial
dispute in the Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara, in
Rajasthan."
The
appointment of Shri
Sukhdeo Narain
was
objected to by the respondent on the ground that the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1131
words "a Judge of a High Court" in section 7(3) mean
"a Judge of the
High
Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan established
under the
Rajasthan
High
Court
Ordinance, 1949" and as
Shri
Sukhdeo Narain had
been a Judge of the High Court of the former
State of
Jodhpur, he coul

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
tJ.
THE MEWAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD.,
BHIL W ARA AND OTHERS.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MUKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN
Bos'.E and
GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
U29
Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947), s. 7(3) (a), and
(b) as amended by s. 34 of the
Industrial
Disputes
(Appellate
Tribunal) Act (XLVlll of 1950)-A fudge of a High Court and a
District fudge-Whether includes a fudge of the High Court and a
District fudge in the former State of fodhpur.
Held, that under s. 7(3) (a) and (b) of the
Industrial Disputes
Act (XIV of 1947) as amended by s. 34 of the Industrial Disputes
(Appellate Tribunal) ~ct (XLVIII of 1950) the phrase "a Judge of
a High Court and a District Judge" includes a Judge of the High
Court and a District Judge in the former State of Jodhpur.
C1v1L
Ai>PELLATE
JuR1so1cTtoN :
Civil
Appeal
No. 103 of 1952.
Appeal under article 133 ( 1) ( c) of the
Constitution
of India from the Judgment and Order, dated the 10th
August, 1951, of the
High
Court of
Judicature
for
Rajasthan at Jodhpur (Wanch6o
and
Bapna
JJ.),
in D. B.
Civil
Miscellaneous
Application
No.
21
of 1951.
K. S. Hajela,
Advocate-General
of Rajasthan,
for
the appellant.
No appearance for the respondents.
1954. March 17. The Judgment of the
Court was
delivered by
GHULAM HASAN J.-This appeal is brought under
a certificate granted by the
High Court of Rajasthan
under article 133 ( c) of the Comtitution of India against
a judgment and order
of that
High
Court in writ
petition under article 226 holding the appointment
of
one Shri Sukhdeo Narain as invalid and directing that
all proceedings taken by him as the
Industrial
Court
under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act (No. XIV
of 1947) are null and void.
1954
Marth 17
1954
Thi State of
Rajasthan
v.
Tht Mewar Tex·
tile Mills Ltd.,
Bhilwara
and OtTMrs.
Ghulam HaJan ].
1130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
We are informed that Shri Sukhdeo Narain has
ceased to work as
an Industrial Tribunal
and the".
present appeal, therefore, becomes infructuous,
but we
are invited by the Advocate-General on behalf of the
State of Rajasthan who is the appellant before us to
decide the question as to the validity of the appointment, as it is likely to affect other awards
made by
tribunals
under
the
Industrial
Disputes
Act.
We
according! y proceed to give our decision.
The question involved in the case is whether
the
appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain is invalid because
he does not fulfil the
qualifications laid down for a
tribunal
under section 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes
Act.
Section 7(3) hereinafter referred to as the Industrial
Act says:-
"Where a tribunal consists of one member only,
that member, and where it
consists of two
or more
members, the
chairman of the
tribunal, shall be a
person who-
(a) is or has been a Judge of a High Court; or
(b) is or has been a District Judge ;
"
The Industrial Act was applied to Rajasthan by the
Rajasthan
Adaptation of
Central
Laws
Ordinance,
1950 (Ordinance IV of 1950), by the
Rajpramukh on
January 24, 1950.
By this adaptation section 7 of the
Industrial Act came to be applied to
Rajasthan.
Shri
Sukhdeo Narain was appointed on October 9, 1950, by
a notificati<;m which ran as follows :-
"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) the
Government of
Rajasthan is pleased to constitute
an
Industrial Tribunal consisting of Shri Sukhdeo Narain,
a retired Judge of the
High
Court
of the erstwhile
Jodhpur
State for the adjudication of an
Industrial
dispute in the Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara, in
Rajasthan."
The
appointment of Shri
Sukhdeo Narain
was
objected to by the respondent on the ground that the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1131
words "a Judge of a High Court" in section 7(3) mean
"a Judge of the
High
Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan established
under the
Rajasthan
High
Court
Ordinance, 1949" and as
Shri
Sukhdeo Narain had
been a Judge of the High Court of the former
State of
Jodhpur, he could not be held to be Judge of the
High
Court under section 7(3) of the
Industrial Act. · This
objection was upheld by the High Court.
Though the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain in
the notification was based upon the fact that he was a
retired Judge of the High Court of · Jodhpur, in arguments· it was also contended before the
High
Court
that even if he was not qualified for appointment as a
former Judge of a High Court, he was certainly
qualified for appointment as a former
District Judge.
The
High Court repelled this contention.
It appears
that
the United State of
Rajasthan came into existence on
April 7, 1949, and the
United
State of
Matsya
was
integrated with it on
May · 15,
1949.
Section
5 of
Ordinance No. IV of 1950 lays down that :
"For the purpose of the application of any Central
law to Rajasthan, unless there be anything repugnant
in the subject or context,-
(ix) references therein to other civil, criminal
and
revenue
courts,
to
public offices,
and
to
Judges,
Magistrates, officers or authorities shall be deemed to
be references
to
such
courts, offices
and
Judges,
Magistrates, officers or authorities of or in Rajasthan."
The High Court held that the word "Rajasthan" as
defined in
Ordinance I of 1949 means the United State
of
Rajasthan
and "the
Judges
and
other officers"
mentioned in section 5 (ix) must be held to be those in
the service of the
United State of Rajasthan.
Accordingly they held that Shri Sukhdeo
Narain could not be
held to be a
District Judge within
the meaning
of
section 7(3) (b) and his appointment
as
an Industrial
Tribunal under
that
section was,
therefore, invalid.
We are of opinion that this_ appeal can be decided on a
short ground.
The
Industrial
Disputes
(Appellate
Tribunal) Act (XL VIII of 1950) came into force on May
20, 1950.
By section 34 it was provided that the
1954
The State of
Rajasthan
v,.
T ht Mewar Textile Mills Ltd.,
Bhilwara
and Others.
GhUlam Has an J.
1954
The Stat1 ef
Rqjast!,.an
v.
Tht Mewar T1xtile Mills Lld.,
8hilwara
and Others.
Oh~/am Hasan ]'
1132
SUl'REME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
Industrial Disputes Act, XIV of 1947, shall be amended
in the
manner
specified in the
Schedule
and
the
Schedule substituted
sub-section (2) to section (1) of
the Industrial Act as follows :-
"It extends to the whole of India except the State
of Jammu and Kashmir."
As we have already stated the appointment of Shri
Sukhdeo Narain was
made on
October 9, 1950, i.t:.,
after the Industrial
Disputes
Act had become
applicable to
Rajasthan.
It is not necessary
therefore
to
invoke the provisions
of
Ordinance IV of
1950 in
deciding the question of the validity of the
appointment.
The argument
based
on section 34
of
Act
XL VIII of 1950 was put forward before the High Court
at the time of the hearing of the application for leave
to appeal and it was
contended
that in
view
of
section 34 the provisions of
Rajasthan
Adaptation of
Central Laws Ordinance, 1950, namely section 5, subsections (vii) and (ix), stood amended or repealed
but
the High Court observed that even if this
argument
had been .raised before them in appeal, it would
have
made no difference.
It has
been contended
before us
by Mr. Hajela, the learned
Advocate-General on behalf
of the State, that after the
Industrial
Disputes Act of
1947 was extended to Rajasthan by section 34
of the
Industrial Disputes (Appellate
Tribunal) Act, XLVIII
of 1950, the provisions of the former stood
amended
by section 34 and could not be read subject to section 5
of the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central
Laws
Ordinance IV of 1950.
We think there
is
force
in this
contention. ·, The effect
of section 34, as
we have
already indicated, was to extend
the
territorial
application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
to
the
whole of India· including Rajasthan the exception being
the State of Jammu and
Kashmir only.
This
being
so the words "A Judge of a High
Court and a District
Judge" used in section 7(3) (a) and (b) respectively
of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
must be held now
to include "A Judge of the High Court and a District
Judge in the former State of Jodhpur". There is
now
no room for the application of section 5 of Ordinance IV
of 1950 according to which a Judge of the High Court
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1133
and a District Judge could only mean a Judge of the
High
Court for
Rajasthan established
under
the
Rajasthan High Court
Ordinance 1949 and a District
Judge of
or in Rajasthan within the meaning of
section 5 (ix) of Ordinance No. IV of 1950.
Accordingly
we hold that the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo
Narain
was perfectly valid.
We accordingly set aside the
order of the
High
Court but without
costs,
as the
respondent
is not
represented.
Agent for the appellant : R. H. Dhebar.
HEM RAJ
().
THE STATE OF AJMER
(And Connected Appeal)
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., VIVIAN BosE
and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
Constitution of India, art. 136(1)-Principles gorcrning the
exercise of powers by the Supreme Court under art. 136(1)-Confessions-Whether can be corroborated by evidence already in possession
of police.
Unless it is shown that execeptional
and special circumstan~
ces exist that substantial and grave injustice has
been
done and
the case in question presents features _of sufficient gravity to war~
rant a review of the decision appealed against, the
Supreme Court
does not exercise its overriding powers under art. 136 ( 1) of the
Constitution and the circumstance
that the
appeal
has
been
admitted by special leave does not entitle the appellant to open
out the whole case and contest all the findings of fact and raise
every point which could be raised in the High Court.
Even at the
final hearing only those points can be urged which are fit to be
urged at the preliminary stage when the leave to appeal is asked
for.
·The contention that confession cannot be corroborated by the
use of materials already in the possession of the police is devoid
of force. A confession made and recorded even during a trial can
be corroborated by the evidence already recorded.
It may .be made
and recorded in the court of committing magistrate and materia,ls
already in the possession of the police may be used for purpose ef
corroboration.
1954
Tiu Stat• qf
Raja.sthan
v.
TM Mewar T ,,,_
Iii< Mthq J,td.,
, ·Bhilwara
and Ot/urs.
Ghulam Ha.son ]. '
1954
Marth 17.