# 'Tide Vaghoji v. Ca1naji, I.L,H. 29 Born. 149

- **Citation:** [1953] 1 S.C.R. 1169
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1951-04-02
- **Bench:** PATANJALI SASTRI c. J, Mukherjea, s. R. DAS, Ghulajvi Hasan, BHAGWA'l'l
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/tide-vaghoji-v-ca1naji-i-l-h-29-born-149-105
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Oontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926, s. 3 -Reflection on conduct or
character of Judicial OJ)ir-ers - When wnonnts to contempt of court
-Contempt proceedings-Guiding principles - Jlc!tters to be considerecl- Relevancy nf S1tj'·rounrlin.q
circnni.~tanre.fj-J11risrl.iction to
be spa.ringly exercised.
(1) 'Tide Vaghoji v. Ca1naji, I.L,H. 29 Born. 149 .
•
•
1170
SUPREME COUR'L' REPOR'l'S
[1953)
1953
The object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection
-
to judges personally from imputations to which they may be
Bra~ima P·rakash exposed as individuals, but is intended to be a protection to the
Sharma and
public whose interest would be very much affected if, by the act
Others
or conduct of any party, the authority of the court is lowered
v.
and the sense of confidence which the people have in the adminisThe State of
tration of justice by it is weakened.
U Uar P-radesh
When the court itself is attacked, tirn summary jurisdiction by
way of contempt ·proceedings must be exercised 'vith scrupulous
care and only< when the case is clear antl beyond reasonable doubt.
There are two primary considerations which should \Veigh
'vith the court in such cases, viz., fir:lt wLether the reflection on
the conduct or character of tho judge is within the limits of fair
and reasonable criticism, and secondly, whether it is a mere libel
or defamation of the judge or amounts to a contempt of tho court.
If it is a mere defamatory attack on the judge and is not calculated to interfere with the due comse of justice or th.a proper
administration of the law by such conrt, it is not proper to pro·
ceed by way of contempt.
Where the question arises whether a defamatory statement
directed against a judge is calculated to undermine the confidence
of the public in the competency or integrity of the judge or is
likely to deflect the court itself from a strict and unhesitant performance of its duties, all the surrounding facts and circumstances
under which the statement was made &nd the degree of publicity
that was given to it would be relevant circumstances. The
c1uestion is not to be cletermined solely with reference to the'
language or contents of the statement made.
The Executive Committee of a District Bar Association
received several complaints against the way in which the Judicial
Magistrate and the Revenue Officer of the District dispos.ed of
cases and behaved towards litigants and lawyers, and passed a resolution which stated that ''it was their considered opinion that
the two officers are thoroughly incompetent in law, do not inspire
confidence in their judicial work, ai·e given to stating wrong facts
when passing orders and are overbearing and discourteous to the
litigant public and lawyers alike" and gave a list of various
complaints against the officers.
Thi:i resolution was passed in
camera, typed out by the President himself and forwarded confidentially to the District Magistrn,te. Commissioner of the
Division, and the Chief Secretary and Premier of the State. The
District Magistrate moved the High Court of Allahabad to take
action against the appellants, who had passed the resolution, for
contempt of court.
The High Con.rt held that the appellants
were guilty of contempt bul; accepted their apology. On appeal:
Held, that in the light of all the circumstances of the case, the
contempt, if any, was only of a technical character and that after
the affidavitS" bad been filed on behall of the appellants before the
High Court, the proceedings against them should have been dropped .
•
\
,
I
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT l{EPORTS'
1171
195.l
CRIMISAL APfELLAT.E J URISDH"fIOC\': Orimin<tl Appeal
No. 24 of 1951.
Brah1na Prakash
Sharm.a and
Others
v.
Appeal by special leave granted by the Snpreme
Conrt on the 2nd April, 1951, from the Jndgment and
Order dated the 5th May, 1950, of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous
Case No. 34 of 1949.
The State o.f
U ttar Pradesh.
,vJ. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, K. S.
Krishnaswarny

## Text

'
I
•
s.c . .R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'L'S
li69
suit automatiqally comes to an end and there is no
1953
doubt that such an order would Le a judgment. If, 011
. D .
h
h
I
d
d
.
d
d'
. .
!l
Asrumatt
ebi
t e ot er iau , an or er IS ma e
1sm1ssmg
·. ie
v.
Judge's summons to show cause why the leave shouldKumarRupendm
not be rescinded, the result is, as Sir Lawrence
Deb Raikot
Jenkins pointed out(1), that a decision on a vital point
and Others.
adverse to the defendant, which goes to the very root
of the suit, becomes final and decisive against him so Mukherjea ·'·
far as the court making the order is concerned. This
brings the order within the category of a 'judgment'
as laid down in the Calcutta cases.
'Ve need not
express any final opinion as to the propriety or otherwise of this view. It is enough for our purpose to
state that there is a difference between an order refusing to rescind leave granted under clause 12 of the
Letters Patent and one under clause 13 directing the
removal of a suit from one court to another, 11nd there
is no good reason to hold that the principle applicable
to one applies to the other also.
The result, therefore, is that, in our opinion, the
view taken by the High Court is right and this appeal
should fail, and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
· Agent for the appellant : P. K. Bose.
Agent for the respondent No. 1: Sukimwr Ghose
for P. 0. Dutt.
BRAHMA PRAKASH SHARMA AND O'L'HEHS
19o3
V.
1lfay 8
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.
[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MUKHERJEA, s. R. DAS,
GHULAJVI HASAN and BHAGWA'l'l .JJ.]
Oontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926, s. 3 -Reflection on conduct or
character of Judicial OJ)ir-ers - When wnonnts to contempt of court
-Contempt proceedings-Guiding principles - Jlc!tters to be considerecl- Relevancy nf S1tj'·rounrlin.q
circnni.~tanre.fj-J11risrl.iction to
be spa.ringly exercised.
(1) 'Tide Vaghoji v. Ca1naji, I.L,H. 29 Born. 149 .
•
•
1170
SUPREME COUR'L' REPOR'l'S
[1953)
1953
The object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection
-
to judges personally from imputations to which they may be
Bra~ima P·rakash exposed as individuals, but is intended to be a protection to the
Sharma and
public whose interest would be very much affected if, by the act
Others
or conduct of any party, the authority of the court is lowered
v.
and the sense of confidence which the people have in the adminisThe State of
tration of justice by it is weakened.
U Uar P-radesh
When the court itself is attacked, tirn summary jurisdiction by
way of contempt ·proceedings must be exercised 'vith scrupulous
care and only< when the case is clear antl beyond reasonable doubt.
There are two primary considerations which should \Veigh
'vith the court in such cases, viz., fir:lt wLether the reflection on
the conduct or character of tho judge is within the limits of fair
and reasonable criticism, and secondly, whether it is a mere libel
or defamation of the judge or amounts to a contempt of tho court.
If it is a mere defamatory attack on the judge and is not calculated to interfere with the due comse of justice or th.a proper
administration of the law by such conrt, it is not proper to pro·
ceed by way of contempt.
Where the question arises whether a defamatory statement
directed against a judge is calculated to undermine the confidence
of the public in the competency or integrity of the judge or is
likely to deflect the court itself from a strict and unhesitant performance of its duties, all the surrounding facts and circumstances
under which the statement was made &nd the degree of publicity
that was given to it would be relevant circumstances. The
c1uestion is not to be cletermined solely with reference to the'
language or contents of the statement made.
The Executive Committee of a District Bar Association
received several complaints against the way in which the Judicial
Magistrate and the Revenue Officer of the District dispos.ed of
cases and behaved towards litigants and lawyers, and passed a resolution which stated that ''it was their considered opinion that
the two officers are thoroughly incompetent in law, do not inspire
confidence in their judicial work, ai·e given to stating wrong facts
when passing orders and are overbearing and discourteous to the
litigant public and lawyers alike" and gave a list of various
complaints against the officers.
Thi:i resolution was passed in
camera, typed out by the President himself and forwarded confidentially to the District Magistrn,te. Commissioner of the
Division, and the Chief Secretary and Premier of the State. The
District Magistrate moved the High Court of Allahabad to take
action against the appellants, who had passed the resolution, for
contempt of court.
The High Con.rt held that the appellants
were guilty of contempt bul; accepted their apology. On appeal:
Held, that in the light of all the circumstances of the case, the
contempt, if any, was only of a technical character and that after
the affidavitS" bad been filed on behall of the appellants before the
High Court, the proceedings against them should have been dropped .
•
\
,
I
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT l{EPORTS'
1171
195.l
CRIMISAL APfELLAT.E J URISDH"fIOC\': Orimin<tl Appeal
No. 24 of 1951.
Brah1na Prakash
Sharm.a and
Others
v.
Appeal by special leave granted by the Snpreme
Conrt on the 2nd April, 1951, from the Jndgment and
Order dated the 5th May, 1950, of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous
Case No. 34 of 1949.
The State o.f
U ttar Pradesh.
,vJ. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, K. S.
Krishnaswarny A iya11gar and 8. P.Sinha ( V. N. Sethi,
K. B. Asthana, N. G. Sen,!(. N. Aggarwala, Shaukat
Hussain, K. P. Gupta, M. D. Upadhyaya and G. 0.
Mathur, with them) for the appellants.
Gopalji
1Vl ehrotra and J agdish Chandra for the
rEispondent.
1953.
May 8.
The J'udgment of the Court was
delivered by
MuKHER.JEA J.-This appeal which has come before
us, on special leave, is directed against a judgment of
a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, dated 5th
May, 1950, by which the learned judges held the
appellants guilty of contempt of court; and although
the apology tendered by the appellants was accepted,
they were directed to pay the costs of the respondent
State.
The appellants, six in number, are members of the
Executive Committee of the District Bar Association
at l\fozaffarnagar within the State of Uttar Pradesh,
and the contempt proceedings were started against
them, because of certain resolutions passed by the
Committee on 20th April, 1949, copies of which were
forwarded to the District Magistrate and other officers
by a covering letter signed by appellant No. l as
President of the Bar Association.
To appreciate t.he contentions that have been raised
in this appeal, it would be necessary to state a few
relevant facts.
The resolutions which form the basis
of the contempt proceedings relate to the Qonduct of
two judicial officers, both of whom functioned flt
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1172
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
1953
Muzaffarnagar at the relevant time. One of them
B h
P k I named Kanhaya Lal Mehra was a Judicial Magistrate
ram.a ra asi
.
Sharma and
while the other named Lalta Prasad was a Revenue
Otliers
Officer. It is said that the first appellant as President
v.
of the Bar Association received numerous complaints
The State af regarding the way in which these officers diposed of
Uttar Pradesh
h ·
d b h
d
d
h 1
cases in t eir courts an
e ave to war s t e a wyers
Mukherjea J. and the litigant public. The Executive Committee of
the Association took the matter in hand and, after
satisfying themselves that the complaints were legitimate and well-founded, they held a meeting on 20th
April, 1949, in which the following resolutions were
passed:-
Resolved that-
"Whereas the members of the Association have
had ample opportunity of forming an opinion of the
judicial work of Sri Kanhaya Lal, Judicial Magistrate,
and Shri Lalta Prasad, Revenue Officer,
It is now their considered opinion that the two
officers are thoroughly incompetent in law, do not
inspire confidence in their judicial work, are given to
stating wrong facts when passing orders and are overbearing and discourteous to the litigant public and the
lawyers alike. Besides the above-mentioned defects
common to both of them, other defects are separately
catalogued as hereunder :-
*
*
*
*
(The complaints against each of the officers separately were then set out under specific heads).
Resolved further that copies of the resolution be sent
to the Honourable Premier, the Chief Secretary of the
Uttar Pradesh Government, the Commissioner and the
District Magistrate for suitable action;
,
Resolved that the District Magistrate and Collector
be requested to meet a deputation of the following in
this connection at an early date;"
(The names of 5 members who were to form the
deputati<m were then mentioned.)
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1173
It is not disputed that this meeting of the ExecuI9;a
tive Committee of the Bar Association was held in
-
d
b
Brahma Prakash
ca~era an no 1101~-mem er was allowed to be present
Sharma
at 1t. The resolut10ns were typed out by the President
and Others
himself and the proceedings were not recorded in the
v.
Minute Book of the Association at all.
On the followThe State of
ing day, that is, on 21st April, HJ49, the President sent Uttar Pradesh.
a copy of the resolutions with a covering letter marked Mukherjea J.
"confidential" to the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar. Copies of the resolutions were similarly despatched to the Commissioner of the Division, the
Chief Secretary and the Premier ofUttar Pradesh. It
is not disputed that the District Magistrate was the
immediate superior of the officers concerned, and the
other three were the higher executive authorities in
the official hierarchy. One paragraph of this covering
letter contained the following statement:-
"Complaints against these offirrrs had been
mounting and a 'stage was reached when the matter
had to be taken up formally.
The resolution is not
only well-considered and unanimous but represents a
consensus of opinion of all practitioners in the Criminal
and Revenue side."
The post-script of the letter addressed to the District Magistrate contained a prayer that he might find
it convenient to fix an early date to meet the deputation of 5 members as indicated in the third resolution.
The Divisional Commissioner, by his letter dated
27th April, 1949, addressed to a.ppellant No.
1,
acknowledged receipt of the copy of the resolutions
and requested the addressee to supply specific details
of cases tried by these officers in support of the allegations contained in the resolution. Without waiting
for this information, however, the Commissioner on
the day following wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary
of the U.P. Government suggesting that the matter
should be brought to the notice of the High Court
inasmuch as instances were not rare where influential members of the Bar got resolutions like these
passed by their associations with a view to put
15?
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1174
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1953
extra-judicial pressure upon the judicial officers so
B I -
as to make them amenable to their wishes which
ranna Prakash
,
•
b
0
0 h u
94
d
Sharma
often were quest10na le.
n l t may, l
9, a epuand Othen
tation of 5 members waited upon the District Magisv.
trate and discussed with the latter the entire situation.
The State af The Magistrate also told the deputation that the
Uttar Prade""· details of complaints as required by the Commissioner
Mukhr,.jca .1. should be furnished at an early date. These details
were sent to the District Magistrate by the appellant
No. 1 on 20th June, 1949, and specific instances were
cited, the accuracy of which was vouched by a number of senior lawyers who actually conducted those
cases.
On 20th July, 1949, the District Magistrate
through the Divisional Commissioner wrote a. letter to
the Registrar of the High Court of Allahabad requesting the latter to draw the attention of the High Court
to the resolutions passed on 20th April, 1949, and other
remarks made by the members of the Committee and
suggesting that suitable action might .be taken against
them under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act
of 1926. On 16th November, 1949, the High Court
directed the issue of notices on 8 members of the Committee to show cause why they should not be dealt
with for contempt of court in respect of certain portions of the resolution which were set out in the notice.
In answer to these notices, the opposite parties appeared and filed affidavits. The case was heard by a
Bench of three Judges who, by their judgrne11t elated
5th May, 1950, came to the conclusion that with the
exception of two of the opposite parties who were not
members of the Executive Committee at the relevant
date, the remaining six were guilty of contempt of
court. It was held that the opposite parties were not
actuated by any personal or improper motive8; the
statement made on their behalf that their object was
not to interfere with but to improve the administration of justice was accepted by the court, but nevertheless it was observed that the terms used in the
resolution were little removed from personal abuse and
whatever might have been the motive, they clea.rly
were likel;Y to bring the Magistrate into contempt and
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SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS
i175
1953
lower their authority. The concluding portion of the
judgment stands as follows :-
.
B1'ahnia Prakash
"We thmk that the opposite parties acted under
Sharma
a misapprehension as to the position, but they have
and Othm
expressed their regrets and tendered an unqualified
v.
apology. In
the circumstances, we accept their
2'1"" State 0!
1
b
h
Uttar Pradesh.
apo ogy, ut we direct t at they pay the costs of the
Government Advocate which we assess at Rs. 300."
It is the propriety of this judgment tlmt has been
assailed before us in this appeal.
According to the learned judges of the High Court,
the allegations made against the judicial officers in the
present case come within the category of contempt
which is committed by "scandalising the court". The
learned judges observed on the authority of the pronouncement of Lord Russell in Reg. v. Gray('), that this
class of contempt is subject to one important qualification. The judges and courts are alike open to criticism and if reasonable argument or expostulation is
offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or
the public good, no court could treat that as contempt
of court. In the opinion of the learned judges, the
complaint lodged by the appellants exceeded the
bounds of fair and legitimate criticism and in this
respect the members of the Bar Association could not
claim any higher privilege than ordinary citizens. No
distinction, the High Court held, could also be made
by reason of the fact that the charges against the
judicial officers in the present case were embodied in a
representation made to authorities who were the
official superiors of the officers concerned and under
whose administrative control the latter acted.
The learned Attorney-General who appeared in support of the appeal, characterised this way of approach
of the High Court as entirely wrong. His contention
is that any act or publication which is calculated to
lower the authority or dignity of a judge does not per
8e amount to contempt of court. The test is whether
the allegations are of such character or are made m
(1) [1900] 'Q.B. 36 .
•
Mukherjea J.
I
•
1176
SUPREME COURT Rl~PORTS
[195:lj
1958
such circumstances as would tend ljo obstruct or
B h -P k
interfere with the course of justice or the due adminisra ma
ra ash
•
fl
R ]'
1
db h'
· th'
Sharma
trat10n o aw.
e iance was pace
y im m
is conand Others
nection upon certain pronouncements of the Judicial
v.
Committee which held definitely that an imputation
7'/w State of affecting the character or conduct of a judge, even
Uttar Pradesh. though it could be the subject-matter of a libel proMukherjea J. ceeding, would not necessarily amount to a contempt
of court. The Attorney-General laid very great stress
on the fact that the resolutions passed and the representations made by the appellants in the present case
were not for the purpose of exposing before the public
the alleged shortcomings of the officers concerned ; the
whole object was to have the grievances of the lawyers
and the litigating public which were genuinely felt,
removed by an appeal to the authorities who alone
were competent to remove them. Such conduct, it is
argued, cannot in any way be calculated to interfere
with the due administration of law and cannot be
held to be contempt of court. The points raised are
undoubtedly important and require to be examined
carefully.
It admits of no dispute that the summary jurisdiction
exercised by superior courts in punishing
contempt of their authority exists for the purpose of
preventing interference with the course of justice andfor
maintaining the authority of law as is administered in
the courts. It would be only repeating what has been
said so often by various judges that the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to judges
personally from imputations to which they may be
exposed as individuals; it is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much
affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the
authority of the court is lowered and the sern;e of
confidence which people have in the administration of
justice by it is weakened.
There are indeed innumerable ways by which
attempts can be made to hinder or obstruct the due
administr~tion of justice in courts. One type of such
•
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S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REl'ORTi:l
1177
interference is found in cases where there is an act or
1963
publication wliich "amounts to scandalising the court
--
itself" - an expression which is familiar to English Brahma Prakash
lawyers since the days of Lord Hardwick('). This scans;
1c;;:•
dalising might manifest itself in various ways but, iu
"" v'. ers.
substance, it is an attack on individual judges or the
7'he State of
court as a whole with or without reference to partiUttar Pradesh.
cular cases, casting unwarranted and defamatory aspersions upon the character or ability of the judges.
Such conduct is punished as contempt for this reason
that it tends to create distrust in the popular mind
and impair the confidence of the people in the courts
which are of prime importance to the litigants in the
protection of their rights and liberties.
There arc decisions of English courts from early
times where the courts assumed jurisdiction in taking
committal proceedings against persons who were guilty
of publishing any scandalous matter in respect of the
court itself. In the year 1899, Lord Morris in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in
211acLeod v. St. Aubin(') observed that "committals
for contempt by scandalising the court itself have
become obsolete in this country. Courts are satisfied
to leave to public opinion attacks or comments derogtitory or scandalous to them." His Lordship said
further : "The power summarily to commit for
contempt is considered necessary for the proper administration of justice. It is not to be used for the vindication of a judge as a person. He must resort to action
for libel or criminal information."
The observation of Lord Morris that contempt proceedings for scandalising the courts have become
obsolete in England is not, strictly speaking, correct;
for, in the very next year, such proceedings were taken
in Reg. v. Gray('). In that case, there was a scandalous
attack of a rather atrociou8 type on Darling J. who
was sitting at that time in Birmingham Assizes and
was trying a man named Wells who was indicted
iufff alici for selling and publishing obscene literature.
(1) Vide In re Read and Hnggon.<?on (1742) 2 Atk. 469, 471.
(2) [1899) A. C. 549.
(3) [1900] 2 Q.B. 36 .
•
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•
1178
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l;S
[1953]
195.J
The judge, in the uourse of the trial, glwe a warning
-
to the neswspaper press that in reporting the proceedBrahma Prakash ings of the court, it was not proper for them to give
Shanaa
bl' 't
· d
tt
th
1 d d '
and Othm
p~ IC! y tom ~cent ma ers
at wer~ revea e
ur.mg
v.
trial. Upon this, the defendant published an article
The State of in the Birmingham Daily Argus, under the heading
Uttar Pradesh. "An advocate of Dece110y", whern Darling J. was
abused in scurrilous language. '!'he case of 'Velis was
Mu.~·herjea J.
h
b
h A ·
']]
· ·
'l'h
t en over ut t e
ss1zes were st1 . s1ttmg.
ere
can he no doubt that the publication amounted to
contempt of court and such attack was calculated to
interfere directly with proper administration of justice.
Lord Russell in the course of his judgment, however,
took care to observe that the summary jurisdiction by
way of contempt proceedings in such cases where
the court itself was attacked has to be exercised
with scrupulous care and only when the case
1s
clear and beyond reasonable doubt. "Because", as his
Lordship said, "if it is not a case beyond reasonable
doubt, the court should and ought to leave the Attorney-General to proceed by crimin:;J information". In
1943, Lord Atkin, while delivering the judgment of the
Privy Council in Devi Prashad \'. J( ing Emperor('),
observed that cases of contempt, which consist of scandalising the court itself, are fortunately rare and require
to be treated with much discretion. Proceedings for
this species of contempt should be used sparingly and
always with reference to the administration of justice.
"If a judge is defamed in such a way as not to affect the
administration of justice, he has the ordinary remedies
J
for defamation if he should feel impelled to use them."
It seems, therefore, that there are two primary considerations which should weigh with the court when it
is called upon to exercise the summary powers in case~
of contempt committed by "scandalising" the court
itself. In the first place, the reflection on the conduct
or character of a judge in reference to the discharge of
his judicial duties would not be contempt if such
reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and
reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in
(I) 70 I. A. 216.
•
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' •
S.C.R.
SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS
1179
respect of public acts done in tho seat of juHtice. It is
J9fJ3
not by stifling criticism that confidence in courts can
--
be created. "The path ofcriticism'', said Lord Atkin('), Brahma Prakash
"is a public way. The wrong-headed are permitted to
ai~~;~;.,
err therein; provided that members of the public abstain
v.
from imputing motives to those taking part in the
The State of
administration of justice and are genuinely exercising Uttar Pradesh.
a right of criticism and not acting in malice, or attempt Mukherjea J.
to impair the administration of justice, they are immune."
In the second placr, when attacks or comments a.re
made on a judge or judges, disparaging in character
and derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken
to distinguish between what is a libel on the judge and
what amounts really to contempt of court. The fact
that a statement is defamatory so far as the judge is
concerned does not necessarily make it a contempt.
The distinction between a libel and a contempt was
pointed out by a Committee of the Privy Council, to
which a reference was made by the Secretary of State
in 1892 (2 ).
A man in the Bahama Islands, in a letter
published in a colonial newspaper criticised the Chief
Justice of the Colony in an extremely ill-chosen
language which was sarcastic and pungent. There was a
veiled insinuation that he was an incompetent judge
and a shirker of work and the writer suggested in a way
that it would be a providential thing if he were to die.
A strong Board constituting of 11 members reported
that the letter complained of, though it might have
been madP the subject of proceedings for libel, was
not, in the circumstances, calculated to obstruct 01·
interfere with the course of justice or the due adminiskation of the law and t.hereforc did not constitute a
contempt of court. The same principle was reiterated
by Lord Atkin in the case of Devi Prashad v. King
Ernperor( 3 ) referred to above. It was followed and
approved of by the High Court of Australia in King v.
Nicholls('), and has been accepted as sound by this
(1) Ariibard ''· Attorneu-GeneralforT1·inidad and '1
1oba(Jo, [1936] A.C. 322
at p. 335.
(2) In the 1natler of a special reference from the Bah,11na Islands [1893]
A. C. 138.
'
(3) 70 I.A. 21(>.
14) 12 Com. L. R. 280,
I
•
•
1180
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1953
Court in Reddy v. The State of 1~f adras (1). The position
--
therefore is that a defamatory attack on a judge may
Brahma Prakash be a libel so far as the judcre is concerned and it would
Sharma
- b
t
] .
o d
. t tl l'b 11
.
and Others
e open o 11m to procee
agams
. ie 1 e or m a
v.
proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the publiTha State of cation of the disparaging statement is cfllculated to
Uttar Prade_,1,, interfere with the due course of justice or proper
administration of law by such court, it can be punished
M ukherjea J. summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done to the judge
μersonally while the other is a wrong done to the public.
It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create
an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding
the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter
a.ctual and prospective litigants from placing complete
reliance upon the court's administration of justice, or
if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of
the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties.
It is well established that it is not necessary to prove
affirmatively that there has been an actual interference
with the administration of justice by reason of such
defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely, or
tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law (2) • .../
It is in the light of these principles that we will proceed to examine the facts of the present case.
It cannot be disputed that in regard to matters of
contempt, the members of a Bar Association do not
occupy any privileged or higher position than ordinary
citizens. The form in which the disparaging statement
is made is also not material, but one very important
thing has to be noticed in the case before us, viz., that
even assuming that the statement was derogatory to
the dignity of the judicial officers, very little publicity
was given to this statement, and in fact, the appellants made their best endeavours to keep the thing out
of the knowledge of the public.
The representation
was made to 4 specified persons who were the official
superiors of the officers concerned; and it has been
found as a fact by the High Court that the appellants
(1) [1952) s. c. R. 452_
(:>.)Mr. Moo"kerjea J. in In re Motilal Ghosh and 'Jthe1's, I.L.R. 45 Cal.
269 at 283.
\
•
•
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1181
acted bona fiJ,e with no intention to interfere with the
191!8
administration of justice though they might have been B h --; k
under a misapprehension regarding the precise legal posi. ra ~~ ... ,~: ash
tion. No copies of the resolution were even sent to the
and Others
officers concerned. Apart from the contents of the reprev.
sentation by the appellants and the language used
2'he Stato ~f
therein, this fact would have a bearing on the question Uttar Pradesh.
as to whether the conduct of the appellants brought Ilfokherjea J.
them within the purview of the law of contempt.
The first question that requires consideration is whether in making the allegations which they did against
the two judicial officers, the appellants exceeded the
limits of fair and legitimate criticism. There were
three resolutions passed at the meeting; the second
and third were of a mere formal character and do not
require any consideration. The offending statement is
to be found in the first resolution which again is in two
parts. In the first part, there are allegtttions of a general
nature against both the officers, but the second part
enumerates under specific heads the complaints which
the Committee had against each of them separately.
With regard to Kanhaya Lal, the allegations are that
he does not record the evidence in cases tried by him
properly, that in all criminal matters transferred to
his court, where the accused are already on bail, he
does not give them time to furnish fresh sureties with
the result that they are sent to jail, and lastly, that
he is not accommodating to lawyers at all. So far as the
other officer is concerned, one serious allegation made
is, that he follows the highly illegal procedure of hearing two cases at one and the same time, and while he
records the evidence in one case himself, he allows the
Court Reader to do the thing in the other. It is said
also that he is short-tempered and frequently threatens lawyers with proceedings for contempt. Some of
these complaints are not at all serious and no judge,
unless he is hypersensitive, would at all feel aggrieved
by them. It is undoubtedly a grave charge that the
Revenue Officer hears two cases simultaneously and
allows the Court Reader to do the work for b.im. If true,
Jqq
•
•
1182
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ Hlii3]
1963
it is a patent illegality and is predsely a: matter which
-
should be brought to the notice of the District l\fagisBrahma PrakaRh
h · ti
d · · t t'
h d f ti
ffi
Sharma
tra.te w o is . ie a mm1s ra ive ea o
iese o cers.
o nd Otlu:1's
v.
The Stltte of
U!tar Pradesh.
1itukherjr,a J.
As regards the first part of the resolution, the allegations are made in general terms that these officers
do not state facts correctly when they pass orders and
that they are discourteous to the litigant public. These
do not by any means amount to scandalising the court.
Such complaints are frequently heard in respect of
many subordinate courts and if the appellants had a
genuine grievance, it cannot be said that in ventilating
their grievances they exceeded the limits of fair criticism.
The only portion of the resolution to which prima
facie objection can be taken is that which describes
these officers as thoroughly incompetent in law and
whose judicial work does not inspire confidence. These
remarks are certainly of a sweeping nature and can
scarcely be justified. Assuming, however, that this
portion of the resolution is defamatory, the question
arises whether it can be held to amount to contempt
of court.
To answer this question, we have to 8ee
whether it is in any way calculated to interfere with
the due administration of justice in these courts,
or, in other words, whether such statement is likely
to give rise to an apprehension in the minds of litigants as to the ability of the two judicial officers
to deal properly with cases coming before them, or
even to embarrass the officers themselves in the <lischarge of their duties.
'Ve are unable to agree with the learned counsel for
the respondent that whether or not the representation
made by the appellants in the present case is calculated to produce these results is to be determined solely
and exclusively with reference to the language or contents of the resolutions themselves; and that no other
fact or circumstance can be looked into for this purpose, except perhaps as matters which would aggravate or mitigate the offence of contempt, if such
offence is found to have been committed. It mav be
that pleas. of justification or privilege are not strictly
speaking available to the defondant in contempt
•
'
• •
S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR1' Rl!:PORTS
1183
proceedings. • The question of publication also in the
m;;
technical sense in which it is relevant in a libel action B 1 -
b .
.
f'
rci una Prul~ash
may e mappropl'late to the law o contempt.
But,
S'ha
l
,
.
rnui
eavmg out cases of e;c Jacie contempt, where the quesand Others
tion arises as to whether a defamatory statement
v.
directed against a judge is mtlrulated to undermine the
1'/w State of
confidence of the public in the capacity or integrity of Uttac Pradesh.
the ]
0 udge, or is likely to deflect the court itself from Mukherjeu J.
a strict and unhesitant perfonnan('c of its duties, all
the surrounding facts and circumstances under which
the statement was made and the degree of publicity
that was given to it would undoubtedly be relevm1t
circumstances. It is true as the learned counsel for
the respondent suggests that the matter was discussed
in the present case among the members of the Btu, and
it might have been the subject-matter of discussion
amongst the officers also to whom copies of the resolutions were sent.
No doubt, there was publication as
is required by the law of libel, but in contempt proceedings, that is not by any means conclusive. What
is material is the nature and extent of the publication
and whether or not it was likely to have an injurious
effect on the minds of the pn blic or of the .iudiciary
itself and thereby lead to interference with the
administration of justice. On the materials before us,
it is difficult to say that the uircumstances under which
the representation was made by the ttppellants was
calculated to have such effect. There might have been
some remote possibility but that rannot be taken note
of.
We are clearly of the opinion that the contempt,
if any, was only of a technical character, and that
after the affidavits were filed on belmlf of the appellants before the High Court, tl10 proceedings against
them should have been dropped. The result, therefore,
is that the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the
High Court is set aside. 'rhere will be no order for costs
either here or in the court below in favour of eitlwr party.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellants: 8. 8. Shukla.
Agent for the respondents : O. P. Lal •
•