# TREOGI NATH v. THE INDIAN IRON & STEEL CO. LTD

- **Citation:** [1968] 1 S.C.R. 97
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967-08-03
- **Bench:** J. M. Shelat, V. Bhargava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/treogi-nath-v-the-indian-iron-steel-co-ltd-4295
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), s. 33C (2)-Labour Court
not specified for computing money value of the benefit claimed by
workmen under s. 33C(2)--Jurisdiction.
Under an award in an industrial dispute, it was held that the appellants-workmen were entitled lb half wages from a certain date to
0 the date they resumed duty. After the final disposal of the companies'
appeal, the workmen were allowed to resume duties. Thereafter, a
dispute arose as to the amount to which the workmen were entitled.
The workmen, by separate applications, applied to the Second
Labour Court, West Bengal for determination of the amounts due to
them under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The companies challenged the jurischction of the Second Labour Court on the
ground that the court had not been specified for the purpose of deD termining the amount at which the benefit claimed by the workmen
was to be computed in terms of money under s. 33C(2} of the Act.
The preliminary objection was accepted by the Second . Labour
Court, against which the workmen filed a writ petition. This petition was accepted by the High Court, but in appeal the High Court
dismissed the petition.
'
HELD: The appeal must fail.
The mere fact that a Laoour Court has been constituted under
s. 70> of the Act, for the purpose of adjudication of Industrial Disputes as well as for performing other functions that may be assigned
to it under the Act does not mean that the court is automatically specified as the Court for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under s.
33C(2) of the Act .. Section 33C(2) confers jurisdiction ·only on those
r Labour Courts which are specified in this behalf, i.e., such Labour
Courts which are specifically designated by the State Government
for the purpose of qomputing the money value of the benefit claimed
by a workman. The Second Labour Court, West Bengal, was never
specified by any order of the State Government as one of those
Labour Courts which was to exercise the powers or discharge the
functions under s. 33C(2). [lOOC-E].
Though the Civil Court• are constituted under s. 13 of the BenG gal, ,Ajgra and Assam Civil Courts Act, the power of those courts to
take l'Q!lnizance of civil suits and decide them is ·conferred by the
Code of Civlil Procedure. It is not by virtue of their constitution under s. 13 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act that the
Courts take cognizance of civil suits and decide them. Section 33C
(2), in the matter of applications made by individual workmen. is
therefore, not comparable with s. 13(2) of the Bengal, A,sra and As"'!n!
Civil Courts Act, but in fact, lays down the reqmrement wh1di
R must be satisfied before the Labour Churt can take cognizance of "the
matter raised before it by the applications of the workmen. ·Section
33C(2) would, thus, serve the purpose in the case of Labour Courts
which is served by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to cognizance in respect of Civil Courts. [102B--D]
·
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98
SUPREME COUl\T l\BPOBTS
[1968) 1 s.o ...

## Text

'1
A
B
97
TREOGI NATH
v.
THE INDIAN IRON & STEEL CO. LTD.
August 3, 1967
[J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), s. 33C (2)-Labour Court
not specified for computing money value of the benefit claimed by
workmen under s. 33C(2)--Jurisdiction.
Under an award in an industrial dispute, it was held that the appellants-workmen were entitled lb half wages from a certain date to
0 the date they resumed duty. After the final disposal of the companies'
appeal, the workmen were allowed to resume duties. Thereafter, a
dispute arose as to the amount to which the workmen were entitled.
The workmen, by separate applications, applied to the Second
Labour Court, West Bengal for determination of the amounts due to
them under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The companies challenged the jurischction of the Second Labour Court on the
ground that the court had not been specified for the purpose of deD termining the amount at which the benefit claimed by the workmen
was to be computed in terms of money under s. 33C(2} of the Act.
The preliminary objection was accepted by the Second . Labour
Court, against which the workmen filed a writ petition. This petition was accepted by the High Court, but in appeal the High Court
dismissed the petition.
'
HELD: The appeal must fail.
The mere fact that a Laoour Court has been constituted under
s. 70> of the Act, for the purpose of adjudication of Industrial Disputes as well as for performing other functions that may be assigned
to it under the Act does not mean that the court is automatically specified as the Court for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under s.
33C(2) of the Act .. Section 33C(2) confers jurisdiction ·only on those
r Labour Courts which are specified in this behalf, i.e., such Labour
Courts which are specifically designated by the State Government
for the purpose of qomputing the money value of the benefit claimed
by a workman. The Second Labour Court, West Bengal, was never
specified by any order of the State Government as one of those
Labour Courts which was to exercise the powers or discharge the
functions under s. 33C(2). [lOOC-E].
Though the Civil Court• are constituted under s. 13 of the BenG gal, ,Ajgra and Assam Civil Courts Act, the power of those courts to
take l'Q!lnizance of civil suits and decide them is ·conferred by the
Code of Civlil Procedure. It is not by virtue of their constitution under s. 13 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act that the
Courts take cognizance of civil suits and decide them. Section 33C
(2), in the matter of applications made by individual workmen. is
therefore, not comparable with s. 13(2) of the Bengal, A,sra and As"'!n!
Civil Courts Act, but in fact, lays down the reqmrement wh1di
R must be satisfied before the Labour Churt can take cognizance of "the
matter raised before it by the applications of the workmen. ·Section
33C(2) would, thus, serve the purpose in the case of Labour Courts
which is served by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to cognizance in respect of Civil Courts. [102B--D]
·
L•P(N)ISU!-8
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SUPREME COUl\T l\BPOBTS
[1968) 1 s.o ...
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 370 of A
1967.
Appeal from the judgment and order date\'.I July 22, 1963 of
the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order No. 58
of 1963.
E. Udayaratnam and A. P. Chatterjee, for the appellants.
B
H. R. Gokhule and D. N. Mulvherjee, for respondents Nos.
1-3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
~~v•, J.-Q:: !!:! industrial dispute referred to it, the
Fifth Industrial Tribunal of West Bengal gave an award, which C
was published on September 19. 1955, under which 41 persons, including·. the 30 appellants who had been dismissed from service by
the two Companies, which are respondents t & 2 in this appeal,
were directed to be reinstated in service. Under the award, it was
held that these appellants were entitled to half their salary from
October 2, 1953 to the date of their actual resumption of duty. D
According to the appellants, they were not allowed to resume duty
by the Companies, even though they offered to do so. The Companies did not admit that threre was any such offer and went up in
appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal and obtained an order
of stay of implementation of the award from it. The Labour
Appellate ~Tribunal dismissed the appeal, whereafter the Companies came in further appeal to this Court, and this Court also E
granted slay of the implementation of the award during the pendency of that appeal. After the final dismissal of the appeal by this
Court, the appellants were allowed to resume their duty. There-
:1ftcr, a dispute arose as to the amount to which the appellants
were entitled under the award until the dale of resumption of duty
oy them. The appellants. by separate applications, applied to the F
Second Labour Court, West Bengal, for determination of the
~mounts due to them under section 33C<2> of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 14 of 1947) (hereinafter referred to as "the
Act"). The Companies challenged the jurisdiction of the Second
·Labour Court on the ground that that Court had not been specified for the purpose of determining the amount at which the benefit G
claimed by the workmen is to be computed in terms of money
under s. 33C(2) of the Act. This preliminary objection was accept·
cd by the Second Labour Court which held that it had no jurisdiction to malle any order on the applications presented by the
appellants. The appellants then filed a petition under Article 226
of the Constitution in the High Court of Calcutta challenging the
correctness of the view taken by the Second Labour Court. A R
learned single Judge of that Court came lo the decision that the
Second Labour Court had jurisdiction to take proceedings on the
applications of the appellants under s. 33('(2) of the
Act, and
Tl\l:OGI NJ.Ta v. TH I. L & s. co. LTD. (Bhargava, J.}
99
.t. consequently, is.sued, a writ of certiorari vacating the order made by
iii" Second Labour Court and a writ of mandamus directing tho
Second Labour Court to decide on merits the applications presented on behalf of the appellants. The Companies then went
before a Division Bench by a Letters. Patent Appeal and, in that
appeal, the decision of the learned single Judge was set aside and
8 that of the Second Labour Court was restored. The appellants
have now come up to this Court by special leave against
this
order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court by
which it has been held that the Second Labour Court had no
jurisdiction to deal with these applications of the appellants.
For convenience, th~ provisions of sub-ss. (I) and (2) of section
Cl 33C of the Act, as they stood at the relevant time, are reproduced
below.:-
D
I
..
"33C. Recovery of money due from the Employer-(1)
Where lilly money is due to a workman from an
employer under a settlement or an award or under
the provisions of Chapter VA, the workman may,
without prejudice to any other mode of recovery,
make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him,
and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that
any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate
for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as
an arrear of land revenue.
(2) jVherc any workman is entitled to receive from the
employer any benefit which is capable of being
computed in terms of money, the amount at which
such benefit should be computed may. subject to
any rules thal may be made under this Act, be
determined by such Labour Court as may be
specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in sub-section (!)."
G The language of sub-s. (2l .of s. 33C is perfectly dear in laying
down that the computation in terms of money of'lhc benefit cla.imed by a workman is to. be made by such Labour Court us may be
,pecified in this behalf by the appropriate Government and. consequently, the only question that falls for determination is whether
it can be held that the Second Labour Court, to which applications
were presented by the appellants, had been specified as "the Court"
B to make the determination under s. 33CC2l. It
was conceded by
counsel for both parties that there was no general or specific
order mentioning the Second Labour Court, West Bengal, as the
too
Sin>BBJIB COURT l\BPOBTS
[1968] 1 8.C.11.
Court specified for purposes of making the detennination under A
s. 33C(2). On behalf of the appellants, it was urged that the Second
Labour Court should be held to have jurisdiction to deal with
these applications, because it was constituted under s. 7(1) of the,
Act and every Labour Court constituted under the Act would be
competent to make the detennination under s. 33C(2) by virtue of
the provision contained in that sub-section itself.
Section 7(1) of the Act lays down that:-
"The appropriate Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, constitute one or more Labour Courts for
the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any
matter specified in the Second Schedule and for per·
B
fonning such other functions as may be assigned to them
C
under this Act."
The submission which was made before the High Court was that
the matter which was raised by the applications presented on
behalf of the appellants related to one of the matters specified in
the Second Schedule, because the Second Schedule at Item No. 6
contained the entry "all matters other than those specified in the D
Third Schedule" and determination of money value of a benefit
.:!aimed by a workman is not one of the matters specified in the
rhird Schedule. This cont~ntion was rejected by the appellate
Bench of the High Court. It was not sought to be pressed before us
oy learned counsel for the appellants when it was pointed out to
him that even if it be held that the matter raised by the appellants I!
. m their applications related to one of those enumerated in the
Second Schedule, that would be immaterial, because, under s. 7(1)
of the Act, a Labour Court is constituted for the purpose of adjudication of industrial disputes relating to those matters. and it
cannot possibly be contended that these disputes raised by individual workmen for determination of amounts due to them p
under the award constituted industrial disputes. In fact, this Court.
in the Central Bank of India Ltd. v. · P.S. Rajagopalan etc.,(')
clearly held that proceedings under s. 33C of the Act are in the
nature of execution proceedings and are not meant to include in
them proceedings for adjudication of industrial disputes which
can only be competently decided by a Labour Court on referen'-e
by the appropriate Government under s.10(1) of the Act. It was in G
view of this clear legal position that the counsel appearing for the
appellants relied on the second part of s. 7(1) of the Act, under
which Labour Courts are constituted "for performing such other
functions as may be assigned to them undes this Act".
The point urged by learned counsel was that the Second 8
Labour Court, West Bengal. having been constituted for perform.
ing such other functions also as may be assigned to it under the
(')[194;1] 3 S.C.lUolO.
I
!
TREOGI NATH v. THE L L & s. co. LTD. (Bluirgava, J.)
101
A Act, it should be held that it was competent to decide the dispute
raised by these applications of the appellants, because this function
of deciding the applications had been assigned to it by s. 33C(2) of
the Act. The submission of learned counsel was that s. 33(C)(2)
should be read as containing a general assignment to all Labour ·
Courts of the function of determining the money value of a beneB fit claimed by a workman under that provision. We are unable to
accept this interpretation. The language of s. 33C(2) itself makes
it clear that the appropriate Government has to specify the Labour
Court which is to discharge the functions under this sub-section.
The use of the expression "specified in this behalf" is significant.
The words "in this behalf" must be given their full import and
effect. They clearly indicate that there must be a specification by
C the appropriate Government that a particular Court is to discharge
the function under s. 33C(2) and, thereupon, it is that Court alone
which will have jurisdiction to proceed under that provision. The
mere fact that a Labour Court has been constituted under s. 7(1)
of the Act for the purpose of adjudication of industrial disputes
as well as for performing other functions that may be assignD ed to it under the Act does not mean that that Court is automatically specified as the Court for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under s. 33C(2) oi the Act. S. 33(C)(2) confers jurisdition only
on those Labour Courts which are specified in this behalf, i.e ..
such Labour Courts which are specifically designated by the State
Government for the purpose of computing the money value of the
benefit claimed by a workman. The Second Labour Court, West
E Bengal, was in fact, never specified by any order · of the State
Government as one of those Labour Courts which is to exercise
the powers or discharge the functions under s. 33C(2).
In this connection, learned counsel appearing for the appellants wanted to draw an analogy with section 13 of the Bengal,
r Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act XII of 1887, under which a
State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix
and alter the local limits of the jurisdiction of any Civil Court
under that Act. It was urged by him that this provision was similar to the provision contained in s. 7(1) of the Act. Section 13(2)
of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act thereafter gives
G the power to the District Judge, in cases where same local jurisdiction. is assigned to two or more Subordinate Judges or to two or
more Munsifs, to assign to each of them such civil business cognizable by the Subordinate Judge or Munsif, as the case may be, as,
subject to any general or special orders of the High Court. he thinks
fit. It was suggested that s.33C(2) of the Act makes a provision
in respect of Labour Courts of the same nature as the provision
B made by s.13(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act
in respect of Subordinate Judges or Munsifs, and since Subordinate Judges and Munsifs can exercise jurisdiction by virtue of
s. 13(1) of that Act to decide civil suits, it should be held that Labour
102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] l s.c.n.
Courts, by virtue of their constitution under s. 7(1) of the Act, get A
the jurisdiction to decide applications under s.33C(2) also, and the
specification of Courts mentioned in that sub-section is only for
the purpose of deciding which Labour Court should exercise
jurisdiction where there may be more than one Labour Court. We
do not think that this comparison is correct or justified. Though
Civil Courts are constituted under s.13 of the Bengal, Agra and B
Assam Civil Courts Act, it has to be remembered that the power
of those Courts to take cognizance of civil suits and decide them
is conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not by virtue of
their constitution under s.13 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil
Courts Act that the Courts take cognizance of civil suits
and decide them. Section 33Cl2). in the matter of applications
made by individual workmen. is, therefore, not COl)lparable with C
s.13(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. but, in
fact, lays down the requirement which must be satisfied before
the Labour Court can take cognizance of the matter raised before
it by the applications Jlf the workmen. Section 33C(2) would, thus,
serve the purpose in the case of Labour Courts which is served by
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to cogni· D
zance in respect of civil courts. S. 33C(2), by its language, makes it
clear that the jurisdiction under that provision is to be exercised
only by those particular Courts which are specified in that behalf
by the Sta'te Government and, in fact, confers jurisdiction on only
those Courts and not on all Labour Courts, which may have been
constituted un.der s.7(1) of the Act.
•
It was also urged by learned counsel before us that we should
give a liberal construction to the provisions of s.33C(2) so as to
ensure that the benefits. of that provision are not denied to a
workman even if a State Government neglects to specify a Labour
Court in that behalf. We do not think that there is any force in
this submission. When a provision lias been made in s.33C(2) for 1
specification of a Labour Court in that behalf by the appropriate
Government, it is presumed that that Government will carry out its
'duty and will make the necessary specification. Even under s.7(1)
of the Act, the power is granted to a State Government to constitute Labour Courts, and if the State Government neglects to
constitute Labour Courts, the provisions of s.33C(2) would auto- G
matically become ineffective. This would be no ground for giving
an interpretation to s.7(1) which would do away with the necessity
of the Labour Court being constituted by a State Government.
Tt may also be incidentally mentioned that in West Bengal the
State Government had made Rules in 1958 under s.38 of the Act
and Rule 74 was as follows: -
"74. Application for recovery of dues-An application
under section 33c; shall be delivered personally or forwarded by registered post in triplicate to the Secretary
R
i
TREOGI NA'l'H 11. THE I. I. & s. co. L'rD. (Bharg.ivr1, J.)
103
A
to the Government of West Bengal in the Department of
Labour or to such officers to whom powers liave been
delegated under section 39 of the Industrial Disputes
Act."
This Rule lays down that all applications under s.33C are to be
delivered to the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal in the
Department of Labour, or to such officers to whom
powers
B may have been delegated under s.39 of the Act. The purpose of
the application being sent to the Government is clear. If the application is under s.33C(I), the Government is to take action on that
application itself and is to realise the money claimed in that
application. On the other hand, if the application happens to be
C under s.33C(2), the purpose of delivery of that application to the
Secretary to the Go'vernmerit clearly would be that, on that applica·
tion, the Government would specify the Labour Court which i>
to' deal with that application. It appears that, in some States, th,.
appropriate Government has, by general orders, specified Labour
Courts for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under s.33C(2). So
D far ·as the Government of West Beng~l is concerned, it did not
issue any similar general order, and the intention of Rule 74 was
that any workman wishing to obtain relief under s.33C(2) should
apply to the. State Government when the Government would specify
the Labour Court for the purpose of dealing with that application.
This position has been further clarified by a subsequent amendment
E of Rule 74 under which it is clearly provided that where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit which is
capable of being computed in terms of money, the workman coneerned may apply to the State Government in the prescribed Form
for the specification of a Labour Court for
deterinining . the
amount of-his dues. It is true that this Rule 74 did not in this form
exist at the relevant time. with which we are concerned in the pr6
P sent case, but we agree with the Bench of the Calcutta High Court
that Rule 74, as it stood at that time, was also intended to lay
down that a workman claiming relief under s.33C(2) must present
his application to the State Government, whereup0n the State
GoV«nment would spe~ify the Labour Court which was to deal
with it under s.33C(2) of the Act.
For the reasons given above, we hold that the decision of the
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court is correct and must b~
upheld. The appeal fails and is dismissed·, but, in the circumstan
ces of this case, we 111ake no order as to costs.
Y.P.
Appeal dismissed.