# TRIBHUBAN PARKASH NAYYAR v. THE UNION OF INDIA

- **Citation:** [1970] 2 S.C.R. 732
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1970
- **Bench:** J.' M. Shelat, C. A Vaidialjngam, I. D. Dua
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/tribhuban-parkash-nayyar-v-the-union-of-india-4942
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Displaced Persons (Claims) Act, 1950-Displaced Persons (Clain1s)
Supplementary Act, 1954-Section 5(1)(b)-Revisional Powers of Chief
Settlement Commissioner-If extends to niatters 1vhich had beco111e finai
under the 1950 Act-Scope of power-Di~placed Persons (Verifica:ion of
Claims) Supplementary Rules, 1954-Rule 18, cl. (iv)-If can be cons·
trued ejusdem generis.,
Th~ nppeI:ant, a displaced person from \Vest Pakistan, subn1itted his
claim under the Displaced Persons (Claim5)
Act of 1950 in re!ip.::ct of
the' property left by him there The Claims Officer verified the claim for
Rs. 8 lacs.
The Claims Commissioner, in revision, raised the value of
the verified claim to Rs. 10 lacs.
The Settlement Commissioner, exercising the revisional po\vers of the Chief Settlement Comn1i;sioner under the
Displaced Persons (Claims) Supplementary Act, 1954, reduced the claim
of Rs. JO lacs to Rs. 15,000.
In a writ petition filed by the appellant a
single Judge of the High Court quashed the order of the Settlement Commissioner holding that there were clear errors of la\v on the fact of the
record.
It was left open to the department to reconsider the matter as to
evaluation and come to a proper conclusion
on
evidence.
A
Let:erJ
Patent Bench reversed the o'der of the single Judge and dismissed the
writ petition.
In appeal to this Court it was contended that: (i) the order
of the Se:tlement Commissioner was vitiated by errors of law on the face
of the record; (ii) the Settlement Commissioner exercising the powe~ of
the Chie'f Settlement Commissioner under the Supplementary Act had no
jurisdicti9n to revhe the order made by the Claims Commission:r eo:er-.
cising revisional power under the Act of 1950; (iii) the po\\'er of re\'i..:;ion_
conferred on the Chief Settlement Commissioner by section 5(1) (h) of
the Supplementary Act \Vas restricted to the verification of the claim ~.nd
its valuation was outside its purview and (iv) the po,ver was circum5crilJ.:
ed within the four~corners of rule 18 of the Displaced Persons (Ver!fication of Claims) Supplementary Rules, 1954.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD: {i) The learned single Judge
\Vas right
in his cont:lu5ions.
The order and the material on record show that the Settlement Commissione·r had, at more places than one, based his conclusions on pure conjectures and surmises without there being any legal evidence ·on the rec,Jrd
to support them.
(ii) The language used in Section 5(1)(b) of the Supplementary Act
is unambiguous and it clearly empowers the Chief Settlement Commissioner, subject to· any rules that may be made, to revise any verified claim
and make such orders in relation thereto as he th!11ks ·fit.
On a plain
reading of the section in the light of the defir:~ion of the
expre~sion
"verified claim" and the st:itutory scheme •. the Chief Settlement Commissioner's special po1Ver of revision would exteud to suo 1notu revision of
the verified claims which had become final under the Act of 1950 as a
result Of orders made by the Claims Con1missioner on revision.
The use
of the words "revised any verified claim
1
' seem prima facie to extend the
power of revision also to verified claims bearing the stamp of scrutiny by
the Chief Settlement Commissioner. There being no doubt as to the mean-
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733
fog of s. 5 ( 1) (b) the preamble cannot be used to control or qualify its
unambiguous language.
[737 A-Fl
(iii) The definition of verified claim in s. 2(f) elf the Supplementary
kt speaks of the final order arid it includes valuation. The Claims Officer
under the Act has also to value the claim and the final order embraces.
both ve·rificatfon o'f title and valuation.
[738 G-HJ
'
(iv) The categories contained in clauses (i) to (iii) of"rule 18 do .not
form a genus or a class with the result that the expression other su.!fi.c1ent
reason" occurring in cl. (iv) of. this rule would not attract the e1usdem
generis rule for its constrbction. But a5suming that t

## Text

732
TRIBHUBAN PARKASH NAYYAR
v.
THE UNION OF INDIA
October I 0, 1969
[J.' M. SHELAT, C. A VAIDIALJNGAM AND I. D. DUA, JJ.]
Displaced Persons (Claims) Act, 1950-Displaced Persons (Clain1s)
Supplementary Act, 1954-Section 5(1)(b)-Revisional Powers of Chief
Settlement Commissioner-If extends to niatters 1vhich had beco111e finai
under the 1950 Act-Scope of power-Di~placed Persons (Verifica:ion of
Claims) Supplementary Rules, 1954-Rule 18, cl. (iv)-If can be cons·
trued ejusdem generis.,
Th~ nppeI:ant, a displaced person from \Vest Pakistan, subn1itted his
claim under the Displaced Persons (Claim5)
Act of 1950 in re!ip.::ct of
the' property left by him there The Claims Officer verified the claim for
Rs. 8 lacs.
The Claims Commissioner, in revision, raised the value of
the verified claim to Rs. 10 lacs.
The Settlement Commissioner, exercising the revisional po\vers of the Chief Settlement Comn1i;sioner under the
Displaced Persons (Claims) Supplementary Act, 1954, reduced the claim
of Rs. JO lacs to Rs. 15,000.
In a writ petition filed by the appellant a
single Judge of the High Court quashed the order of the Settlement Commissioner holding that there were clear errors of la\v on the fact of the
record.
It was left open to the department to reconsider the matter as to
evaluation and come to a proper conclusion
on
evidence.
A
Let:erJ
Patent Bench reversed the o'der of the single Judge and dismissed the
writ petition.
In appeal to this Court it was contended that: (i) the order
of the Se:tlement Commissioner was vitiated by errors of law on the face
of the record; (ii) the Settlement Commissioner exercising the powe~ of
the Chie'f Settlement Commissioner under the Supplementary Act had no
jurisdicti9n to revhe the order made by the Claims Commission:r eo:er-.
cising revisional power under the Act of 1950; (iii) the po\\'er of re\'i..:;ion_
conferred on the Chief Settlement Commissioner by section 5(1) (h) of
the Supplementary Act \Vas restricted to the verification of the claim ~.nd
its valuation was outside its purview and (iv) the po,ver was circum5crilJ.:
ed within the four~corners of rule 18 of the Displaced Persons (Ver!fication of Claims) Supplementary Rules, 1954.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD: {i) The learned single Judge
\Vas right
in his cont:lu5ions.
The order and the material on record show that the Settlement Commissione·r had, at more places than one, based his conclusions on pure conjectures and surmises without there being any legal evidence ·on the rec,Jrd
to support them.
(ii) The language used in Section 5(1)(b) of the Supplementary Act
is unambiguous and it clearly empowers the Chief Settlement Commissioner, subject to· any rules that may be made, to revise any verified claim
and make such orders in relation thereto as he th!11ks ·fit.
On a plain
reading of the section in the light of the defir:~ion of the
expre~sion
"verified claim" and the st:itutory scheme •. the Chief Settlement Commissioner's special po1Ver of revision would exteud to suo 1notu revision of
the verified claims which had become final under the Act of 1950 as a
result Of orders made by the Claims Con1missioner on revision.
The use
of the words "revised any verified claim
1
' seem prima facie to extend the
power of revision also to verified claims bearing the stamp of scrutiny by
the Chief Settlement Commissioner. There being no doubt as to the mean-
-
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fog of s. 5 ( 1) (b) the preamble cannot be used to control or qualify its
unambiguous language.
[737 A-Fl
(iii) The definition of verified claim in s. 2(f) elf the Supplementary
kt speaks of the final order arid it includes valuation. The Claims Officer
under the Act has also to value the claim and the final order embraces.
both ve·rificatfon o'f title and valuation.
[738 G-HJ
'
(iv) The categories contained in clauses (i) to (iii) of"rule 18 do .not
form a genus or a class with the result that the expression other su.!fi.c1ent
reason" occurring in cl. (iv) of. this rule would not attract the e1usdem
generis rule for its constrbction. But a5suming that the first t~ree ~Jaus~
eonstitute a class or kind of objects or genus, the grounds given ~y th.e
Settlement Com.missioner are analogous to cl. "(iii) which speaks o:.t gross
and material irregularity and disparity in the evaluation of the claim.
[741
HJ
[The case was remitted to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for a
freSh decision in accordance with law.]
·
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1568 of.
1966.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 9, 1964
cif the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Letters Patent
Appeal No. 2-D o.f 1963.
,
K. L. Gosain, K. L. Mehta, D. N. Bhasin, S. K. Mehta. lnder,
jeet Gulati and .Sona Bhatiani, for the appellant.
B. Sen and S. P. Nayar, for foe resnondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dua, J.
The appellant, a displaced person from Lahore,
now in West Pakistan, submitted his claim in respect 0f the
immovable property left by him there. The claim was submitted
under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Claims)
Act
XLIV of 1950 (hereaft~r called the principal Act).
The property in respect of which the claim was submitted was valued
by the appellant at Rs. 10 lacs.. It consisted of
a building
2! storeyed high. with 12 shops and a well as also some plat.-
form etc. in Landa Bazar, in Lahore.
The Claims
Officer
yerified this claim for Rs. 8 lacs.
Against this order a revision
Was taken by the appellant to the Claims Commissioner who
on May l, 1953 in a brief order raised the value of th~ verified
claim to Rs. 10 lacs.
The relevant part of that order reads as
under:
"I have . gone through the order of the learned
Claims Officer and I find that he has given a :;ueer
argument to allow Rs. 8,00,000/- to the
claimant.
By every m~thod tried by him the assessment went
beyond Rs. 10,00,000/- and I think he ought to have
allowed Rs. 10,00,000/- as claimec by the claimant.
I enhance the ass·essment and allow Rs. 10,00,000 /-
to· tte claimant."
734
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 2 S.C.R.
We would assume that the Claims Commissioner had been duly
delegated the power of the Chief Claims ·Commissioner to revise
the order of the Claims Officer, because no dispute was raised
on this point. On the strength of the verified claim the appellant purchased two properties in Delhi at a public auction; one
of them is situated in Daryaganj and the other in New Rajinder
Nagar.
On Jl<ovember 8, 1957 Shri M. S. Chaddha, Settlement
Commissioner, exercising power of the
Chief
Settlement
Commissioner issued to the appellant a notice under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Supplementary Act, 1954 calling upon
him to show cause why the order of the Claims Commissioner
dated May I, 1953 be not revised and varied. On May 23,
195 8 the said officer reduced the appellant's claim of Rs. I 0 lacs to
Rs. 15,000/-. The appellant then filed a writ petition under
Art. 226 in the Punjab High Court challenging the order
reducing the valu.e of his claim. · A learned Single Judge on
November I, 1962 allowed the writ petition holding that the
learned Settlement Commissioner exercising the power of the
Chief Settlement Commissioner had proceeded to deal with the
value
of the property on wholly conjectural grounds. In a
detailed order the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion
that the Settlement Commissioner had not only ignored important evidence but had also held certain documents to be forged
without any evidence in support of the fillding.
In the opinion
of the learned Single Judge, therefore, there were clear errors
oi law on the face of the record rendering the order of the
Settlement Commissioner open to challenge in writ proceedings
in the High Court.
On this view the order was set aside and
quashed.
It was, however, observed that it would he open to
the department to reconsider the entire matter a, to valuation
and come to a proper conclusion on evidence.
The respondent took the matter on apptal to a Division
Bench under the Letter Patent and the Letters Patent Bench
reversed the order of the learned Single Judge holding that on
a reading of the order of the Settlement Commissioner it could
not be said that his finding was based on no legal evidence. The
appeal was accordingly allowed and setting aside the order of
the learned· Single Judge, the appellant's writ petition was dismissed.
The appellant has come to this Court on appeal with
certificate.
On behalf of the appellant two main points were raised before
us. It was contended, in the first instahce, that Shri M. S.
Chaddha, while exercising the power of the Chief Settlement
Commissioner, had no jurisdiction to revise the order made by
the Claims Commissiorer exercising the revisional power of the
Chief Claims Commissioner under the principal Act. Secondly,
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T, P. NAYYAR v. UNION (Dua, J..)
735
it was contended that there was a clear error of law apparent
on the face of the record with the result that the learned Single
Judge was fully justified in quashing the order of •he Settlement
Commissioner, and that the Letters Patefit Bench was in error
in a!lowing the app.eal. While developing this ground of attac~
the counsel also submitted that in exercising the power of revision the Settlement Commissioner could not interfere with conclusions of fact and that he had, therefore,· exceeded his jurisdiction in so doing.
In order to examine the first submission we have to turn to
the provisions of the Principal Act and of the Displa;,ed Persons
(Claims) Supplementary Act 12 of 1954 (hereafter called the
Supplementary Act). The principal Act, enacted with the obje,:
· of providing for the registration: and verification of claims of
displaced persons in respect of immovable property in Pakistan,
was brought on the statute book on May 18, 1950 and was
initially to remain in force for a period of two years only. Its
life was extended by a further period of one year by means of
an amendment in 1952. On the expiry of the third year the Displ11ced Persons (Claims) Supplementary Ordinance No. 3 of
1954 was promulgated pending the passage by the Parliarr.ent of
the bill which later emerged in the shape of Supplementary Act.
The Ordinance was enforced on January 18, 1954. The supplementary Act was enacted, as its preamble shows, to provide for
the disposal of certain proceedings pending under the principal
Act and for matters connected therewith. We have specifically
referred to the preamble because on behalf of the appellant
strong reliance was pkced on the preamble in si•pport of his
construction of ss. 4 and 5 of the supplementary Act,
which
deal with the revisional power of the Chief Settlement Commissioner appointed under this Act.
It is not disputed at the bar
that this Act was primarily designed to finalise the disposal
of certain proceedings pending under the principal Act at the
time of its expiry.
According to the appellant the words "for
matters connected therewith" in the preamble are intended to
have the effect of restricting the ambit of its provisions exclusively to the proceedings actually pending on the date of the
expiry of the principal Act, whereas, according to the respondent
these words demand a liberal construction so as to bring within
the fold of tbe Act all proceedings initiated for the registration
of claims, notwithstanding the fact that final order of verification and valuation had already been made thereon.
The respo1;1dent also placed strong reliance on the language used in s. 5
which, he argued, is plain and unambiguous and its ambit
cannot be restricted by the Preamble.
That section reads
as
under:
736
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1970] 2 S.C.R.
"Special power of revision in respect of cases decided
under Act XLIV of 1950.
5. (1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the
principal Act, the Chief Settlement Commissioner:
(a) may, on an application for revision made
to
him within time by any person aggrieved by
the decision. of the Claims Officer, call for the
record of the case and make such order in the
case as he thinks fit.
"Explanation-For the purposes of this clause, an application for revision shall be deemed to be or to have been made
within time, if-
(i) such application was not barred by limitation
on the appointed day under the rules made
under the principal Act and is filed within one
month from the commencement of this Act;
or
(ii) such applicaiton had been filed
before the
appointed day and was not, on the date on
which it was filed barred by limitation under
the rules made under the principal Act;
(b) may, on his own motion, but subject to any
rules that may be made in this behalf, revise
any verified claim and make such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit.
(2) No order varying the decision of the Clairos
Officer or revising any verified claim which prejudicially affects
any person shall be made
without giviqg an opportunity of being heard."
This special power of revision was conferred on the Chief
Settlement Commissioner in addition to the ordinary power · of
revisio11. conferred by the proviso to s. 4(3) which was similar
to the power of revision conferred on the Chief Claims Commissioner under the principal· Act.
The suo motu power to revise
verified claims, according to the appellant's learned counsel, was
designedly vested in the Chief Settlement Commissioner, he
being the final authority under the supplementary Act.
But
this power, argued the counsel, was not intended to extend to proceedings, which could not be considered to be pending under the
principal Act.
This argument was sought to be founded on the
Pleamble of the supplementary Act.
A verified claim which had
lieen subjected to scrutiny by the Chief Claims Commissioner and
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bore that officer's seal under the principal Act, according to the
appellant's counsel, could not be described to be a matter
peμding under the principal Act and a revision of such a claim
cohld not be held to be a matter connected with a pending
proceeding.
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The object and purpose of a preamble to a statute is well
settled and at the bar before us there was no serious dispute on
this point. A preamble is a key to open the mind of the legislature but it cannot be used to control or qualify precise and
unambiguous language of the enacttnent. It is
only when
there is a doubt as to the meaning of a provision that recourse
may be had to the preamble to ascertain the reasons for the
enactment and hence the intention of the Parliament. If the
language of the enactment is capable of more than one meaning
then that one is to be preferred which comes nearest to the
purpose and scope of the preamble. In other words, Preamble
may assist in ascertaining the meaning but it does not affect clear
D
words in a statute.
The courts are thus not expected to start
with the preamble for construing a statutory provision nor does
the mere fact that a clear and unambiguous statutory provision
E
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goes beyond the preamble give rise, by itself, to a doubt on its
meaning.
Now the language used in s. 5(1)(b) of the supplementary
Act is unambiguous and it clel!flY empowers the Chief Settlement
Commissioner, subject to any rules that may be made, to revise
any verified claim and make such orders in relation thereto as he,
thinks fit. A verified claim, as defined in s. 2(f) of the Supplemen- ·
· tary Act, means any claim registered under the principal Act in
respect of which a final order has been passed under that Act.
Now it is difficult to contend that on a plain reading of s. 5(l)(b)
in the light of the definition of the expression "verified claim",
the Chief Settlement Commissioner had no ·power suo motu to
revise a claim on which a final order had been passed under the
principal Act by the Chief Claims c_ommissioner:
~! may be
pointed out that according to the- statutory' scheme, urider· s. 5(1)
(a) of ,the Supplementary Act an aggrieved party is entitled to
G
apply to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for revision of decisions of the Claims 'Officers and there is adequate· provision for
safeguarding the interests of the aggrieved parties from any possible injury by. reason of lapse :if time.
The difference in the
language used in clauses (a) and (b) of s. 5(1) t.'rrows sufficient·
H
light on the legislative intent. The use of the words "revise any
verified claim" seems prima facie to extend the power of revision
also to verified claims bearing the stamp of scrutiny by the Chief
Settlement Commissioner. Had the Parliament intended· this
power to be restricted, as suggested on behalf of the appellant,
738
SUPREME couar REPORTS
[l 970] 2 S.C.R.
then it would have expressed such intention in clear words.
The
statutory scheme also supp<irts this view.
Under the proviso t<>
s. 4 ( 3) the Chief Settlement Commissioner' has suo motu power
of revision from the deci;,10ns of the Settlement Officers and under
s. S(l)(a) he has the power of revision on applications by aggrieved parties from the decisions of Claims Officers.
But under
s. 5 ( 1) (b) the suo motu power of revision does not extend to all
decisions but is confined only to verified claims though in this
respect it takes within its fold all such claims and is not restricted
to foe claims verified only by the Claims Officers. On a plain
reading of s. 5(1)(b), therefore, the Chief Settlement Commissioner's special power of revision would seem to us to extend to
suo motu revision of the verified claims which had become final
under the principal Act as a result of orders made by the Chief
Claims Commissioner on revision.
Neither any statutory bat
nor any precedent has been cited against the exercise of this
power; nor has any principle been brought to our notice which
would induce us to restrict the plain language of s. S(l)(b).
The submission that an order made on a revision can in no
case be subjected to further revision, is also unacceptable on the
statutory scheme and language. . No constitutional bar to further
scrutiny of such orders on revision was pointed out.
It may in
this connection be borne in mind that verification of claims· under
the principal Act involved proof in regard to title to, and value
of, property left by the displaced persons in' West Pakistan; and
this had to be completed within a period of, originally, two years
which was later extended by one year.
The best evidence in
this respect was only available in West Pakistan, and it is a
matter of common knowledge that it was not easy for an average
displaced person to secure such evidence.
Chances of errors in
verification and valuation of claims, in these
circumstances,
being not too few, the highest authority was advisedly in larger
public interest vesteil with a wide power to review and reassess
such verified claims.
It was then conten(ied that the power of ·revision under
s. S(l)(b) is restricted to the verification of the claim and its
valuation is outside its purview., This cont:~ntion is difficult to
accept.
It is true that "claim" as defined in the principal Act
broadly speaking means the assertion of a right to ownership of,
or to any interest in, immovable property.
But the Claims Officer under that Act has also to value the claim and the final order
embraces both verificaiion of title and valuation. . The definition
of "verified claim" in s. 2(f) of the supplementary Act speaks of
the final order and it includes valuMiOn;
This takes us. to the submission that tlie power of revision of
the Chief Settlement Commissioner is circumscribed within the
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739
four corners of r. 18 of the Displaced Persons (Verification of
Claim) Supplementary Rules, 1954.
This rule, of course, spe·
cifically controls the exercise of the power of revision conferred
bys. 5(1)(b) and this is not disputed. Rule 18" is in the following
terms:
"Special revision of verified claims under clause (b) of
sub-section (1) of section 5.
18. The Chief Settlement Commissioner may, while
exercising the powers of special revision conferred on
him by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 5, call
for the record of any verified claim and may pass any
order in revision in respect of such verified claim in
such manner as he thinks fit, if he is satisfied that such
order should be passed on one or the other of the
following grounds, namely :-
( i) the discovery of any new matter or documentary evidence which after the exercise of due
diligence was not within the knowledge of or
could not be produced by the claimant at the
time when the claim was verified; or
(ii) correction of any clerical or arithmetical mistake apparent on the face of the record; or
(iii) gross or material irregularity or diSparity in the
valuation of the claim; or
(iv) any other sufficient reason :
Provided that the' Chief Settlement Commissioner
shall not entertain or take into consideration any appli·
cation or represeuation made to him under this rule
by any claimant if such application or representation is
made after tll.e 30th day of April, 1954."
It was contended that the grounds on which the Chief
Settlement Commissioner revised the verified claim do not fall
within the first three clauses of this rule.
The fourth clause,
according to Shri Gosain's argument, must be read ejusdem .
generis and so read this clause wouldalso be inapplicable to the
case. Reliance in support of this ecgument was placed on
M.M.B. Catholicos and another v. The Most. Rev. Mar Poulose
and others('), a case dealing with the power of review under
Order 47 rule 1 Civil P.C., the language of which, according to
the appellant's counsel, is completely identical with that of rule 18.
(!) [195511 S.C.R. 520.
L5SnpCl(NP)J70-2
740
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 2 S.C.R.
Let us examine the language of these two provisions. Rule 18
·has already been reproduced.
Order 47 r. l(c) Civil P.C. which
alone is relevant for our purpose is in the following terms.
"Rule I. Any person considering himself aggrieved-
(a) ................. .
(b) ................. .
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court
of Small Causes and who, from the discovery of new
and important matter or evidence which, after the
exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge
or could not be produced by him at the time when the
decree was passed or order made, or on account of
some mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to
obtain a review of the decree passed or order made
against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the
Court which passed the decree or made the order.
(2) .................... "
From a plain reading of these two provisions the difference
in their language is quite obvious. Clauses (i) and (ii) of r. 18
are certainly similar to cl. (c) of Order 47 r. 1,
but clause
(iii) of r. 18 is wholly different from cl. (c) of r. 1 of Order 47.
It is difficult to hold these clauses to be similar in kind or to
have a common genus. The former seems not only to take
within its fold gross and material irregularity in the valuation of
the claim, which to some extent resembles one of the grounds on
which revisional power as contemplated by s. 115 Civil P .C. can
be exercised, but also to include cases where there is disparity in
the valuation of the claim. Quite clearly this clause is much
wider in scope than Order 47 r. 1 (c). The expression "other
sufficient cause" occurring in cl. (iv) of r. 18 has therefore to )le
construed in this context. When in a statute there are general
words following particular and specific words, the general words
are sometimes construed as limited to things of the same kind
as those specified.
This rule of interpretation generally known
as ejuedem generis rule has been pr~ssed into service on behalf
of the appellant. This rule reflects an atterμpt to reconcile
incompatibility between the specific and general words, in view
of the other rules of inte_rpretation, that all words in a statute are
given effect if possible, that a statute is to be construed as
a
whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous.
Ejusdem generis rule being one of the rules of interpretation, only serves, like all such rules, as an aid to discover the
legislative intent; it is neither final nor conclusive and is attracted
oRly when the specific words enumerated, constitute a class,
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H
T. P. NAYYAR V. UNION (Dua, J.)
741
which is not exhausted· and are followed by general terms
and
when there is no manifestation of intent to give broader meaning
to the general words.
The first three categories contained in r. 18, in our opinion,
do not form a genus or a class with the result that clause (iv)
would not attract the ejusdem generis rule for its construction.
But assuming that they constitute a class or kind of objects
or genus, it appears to us that grounds given by the Settlement
Commissioner are analogous to clause (iii) which speaks of gross
and material irregularity or disparity in the valuation of the
claim. This submission must, therefore, be rejected.
We now come to the merits of the order of the Settlement
Commissioner.
After going through the order and the material
on the record, to which our attention has been drawn, we are
satisfied that the Settlement Commissioner has at more places
than one based his conclusions on pure conjectures and surmises
without there being any legal evidence on the record to support
them. We do not consider it necessary to exhaustively deal with
the argument in support of the errors of law on the face of the
record for the puq~ose of considering the alleged infirmities in
the order of the Settlement Commissioner.
The learned Single
Judge has dealt with this question at length and we are in agree-.
ment with his conclusions. We may only add that we have also
looked at the original documents which appeared suspicious to
the Settlement Commissioner, but we are unable to find any
circumstance which could be said to be suspicious or abnormal
so as to eive rise to any reasonable doubt about th.eir genuineness.
The respondent's learned counsel also expressed his inability to
bring to our notice any material throwing suspicion on the genuineness of these documents. Indeed the learned counsel was frank enough to express his inability to support the view taken by the Letters
Patent Bench or to find fault with the conclusions of the learned
Single Judge, whose order seems to
be unexceptionable.
We
accordingly allow the appeal and setting aside the order of the
Letters Patent Bench restore that of the Single Judge. It was
agreed at the bar that as directed by the Single hdge the case
should go back to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for a fresh
decision in accordance with law. That tliis case can be remitted
back to t~e Chief Settlement Commissioner in these proceedings
was not disputed before us.
We should, however, make it clear
tb~t .this order i~ not to be c.onstr.ued to contain any expression of
opm10n on merits on the ev1denl!ary value of the material on.:the
~ecor~ on the ~estion of valuation of the claim. The appellant
1s entitled to his costs.
R.K.P.S.
Appeal al/owea