# TULSIPUR SUGAR COMPANY LTD v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS

- **Citation:** [1970] 1 S.C.R. 35
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-03-18
- **Case number:** ; Civil Appeal No. 480 of 1967
- **Bench:** J. M. Shelat, V. Bhargava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/tulsipur-sugar-company-ltd-v-state-of-u-p-ors-4777
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Indust,ial law-Labour Court, acting under s. 6(6) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (28 of 1947)-Correction of accidental omission In
award after it became final and enforceable-Validity of.
The Central Wage Board for sugar industry bad recommended revised
wage scales, revised categories and fitment of workmen into those scales
and categories as from November 1, 1960. The State Government had
accepted those recommendations fully in.eluding the date of implementation .
The appellant-company, however, did not implement them and hence, its
workmen raised a dispute and two questions were referred to the Labour
Court namely : (l) of fitment of certain workmen in the new grades, and
(2) the date from which it was to have effect. By its award, the Labour
Court held that two of the workmen should be fitted into certain grades
and directed the company to do so within one month aft~r the award
became enforceable, but, omitted to fix the date from which such fitment
should have effect.
On December 7, 1963, the award was published in
the State Gazette and, under s. 6A (I) of the U .P. Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, it became enforceable on January 7, 1964. The appellant fitted the
two workmen in the two grades from February 7, 1964, that is, one month
after the award became enforceable. The union thereupon applied to the
Labour Court to amend its award on the ground that it had omitted to
answer the second question referred to it and the _Labour Court amended
its award and directed that the two workmen should be placed in their
respective grades from November 1, 1960, as recommended by the Wage
Board. The amendment was published in the Gazette on June 20, 1964.
The appeJ!ant filed a writ petition iii the High Court for quashing the order
of amendment, but the High Court dismissed the petition.
In appeal to this Court, on the questions : (I) Whether the correction
was of an error arising from ·an accidental omission within the meaning
of s. 6(6) of the Act; and (2) Whether the award could be. corrected (i)
after it was published in the Gazette and had become final, and (ii) after
It had become enforceable.
HELD : (1) Section 6(6) enables the· Labour Court to correct an
accidental omitsion,
In the present case, the Labour Court omitted to
amwer the second question which it was bound to answer. Since the first
question was answered by it in accordance with the Wage Board's recom·
mendations an.cl the Government's notification accepting thorn fully, if the
attention of the Labour Court had been drawn, it would have answered the
second question ,also in consonance with those recommendations and the
notification. Therefore, there was an error in the award due to an acciden~
ta! omission within the meaning of s. 6(6) of the Act. [39 G-H; 40A]
(2) (i) The scheme of ss. 6 and 6A shows that there are 3 different
lltages before an award becomes enforceable, namely : (a) when the award
ii signed by the adjudicating authority; (b) when it is published and becomes final; and (c) when it becomes enforceable under s. 6A. Section
6(6) does not lay down expressly any time limit within which the correctional jurisdiction under the section should be exercised.
To hold by implication that such iurisdiction can only be exercised till the date of publica~
36
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1970) ! S.C.R.
tioi;i wheo. the award becomes 11.naI, would be contrary to the •uh-section
which envisages the correction of an award even after it is published and
has become final. (40 C; 41 G-H; 42 D-EJ
(ii) There is nothing in""· 6, 6A or 60.to imply the limitation namely,
that the power to correct is to be exercised only before the award becomes
enforcca~le. The circumstance that t~e proceedings before a Labour Court
and a Tribunal are deemed to be concluded under s. 6D when their award
becomes enforceable and they become functus officio would be ao ground
for inferring such a time limit, because : (a) Since an arbitrator is not
mentioned in s. 60 it would lead to the result.

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TULSIPUR SUGAR COMPANY LTD.
v.
STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
March 18, 1969
[J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]
Indust,ial law-Labour Court, acting under s. 6(6) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (28 of 1947)-Correction of accidental omission In
award after it became final and enforceable-Validity of.
The Central Wage Board for sugar industry bad recommended revised
wage scales, revised categories and fitment of workmen into those scales
and categories as from November 1, 1960. The State Government had
accepted those recommendations fully in.eluding the date of implementation .
The appellant-company, however, did not implement them and hence, its
workmen raised a dispute and two questions were referred to the Labour
Court namely : (l) of fitment of certain workmen in the new grades, and
(2) the date from which it was to have effect. By its award, the Labour
Court held that two of the workmen should be fitted into certain grades
and directed the company to do so within one month aft~r the award
became enforceable, but, omitted to fix the date from which such fitment
should have effect.
On December 7, 1963, the award was published in
the State Gazette and, under s. 6A (I) of the U .P. Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, it became enforceable on January 7, 1964. The appellant fitted the
two workmen in the two grades from February 7, 1964, that is, one month
after the award became enforceable. The union thereupon applied to the
Labour Court to amend its award on the ground that it had omitted to
answer the second question referred to it and the _Labour Court amended
its award and directed that the two workmen should be placed in their
respective grades from November 1, 1960, as recommended by the Wage
Board. The amendment was published in the Gazette on June 20, 1964.
The appeJ!ant filed a writ petition iii the High Court for quashing the order
of amendment, but the High Court dismissed the petition.
In appeal to this Court, on the questions : (I) Whether the correction
was of an error arising from ·an accidental omission within the meaning
of s. 6(6) of the Act; and (2) Whether the award could be. corrected (i)
after it was published in the Gazette and had become final, and (ii) after
It had become enforceable.
HELD : (1) Section 6(6) enables the· Labour Court to correct an
accidental omitsion,
In the present case, the Labour Court omitted to
amwer the second question which it was bound to answer. Since the first
question was answered by it in accordance with the Wage Board's recom·
mendations an.cl the Government's notification accepting thorn fully, if the
attention of the Labour Court had been drawn, it would have answered the
second question ,also in consonance with those recommendations and the
notification. Therefore, there was an error in the award due to an acciden~
ta! omission within the meaning of s. 6(6) of the Act. [39 G-H; 40A]
(2) (i) The scheme of ss. 6 and 6A shows that there are 3 different
lltages before an award becomes enforceable, namely : (a) when the award
ii signed by the adjudicating authority; (b) when it is published and becomes final; and (c) when it becomes enforceable under s. 6A. Section
6(6) does not lay down expressly any time limit within which the correctional jurisdiction under the section should be exercised.
To hold by implication that such iurisdiction can only be exercised till the date of publica~
36
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1970) ! S.C.R.
tioi;i wheo. the award becomes 11.naI, would be contrary to the •uh-section
which envisages the correction of an award even after it is published and
has become final. (40 C; 41 G-H; 42 D-EJ
(ii) There is nothing in""· 6, 6A or 60.to imply the limitation namely,
that the power to correct is to be exercised only before the award becomes
enforcca~le. The circumstance that t~e proceedings before a Labour Court
and a Tribunal are deemed to be concluded under s. 6D when their award
becomes enforceable and they become functus officio would be ao ground
for inferring such a time limit, because : (a) Since an arbitrator is not
mentioned in s. 60 it would lead to the result. which could not have been
111tended, that there is a time limil only for the Labour Coun and Tribunal
and not for an arbitrator; and (b) the power is similar to that of a civil
coun under s. 152 C.P.C. or under r. 28 of the ludustrial Disputes (Cen..
tral) Rules, 1957 of an adjudicating authoriry under the Industrial Disputes
Act, and is based upon the principle that no pany should suffer any detriment on account of a mistake or an error committed by any adjudicating
authority, and no limiration of time for exercising the correctional jurisdiction is implied even though a civil court or an adjudicating authority under
the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 also become functus officio afler their
judgment or award becomes enforceable.
Also, 1here is no hardship in
holding that the Labour Coun could correct an error under s. 6(6) even
after the award had become final as a result of the publication. or •fter
it had become enforceable under s. 6A, because, the co~ction is within a
circumscribed field, namely, only in cases where a mistake. clerical
or
arthmetical. or ln error arising from an accidental slip or "mission, has
occurred. [42 G-11; 43 A-B, C-E, G-H; 44 A-HJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ; Civil Appeal No. 480 of
1967.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
September 21, 1966 of the Allahabad High Court,
Lucknow
Bench in Special Appeal No. 76 of 1966.
L. M. Singhvi, B. Datta, D. N. Misra, J. B. Dadachanji and
O. C. Mathur, for the appellant,
0. P. Rarta, for respondents No. I.
J. P. Go.ml, Sobhag Mal Jain and S. P. Singh, for respondent
No. 4.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shela!, J.
Two questions arise for determination in this
appeal, by special leave, against the judgment of the Appellate
Bench of the High Court of Allahabad. namely, ( 1) whether a
correction in its award by the Labour Court, Lucknow, was one
of an error arising from an accidental omission within the meaning of s. 6(6) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, XXYIII of
1947 (hereiuafter referred to as the Act). and (2)
whether.
even if it was so, it could so correct after its award was published
and had become enforceable.
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TULSIPUR SUGAR co. v. u. P. STATE (She/at, J.)
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The Central Wage Board for sugar industry,
appointed by
the Uruon Government for determining a wage-structure,
revision of categories of workmen, their fitment into such categories
and for fixing the principles governing the grant of bonus, had
made certain recommendations.
Amongst its recommendations,
the Wage Board recommended that its decision should be brought
into effect as from November l, 1960. By its notification dated
April 27, 1961, the U.P. Government accepted those recommendations including the one that they should be brought into force
with effect from November 1, 1960.
On a dispute having arisen
between the appellant-company and its workmen on the company
failing to implement the said recommendations, the State Government referred it to the Labour Court for adjudication under
s. 4(k) of the Act.
The dispute involved two questions
(1)
whether the company ;hould fit the workmen named in the reference in the revised categories and in the new wage scales and
(2l if so, with effect from what date.
By its award dated November 6, 1963 the Labour Court held that two of the said workmen should be fitted in Grade II(B) and Grade IV respectively
and directed the company to do so within one month after the
award became enforceable.
It,
however,
omitted to fix
the
date from which such fitment should have the effect.
On December 7, 1963 the said award was
published
in
the State
Gazette. The company thereafter fitted the two workmen in the
said two grades from a date one month hence after the award
became enforceable and
not from
November 1,
1960. The
workmen's union thereupon applied to the Labour
Court
to
amend its award on the ground that it had omitted to answer the
second question arising under the
reference and the
Labour
Court accordingly amended its award directing that the two workmen should be placed in the said grades with effect from November 1, 1960.
The order amending the said award was gazetted
on June 20, 1964.
The company filed a petition in the High
Court for certiorari and for quashing the said order of amendment.
Nigam, J. whoJle-<!rd the petition in the first instance dismlssed..it holding that (1) Uiet11bour Court had made an error
arising from an--accidental omission to ar1swer the said second
question and therefore had the power to correct it under s. 6(6)
of the Act, and (2) even if there was no such error arising from
accidental omission, the amendment merely provided what was
already contained in the notification dated April 27, 1961, that
once the Labour Court had directed the company to fit the workmen in the said grades, such fitrnent had, under the force of that
notification, to take effect from November 1, 1960 and that that
result was arrived at not by reason of the correction of the award
but by force of the original award read with the said notific~tion.
On a letters patent appeal having been filed against the said judgment, the Appellate Bench of the High Court agreed with Nigam,
38
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] l SC.R
J. that the correction amounted to one of an error arising from
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the accidental omission to answer the said second question within the scope of s. 6 ( 6) of the Act.
The Appellate Bench, however, proceeded to examine the various
provisions
and the
scheme of the Act and held (I) that the jurisdiction of the
Labour Court under the Act was of a limited character, (2) that
it gets sciscn of an industrial diSpute only when its jurisdiction ia
invoked by a reference under s. 4(k) or by a voluntary reference
to arbitration under s. 5B, (3) that under s. 4Dfroceedings before it arc deemed to commence from the date o such reference
and 111'.0 deemed to be complc~ on the date when its award becomes enforceable, ( 4) that ill jurisdiction which emanates from
the reference gets exhausted on the completion of tho prOC"'Odinp
before it and the Labour Coun itself becomes functus officio on
the date when its award becomes final and enforceable, ( 5) that
it cannot thereafter reconstitute itself or take seisen of a diSpute,
which it has already adjudicated and proceedings relating to it
have become concluded, without a fresh reference and ( 6) that,
therefore, its correction~: jurisdiction under s. 6 ( 6), unlike that
of a civil court under s. 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is
not unlimited.
The Appellate Bench on this reasoning held that
the two extreme points during which the Labour Court could
correct its award were the date of its signing it and the date when
the award becomes final and
enforceable.
Consequently,
the
Labour Court had no jurisdiction to correct the award after it
became final and enforceable, I.e., after January 7, 1964, on exJ:
piry of 30 days from December 7, 1963 when it was published
and the correction, therefore, was in excess of its jurisdiction and
invalid.
The Appellate Bench, however, declined to issr~ the
writ on the ~round that the correction did no more than doing
justice to the workmen by ordering implementation of the said
notification of April 27, 1961 and observing that equity was
on the side of the two workmen dismissed the appeal as also the
said petition.
Dr. Singhvi, who, on behalf of the company, disputed the car•
rectness of the judgment, contended that (a) no clerical or arithmetical error through any accidental slip or omission had arisen,
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that s. 6 ( 6), therefore, did not apply to the facts of this case, and
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if at all, the application ought to have been under s. l lB, which
however, was never invoked; (b) that power under s. 6(6) could
be exercised only until the date on which the said award became
enforceable and not thereafter, that the correctional jurisdiction
under s. 6 ( 6) is not without any limit as to time within which it
could be invoked or exercised and expired or exhausted itself
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when tl!e award became final; ( c) that the principles of industrial
law postulate the finality of an award made under it and that
subject to exceptions as in s. 6A, once the award had become
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TULSIPUR SUGAR co. v. u. P. STATE (She/at, J.)
39.,
final it did not contemplate any disturbance of it by amendment
or otherwise, and ( d) that th.e High Court was in error in refusing remedy on a supposed consideration of equity once it found.
lack of jurisdiction in the Labour Court as it in fact did and,
therefore, ought to have issued the remedial writ and quashed
the impugned order of correction.
As already stated, the Wage Board had recommended revised
wage sculcs, revised categories and fitment of workmen in their
respective categories on the revisr.d wage scales as from Novem•
tier 1, 1960.
The Siate Government had accepted those recom·
mendatiom fully including the date of their implementation and
the consequent fitment of workmen in appropriate categories.
and revised wage scales.
Its notification made it clear that such
fitment on the revised wage scales should be as recommended by
the Wage Board as from November 1, 1960.
I:l the belief, perhaps, that the said recommendations and their acceptance by the
Go ;ernment were noi binding on it, the company did not implement them and hence the union raised the dispute which was.
ultimately referred to the Labour Court. The terms of that reference leave no doubt that it comprised of two questions, ( 1) of
fitment and (2) the date from which it was to have effect. The
award of the Labour Court that the company was liable to fit the
two workmen in grades II and IV respectively and pay them at
the revised scales in respect of these grades was
binding and
therefore the company was liable to carry oui the fitment and pay
the revised scales in accordance with such fitment.
But the
award did not decide or fix the date from which the said fitment,
when made, was to have effect.
As rightly held by the High
Court, the Labour Court thus omitted to answer the second question as it was bound to do and the reference remained partly un·
adjudkated. The Labour Court, no doubi, did direct that the
award should be implementad within one month after it became
enforceable under the Act, i.e~ orrCir before February 7, 1964.
But that direction meant only that the company should fit
the
two workmen in the two ,;rades it had ordered and still left the
question, as to the date from which such fitment was to have
effect, unanswered. Thus, the fact that the Labour Court failed
to answer the second question admits of no doubt. There can
also be no doubt that since the first question was answered by it
in accordance with the Wage Board's recommendations and the
Government's notification accepting them fully, if its
attention
bad been drawn it would in all probability have answered the second question also in consonance with those recommendations
and the said notification. There is, therefore,· no question that
there was an error in the award due to an accidental omission on
the pari of the Labour Court, which error it undoubtedly had
the jurisdiction to correct under s. 6(6). The error was that
40
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1970] I S.C.R.
·_there was no direction in the award as to the date from which
. the fitment of the two workmen in the said grades and the revised
scales should take effect, arising from an accidental omission to
answer that part of the reference.
The next question is whether there is under the Act any time
limit within which the correction of the award can be made. The
impugned correction, no doubt, was made by the Labour Court
after its award had become fjnal and enforceable. The principal
. premise in the High Court's Teasoning as also in that of COllDBCI
for the company was that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court
to correct the award ceased when the award became final
and
enforceable.
lt may be observed at the very outset that no time
limit within which such correction can be made has been laid
down in' any express terms ins. 6(6). The question, therefore,
is whether any such time limit can be inferred either from s. 6
or lrom the other provisions of the Act. Section 4 ( k) enables the
State Government to refer an industrial dispute which either exists
or is apprehended to the Labour Court if the matter of the industrial dispute is one of those contained in the First Schedule to
the Act or to a Tribunal if it is one contained in the first or
the second Schi:dule.
Even if the dispute relates to a matier in
- the second Schedule, if it is not likely to affect more than 100
workmen, the Government can, if it w thinks fit, refer such a
dispute to the Labour Court. Under s. 5B where auy industrial
dispute exists or is apprehended and the employer and ihe workmen agree, they may re~er the dispute to arbitration of such person
or persons including the presiding officer of a Labour Court or a
Tribunal as may be specified in the arbitration agreement. Sec•·.an
6( 1) enjoins upon the Labour Court and the Tribunal to which
an industrial dispute is referred for adjudication to hold its proceedings expeditiously and submit its award to the State Government as soon as it is practicable on the concli:sion thereof. Sub·
sec. 3 provides that subject to the provisions of sub-s. 4 every
arbitration aware! and the award of a Labour Court or a Tribunal
shall, within 30 days from the date of its rC(;Cipt by the State
Government, be published in such manner as the State Government thinks fit.
Sub-s. 4, to which sub-s. 3 is made subject,
authorises the State Government before publication of an award
of a Labou~ Court or a Tribunal to remit it for. its reconsidera·
tion and provide5 that after such reconsideration it shall submit
its award to the Government and the State Government shall
thereupon publish it in the manner provided in sulH>. 3. Sub-s. 5
provides that subject to the provisions of s. 6A an award published under sub-s. 3 shall be final and shall. not be called in ques-
. tion in any court in any manner whatsoever Section 6A, to the
provisions of which s. 6(5) is made subject, provides by ill! sub-s.
1 that an award, including an arbitration award, shall become enA
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TULSIPUR SUGAR CO. V. U. P. STATE (She/at,/,)
41
forceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication. The first proviso thereof empowers the State Government,
if it is of the opinion that it is inei>pedient on public grounds.
affecting national or State economy or social justice to give efrect
to the whole or any part of the award, to declare by notification
in the official gazette that it shall not become enforceable on the
expiry of the said period of 30 days.
The second proviso provides that an arbitration award shall not become enforceable if
the State Government is satisfied that it was given or obtained_.
through collusion, fraud or misrepresentation.
Thus, even
though an award has been published under s. 6 ( 3) and has
beco!lll;:l Jinal and ·would ordinarily become enforceable on expiry
of 30 days from such publication, the State Government Gall
make a declaration under the first proviso and under sub-s. 2 can
within 90 days from its publication make an order either rejecting
or modifying it, in which event it has to lay the award and its
said order before the State Legislature. Sub-s. 3 provides that if
an award is rejected or modified by an order under sub-s. 2 and
is laid before the Legislature, it shall become enforceable within
15 <;lays from th.e date it is so laid.
But where no such order
under sub-s. 2 has been made, it shall become enforceable on
the expiry of 90 days referred to in sub-s. 2.
Sub-s. 4 provides
that subject to sub-sections 1 and 3, an award shall come into
operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein
but where no such date is specified it shall come into operation
on the date when the award becomes enforceable under sub-s. 1
or sub-s. 3, as the case may be.
The provisions of s. 6 and s ..
6A thus make it clear that whereas the former provides for the
award becoming final, the latter provides for its enforceability and:
the time from which it has to be implemented. The two characteristics of the award, i.e., its finality on publicati,on .and its enforceability under s. 6A, are distinct, having different poinis of
time and should not, therefore, be mixed up, for, though an
award has become final on its publication under s. 6 it becomes enforceable in accordance with and subject to the eventualities
provided in s. 6A. There are thus three different stages in the
case of an award; ( 1) when it is signed by the adjudicating authority, (2) when it is published by the State Government in the·
prescribed manner and (3) when it becomes enforceable. Even
though an award may have become final on its being published,
it becomes
enforceable subject to the expiry of the
different
periods and ·the events prescribed in s. 6A.
The scheme of ss. 6 and 6A is to retain a certain amount of
control over awards, including an arbitration award,
with the
State Government.
An award, therefore, does not become final
as it ordinarily would be when the adjudicating authority signs
M12Sup.CJ/69-4
42
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] l S.C.R.
it but becomes final when it is published in the manner prescribed
by the State Government. Hetore ;uch puoJication the Govemment is given the power to remit it to the adjudicating authority
for reconsideration and the State Government has to publish it
on its being resubmitted to it. In spite of its becoming final on
such publication it becomes enforceable only on the expiry of 30
days after it has become final as laid down by sub-s. 1 of s. 6A.
But it does not so become enforceable if the Government were
to make a declaration under the first proviso and an order under
sub-a. 2 or the award specifies a date which is later than 30 days
after its publication.
Therefore, the words "subject to the provi&ions of s. 6A" in sub-s. S of s. 6 must mean that though an
award has become final on its being published it does not immediately or automatically begin to be operative as that finality is
subject to the expiry of periods and the powers of the State Government under s. 6A.
Having seen the effect of the provisions of ss. 6 and 6A, we
have next to consider the scope of the correctional jurisdiction
conferred or the adjudicating authority under sub-s. 6 of s. 6.
As already observed, the sub-section does not lay down in any
express terms any time limit within which such jurisdiction is to
be exercised. It contemplates a correction both before and after
the publication of the award, i.e. after it has become final. U it
is corrected before its publication the correction would be carried
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But if it
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corrected after its publication and after it has become final, a
copy of the order of correction has to be sent to the State Government and the provisions as to publication of an award under
s. 6 (3) are mutatis mutandis applicable. The correctional jurisdiction is limited only to cases where clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors arising from an accidental slip or omission have
occurred.
Though s. 6(6) does not expressly provide for any
time limit, the High Court appears to have been much impressed by
s. 6D which lays down the two points as to the commencement
and the completion of proceedings before a labour court and a
tribunal. From these two limits it came to the conclusion that
though no time limit is expressly provided ins. 6(6) it must be
inferred that the correctional juriJdiction under s. 6(6) can only
be exercised upto the time that the award becomes final and enforceable. It will be observed that though s. 6(6) empowers all
the three adjudicating authorities, ·namely, a labour court, a tribunal and an arbitrator, to correct the award, s. 6D lays down
the two points of commencement and completion of proceedings
only in the case of a labour court and a tn'bunal. Section 6D, therefore, does not furnish an indication or a ground for inferring a
time-limit in s. 6 ( 6) in the case of an award by an arbitrator.
Would that mean that thouib, according to the High Court,
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TULSIPUR SUGAR co. v. u. P. STATE (Shelat, J.)
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there is a period within which a labour court and a tribunal can
exercise the correctional jurisdiction, there would be no such
limit in the case of an award by an arbitrator? In our view no
such result could have been contemplated. It would thu§, appear
that the two extremeties of time provided in s. 6D cannot be used
as a ground for inferring a time limit for the correctional jurisB
diction under s. 6 ( 6) .
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Acceptance of the High Court's reasoning becomes still more
difficult when we examine the premises of that reasonin~. The
High Court does not appear to be sure whether the linut as to
time io to be the date of finality of the award or its enforceability,
for, it states that the correctional jurisdiction can be exercised
until the award has become final and enforceable.
As already
stated, the concepts of finality and enforceability of an award are
distinct and have been dealt with by the Legislature separately in
ss. 6 and 6A. If it is to be reasoned that the correctional jurisdiction can be exercised till the date when the award is published
and becomes final, such a reasoning would be contrary to the
provisions of s. 6 ( 6) themselves which envisages correction of
an award even after it is published and has become final. Sub-s.
6 expressly provides that when so corrected, the order correcting
it has to be published in the manner prescribed under and within
the time provided in s. 6(3). It is, therefore, manifest that the
date ·when an award becomes final cannot be the date within
which the power under s. 6 ( 6) has to be exercised. If, it is to
be held, on the other hand, that the power to correct is to be
exercised until the award has become enforceable,. the difficulty
would be that there is nothing either in s. 6 or s. 6A or s. 6D
which warrants such a limitation by implication. Is it that an
award is really final when it becomes enforceable? · Such a conclusion would, firstly, be contrary to the clear language of s. 6
and, secondfy, would lead to a curious result that though it has
become final on publication, it is not really so, as that finality
is subject to the provisions of s. 6A. In that case, an award can
be challenged in a court during the interval between its publica·
tion and the date when it becomes enforceable. That would be
so, despite the clear language of s. 6(5) that an award becoming
final on publi<;ation cannot thence be challenged in any court
whatsoever. Laying down by implication the time limit during
which the correctional jurisdiction under s. 6(6) can be exercised
upto the time of the award becoming final under s. 6(5) or be- ·
coming enforceable under s. 6A creates difficulties,
besides, it
would appear, being contrary to the provisions of these two seC'-
tions and i8 therefore not commendable.
The correctional jllrisdiction conferred on the adjudicating authority under s. 6(6) is
in terms identical with the one conf.erred under s.
152 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and rule 28 of the lridustrial Disputes
44
iUPREME COUllT REPORTS
(1970] I S.C.R.
(Central) Rules 1957 and is in consonance with the first and
foremost principle that no party should suffer any detriment on
accou~t of a mis.take or an error committed by an adjudicating
:mthonty. The circumstance that the proceedings before a labour
court and a tribunal are ·deemed to be concluded under s. 60
when their award becomes enforceable or that thereupon
they
become functus officio would also be no ground for inferring any
limitation of time in s. 6 ( 6), for, that would also be the case in
the case of a civil court or an adjudicating authority under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 even without a provision like s. 60
and yet the legislature has not chosen in the case of either of
them to lay down any limitation of time for exercising its correctional jurisdiction. In our view, !hero are no compelling reasons
to read into s. 6 ( 6) any such limitation by implication.
We are also not impressed with the difficulty which the High
Court supposed would result in case s. 6 ( 6) is interpreted as not
having by implication any time limit within which the correctional
power can be exercised by any of the three adjudicating authori·
ties. The High Court felt that if there is no _such time limit an
award, even after it has become enforceable and in some cases
even implemented, would be rendered unsettled.
But as already
stated, the power is a limited one which can be exercised only
in cases where a mistake. clerical or arithmetical or an error aris·
ing from an accidental slip or omissiou has occurred.
The award
thus would have to be corrected only within this circumscribed
field. It may be that the correction of an awa,rd might to a certain extent have an unsettling effect to what has already become
settled, but the correction is made not due to any fault of the
parties but of the adjudicating authority whose accidental slip
or omission cannot be allowed to prejudice the interests of the
parties.
We do not visualise any substantial hardship resulting
from the exercise of this power 'Which the High Court thought
might arise if an award is allowed to be amended even after it
has become enforceable or even if it has been enforced. A sirni·
Jar difficulty can also be imagined when a civil court exercises a
similar power under s. 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But
no one has so far suggested that because of that difficulty a limi·
talion must be inferred in that section. A similar difficulty would
also arise under r. 28 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,
1957. But so far no one has read a similar limitation in the
correctional power provided by that rule.
In our view the error which the Labour Court corrected clearly
fell within s. 6(6) and could be corrected even after the award
had become final as a result of its having been published and had
becmne enforceable under s. 6A.
In this view it is not necessary fo considers. 11 B or its effect especially as it is nobody's case
A
B
c
I>
E
F
G
H
TULS!PUR SUGAR CO. V, U. P. STATE (Shelat, J.)
45
A
that it was at any stage invoked or resorted to. In the view that
we have taken it was s. 6(6) and nots. llB which could on the
facts of this case be resorted to.
The appeal, therefore, is dismissed though for reasons different from those given by the High
Court. The appellant-company will pay the costs of this appeal
to the respondents.
B
V.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.
•