# UDAI RAM SHARMA ANI) OTHERS ETC v. UNION OF INDIA &"ID OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1968] 3 S.C.R. 41
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-02-01
- **Case number:** Writ Petitions Nos. 114, 216, 223 and 252 of 1966
- **Bench:** K. N. Wanchoo, R. S. Bacrawat, G. K. Mitter, C. A. Vaidialingam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/udai-ram-sharma-ani-others-etc-v-union-of-india-id-others-4411
- **Pages:** 50

## Headnote

.
Land Acquisition (Amendment and Vclidation) Act, 13 of 19~7, ss.
2, 3, 4, 5-Validity of Act-Validation of past invalid reports under s. 5-A
of Lafrd Acquisition Act 1894 and declarations under s. 6 without removal
of lacuna in substantive law wheth£r an encroachntent on judicial power
by the legislature-Amendment whether violates Arts. 14 and 31 (2) of
Constitution of India 1950.
In the Stal;, of Madhya Pradesh v. V. P. Sharma, [1966) 3 S.C.R. 557
is Court held that once a declaration under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act 1894 was made the notification under s. 4(1) of the Act was exhausted and there could be no 'Successive notifications under s. 6 with resocct to
land in a locality specified in one notification under s. 4(1). Relying on
the above judgment the present writ petitions were filed in order to challenie successive notifications under s. 6 following a single notification
under s. 4(1) in respect of land belonging to them. Meanwhile in order
to meet the situation created by the judgment in V, P. Sharma' s case the
President of India promulgated the Land Acquisition (Amendment and
Validation) Ordinance (I of 1967). The Ordinance .was later followed
by the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act 1967. Section
2 of this Act purported to amend s. 5-A of the principal Act by allowing
the making of more than one report in .respect of land which had been
notified under s. 4(1). Section 3 purported to amends. 6 of the principal
Act' .hY emPQ__wering different declarations to be made from time to time in
respect of different parcels of land covered by the samei notification under
s. 4(1) irrespective of whether one report or different reports had been
made under s. 5-A sub-s. (2). Section 4 of the Act purported to validate
all acquisitions of land made or purporting to have been made under the
principal Act before the commencement of the ordinance namely January
20, 1967, notwithstanding that more than one declaration under s. 6 had
been made in pursuance of the same notification under s. 4(1), and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary.
The Amending Act also laid down time limits for declarations under s. 6
of the principal Act after the notification under s. 4( 1) had been issued
in respect of notifications made after January 20, 1967 the ·time limit was
three years; in respect' of notification made before that date the time limit
was to be two years after that date.
Provision was also made for pay·
ment of interest on compensation due to persons in respect of whose land
declarations under s. 6 had been delayed beyond a specified period; no
interest was however, to be paid to those to whom compensation h~d
already been paid.
The petitioners by leave of Co'urt amended their petitions to attack the
validity of t~e aforesai~ Validating Act pn the follo~ing m.ain grounds :
( 1) By seeking to validate past transactions of a kind which had been
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declared invalid by this Court without retrospectively changing the subs-.
tantive law. under which the past tr.:nsactions had been effected the legislature Was encroaching over the domain of the judicial power vested by tho
Constitution in the judiciary exclu.sively; (ii) The Validating Act did not
L4Sup. C.1./68-4
42
SUPREME COURT lll!POllTS
(1968] 3 s.c.R.
revive the notification under s. 4 which had become exhausted after the
A
first declaration under s. 6 and no acquisition following thereafter could be
made without a fresh notification under s. 4; (iii) The Validating Act
violated Art. 31(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as it purported to
authorise acqμisitions without fresh notifications under 5. 4 thereby allow·
ing compensation to be paid on the basis of the said notification uruler
s. 4 without allowing for increase in the value of land thereafter; (iv) The
Validating Act violated Art. 14 of the Constitution in various ways.
B
HELD: Per Wanchoo C.J., Bachawat & Mitter, JJ.-(i) The American
doctrine of well defined separation of le

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UDAI RAM SHARMA ANI) OTHERS ETC.
v.
UNION OF INDIA &"ID OTHERS
February 1, 1968
(K. N. WANCHOO, CJ., R. S. BACRAWAT, G. K. MITTER
AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.J
.
Land Acquisition (Amendment and Vclidation) Act, 13 of 19~7, ss.
2, 3, 4, 5-Validity of Act-Validation of past invalid reports under s. 5-A
of Lafrd Acquisition Act 1894 and declarations under s. 6 without removal
of lacuna in substantive law wheth£r an encroachntent on judicial power
by the legislature-Amendment whether violates Arts. 14 and 31 (2) of
Constitution of India 1950.
In the Stal;, of Madhya Pradesh v. V. P. Sharma, [1966) 3 S.C.R. 557
is Court held that once a declaration under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act 1894 was made the notification under s. 4(1) of the Act was exhausted and there could be no 'Successive notifications under s. 6 with resocct to
land in a locality specified in one notification under s. 4(1). Relying on
the above judgment the present writ petitions were filed in order to challenie successive notifications under s. 6 following a single notification
under s. 4(1) in respect of land belonging to them. Meanwhile in order
to meet the situation created by the judgment in V, P. Sharma' s case the
President of India promulgated the Land Acquisition (Amendment and
Validation) Ordinance (I of 1967). The Ordinance .was later followed
by the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act 1967. Section
2 of this Act purported to amend s. 5-A of the principal Act by allowing
the making of more than one report in .respect of land which had been
notified under s. 4(1). Section 3 purported to amends. 6 of the principal
Act' .hY emPQ__wering different declarations to be made from time to time in
respect of different parcels of land covered by the samei notification under
s. 4(1) irrespective of whether one report or different reports had been
made under s. 5-A sub-s. (2). Section 4 of the Act purported to validate
all acquisitions of land made or purporting to have been made under the
principal Act before the commencement of the ordinance namely January
20, 1967, notwithstanding that more than one declaration under s. 6 had
been made in pursuance of the same notification under s. 4(1), and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary.
The Amending Act also laid down time limits for declarations under s. 6
of the principal Act after the notification under s. 4( 1) had been issued
in respect of notifications made after January 20, 1967 the ·time limit was
three years; in respect' of notification made before that date the time limit
was to be two years after that date.
Provision was also made for pay·
ment of interest on compensation due to persons in respect of whose land
declarations under s. 6 had been delayed beyond a specified period; no
interest was however, to be paid to those to whom compensation h~d
already been paid.
The petitioners by leave of Co'urt amended their petitions to attack the
validity of t~e aforesai~ Validating Act pn the follo~ing m.ain grounds :
( 1) By seeking to validate past transactions of a kind which had been
H
declared invalid by this Court without retrospectively changing the subs-.
tantive law. under which the past tr.:nsactions had been effected the legislature Was encroaching over the domain of the judicial power vested by tho
Constitution in the judiciary exclu.sively; (ii) The Validating Act did not
L4Sup. C.1./68-4
42
SUPREME COURT lll!POllTS
(1968] 3 s.c.R.
revive the notification under s. 4 which had become exhausted after the
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first declaration under s. 6 and no acquisition following thereafter could be
made without a fresh notification under s. 4; (iii) The Validating Act
violated Art. 31(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as it purported to
authorise acqμisitions without fresh notifications under 5. 4 thereby allow·
ing compensation to be paid on the basis of the said notification uruler
s. 4 without allowing for increase in the value of land thereafter; (iv) The
Validating Act violated Art. 14 of the Constitution in various ways.
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HELD: Per Wanchoo C.J., Bachawat & Mitter, JJ.-(i) The American
doctrine of well defined separation of legislative and judicial powen has
no application to India and it cannot be said that an Indian Statute ,which
seeks to validate invalid actions' is bad if the invalidify has already been
pronounced upon by a court of law.
A. K. Gopala11 v. Sir.le, [1950) S.C.R. 88, referred to.
(Ii) The absence of a provision in the amending Act to give retrospec·
tive operation to s. 3 of the Act does not affect the validity of s. 4. It was
open to Parliament to adopt either course e.g. (a) to provide expressly
for the retrospective operation of s. 3, or, (b) to Jay down that no acquisition purporting to have been made and no action taken before the Land
Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 shall be deemed
ro be invalid or even to have become invalid because, intn alia, of the
lllllking of more than one declaration under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act, notwithstanding any judgment decree or order to the contrary. Parliament was competent to validate such actions and transactions. its power in
that behalf being only circumscribed by appropriate entries in the Lists
of the Seventh Schedule and the fundamental rights set.(<ith in Part Ill
of the Constitution. Section 4 of the Amending Act being within the
legislative competence of Parliament, the provisions thereof are binding
on all courts of law notwithstanding judgments, orders or decrees to the
contrary rendered or made in tbe past. [67 C-F]
Case-1aw referred to.
(iii) The impugned Act does not violate Art. 31(2).
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"fhe Act does not in express terms enact any law which directly affects
compensation payable in respect. of property acqvired nor does it lay down r
any principles different from those which were already in the Land AC'!Uisition Act of 1894. After the amendment of the Constitution in 1955 the
quest.ion of compensation is not justiciable and it is enough if the law pro--
vides that a person expropriated must be given compensation for his· property or lays down the principks therefor. [67 G-H]
The Legislature might well have provided in the Act of 1894 that it
would be open to the appropriate Government afte'r issuing a notification
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under s. 4 to consider objections raised under s. 5 with regard to the
different localities from time to time enabling different reports to be made
under s. 5-A with consequent adjustments in s. 6 providing for declarations
to be made as and when each report under •· SA was conside<ed. By the
validation of action taken under s. 6 more than once in respect of a single
notification under s. 4, the original scheme of acquisition is not altered.
The public purpose behind the notification remains the same. It is not
as if a different public purpose and acquisition of land for such purpose
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wer~ be~g interploated by means of t~~ Validating Act.
Only the short·
conungs 1n th.e Act as to want to prov1Sion to enable more than one declaration under s. 6 are being '.removed. [68 D-F]
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lJDAI RAM SHARMA v. tJ!oo'ION
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'Ibo date of valuation under the Validation Act is that of the i~ue of
notification Wlder s. 4(1), a principle which has held the field since 1923.
Legislative competence to acquire laud under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act cannot be c:llallenged because of constant appreciation of
laud values all over the country dUe to the prevalent abnormal inflation.
There must be some time Jag between the commencement and conclusion
of land acquisition proceedings and in principle there is nothing wrong in
accepting the said commencement as the date of valuation. Sections 4 and
23 of the Land Acquisition Act are protected by Art. 31(5)(a) of the
Constitution. Only ss. S-A and 6 of the Act have been amended.
The
amendment does not alter the principle of compensation fixed by the Act
nor contlcavene Art 31 of the Constitution ill aoy way. [69 G-70 BJ
It cannot be said of the Validating Act that it was fixing an arbitrary
date for the valuation of the property which bore no relation to the acquisition proceedings. The population in Indian cities especialJy in the capital
is ever-increasing. 'Ibe State has to plan the development of cities and it
is not ,possible to take up all schemes in all directions at the same time.
'Ibe "'80tl?ces of the State may not be sufficient to acquire all the area required by a scheme at the same time.
Of necessity the area under the
proposed acquisition would have to be carved into blocks and the develoPment of one or more blocks at a time could only be taken up in consonance
with the reoources available. Even contiguous blocks could be developed
gradually and systematically. In view of such factors it cannot be said
that the principle of fixing compenaation on the basis of the price prevailing
on the date of the notification under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
was not a relevant principle which satisfied the requirements of Art, 31(2).
[70 C-71 HJ
The State of Wut Bengal v. MTS. Bela BlW!riee. [1954J , S.C.R. 558,
State of Madras v. D. Namasivuya Muda/iar, ~1964J 6 , S.C.R. 936 and
P. V. Mudalior v. Deputy Collector, [1965J 1 S.C.R. 614, considered.
(iv) The validating Act was not violative of Art. 14.
Whenever an Amending Act is passed there is bound to be some difference
in matment between transactions which have already taken place and
those which are to take place in the future. That by itself will not attract
the operarion of Art. 14. Again, even with respect to transac'ions which
may be completed in the future, a reasonable classification will not be
struck down. [72 CJ
lalan Trading Co. v. Mavloor Union, [1967] 1 S.C.R. 15, relied on.
It is not p<JSSiblc to say that because the Legislature thought of improv- ,
ing upon the Act of 1894, by prescribing certain limits of lime as from
20th January 1967 the difference in treatment in cases covered by the notification before the said date and after the said date denies equal protection
of laws because the transactions ate not similarly circumstanced. Some of
the notifications issued under s. 4 must have been made even more than
3 years before 20th Janua'ry, 1967 and such cases obviously could not be
treated in the same manner as notifications issued after that date. Art. 14
does not strike at. differentiation caused by the enactment of a law
between transactions governed thereby and those which are not so
governed. [73 H-74 Bl
Hatisingh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Union of Indid, [1960J 3 S.C.R.
528.
No grievance can be made because interest is denied to persons who
have already taken the compensation.
Even here the classification is not
unreasonable and cannot be said to be unrelated to the object of the Act.
[74 E-FJ
44
SUPREME COURT REPOllTS
[1968) 3 S.C.R.
Per Shela! and. Vaidialingam, JJ. (dissenting)-
By validating .the acquisition orders and declarations made on the
basis of an exhausted notification under s. 4 the impugned Act saves
government from having to i .. ue a fresh notification and having to pay
compensation calculated on the market value as on the date of such fresh
notification and depriving the expropriated owner of the benefit of the
appreciated value in the meantime. 1be real object of s. 4 of the impugn·
ed Act is thus to save the State from havmg to compensate for such
appreciation under the de.vice of validating all that is done under an
exhausted s. 4 notification and thus in reality fixing an an!e!rior date i.e.
the date of such a dead s. 4 notification for fixing the compensation. The
impugned Act thus suffers from a two fold vice : (i) that it purports to
validate acquisitions orders and notifications without resuscicating the
notification under i. 4 by any legisla.tive provision on the basls of which
alone the validated acquisitions, orders and declarations .can properly be
sustained and (ii) that its provisions are in derOgation of Art. 31(2) as
interpreted by this Court by fixing compensation on the basis of value on
the date of notifications under s. 4 which had become exhausted and for
keeping them/ alive no legislative provision is to be found in the impugned
Act. It is therefore not possible to agree with the view that the pUJ'P(lSe of
s. 4 is to fill the lacuna pointed out in Shamuis case nor with the vieJIV
that it raises a question of adequacy of compensation. The section under
the guise of validating the acquisitions, otders and notifications camouftages
the real object of enabling acquisitions by paying compensation on the
basis of values frozen by notifications under s. 4 which by Part acquisitions
thereunder had lost their efficacy and therefore required the rest of the
land to be notified afresh and paying compensation on the date of such
fresh notificatiollJl.
The fact that neither s. 4 nor s. 23 of the principal
Act are altered does not make any difference. (89 D-H, 85 HJ
Section 4 of the Anlending Act must therefore be struck .down as
invalid. [90 Al
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 114, 216, 223
and 252 of 1966 and 85 of 1967.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the
enforcement of fundamental rights.
C. B. Agarwala and K. P. Gupca, for the petitioners' (in W.P.s
Nos. 114, 216 and 252 of 1966 and 85 of 1967.)
R. V. S. Mani and K. P. Gupta for the petitioner (in W.P.
No. 223 of 1966).
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Niren De, Solicitor-General, B. R. L. Iyengar and R. N. Sachthey for the respondents (in W.Ps. Nos. 114 and 216 of 1966).
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Niren De, Solicitor-General, R. H. Dhebar lll)d R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 1 to 5 (in W.P. No. 223 of 1966 and
the respondents (in W. P. No. 85 of 1967).
R. N. Sachfhey, for respondent No. 9 (in W. P. No. 223 of
1966).
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M. K. Ramamurthi, Vineet Kumar and Shyamala Pappu for
respondents Nos. 12(a) to 12(d) (in W.P. No. 223 of 1966).
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UDAI RAM SHAlWA V. UNION (Mitter,/.)
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V. A. Seyid Muhammad and R.H. Dhebar and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 1 to 5 (in w. P. No. 252 of 1966).
P. C. Bhartari, for the intervener (in W.P. No. 114 of 1966).
The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J., BACHAWAT and MITTER,
JJ. was ·delivered by MITTER, J. The dissenting opinion of
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SHELAT and VAIDIALINGAM, JJ. was delivered by Sm!LAT, ].
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Mitter, J. This is a group of five Writ Petitions under Art.
32 of the Constitution challenging in four cases the validity of land
acquisition proceedings started by a notification dated November
13, 1959 under s. 4 ofl the Land Acquisition Act and declarations
contained in other notifications dated March 18, 1966 onwards
under s. 6 of the said Act and for other incidental reliefs including
the issue of appropriate writs for the purpose. Various persons
have joined as petitioners in three of the applications.
In Writ
Petition No. 114 of 1966 the petitioners number 61. They
all own lands in village Mandawali Fazilpur, on Patparganj Road
within the union territory of Delhi, the notification of the declaration under s. 6 having been made on March 18, 1966. In Writ
Petition No. 216 of 1966 there are 71 petitioners who also own
lands in the same village. Their complaint is based on the same
notification under s. 4 and a notification dated July 12, 1966 under
s. 6 of the Act. In Writ Petition No. 223 of 1966 the single petitioner is Pandit Lila Ram who owned lands in villages Masjid
Moth, Raipur Khurd and Shahpur Jat respectively withi.n the union
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territory of Delhi. His complaint is based on a s. 4 notification
dated September 3, 1957, a notification dated April 15, 1961
under s. 6 of the Act and several awards of Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi made in 1961. In Writ Petition No. 252 of 1966,
there are eight petitioners who owned lands in village Kotla at
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Patparganj Road within the union territory of Delhi. Their grievance is against s. 4 notification dated November 13, 1959 and a
notification dated June 14, 1961 under s. 6 of the Act. In Writ
Petition No. 85 of 1967 the sole petitioner is ·one Rai Bahadur
Sohan Lal who owned land in village Kilokri on the Delhi-Mathura
Road within the union territory of Delhi. His grievance is against
s. 4 notification dated November 13, 1959, a notification dated
July 27. 1961 under s. 6 of the Act and an award dated February
16, 1962.
Although there are some distinctive features in some of the
petitions to be mentioned later, the common attack is based on the
judgment of this Coun delivered on February 9, 1966 in State
of Madhya Pradesh v. V. P. Sharma('). That case arose out of
proceedings for acquisition of land in eleven villages in Madhya
Pradesh for the steel plant at Rourkela. There a notification had
been issued under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on May 16.
(I) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 557.
46
SUP&l!MB COUl.T UPOl.TS
[1968] 3 s.c.R.
1949 declaring that lands in eleven named vi~ages were .likely to
be needed for a.. public_ purpose i.e., the erect.ion of an uon and
steel plant. Thereafter, notifications were issue<;! under s. ~ fr<>!11
time to time and some lands in village Chhawam were acquued Ill
the year 1956. In August 1960 a fresh notification under s: 6 of
the Act was issued proposing to acquire Ac. 486-~ 7 of land Ill the
said village.
Some owners of the land in the village who were
affected by the notification filed a writ petition challenging the
validity of the notification under s. 6. The High Court accepted
their contention whereuJ>On the State of Madhya Pradesh came up
to this Court in appeal. It was held by this Court that ss. 4, 5~A
and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were integrally connected and
that acquisition always began with a notification under s. 4(1)
followed by consideration of all objections thereto under s. 5-A
and a declaration under s. 6, According to this Court, once a
declaration under s. 6 was made the notification under s. 4(1) was
exhausted and the latter section was not a reservoir from which
the Government might from time to time draw out land and make
declaration with respect to it successively. The ultimate conclusion was that there could be no successive notifications under s. 6
with respect to land in a locality specified in one notification under
s. 4(1) and in the result, the appeal of the State was dismissed.
The present Writ Petitions were all filed after the said judgment
of this Court.
The omnibus notification under s. 4 in four of these cases dated
November 13, 1959 covered an area of Ac. 34,070-00 marked as
blocks Nos. A to T and X in a map enclosed with the notification
excepting therefrom certain classes of lands, namely, (a) Government land and evacuee land, (b) land already notifi~ either under
s. 4 or under s. 6 of the Act for any Government scheme, (c) land
already notified either under s. 4 or under s. 6 for house building
co-operative societies mentioned in annexure (iii) to the notification
and the land under graveyards, tombs, shrines and those attached
to religious institutions and wakf property. The notification stated
that land was required by the Government at the public expense
for a public purpose, namely, the planned development of Delhi.
As already noted, there were sevetl!l notifications under s. 6 made
from time to time, the earliest one in this series of petitions being
dated June 14, 1961. It is clear that on the basis of the judgment
of this Court the validity of the notifications under s. 6 of the
Act after, the first of the series could not be upheld in a court of
law.
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On January 20, 1967 an Ordinance was promulgated by the
President of India styled The Land Acquisition (Amendment and
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Validation) Ordinance (1 of 1967). The scheme of the Ordinance
was that the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 was to have effect,
subject to the amendments specified in ss. 3 and 4 of the Ordin-
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UDAl :&AK SHARMA v. UNION (Mitter, J.)
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ance. Section 3 purported to amend s. 5-A of the Land Acquisition
Act (hereinafter-referred to as the principal Act) by enabling different reports to be made in respect of different parcels of land under
s. 5-A of the Act. Similarly, s. 4 of the Ordinance purported to
amend s. 6 of the principal Act by enabling different declarations
to be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of
land covered by the same notification under s. 4. Section 5 of the
Ordinance purported to validate all acquisitions of land made or
purporting to have been made under the principal Act before the
commencement of the Ordinance, notwithstanding any judgment,
decree or order of any· court to the contrary.
On April 12, 1967 Parliament passed an Act (Act 13 of 1967)
styled The Land Acquisition (Amendment and Short Title Validation) Act, 1967. Section 2 of this Act purported to amends. 5-A
of the principal Act to allow the making of more than one report
in respect of land which had been notified under s. 4(1). Section '3
similarly purported to amends. 6 of the principal Act by empowering different declarations to be made from time to time in respect of
different parcels of land covered by the same notification under
s. 4(1) irrespective of whether one report or different reports had
been made under s. 5-A sub-s. (2). Clause (ii) of s. 3 inserted a
new proviso to s. 6(1) reading:
"Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under section 4, subsection (1), published after the commencement of the
Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, shall be made after the expiry of three years
from the date of such publication."
As a good deal of argument turns on the interpretation of s. 4 of
the Amending Act, it is necessary to set the same out in extenso :
"4. (1) Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or
order of any court to the contrary,-
(a) no acquisition of land made or purporting to
have been made under the principal Act before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment aaa
Validation) Ordinance, 1967, and no action taken or
thing done (including any order made, agreement entered into, or notification published) in connection with
such acquisition shall be deemed to be invalid or ever
to have become invalid merely on the ground-
(i) that one or more Colleciors have performed the
functions of Collector under the principal Act in respect
of the land covered by the same notification under subsection (1) of section 4 of the principal Act;
(ii) that one or more reports have heen made under
sub-se9tion (2) of section 5-A of the principal Act, whe-
48
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 s.c.R.
ther in respect of the entire land, or different parcels
thereof, covered by th6 same notification under subsection (1) of section 4 of the principal Act;
(iii) that one or more declarations have been made
under section 6 of the principal Act in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification
under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the principal Act;
(b) any acquisition in pursuance of any notification
published under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the principal Act before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment artd Validation) Ordinance 1967.
may be made after such commencement and no such
acquisition and no action taken or thing done (including
any order made, agreement entered into or notification
published), whether before or after such commencement,
in connection with such acquisition shall be deemed to
be invalid merely on the ~rounds referred to in clause
(a) or any of them.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause
(b) of sub-section (1), no declaration under section 6 of
the principal Act in respect of any land which has been
notified before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation)
Ordinance, 1967,
under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the principal Act,
shall be made after the expiry of two years from the commencement of the said Ordinance.
'(3) Where acquisition of any particular land covered
by a notification under sub-section ( 1) of section 4 of
the principal Act, published before the commencement
of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation)
Ordinance, 1967, is or has been made in pursuance of
any declaration under section 6 of the principal Act,
whether made before or after such commencement, and
such declaration is or has been made after the expiry
of three years from the date of publication of such notification, there shall be paid simple interest, calculated
at the rate of six per cent per ;mnum on the market value
of such land, as determined under section 23 of the
principal Act, from the date of expiry of the said period
of three years to the date of tender of payment of compensation awarded by the Collector for the acquisition
of such land :
Provided that no such interest shall be payable for
any period during which the proceedings for the acquisition of any land were held up on account of stay or
injunction by order of a court :
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Provided further that nothing in this sub-section shall
apply to the acquisition of any land where the amount
of compensation has been paid to the persons interested
before the commencement of this Act."
49
Section 5 of the Amending Act repealed the Land Acquisition
(Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 and further provided that notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any
action taken under the principal Act as amended by the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the
principal Act as amended by. this Ace as if this Act had come
into force on the 20th January, 1967.
The petitions before us were amended by leave of the Court
so that the Validation Act of 1967 could. be challenged. Mr. C. B.
Agarwala who appeared for the petitioners in Writ Petitions
Nos. 114, 216, 252 of 1966 and 85 of 1967 raised the following
points in support of the petitions : (1) The Validation Act does
not revive the notification under s. 4 which had become exhausted
after the first declaration under s. 6 and no acquisition could be
made without a fresh notification under s. 4. (2) The Validation
Act violated Art. 31(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as it purported to authorise acquisitions without fresh notifications under
s. 4 thereby allowing compensation to be paid on the basis of the
dead notification under s. 4. It was argued that once a notification under s. 4 was exhausted Government had. to make a fresh
one under the said section; as a result thereof;compensation had
to be assessed on a different basis altogether. (3) The Validation
Act vioiated Art. 14 of the Constitution in various ways :-
(a) It made discrimination inasmuch as a notification under
s. 4 made before the commencement of the Ordinance had to be
followed by a declaration under s. 6 within two years of the said
date, whereas if a notification um!er s. 4 was made after 20th
January 1967 i.e. the date of the Ordinance, the declaration under
s. 6 could be made within a period of three years from th~ date
of the notification under s. 4. The discrimination lay in the fact
that whereas a declaration under s. 6 had to be inade in respect
of a notification under s. 4 bearing date subsequent to 20th January 1967 within three years, a much longer period of time might
elapse between a date of declaration under s. 6 and a notification
under s. 4 issued prior to the date of the Ordinance.
(b) If a notification under s. 4 was made after the date of the
Ordinance, compensation had to be paid on the basis of such
notification but if a notification had been made under s. 4 of the·
Act before the date of the Ordinance, compensation would be
awarded on the
basi~ of the exhausted notification under s. 4
however much time might have elapsed since the date of the dead
notification.
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SUPREME COUllT .REPORTS
[1968] 3 S.C.R.
(c) H coi:p.yensati()n ha. d not been paid before the Ordinance,
interest at 6% had to be paid to the owner of the land on the
.amount of compensatjon fixed, but if the owner had received.compensation before the date of the Ordinance, he had no clalDl to
interest although the acquisiti!Jn in both cases flowed from the
same notification under s. 4.
( d) It was open to Government to make a fresh notification
under s. 4 after the lapse of threo:> years from the date of the Ordinance and such notification might be issued after every period of
thro:>e years in any case where acquistion was not completed. In
such cases, owners of land would be substantially benefited by
the new notification under s. 4. But if a notification had been
made before the date of the Ordinance, the owner of the land would
receive compensation based on the old notification although a
period much longer than three years might elapse between the date
of the notification under s. 4 and a declaration under. s. 6, his
only solatium being interest at 63 p.a. on the amount of the compensation. This would result in discrimination inasmuch as a person affected by a s. 4 notification prior to the date of the Ordin-
:ance would be treated very differently from another person whose
land was acquired in terms of a notification made after the commencement of the Ordinance.
On the first point, it was argued by Mr.· Agarwala that ss. 2
and 3 of the Amending Act had no retrospective operation, that
there was no law which purported to validate retrospectively any
but the first report ma~e under s. 5-A of the principal Act or
aey but the first declaration issued under s. 6 of the Act and consequently there was no legal basis for the validation of such past
acts. by the operation of s. 4 of the Amending Act. It was therefore argued that the defect in the principal Act as pointed out by
this Court in V. P. Sharmcts case(') was not removed by
s. 4 of the Amending ~ct. It was urged that Acts so:>eking to
validate past transactions .~an only be effective if the amendment
introduced had retrospective operatio11 so as to cure the lacuna
in the enactment from a date anterior .to that of the impugned
transactions.
If the Amenc,!jng Act had no retrospective operation, it could not protect past traμsactions which would still have
to be declared invalid inasmuch as the notification under s. 4
made on November 13, 1959 having exhausted itself after the
first declaration under s. 6 was not resusciated by any provision
of the Amending Act.
On the second point, the broad contention urged was that the
amendment was hit by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution inasmuch
as its whole purpose was to avoid payment of enhanced compensation which would be necessitated if a fresh notification had to
be issued under s. 4. The notification dated November 13, 1959
(1) [19661 3 S.C-R. 557.
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51
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having spent itself, a fresh one in the normal course would have
to be issued and compensation be paid not on the basis of valuation on November 13, 1959 but on that prevailing at least 8 or
9 years afterwards which would be substantially higher. . It was
argued that acquisition on the basis of any declaration under s. 6
of the Act after the first one would in effect be providing for
8
compensation on the basis of a notification under s. 4 which had
no relation to the acquisition.
In other words, the date of the
earlier notification under s. 4 must be treated to be an arbitrary
date divorced from and· completely alien to the acquisition sought
to be made by a subsequent declaration under s. 6.
In such
circumstances, the ratio of a number of decisions of this Court
c
starting from that of The State of West Bengal v. Mrs •. Bela
Banerjee(') to .a recent judgment in Union of India v. ,Kamalabai
Harjivandas Parekh and others(') would apply. It is not necessary to examine all these decisions in detail. The notable deci·
sions to which reference was made at some length are P. V. Mudaliar v. Dy. Collector('), Jeejeebhoy .v. Asstt. Collector(') and
D
State of Madras v. D. Namasivaya Muda/iar( 6 ). It was argued
that though the Land Acquisition Acfwas saved by Art. 31(5)(a)
of the Constitution, any amendment thereto after the coming into
force of the Constitution had to pass the test of Art. 13 and Art.
31(2) would apply with full force to any amendment of the Land
Acquisition Act if as a result thereof a person expropriated was
being deprived of compensation, i.e., the just equivalent of the
E
property acquired.
TI\e point sought to be made was that the
notification of November 13, 1959 having exhausted itself, the
value of the property at or about that date would be illusory compensation in violation of Art. 31 (2) in respect of a declaration
under s. 6 made after the first one of the series. Reference was
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made to proceedings for compulsory acquisition of land in England under the Lands Clauses Acts under which "once the undertakers or authority .are authorised to purchase, the next step in
the normal course 1s to serve a notice to treat"-see Halsbury's
Laws of England, third edition, Vol. 10, page 60, Art. 97. - It
is pointed out in Art. 102 of the said book that
"The effect of serving a notice to treat is to establish a relation analogous in some respects to that of a
purchaser and vendor, a relation which binds the undertakers to take the land and binds the land-owner to
give up the land subject to his being paid compensation, but until the price is ascertained the land remains
the property of the landowner. Both parties have the
(!) [1954) S.C.R. 558.
(2) C.A. 1564/1966 decided on 7+1967,
(3) (1965] 1 S.C.R. 614,
(4) [i965] 1 s.c.R. 636.
(5) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 936.
52
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 3 S.CR.
right to have the price ascertained and the purchase
completed in manner provided by the Lands- Clauses
Acts."
It was said that the English procedure ensured the payment of
just equivalent of the property to the person who was deprived
of it and that issue of a declaration under s. 6 made years after
the notification under s. 4 the date· of which alone was to be considered for fixing the value of the property, ignored the rights of
the person to the lawful compensation aimed at by Art. 31 (2)
of the Constitution. Reference was made to the judgment of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ezra v. Secretary
of State for India(') where ori a reference to the sections of the
Land Acquisition Act as they then stood,< it was observed :
"that the expert official charged with the duty of fixing a value shouldl>e possessed of all the information
in the hands of the department, and should at the same
tiine avail himself of all that is offered at the enquiry,
his ultimate duty being not to conclude the owner by
his so-called award, but to fix the sum, which in his
best judgment is the value and should be offered."
On the question of violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution,
besides the general argument already referred to, it was urged
that in Writ Petition No. 85 of 1967 there was a further point
as to discrimination.
The facts laid in this petition are as
follows. · The petitioner was the owner of land measuring. Ac.
10--62 in village Kilokri.
He wanted to develop the land by
establishing a residential colony and selling the same out in plots.
For this purpose; he had spent a good deal of money and taken
enormous trouble and divided the area after development into
78 residential plots. In 1956 he had submitted a lay out plan
of the land in question for necessary sanction to the Delhi Development Provisional Authority.
On June 18, 1956 he was informed by the Delhi Development Provisional Authority that the
final lay out plan had becen approved by the said authority. In
September 1957 the said authority demanded from the petitioner
a security for Rs. 12,850-25 ,as a guarantee for carrying out the
development of the colony in accordance with the approved
standards and this sum was duly deposited by the petitioner.. On
September 15, 1958 the petitioner submitted service plans in
respect df his colony and these were dllly checked and found to
be in order : the case was ordered. to be placed before the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation for approval. By
December 24, 1958 the Standing Committee referred the case
R. 32 Calcutta 605 at 629,
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53
A back to the Town Planner for a scrutiny Qf the ownership documents. . The question relating to the proof of ownership was
settled on March 19, 1961. In the meantime, the notification
dated November 13, 1959 had been issued under s. 4(1) of the
Act. The petitioner duly filed his objections under s. 5-A of the
Act. By a notification dated July 1, 1960 published by the Delhi
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Administration the Chief . Commissioner, Delhi, withdrew the
land of 16 .. colonies from the acquisition out of the area covered
by the notification of November 13, ·1959 on the ground that
their lay out plan had been sanctioned by the Delhi Municipal
Corporation and as per general decision of the Standing Com•
mittee, Delhi Municipal Corporation, the petitioner was asked by
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the Town Planner by letter dated April 16, 1960 to submit a denotification certificate. to the effect that the land comprising the.
proposed lay out of his colony was excluded from the purview
of the notification issued under s. 4 of the Act. On June 14,
1961 the Deputy Housing Commissioner, Delhi Administration,
issued the first notification under s. 6 of the Act in respect of
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97 bighas and 4 biswas of land in village Kilokri as required by
the Governmenf for a public purpose at the public expense,
namely, the planned development of Delhi. The petitioner's land
was not covered by this notification. The Deputy Housing Commissioner, Delhi Administration, purported to. issue another notification dated 26/27th July, 1961 under s. 6 of the Act declaring
that land specified therein in village Kilokri was reqajred to be
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taken by the Government at public expense for a public purpose.
This notification covered·the. petitioner's land in question in village
Kilokri. On January 9, 1962 the petitioner was informed by a
letter issued by the office of the Town Planner, Municipal Corporation, Delhi,, that the. Standing Committee of the Municipal
Corporation by its resolution No. 1190 dated December 18, 1961
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had rejected the lay out plan of the petitioner's colony. According to the petitioner, this resolution went to show that his land
was sought to be acquired because it had not been de-notified
along with the land of the other colonies on the ground that the
Standing Committee. had rejected the lay out plan of his colony.
Thereafter the Land Acquisition Collector, De]hi, made an award
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No. 1276 dated February 16, 1962 with respect to the petitioner's
said land. In March 1965 the petitioner learnt about the notification issued by the Delhi Administration 0n July 1, 1960 under
s. 48(1) of the Act withdrawing the land of the 16 colonies men-
. tioned therein from the acquisition out of the area covered by
the notification dated November 13, 1959 on the ground that
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their lay. out plan had bee.n sanctioned by the Delhi Municipal
Corporation. By letter dated March 10, 1965 the petitioner asked
the Deputy H~using Commissioner, Delhi Administration, for
restoration of his land on the same basis because liis lay out plan
54
SUPREME COURT lU!POllTS
[1968] 3 s.c.R.
had been sanctioned before the s. 4 notification. This request was
however turned down by letter dated May 14, 1965 on the ground
that the petitioner's land had already been acquired and could
not be released. According to the petitioner, there was no basis
for treating his land in a manner different from that of the 16
colonies. This differential treatment has resulted in violation of
Art. 14 of the Constitution so far as the petitioner's colony is concerned.
Mr.