# UDAICHAND v. SHANKER LAL & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1978] 2 S.C.R. 809
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977-05-03
- **Case number:** Civil Miscellaneous Petition. No. B 8783 of 1977
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/udaichand-v-shanker-lal-others-7432
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

UDAICHAND
v.
SHANKER LAL & OTHERS
February ?, 1978
809
1M. H. BEG, C. J., P. N. BHAGWATI AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]
Special leave, revocation of under rule 6 of Order XLVII read with rule 10
of Order XVI '.Jf Supren1e Court Rules 1966~Special [ea1? obtained by 1nisreprese111a1ion of facts should be revoked-Constitution of India Article 136.
The respcndents are the legal representatives of one Surajmal, who had purchased suit shop by a registered sale deed dated 17-5-1965, from one Bhurdas to
whom the petitioner had executed t\VO rent notes, Exhibit 8 and Exhibit 10,
~pecifically mentioning the name of Bhurdas, as the owner of the shop. The
petitioner was notified of the said sale deed by a registered letter dated 25-6-1965
which was received by him on 29-6-1965. Surajmal terminated the tenancy of ~
the petitioner by a registered notice in July 1965, coupled with the demand for
arrears of rent.
Upon the failure to comply with the notice to quit, a suit w<ts
filed against the petitioner on 23-11-65. The petitioner contested the suit denying the execution of any rent note in favour of Bhurdas and pleaded having
taken the shop from another individual, Mahant Ran1 Ratan Das. In the
course of litigation, the petitioner prayed for an issue to be framed on the question Whether there was legal necessity for the transfer in favour of the plaintiff
'by Bhurdas, which was refused.
In revision against the said interlocutory order,
the High ·court refused to interfere taking the view that the petitioner was estopped from questioning the title of Bhurdas as his landlord by reason of the princi-
,ple laid down in Section 116 of the' Evidence Act.
Ultimately, upon the decree of eviction by the trial Court and affitmed by the
First Appellate Court, the defendant-petitioner again challenged the view that
be was estopped from questioning the title of Bhurdas, by way of second appeal
before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal quoting a recital
in Exhibit 10 wherein the petitioner has admitted the ownership of the shop by
Bhurdas to whom he would pay rent. The petitioner thereafter filed S.Peci~
leave petition and obtained ex-parte ad-interitn stay of eviction by allegmg in
Ground No. 7 that the rent note, Exhibit 10, no where stated that Bhurdas was
the owner of the shop and, therefore, there was no proper appreciation of the
·said Exhibit.
The respondent filed an application for revocation of the special leave peti-
:tion.
Revoking the special leave. and dismissing it the Court.
HELD : In dealing with application for special leave, the Court naturally
takes statements of facts and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their
face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by mak·
ing statements, which are untrue and mis-leading.
Supreme Court cannot permit abuiie of the process of law and of law courts. [812 BC]
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Hari Narain v. Badri Das, [1964] 2 SCR 203 @ 209 and Rajabhal Abdul
Rehman Munshi v. Vasudev Dhanjibhai Mody, [1964] 3 SCR 481 @ 488 & 493
G
followed and reiterated
The King v, Williams & Ors. [1914] I K. B. 608, The King v. The General
Commissioners for the Purposes of the Income Tax Acts for the District of Ken ..
sington, [1917] I K. B. 486 and Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhru Ram & Ora.
AIR 1951 All 746 referred to.
Observation :
Supreme Court cannot mitigate possible rigours of any law by permitting defaulting tenants to hold up their evictions indefinitely or for inordinately Ions
periods on tjimsy or uqsμstainable $rDPIJds.
[813 B-C]
H
810
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
A

## Text

UDAICHAND
v.
SHANKER LAL & OTHERS
February ?, 1978
809
1M. H. BEG, C. J., P. N. BHAGWATI AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]
Special leave, revocation of under rule 6 of Order XLVII read with rule 10
of Order XVI '.Jf Supren1e Court Rules 1966~Special [ea1? obtained by 1nisreprese111a1ion of facts should be revoked-Constitution of India Article 136.
The respcndents are the legal representatives of one Surajmal, who had purchased suit shop by a registered sale deed dated 17-5-1965, from one Bhurdas to
whom the petitioner had executed t\VO rent notes, Exhibit 8 and Exhibit 10,
~pecifically mentioning the name of Bhurdas, as the owner of the shop. The
petitioner was notified of the said sale deed by a registered letter dated 25-6-1965
which was received by him on 29-6-1965. Surajmal terminated the tenancy of ~
the petitioner by a registered notice in July 1965, coupled with the demand for
arrears of rent.
Upon the failure to comply with the notice to quit, a suit w<ts
filed against the petitioner on 23-11-65. The petitioner contested the suit denying the execution of any rent note in favour of Bhurdas and pleaded having
taken the shop from another individual, Mahant Ran1 Ratan Das. In the
course of litigation, the petitioner prayed for an issue to be framed on the question Whether there was legal necessity for the transfer in favour of the plaintiff
'by Bhurdas, which was refused.
In revision against the said interlocutory order,
the High ·court refused to interfere taking the view that the petitioner was estopped from questioning the title of Bhurdas as his landlord by reason of the princi-
,ple laid down in Section 116 of the' Evidence Act.
Ultimately, upon the decree of eviction by the trial Court and affitmed by the
First Appellate Court, the defendant-petitioner again challenged the view that
be was estopped from questioning the title of Bhurdas, by way of second appeal
before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal quoting a recital
in Exhibit 10 wherein the petitioner has admitted the ownership of the shop by
Bhurdas to whom he would pay rent. The petitioner thereafter filed S.Peci~
leave petition and obtained ex-parte ad-interitn stay of eviction by allegmg in
Ground No. 7 that the rent note, Exhibit 10, no where stated that Bhurdas was
the owner of the shop and, therefore, there was no proper appreciation of the
·said Exhibit.
The respondent filed an application for revocation of the special leave peti-
:tion.
Revoking the special leave. and dismissing it the Court.
HELD : In dealing with application for special leave, the Court naturally
takes statements of facts and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their
face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by mak·
ing statements, which are untrue and mis-leading.
Supreme Court cannot permit abuiie of the process of law and of law courts. [812 BC]
A
B
c
D
E
F
Hari Narain v. Badri Das, [1964] 2 SCR 203 @ 209 and Rajabhal Abdul
Rehman Munshi v. Vasudev Dhanjibhai Mody, [1964] 3 SCR 481 @ 488 & 493
G
followed and reiterated
The King v, Williams & Ors. [1914] I K. B. 608, The King v. The General
Commissioners for the Purposes of the Income Tax Acts for the District of Ken ..
sington, [1917] I K. B. 486 and Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhru Ram & Ora.
AIR 1951 All 746 referred to.
Observation :
Supreme Court cannot mitigate possible rigours of any law by permitting defaulting tenants to hold up their evictions indefinitely or for inordinately Ions
periods on tjimsy or uqsμstainable $rDPIJds.
[813 B-C]
H
810
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
A
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Miscellaneous Petition. No.
B
8783 of 1977.
(Application for additional grounds etc.)
In the matter of :-
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2478 of 1977
From the Judgment and Order dated 3-5-1977 of the Rajasthan
High Court in S.B. Civil 2nd Appeal No. 403 of 1975.
Badridas Sharma and S. R. Snivastava for the Petitioner.
Dr. L. M. Singhvi, S. M. Jain, Dalveer Bhandari and S. K. Jain for
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the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BEG, C.J. The plaintiff landlord had purchased a shop by a sale
deed dated 17th May, 1965, and then terminated the tenancy of the
defendant-petitioner by a registered notice in July, 1965, coupled with
a demand for arrears of rent.
Upon the failure of defendant to comply with the notice to quit a suit was filed against the defendant-petitioner on 23rd November, 1965. During the pend ency of that suit the
Rajasthan Premises (Control of, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950, was made
applicable by a notification dated 30th March, 1967, to Rajgarh town
where the shop is situated.
· The defendant petitioner had denied having executed any rent note
in favour of Bhurdas, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff landE
lord who had also notified the defendant petitioner of the sale in favour
of the plaintiff by a registered notice dated 25th June, 1965, received
by the defendant petitioner on 29th June, 1965. The defendant petitioner pleaded having taken the shop from another individual, Mahan!
Ram Ratan Das.
In the course of litigation, the defendant-petitioner had asked for
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an issue to be framed on the question whether there was legal necessity
for the transfer in favour of the plaintiff. In other words, he had
questioned, at that stage, the legality of transfer in favour of the .plaintiff on the ground of want of title in the plaintiff's predecessor-ininterest and also on the ground that the sale deed was invalid. The
High Court had, however, on a revision application preferred by the
defendant-petitioner rejected the demand of the tenant for framing of
G an issue on the question whether there. was legal necessity for the transaction. The ground for this rejection was that, as the deferidantpetitioner had obtained possession under a tenancy from Bhurdas, the
predecessor-in-interest of the present landlord, Surajmal, the defendantpetitioner Udai Chand, was estopped from questioning the title of his
landlord by reason of the principle laid down in Section 116 of the
Evidence Act.
H
Ultimately, upon the decree for eviction, the defendant-petitioner
had again challenged the view that he was estopped from questioning
the title of Bhurdas. On this question the learned judge who heard
the second appeal in the High Court observed :
'-
UDAI CHAND V. SHANKER LAL (Beg, C.J.)
"I would like to mention here that the learned Counsel
for the appellant did not challenge the correetness of the
finding that the rent notes Ex. 8 and Ex. 10 were executed
by the defendant in favour of Bhurdas. The learned Counsel
for the appellant also did not challenge the genuineness of the
sale deed dated May 17, 1965 executed by Bhurdas in favour
of Surajmal".
811
The High Court then quoted the recitals of Ex. 10 showing that the
defendant had admitted that the shop was owned by Bhurdas to whom
he would pay rent.
The defendant-petitioner's second appeal was,
therefore, dismissed by the High Court.
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The defendant-petitioner then filed a special leave petition in this
Court under Article 136. Ground No. 7 of the grounds of special leave
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petition was :
·
"That the Hon'ble Court should have appreciated that the
rent note Ext. I 0 nowhere states that Bhoordas was the owner
of the house and hence the inference of the Hon'ble Judge
that the petitioner had admitted that Bhoordas was the owner
of the shop, is not correct and hence the judgment under
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appeal deserves to be set aside".
On 17th May, 1977, the learned Vacation Judge granted special
leave to appeal to this Court and also an ex-parte order staying dispossession pending disposal of a notice of motion.
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The respondent's application for revocation of special leave to
appeal is now before us. The respondents have filed a true copy of
the rent deed Ex. 10. A perusal of it shows that there was a specific
mention of Bhurdas as the owner of the shop in dispute which the defendant petitioner had taken on rent. Hence, there could be no getting
away from the fact that the defendant petitioner had made a clearly
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false and misleading assertion in his special leave petition. We fail to
see what point other than the applicability of Section 116 of the Evidence Act could possibly arise in the case. The whole case was concluded by findings of fact. Nevertheless, the special leave petition was
granted in this Court. We think that the only reason why such leave
could have been granted was that it was misrepresented to the Court
that the rent note in favour of Bhurdas did not contain an admission
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of the ownership of Bhurdas. This was certainly a mis-statement of
a material fact which was of decisive importance in the case. In fact,
it was a serious misrepresentation on the> only point which could pO!!sibly arise in the case.
We have heard learned counsel for both sides. Learned Counsel
for the defendant petitioner is unable to give any explanation for the
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false assertion in ground No. VII of his special leave petition except
that the .learned Counsel had himself misunderstood the document,
because of other facts in the case. We are unable to accept this flimsy
explanation a~ a sufficient justificapon for the false assertion.
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812
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
[1978] 2 S·C·R·
Reference was made by the learned Counsel for the respondents to
The King v. Williams & Ors.( 1), and The King v. The General Commissioners for the Purposes of the Income Tax Acts for the District of
Kensington( 2 ), which are cases of misleading assertions by petitioners
made ill affidavits to support grounds for writ petitions. He also cited
Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achru Ram & Ors.( 3), on principles governing refusal of relief on writ petitions due to misrepresentation or suppression of material facts. More relevant is : Hari Narain v. Badri
Das(4), where Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for this Court said (at
p. 209) :
"In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court
naturally takes. statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair
to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements·
which are untrue and misleading''.
In that case, this Court revoked the grant of special leave despite the
fact that Mr. Setalvad, who had argued the special leave petition at the
time of its grant, had stated that, so far as he recollected, the special
leave. was not granted on the ground on which misrepresentation by
his client had taken place.
The last mentioned case was cited with approval in Rajahhai Abdul
Rehman Munshi v. Vasudev Dhaniibhai Mody( 5), where Sarkar and
Shah JJ. pointed out (at p. 488) :
"Exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 13 6 of
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the Constitution is discretionary, it is exercised sparingly and
in exceptional cases, when a substantial question of law falls
to be determined or where it appears to the Court that interference by this Court is necessary to remedy serious injustice.
A party who approaches this Court involr::inl! the exercise of
this overriding discretion of the Court must come with clean
hands. If there appears on his part any attempt to overreach
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or mislead the Court by'false or untrue statements or by withholding true information which would have a bearing on the
question of exercise of the discretion, the Court would be
justified in refusing to exercise the discretion or if the discretion has been exercised in revoking the leave to appeal
granted even at the time of hearing of the appeal".
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And, Hidayatullah J., said (at p. 493-494) there :
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·---
(1)
(2)
(l)
(4)
"The powers exercisable by thisl Court under Art. 136 of
the Constitution are not in the nature of a general appeal. They
enable this Court to interfere in cases where an irreparahle
[1914] 1 K.B. 608.
[1917] 1 K.B. 486.
A.I.R. 1951 All 746.
[1964] 2 S.C.R. 203 at 209.
(5) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 481 at 488 and 493.
UDAI CHAND V. SHANKER LAL (Beg, C.J.)
injury has been caused by reason of a miscarriage of justice
due to a gross neglect of law or procedure or otherwise and
there is no other adequate remedy.
The articJe is hardly
meant to afford relief in a case of this type where a party is
in default of rent because he withdrew a deposit lying in court
but who cannot, on the record of the case, be shown to have
withdrawn the amount. If the petition had mentioned that the
decision of the appeal court had proceeded on the ground that
the amount was taken out, it is difficult to imagine that this
Court would have given special leave to decide a question of
discretion".
813
We are constrained to observe that the tendency to file appeals in
hopeless cases only to gain time and ward off eviction has assumed
alarming proportions. We cannot mitigwte possible rigours of any law
by permitting defaulting tenants to hold up their evictions indefinitely or
for inordinately long periods on flimsy or unsustainable grounds. We
cannot permit abuses of the process of law and of law Courts.
Accordingly, we allow this application for revocation of special leave.
We hereby revoke the special leave granted and reject the special' leave
petition. We also vacate the stay granted. The application for urging
additional grounds is rejected. The plaintiff-respondent will get special
costs.
S.R.
Petition allowed.
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