# UDDAR GAGAN PROPERTIES LTD v. SANT SINGH & ORS

- **Citation:** [2016] 2 S.C.R. 214
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2016
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 5072 of2016
- **Bench:** Anil R. Dave, Adarsh Kumar Goel
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/uddar-gagan-properties-ltd-v-sant-singh-ors-30994
- **Pages:** 29

## Headnote

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Acquisition of land of original
owners-farmers for public purpose - issuance of acquisition
notification - Subsequently, builder entered into agreements with
some farmers whose land was under acquisition - Release of land
in favour of builder - Challenge to - Held: Power of the State to
acquire land for a public purpose has been used to facilitate transfer
of title of the land of original owners to a private builder to advance
the business interest of the said builder, which is npt legally
permissible - Acquisition of land is for a private company without
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following the statutory procedure for the said purpose - Entertaining
application for· release of land in favour of the builder who came
into picture after acquisition notification and release of land to
such builder amounts to permitting profiteering at the cost of
livelihood and existence of a farmer - State enabled the builder to
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enter the field after initiation of acquisition to seek colonization on
the land covered by acquisition - Such fraudulent and clandestine
exercise of power by the State is not permitted by law - It is in
violation of Public Trust Doctrine - High Court rightly held that
there was abuse of power in releasing land in favour of builder -
Notifications and awards in favour of original owners upheld -
Land covered thereby vests in the Development Authority free from .
all encumbrances - Release orders in favour of the builder quashed
- Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977,
Partly disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 There is no reason to disagree with the finding
recorded by the High Court that the instant case is a gross abuse
of law on account of unholy nexus of the foncerned authorities
and· the builder to enable the builder to profiteer. The land could
either be taken by State for a eompelling public purpose or
returned to the land owners and not to the builder. [Para 13]
(235-C]
214
UDDAR GAGAN PROPERTIES LTD. v. SANT SINGH
215 •
1.2 There could be no objection to acquisition of land for a
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co11.1pelling public purpose nor to regulated development of
colonies, but entertaining an application for.releasing of land in
favour of the builder who comes into picture after acquisition
notification and release of land to such builder tantamounts to
acquisition for a private purpose. It amounts to transfer of B
resources of poor for the benefit of the rich .. It amounts to
permitting profiteering at the cost of livelihood and existence of
a farmer. T.his is against the philosophy of the Constitution and in.
violation of guaranteed fundamental rights of equality and right
to property and to life. What cannot be done directly cannot be
done indirectly also. [Para 14]
(235~D-E]
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1.3 This apart, if State is to be party to directly or indirectly
select beneficiary of State.largesse - which in instant fact situation
the State certainly is - objectivity and transparency are essential
elements of exercise of public power which are required to be
followed. It is patent that the State has enabled the builder to
enter the field after initiation of acquisition to seek colonization
on the land covered by acquisition. Id absence of State's action,
it was not possible for the builder to enter into the transactions
in question which was follo,wed by withdrawal from acquisition.
But for assurance from some quarters, the builder could not have
made investment nor land owners could have executed the
transactions in question. Such fraudulent and clandestine exercise
of power by the State is not permitted by law. This is in violation
of Public Trust Doctrine.[Para 15] (235-F-H]
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1.4 Reliance on .Pol.icy dated 6th March, 2000 is
misconceived. The policy is applicable only to release of such
land from acquisition as is owned/ purchased by the developers
before the issue of notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. This condition was required to be strictly
·complied with and no person other tha

## Text

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[2016] 2 S.C.R. 214
UDDAR GAGAN PROPERTIES LTD.
v.
SANT SINGH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5072 of2016)
MAY13,2016
[ANIL R. DAVE AND ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Acquisition of land of original
owners-farmers for public purpose - issuance of acquisition
notification - Subsequently, builder entered into agreements with
some farmers whose land was under acquisition - Release of land
in favour of builder - Challenge to - Held: Power of the State to
acquire land for a public purpose has been used to facilitate transfer
of title of the land of original owners to a private builder to advance
the business interest of the said builder, which is npt legally
permissible - Acquisition of land is for a private company without
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following the statutory procedure for the said purpose - Entertaining
application for· release of land in favour of the builder who came
into picture after acquisition notification and release of land to
such builder amounts to permitting profiteering at the cost of
livelihood and existence of a farmer - State enabled the builder to
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enter the field after initiation of acquisition to seek colonization on
the land covered by acquisition - Such fraudulent and clandestine
exercise of power by the State is not permitted by law - It is in
violation of Public Trust Doctrine - High Court rightly held that
there was abuse of power in releasing land in favour of builder -
Notifications and awards in favour of original owners upheld -
Land covered thereby vests in the Development Authority free from .
all encumbrances - Release orders in favour of the builder quashed
- Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977,
Partly disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 There is no reason to disagree with the finding
recorded by the High Court that the instant case is a gross abuse
of law on account of unholy nexus of the foncerned authorities
and· the builder to enable the builder to profiteer. The land could
either be taken by State for a eompelling public purpose or
returned to the land owners and not to the builder. [Para 13]
(235-C]
214
UDDAR GAGAN PROPERTIES LTD. v. SANT SINGH
215 •
1.2 There could be no objection to acquisition of land for a
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co11.1pelling public purpose nor to regulated development of
colonies, but entertaining an application for.releasing of land in
favour of the builder who comes into picture after acquisition
notification and release of land to such builder tantamounts to
acquisition for a private purpose. It amounts to transfer of B
resources of poor for the benefit of the rich .. It amounts to
permitting profiteering at the cost of livelihood and existence of
a farmer. T.his is against the philosophy of the Constitution and in.
violation of guaranteed fundamental rights of equality and right
to property and to life. What cannot be done directly cannot be
done indirectly also. [Para 14]
(235~D-E]
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1.3 This apart, if State is to be party to directly or indirectly
select beneficiary of State.largesse - which in instant fact situation
the State certainly is - objectivity and transparency are essential
elements of exercise of public power which are required to be
followed. It is patent that the State has enabled the builder to
enter the field after initiation of acquisition to seek colonization
on the land covered by acquisition. Id absence of State's action,
it was not possible for the builder to enter into the transactions
in question which was follo,wed by withdrawal from acquisition.
But for assurance from some quarters, the builder could not have
made investment nor land owners could have executed the
transactions in question. Such fraudulent and clandestine exercise
of power by the State is not permitted by law. This is in violation
of Public Trust Doctrine.[Para 15] (235-F-H]
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1.4 Reliance on .Pol.icy dated 6th March, 2000 is
misconceived. The policy is applicable only to release of such
land from acquisition as is owned/ purchased by the developers
before the issue of notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. This condition was required to be strictly
·complied with and no person other than original owners prior to
acquisition could directly or indirectly avail of the said policy.
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Even a bona fide error .could not justify a patent illegality. In the
instant case, the builder itself did not have even an inch of land
before the notification. It is also patent that the application for
grant of licence, though purportedly made by the land owners,
has in fact been made by the builder. Referencti to the order of
the High Court in Writ Petition filed by the builder is of no avail
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to the appellant as it is only a direction to consider the claim of
the writ petition"-rs in accordance with law. The validity of claim
of the builder has not been adjudicated upon in the said order.
Even in order in the Writ Petition and other connected matters,
there was no consideration or adjudication of the issue.with regard
to the validity of release of land in favour of a builder who came
into picture after the acquisition notification, which took away
the basis of the claim for any relief. [Para 17] [236-B, C-G]
1.5 While it is true that a belated petition cannot be
entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is well settled
that this is only a rule of practice based on sound and proper
exercise of discretion and not a jurisdictional bar. Exercise of
discretion to .quash an illegal action based on fraud or abuse of
law even belatedly may not be liable to be interfered with under
Article 136 of the Constitution. The land sought to be acquired
for a public purpose is allowed to be transferred to private
persons, any administrative action or private transaction could
be held to be vitiated by fraud. There is no legal sanction for
such action. [Para 18] [236-G-H; 231-A-B]
1.6 There is no ground to interfere with the finding recorded
by the High Court that there was an abuse of power in releasing
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the State and the builder resulting in transfer nf land -from land
owners to the builder wa11 without any authority of law and by
colourable exercise of power, none of the contentions raised by
the builder could accepted. The issue of moulding relief
separately may be considered but the builder cannot be allowed
F • to retain the land acquired illegally. Undoing of such illegal actions
would clearly be in the interests of justice. The wrong has to be
remedied. (Para 22] (238-C-D]
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1.7 The High Court rightly observed that the notified public
purpose was valid but the subsequent events resulted in illegality.
The High Court also rightly held that it would be inappropriate
to release the land in favour of the builder by permitting the
builder to take over the property and granting licence for
colonization on the land covered by acquisition. Further, view of
the High Court that doctrine of severability cannot be invoked
and the entire acquisition was liable to be quashed needs
UDDAR GAGAN PROPERTIES LTD. v. SANT SINGH
217 •
modification. [Para 23] [238-F]
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1.8 Once release of land under acquisition is found to be
mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power, acquisition of released
land stands revived. The operative direction of the High Court
to quash the acquisition to the extent it has neither been
challenged nor concerns the land transferred to a private builder B
by abusing thf,' power of acquisition or on account of any
extraneous considerations does not appear to be justified.
Similarly the direction of permitting the builder to retain the land
of those land owners. who are not able to refund the sale
consideration received by them may permit the builder to illegally C
retain the land. Moreover, it may not be practicable in the present
fact situation to restore the land to the land owners but they can
be duly compensated while restoring the land to the State to use
it for notified public purpose. Person whose land is taken for
houses for others cannot be rendered homeless and unemployed.
This would be sheer exploitation. From the impugned judgment D
there is nothing to show that the developments which are now
relied upon had taken place on the date of filing of the writ
. petition. It was specifically held in the impugned judgment that
no development had taken place till the judgment of tire High
Court. Any subsequent transactions or development are of no
consequence for rights of parties. Any subseq.uent transactions
entered into by the builder cannot be taken into account and are
hit by the principle oflis pendens. In any case it was for the builder
to inform the third parties to whom the plots have been sold"that
the land was under litigation. If the third parties have purchased
the land knowing fully about the litigation, they have clearly taken
risk and their remedy will be only against the bUilder. If pendency
of litigation ,was suppressed, the third parties· can take their
remedies against the builder. Without prejudice to their said
private remedies, the court may try to balance equities to the
extent possihfe. If the authorities have proceeded to entertain
applications for licence to give undue benefit to the builder by
way of helping him to take overland undertbe cloud ofacquisition,
it may call for action against those who have misused their power.
[Para 25] [239-B-H; 240-A-B]
1.9 Land is· scarce natural resource. Owner of land has
guarantee agarnst being deprived of his rights except under a
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valid law for com pelting needs of the society and not otherwise.
The commercial use of land can certainly be rewarding to an
individual. Initiation of acquisition for public purpose may deprive
the owner of valuable land but it cannot permit another person
who may be able to get permission to develop c.olony to take
over the said land. If the law allows the State to take land for
housing neMs, the State itself has to keep the title or dispose of
land consistent with Article 14 after completion of acquisition. If
after initiation of acquisition, process is not to be completed, land
must revert back to owner on the date of notification and not to
any one else directly or indirectly.This is not what has happened.
However, having regard to the irreversible situation though in
normal circumstances land may have reverted to land owners,
the relief would have to be moulded.[Para 26, 28) [240-B-D, E-F)
1.10 Notifications dated 11th April, 2002, 8th April, 2003
and awards dated 6th April 2005 are upheld. The land covered
thereby vests in HUDA free from all encumbrances. HUDA may
forthwith take possession thereof. All release orders in favour of
the builder in respect of land covered by the Award in exercise of
powers under Section 48 are quashed. Consequently, all licences
granted in respect of the land covered by acquisition would stand
transferred to HUDA. Sale deeds/ other agreements in favour of
the builder in respect of the said land are quashed. The builder
would not be entitled to recover the consideration paid to the
owners but would be entitled to reimbursement. Creation of any
third party rights by the builder also stand quashed. The sale
consideration paid by the builder to the land owners would. be
treated as compensation under the award. The land owners would
not be required to refund any amount. The land owners who have
not received compensation would be at liberty to receive the
same. The land owners would also be at liberty to prefer reference
under Section 18 of the 1894 Act, if such reference has not been
earlier preferred. The builder would be entitled to refund/
reimbursement of any payments made to the State, to the land
owners or the amount spent on development of the land, from
HUDA on being satisfied about the extent of actual expenditure
not exceeding HUDA norms on the subject. Claim of the builder
will be taken up after settling claim of third parties from whom
the builder bas collected money. No interest would be payable
UDDAR GAGAN PROPERTIES LTD. v. SANT SINGH
219
on the said amount. The third parties from whom money has been
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·coll~cted by the builder would be entitled to either the refund of
the amount, out of and to the extent of the amount payable to the
builder. No interest would be payable on the said amount. [Para
29] [240-F-H; 241-A-F]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal,No. 5072
B
of2016
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.2013 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 19069 of 2011
WITH
C. A. NOS. 5073-77, 5079-85, 5086, 5087-5099 AND 5100 OF
2016
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Shyam Divan, Harish Salve, K.K. Venugopal, S. Guru Krishna
Kumar, Mahabir Singh, Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Kavin Gulati, Sr. Advs.
Anil Grover,.AAG, Tejveer Singh Bhatia, R.N. Karanjawala,Adv. Ms.
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Ruby Singh Ahuja, Ms. Deepti Sarin, Chah~! Chawla, Ms. Kanika
Agnihotri, Jai Shankar Singh, Upender Thak~·r, Ms. Aakansha Munjal,
(For M/s.Karanjawala & Co.), Ms. Kanita Agnohotri, Tejveer Bhatia,
Ms. Deepti Sarin,ChahafChawla, (For Mis. Karanjawala & Co.), Piyush
Hans, Satish Kumar,. San jay Kumar Vi sen, Ms. Nupur Singhal, Ms.
AnubhaAgrawal, Sanjeev K. Bhardwaj, Anil Karnwal, (For Sun ii Roy),
· Nikhil Jain,_ Gagan Deep Sharma, Ms. Preeti Singh, Tejveer Bhatia,
Gaurav Sharma, Rohan Swarup, Ms. Binu Tamta, Ms. Virula Sinha,
(For Ms. Sushma Suri), D.N. Goburdhan, M.L. Sharma, Dinesh Verma,
Subhasish Bhowmick, S.L. Aneja, Ajay Pal, Amit Mehra, P.P Nayak,
Siddharth Mittal, Surender Singh, Dr. Kailash Chand, Kamal Mohan
Gupta, Rohit Kumar Singh, Advs., them for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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ANIL R. DAVE, J. I.
Leave granted. Principal question
which has fallen for consideration is whether the power of the State to
acquire land for a public purpose has be~n used in the present case to
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facilitate transfer of title of the land of original owners to a private builder .
to advance the business interest of the said builder which is not legally
~ permissible. Further question is whether on admitted facts, the acquisition
ofland is entirely or partly for a private company without following the
statutory procedure for the said purpose. Further question is how in the
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facts and circumstances relief could be moulded.
2. Vide notification dated 11'" April, 2002, 850.88 acres of land
was proposed to be acquired for residential/commercial Sector 27-28,
Rohtak, Haryana by the Haryana Urban Development Authority under
the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 ('the 1977 Act').
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However, the final notification dated 8'" April, 2003 under Section 6 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('the 1894 Act'), according to the
impugned order of the High Court, was in respect of 441.11 acres. Award
dated 6"' April, 2005 was for 422.44 acres. Appellant -Uddar Gagan
Properties Limited ('the Builder') who is a Builder-cum-Developer
entered into collaboration agreements with some of the fanners-owners_
whose land was under acquisition on 02"' March, 2005 for development
ofa Colony in accordance with the Haryana Development and Regulation
of Urban Areas Act, 1975('the 1975 Act'). The Builder made applications
on and around 21" March, 2005 to the Director, Town and Country
Planning, Chandigarh, Haryana for grantoflicence to develop a colony
on land covering about 280 acres. The licences were granted on and
around 12'h June, 2006 and corresponding land was released from
acquisition. The licences were addressed to the owners but remitted to
the builder. This was followed by execution of sale deeds in favour of
the builder through power of attorney holder of the land owners.
3. It was on these undisputed facts thatthe High Court was called
upon to examine the questions on a group of petition/s by the land owners
which are framed in the impugned judgment as follows :-
[i] Whether the object behind the subject-acquisition was to
achieve a bona-fide public purpose or to use it as a cloak for
the private benefit of Builder-cum-Developer?
[ii] Whether the power of 'eminent domain' has been exercised
in violation of Articles 14, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution?
[iit} Whether it is lawful to enter into 'Agreement to Sell' or
'Collaboration Agreement· in respect of the land under
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acquisition and can an instrument of sale be executed in
respect of such land?
[iv] Whether a writ cou;t in exercise of its powers under Article
226 of the Constitution is competent to annul a saletransaction executed in violation of and 011 playing a fraud
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on the Statute?
UDDAR GAGAN PROPERTIES LTD. v. SANT SINGH
221
[ANIL R. DAVE, J.)
[v} Whether the orders granting Licenses or releasing the
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acquired land have been passed in favour of JI'" respondent
in accordance with provisions of 1975 State Act?
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[vi} Whether the petitioners have got locus standi to challenge
the. 'licences' or the orders of release of the acquired land in
favour of respondent No. 11?
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[vii} Whether writ petitions suffer from inordinate delay and
latches?"
4. It was held that in view of the scheme of the 1977,fict, the
notified public purpose for acquisition was covered by Section 3(f)(ii)
and (iv) of the 1894 Act, but the events following the notification for
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acquisition unfolded different story. After receipt ofnotices by the land
owners under Section 9 of the 1894 Act, calling upon them to appear
before the Collector for determination of compensation, the builder
suddenly surfaced in March, 2005 and applied for grant of licences for
setting up colony on the land ·covered by the notification and paid full
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sale consideration to the land owners. The Government files deceptively
projected the initiative .to release land at the instance of farmers and
owners while the real fact was to transfer the title of land to the builder.
Factual matrix based on record noticed in the judgment of the High
Court is as follows :-
'.'{60}. Awards No. 1, 2 and 3 were admittedly passed on .06'"
April, 2005 i.e. a day before the expiry of the statutory period
of two years. As per the categoric stand taken by the Land
Acquisition Collector in the written statement initially filed,
he took over the possession of land and handed-over it to the
Estate Officer. HUDA, Rohtak on that very day, i.e., 06th April,
2005. The official record also substantiates this plea of the
respondents. On doing so, the acquired land stood vested
absolutely in the State Government, free from all encumbrances
by virtue of Section 16 of the 1894 Act.
xxx xxx
[62}. The Government Files pertaining to the grant of licence
or release of land in favour of 11th respondent have been.
deceptively captioned as if the entire initiative to seek the
release of land is at the instance of the farmer-owners of the
acquired land. That very record, however, falsifies this facade.
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The application dated 21st March. 2005 [receipt No. 2461}
is on the letter-head of respondent No. JI. It is signed by one
of its Directors. Form 'LC-I', however. earlier thumb
impressions of previous owners along with the attested copies
of 'Power of Attorney' and 'Collaboration Agreements'
executed by them in favour of respondent No. II. The
Application Forms refer to deposits of demand drafts of lacs
of rupees. Who paid that requisite fee or statutory charges?
Was it by the farmers whose land already stood acquired and
·who had not received even a single penny of co_npp1sation?
OR was it deposited by respondent No. II? The copies of
Demand Drafts answer this query as every penny was
deposited by respondent No. JI only.· The illiterate or semiilliterate farmers had no knowledge except that their land
was under acquisition and there was a Builder willing to pay
them a price which was much more than the Government
compensation.
[63]. It is quite unfortunate and misleading that every relevant
Government file recites, say for example, that "Shri Surat
Singh and other individuals have submitted request on LC-I
for setting up of Residential Plotted Colony over an area
measuring 84. 04 Acres ....... the applicants have deposited an
amount of ''34, 091401- towards Scrutiny Fee and '42, 020001
- towards Licence Fee'. The said application was dealt with
first time vide office note dated 19th August, 2005 yet no
where it is disclosed that the land had already been acquired,
award passed and it stood vested in the State free from all
encumbrances. In the subsequent notings, the so-called
'applicants' disappeared and all the Officers starting from
the District Town Planner onwards, have worked over-board
. to contribute in favour of the claim of II th respondent. "
5. It was concluded :-
"[69]. From the facts noticed above, there can be no different
conclusion but to infer that though the proposal to acquire
land for the developmept of Urban Sectors at Rohtak was
mooted, approved and was taken to a logical conclusion for
a bona-fide public purpose. However, during the interregnum
and before passing the Award, an unholy nexus to promote
UDDAR GAGAN PROPERTIES LTD. v. SANT SINGH
223
[ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
the private interest of respondent No. 11 sprouted which de-
· railed the public purpose of acquisition and led to the misuse
of power under Section 48 of the 1894 Act. Respondent No.
11 exploited the moments of suspense and succeeded in
entering into distress-sale agreements with the desperate
. owners who were sandwiched and had no other choice but to
give in for a comparatively better offer.
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[70}. To say that the landowners entered into varied contracts
with Respondent No.11 voluntarily, willingly or without undue
pressure. is too farcical to be believed. The~~_is. a natural and
conventional bondage between the land and its tiller. A farmer
seldom sells the land save for the compelling reasons.
Agricultural being their only source of survival, the loss of
land is a terrible nightmare for any farmer. The Land
Acquisition Collectors never assess the compensation as per
actual market value of the land and the only yardstick to be
followed is the Collector :S rate fixed for the purpose of D
registration charges. The farmer can not sell the land.in open
market as on issuance of Section 4 notification all sale
transactions are invariably banned. These moments of fear
and anxiety must have prompted respondent No. 11 to indulge
in the best bargain. For the farmers the offer was like 'better
you give the wool than the whole sheep·. There was no free
trade for the farmers. Their choice was limited
: to accept
the State compensation at the Collector :S rate or a better offer
given by State sponsored private builder. There was inequality
of bargaining power. The determination of land value was
not at all in the control of farmers. They were gropping in the
dark. They had no clue that the land will be released. They
accepted the unreasonable and unfair unilateral terms and
lost their land. ·
{71}. The sale price of the land was determined by respondent
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No. 11 gnd not by the market forces. Given a choice between
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retaining their land or selling it to the Builder for the offeredprice, not a single farmer would have agreed to sell it. The
circumstances forced the /a11dow.1iers to accede to the offer
made by 11th respondent made. It is a proven case of
unconscionable bargain exerted through undue influence and
fraud, both. The sample 'agreements' on record truly reveal H
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that illiterate/semi-literate farmers were asked to sign the
documents on dotted-lines forcing them to sell out most of
their- ancestral holdings. The en-mass 'Agreements'
conclusively belie the plea of need-based bona-fide sales.
How the Courts should deal with the unconscionable contracts
" which are injurious to public good and public interest, has
been eloquently answered by the Supreme Court in Central
Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited & Anr. Vs. Brojo
Nath Ganguly fie Anr. {1986] 3 SCC, 156 saying that
" ...... Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees to all persons
equality before the law and the equal protection of
laws ........ This principle is that the courts will not enforce and
will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and
unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause
in "a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal
in bargaining power. ..... Fol' insta11ce, the above principle will
apply where the inequality of bargaining power is the result
of the great disparity in the eco11omic strength of the
contracting parties ......... !/ will also apply where a· man has
no choice or rather no meaningful choice, but 10 give his
assent to a contract or to sign 011 the dotted line in a prescribed
or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the
contract, however unfair, unreaso11able a11d unconscionable
a clause in that co11tract or form or rules may be ..... ".
[72]. If there were good and justifiable reasons, though
conspicuously missing from the record, for 11ot proceedi11g
with the subject-acquisitio11, the State Govemment as a
guardian of people:. rights could shelve off its previous pla11
to develop Sector 27-28 at Rohtak through the State age11cy
and release the land to its owners. It, however, did not do so.
Rather, the State u11leashed the threat of its mighty power
under the ruse of emi11ent domai11 a11d created a psycho-fear
i11 the mi11d of poor farmers that they would, if did not agree,
lose the land a11d its value both.
[7 3]. We may 11ow also deal with yet another vigorously argued
plea that the land was as a matter of fact released from
acquisition or most of the lice11ces were granted 10 respondent
No. 11 u11der the directio11s of this Court. The official
'-..,-
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UDDAR GAGAN PROPERTIES LTD. v. SANT SINGH
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[ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
respondents in the written statements have repeatedly referred
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to CWP Nos. 14451 to 14453 of 2010 which were allow.ed by
a learned Single Judge on 06'" December, 20 JO directing the
State and its authorities to extend the benefit of Section 48 of
the 1894 Act to the landowners and grant them licences. It is
pertinent to mention that while CWP No. 14451 of 2010 was
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filed by Mis Uddar Gagan Properties Private Limited -
respondent No. 11 along with s01i1e land-owners represented
it, in the 2nd case also the said Builder-cum-Developer was
one of the writ petitioner and the other farmers were also
impleaded "THROUGH THEIR POWER OF ATTORNEY
HOLDER - SHRI SANJAY JAIN ... ", namely, the authorised
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representative of respondent No. II. All the three writ petitions
were, thus, filed by respondent No. 11 only. It is interesting to
note that the learned Single Judge in his order dated 06th
December, 2010 has said that "Two sets of replies have been
filed by respondents no. 1 and 2. While admitting the entire
0
factual aver men ts made in the writ petiiions regarding the
ownership. of the acquired land by the petitioners, their
applications for grant of licence and release of the part of
the lan(l and grant of licence to the petitioners in CWP
No.14452 of 2010 and 14451 of 2010, it is stated that
possession of the land where the Rabi crop was standing could E
not be taken over by the Estate Officer, HUDA, Rohtak/Land
A~g_uisition Collector, Hissar as the land owners were granted
tirlle upto 30.4.2005 at their request. Subsequently, the matter
was referred to the Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak who vide
his report dated 17.3.2006 confirmed the possession of the
land owners upto October, 2005. Thereafter on account of · F
. status quo issued by the High Court in CWP Nos.1893 and
I 894 of 2006, possession of tracts o:f!Gnd for which licence
was granted could not be taken over from the petitioners".
[Emphasis applied].
[74}. It may be seen that 'the public purpose' of acquisition,
the factum of taking possession of the acquired land on 06th
April, 2005, non-existence of any Government policy or a
provision in the Statute to grant Licence for an acquired land
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etc. etc. were not disclosed before the learned Single Judge.
Only selective information convenient to the cause of H
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respondent No. 11 was brought on record. There is a serious
doubt on the nature of contest given by the official respondents
who took it like a 'friendly match'. The collusion between
respondent No. 11 and the senior functionaries is writ large
in the fact that despite unambiguous opinion given by the.
Advocate General, Haryana that it was a fit case to file Letters
Patent Appeal, the Department secured a contrary opinion
from the office of LR, Haryana and allowed the judgment of
learned Single Judge to attain finality. In this entire process,
the Constitutional Office of the Advocate General was also
belittled. We fail to understand as how the opinion given by
the Advocate General could be over-ruled by securing a
tai/iJr-m.ade opinion from an inferior authority.
[75]. The 'names of landowner-farmers were kept at the
forefront in the Government files or before the Court to hide
the identity of respondent No. 11 wherever possible and to
give a misleading impression as if the real beneficiaries of
State largess were the small time landowners. The fact. of the
matter_ is that the farmers have not got eyen an inch of the
released land, which has been formally transferred in favour
of respondent No. 11 through the Sale Deeds executed in
January, 2007, again by General Power of Attorney holders
of the farmers, namely, authorised representatives of
respondent No. 11. The only irresistible conclusion can be
that the farmers stood ousted from the scene since Marchi'
April, 2005 and it was the 11th respondent who masqueraded
for them, othenvise where was the occasion for the landowners
to execute Sale Deeds on 25th January, 2007 through the
Power of Attorneys obtained from them in March, 2005?
xxx xxx
[79 ]. The Vendors and the Vendee both had full and informed
knowledge of the fact that the transacted land had since been
acquired and Award also passed. The Vendee was aware of
the fact that the Vendors did not possess a clean title, yet the
Sale Deeds were presented and got registered, after about
two years of the ·passii1g of the Awards, on 06th April, 2005.-
Every such transaction in respect of the acquired land was
indeed null and void having no existence in the eyes of law.
'
UDDAR GAGAN PROPERTIES LTD. v. SANT SINGH
[ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
[80}. ............ Secondly, it is not a case of challenging the
Sale Dee~s for the breach of any bilateral terms and
conditions or on the conventional grounds where a question
of fact has to be proved. The incidental relief to declare the
Sale Deeds as null and void is an offshoot of the broader
issues raised by the petitioners including those hovering
around the systematic colourable exercise of power by the
State apparatus. A Constitutional Court while performing its
solemn duty as a Trustee of the fundamental rights of the
citizens shall thus be well within its right to lift the veil and
unmask the private ·ob)ect behind an acquisition carried out
in disregard to the. mandate of Articles 14 and 300-A of the
Constitution.
xxx xxx
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[82}. Power of land acquisition vested under the 1894 Act
could be invoked only in public interest and not for creating
land-bank in favour of respondent No. 11 through distress
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sales. The State cdn not force the landowners IQ surrender
their title in favour of and at a price to be dictated by a private
beneficiary. The notified public purpose was only a ruse to
enable respondent No. II to purchase the land at the lowest
possible price for maximizing the profiteering. It is so well
seflled that an action to be taken in a particular manner as
provided by a Statute, must be taken, done or performed in
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the manner prescribed or not at all. The .rule laid down by the
Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad Vs. King Emperor, AIR 1936
PC, 253 that "where a power is given to do a certain thing in
a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at
all", has been approved and further expanded by the Apex
Court in a catena of decisions. Whe1l an action is taken in
furtherance of explicit power given by a Statute, the legitimacy
of invoking such power shall depend entirely upon the extent
of achieving the net-end object for which the Statute enables
the exercise of such power. These principles have been violated
in whole-!!flme in the case in hand as the pretended public
purpose was neither intended nor was finally achieved.
[83]. There Is too much hype created by the official respondellfs
with reference to the legislative Scheme of the 1975 State Act.
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At the cost of repetition, it may be mentioned that applications
for the grant of Licences were moved mostly in Marchi April,
2005 though respondent No. 11 continued dropping in such
applications in the year 2006 also. All the Licences were
issued after passing of the Award in April, 2005 and before
the execution of Sale Deeds in January, 2007. The Builder
did not own an inch of land, yet every licence was addressed
to it and sent with a specific enclosure that respondent No. 11
was the sole owner of the licensed and released land. The
issuance of licence, in our considered, view, was a fraud played
on the policy behind the 1975 Act. We say so for the reasons
that Section 2[d] of the Act defines 'colonizer' to mean "'an
individual, company or association, body of individuals,
whether incorporated or not, owning land for converting it
into a colony ..... ". Section 2[k} defines the expression 'owner'
to include a person in whose favour a lease of land in an
urban area for not less than 99 years has been granted.
Section 3[1} mandatorily requires that "'any owner desiring
to convert his land into a colony" can make an application
for the grant of Licence. Sub-Section [2} obligates the Director
to inquire into "'title to the land". Similarly, Rule 3 of the
Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Rules,
1976 requires an owner of the land desirous of setting up a
colony to apply along with requisite documents including
"'copy or copies of all title deeds ... ". A mis-directed reliance
. -
has been placed on Rule 17 of these Rules which says ·that
"the Colonizer shalJ not transfer the licence granted to him
under Rule 12 to any other person without the prior approval
of the Director". It has already been dealt with in extenso
that the true owners were left with no choice but to enter into
the Collaboration Agreements with the Butfder, who was so
sure of obtaining the licences and getting the land released
that he ousted the owners from the consequential benefits of
the licences in 2005 itself by paying them "entire sale
consideration" for the land which had already vested in the
State free from all encumbrances.
xxx xxx
[87]. Repeated reference to Section 48[1] of the 1894 Act is
UDDAR GAGAN PROPERTIES LTD. v. SANT SINGH
229
[ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
also equally misconceived and misplaced. The Full Bench in
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Ram Murti Sarin s case [supra} says that if possession has
not been taken by the Land Acquisition Collector as per the
Award announced by it, the State Government can allow the
.acquisition proceedings to lapse without any notification
under Section 48 of the Act, if it is no longer interested in
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acquisition of land. Had the official respondents followed
the law in letter and spirit after arriving at the conclusion
that the State was not interested in acquisition of land, the
one and only consequence ought to have been to 'allow the
acquisition to lapse and resultant return of land to the original
owners. Here is a case where ariificial reasons were created,
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the records were fudged with the aid of the Deputy
Commissioner, Rohtak, to mislead the fact that the possession
of acquired land was not taken while ':'nnouncing the Award.
The responsible officers of the State Government, in their
anxiety to help out respondent No. JI, have completely
overlooked the interest of landowners or of the General Public
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to whom thousands of plots could have been allotted at a
fairly low price through the aegis of HUDA.
xxx xxx
[89}. The obje<:tion of delay or latches raised against the
petitioners merits rejection at-least on two counts. Firstly, it
·is decipherable from the Government record that the process
of granting licences or releasing the land commenced in the·
year 2006 and continued till the year 2011. In fact, till the
last date of hearing, the official respondents, for the reasons
best known to them, did not deem it necessary to bring it on
record as to how much land [out of 422.44 acres] has since
-beel) released in favour of respondent No. 11. It, however,
appears from the submissions made at the bar that a major
chunk of land has now goi1e into the hands of respondent
E
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No. 11 in due course of time except a few patches where the {i
State/ HUDA intends to develop 'public utilities' to facilitate
the said resprmdent. Secondly, no development ll'hatsoever
has been carried out till date and it was informed that the
land is still lying in its original form without any construction
having been made. (emphasis added) "
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, .
6. It is clear from the findings recorded by the High Court that the
transfer of title of land, covered by the notification for acquisition, in
favour of a builder, who sought release ofland for setting up of a colony,
was clearly to defeat the law and the notified purpose of acquisition. It
was observed that on this undisputed factual position, the plea of
alternative remedy of seeking annulment of sale deed by a suit could not
be entertained. Relief of setting aside of sale transaction was incidental
and consequential to the finding of illegal exercise of power to release
the land covered by acquisition proceedings to the builder who was not
the original owner. It became necessary to undo the illegality and
systematic fraud. It was undisputed that the builder did not own an inch
ofland prior to acquisition and it was only the land acquisition proceedings
coupled with the capacity of the builder to seek licences for colonization
ofland covered by acquisition which enabled itto acquire title. Contrary
to the legal mandate of requirement of a colonizer owning of its own
land, ownership ofland could not be allowed to be acquired by the sword
ofacquisition on the head of the original owners.
7. The High Court has observed that circumstances of the situation
which created helplessness for the farmers to surrender their rights and
unholy nexus of the builder with the officers of the Government resulted
in constitutional guarantee of equality and fair play being defeated and
acquisition power being abused to transfer the land to the builder in the
name of acquisition by the State for public purpose.
8. On the aspect of moulding the relief, following operative order
was passed :-
{9./ }. In the light of the discussion and for the reasons stated
above, we allow these writ petitions in the following terms:-
[i] Since the subject acquisition neither intended nor has
achieved its 'public purpose', the notifications dated 1 l'"
April, 2002 and 8th April, 2003 issued under Sections ./ and
6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 189./ are hereby quashed in
entirety. As a result thereto, the subsequent awards passed on
06th April, 2005 can not sustain and are consequently
quashed;
[ii} As a necessary corollary, the licenc.es granted to
respondent No. 11- Builder-cum-Developer dated 12'" June,
2006, 1st August, 2006, 1st September, 2006 or issued
UDDAR GAGAN PROPERTIES LTD. v. SANT SINGH
231
[ANIL R.