# Ujagar Singh v. The State of Punjab. Chandrasekhara Aiyar /

- **Citation:** [1952] 1 S.C.R. 765
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1950-05-17
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1951
- **Bench:** Meher Chand Mahajan, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, BosE
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ujagar-singh-v-the-state-of-punjab-chandrasekhara-aiyar-65
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Civil Procedure code, 1908, s. 60 (k)-Provident Funds Act
(XIX of 1925), ss. 2 (a), 3 (1)-Compulsory deposit in Provident
Fund-Exemption
from
attachment-Appointment of
receiverLegality.
A receiver cannot be appointed in execution of a decree in
respect of a compulsory deposit in a Provident Fund due to the
judgment debtor.
Whatever doubts may have existed under the
earlier Act of 1897, the definition of "compulsory deposit"
in
s. 2 (a) of the Provident
Funds Act (XIX of 1925) clearly
includes deposits remaining to the credit of
the
subscriber or
depositor after he has retired from service.
Arrears of salary and allowances
stand
upon
a
different
footing and are not exempt from being
proceeded against in
execution.
CML
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeal
No. 132 of 1951.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Decree dated 17th May, 1950, of the High Court of
Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Sinha J.) in
Appeal No. 41 of 1950 arising out of the Order of
1951
Ujagar Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
1952
May 21.
The Union of
India
v.
Hira Devi
and Another.
-·-
Chandra-
. sekhara
Aiyar /.
766
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1952]
Banerjee J. dated 19th December, 1949, in Suit No.
1132 of 1948.
M.
C. Setalvad,
Attorney-General
for India
(B.
·Sen, with him) for the appellant.
Naziruddin Ahmad (Numddin Ahmad, with him)
for respondent No. I.
S. N. Mukherjee for respondent No. 2.
1952.
May 21.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYER
J.-This
Court
granted special
leave to appeal
m
this
dse
on
the
Government agreel11g to pay the costs of the respondents in respect of the appeal in any event.
-
The decree-holder was a lady named Hira Devi.
The judgment debtor was one Ram Grahit Singh, who
retired on 31st January, 1947, as a Head Clerk m the
Dead Letter Office, . Calcutta. A money decree was
obtained
against him
on
30th July,
1948.
On
!st
February, 1949, a receiver was appointed for collecting the moneys standing to the credit of the judgment-debtor in a Provident Fund with the Postal
authorities.
The Union of India intervened with an
application dated
20th September,
1949, for
setting
aside the order appointing the receiver.
Mr.
Justice
Banerjee
dismissed
the
application
of the Union of India, holding that a receiver could
be appointed
for collecting
the
fund. On
appeal,
Trevor Harries C. J. and Sinha J. upheld his view.
From the facts
stated in the petition filed by
the Union of India before the High Court, it apears
that a sum of Rs. 1,394-13-1 represents arrears of pay
and allowances due to the judgment-debtor and a sum
of Rs.
l,563, is the compulsory deposit in
his P10vident
Fund
account.
Different c011s1derations
will
apply to the two sums, though in the lower court the
parties seem to have proceeded on the footing that
the entire sum was a "compulsory deposit" within the
meaning of the Provident Funds Act, 1925.
The
main question
to be decided is
whether
a
receiver can be appointed in execution in respect of
Provident Fund money due to the judgment-debtor.
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
767
Compulsory deposit and other ,sums in or derived from any fund to which the Provident Funds Act
XIX of 1925 applies are exempt from attachment and
sale under section 60 (k), Civil Procedure Code.
" Compulsory
deposit "
is thus
defined
in section 2(a) of the Provident Funds Act XIX of 1925:-
"Compulsory deposit means a subscription to,
or
deposit in a Provident Fund which under the rules of
the Fund, is not, until the happening of some specified
contingency repayable on demand otherwise than for
the purpose of the payment of premia in respect of a
policy of life insurance (or the payment of subscriptions or premia in respect
of a family pension fund),
and includes
any
contribution
and any interest or
increment which has accrued under the rules of the
fund on any such
subscription,
deposit,
contribution,
and also any such subscription, deposit, con

## Text

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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
765
PATANJALI SAsTRr J.-I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.
DAs J.-In view of the ma=ority
decision in Case
No. 22 of 1950 (The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram
Sridhar Acharya), I concur in the order proposed by
my learned brother.
Order accordingly.
Petition No. 194 of 1950
Agent for the petitioner : R. R. Biswas.
Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.
Agent for the intervener : P. A. Mehta.
Petition No. 167 of 1950
Agent for the petition: R. S. Narula.
Agent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta.
THE UNION OF INDIA
v.
HIRA DEVI AND ANOTHER.
[MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
and BosE, JJ.]
Civil Procedure code, 1908, s. 60 (k)-Provident Funds Act
(XIX of 1925), ss. 2 (a), 3 (1)-Compulsory deposit in Provident
Fund-Exemption
from
attachment-Appointment of
receiverLegality.
A receiver cannot be appointed in execution of a decree in
respect of a compulsory deposit in a Provident Fund due to the
judgment debtor.
Whatever doubts may have existed under the
earlier Act of 1897, the definition of "compulsory deposit"
in
s. 2 (a) of the Provident
Funds Act (XIX of 1925) clearly
includes deposits remaining to the credit of
the
subscriber or
depositor after he has retired from service.
Arrears of salary and allowances
stand
upon
a
different
footing and are not exempt from being
proceeded against in
execution.
CML
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeal
No. 132 of 1951.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Decree dated 17th May, 1950, of the High Court of
Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Sinha J.) in
Appeal No. 41 of 1950 arising out of the Order of
1951
Ujagar Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
1952
May 21.
The Union of
India
v.
Hira Devi
and Another.
-·-
Chandra-
. sekhara
Aiyar /.
766
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1952]
Banerjee J. dated 19th December, 1949, in Suit No.
1132 of 1948.
M.
C. Setalvad,
Attorney-General
for India
(B.
·Sen, with him) for the appellant.
Naziruddin Ahmad (Numddin Ahmad, with him)
for respondent No. I.
S. N. Mukherjee for respondent No. 2.
1952.
May 21.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYER
J.-This
Court
granted special
leave to appeal
m
this
dse
on
the
Government agreel11g to pay the costs of the respondents in respect of the appeal in any event.
-
The decree-holder was a lady named Hira Devi.
The judgment debtor was one Ram Grahit Singh, who
retired on 31st January, 1947, as a Head Clerk m the
Dead Letter Office, . Calcutta. A money decree was
obtained
against him
on
30th July,
1948.
On
!st
February, 1949, a receiver was appointed for collecting the moneys standing to the credit of the judgment-debtor in a Provident Fund with the Postal
authorities.
The Union of India intervened with an
application dated
20th September,
1949, for
setting
aside the order appointing the receiver.
Mr.
Justice
Banerjee
dismissed
the
application
of the Union of India, holding that a receiver could
be appointed
for collecting
the
fund. On
appeal,
Trevor Harries C. J. and Sinha J. upheld his view.
From the facts
stated in the petition filed by
the Union of India before the High Court, it apears
that a sum of Rs. 1,394-13-1 represents arrears of pay
and allowances due to the judgment-debtor and a sum
of Rs.
l,563, is the compulsory deposit in
his P10vident
Fund
account.
Different c011s1derations
will
apply to the two sums, though in the lower court the
parties seem to have proceeded on the footing that
the entire sum was a "compulsory deposit" within the
meaning of the Provident Funds Act, 1925.
The
main question
to be decided is
whether
a
receiver can be appointed in execution in respect of
Provident Fund money due to the judgment-debtor.
.,
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' .._.
. '
•
. .
..
-
' •
-.
) -
•
\
.
., ..
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
767
Compulsory deposit and other ,sums in or derived from any fund to which the Provident Funds Act
XIX of 1925 applies are exempt from attachment and
sale under section 60 (k), Civil Procedure Code.
" Compulsory
deposit "
is thus
defined
in section 2(a) of the Provident Funds Act XIX of 1925:-
"Compulsory deposit means a subscription to,
or
deposit in a Provident Fund which under the rules of
the Fund, is not, until the happening of some specified
contingency repayable on demand otherwise than for
the purpose of the payment of premia in respect of a
policy of life insurance (or the payment of subscriptions or premia in respect
of a family pension fund),
and includes
any
contribution
and any interest or
increment which has accrued under the rules of the
fund on any such
subscription,
deposit,
contribution,
and also any such subscription, deposit, contribution,
interest or increment remaining to the credit of the
subscriber · or depositor after the happening of any
such conti:hgency."
Such a deposit cannot be assigned or charged
and is not liable to any attachment.
Section 3 (1) of
the said Act provides :-
3. (1) "A compulso1ry deposit
in any Government or Railway Provident Fund shall not in
any
way be capable of being assigned or charged and shall
not be liable tO attachment under any decree or order
of any CivH, Revenue or Criminal Court . in respect of
any debt or liability incurred by the subscriber or
depositor, and neither the Official Assignee nor any
receiver
appointx:d
under the
P110vincial
Insolvency
Act, 1920 shall be entitled to, or have any claim on
any such compulsory deposit."
It is obvious that
the
prohibition
against
the
assignment or the attachment of such compulsory deposits is based on grounds of public policy.
Where
the interdiCtion
is
absolute, to allow
a
judgment
creditor to get at the fund indirectly by means of the
appointment of a receiver would be to circumvent the
statute. That such a frustration of the very object Qf
1952
The Union of
India
v.
Hira Devi
and Another.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
1952
The Union of
India
v.
Hira Devi
·and Another.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar ].
768
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952)
the legislation should not be permitted was laid down
by the Court of Appeal as early as 1886 in the case of
Lucas v. Harris('), where the question arose with reference to a pension payable to two officers of Her
Majesty's Indian Army. Section 141 of the Army Act,
1881 provided :
"Every assignment of, and every charge on, and
every agreement to assign or charge any ...... pension
payable to any officer or soldier of Her Majesty's
forces, or any pension payable to any such officer
...... or to any person in respect of any military
service, shall except so far as the same is made in
pursuance of a royal warrant for the benefit of the
family of the person entitled thereto, or as may be
authorised by any Act for the time being in force,
be void."
In that case, the appointment of a receiver to collect
the pension was in question. Lindley, L.J., observed :-
"In considering whether a receiver
of a retired
officer's pension ought to be appointed, not only the
language but the object of section 141 of the Army
Act, 1881 must be looked to; and the object of the
section would, in my opinion, be defeated, and not
advanced, if a receiver were appointed."
Lord Jusdce Lopes reiterated the same thing in
these words :-
"It is beyond dispute that the object of the legislature was to secure for officers who had served their
country, a prv 'ision which would keep them from
want and would enable them to retain a respectable
social position.
I do not see how this object could be
effected
unless those pensions were made absolutely
inalienable, preventing not only the
person himself
assigning his interest in the pension, but also
preventing the pension being seized or attached under a
garnishee order, or by an execution or other process of
law.
Unless
protection is
given
to this extent the
object which the legislature had in view is frustrated,
and a strange anomaly would exist.
A person with a
( 1) 18 Q.B.D. 127.
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
769
pension would not bt able to utilise his pension to
pay a debt beforehand, but immediately his creditor
had obtaineci judgment might be deprived of his
pension by attachment, equitable execution, or
some
other legal process. It is impossible . to suppose that
the legislature could have intended such an anomaly."
Section
51
of
the
Civil
Procedure
Code
no
doubt recognises five modes of execution of a decree
and one of them is the appointment of a receiver.
Instead of executing the decree by attachment and
sale, the Court may appoint a receiver but this can
only be in a case where a receiver can be appointed.
The Provident Fund money is exempt from attachment and is inalienable.
Normally, no execution can
lie against such a sum.
The learned Judges in the Court below rested
their view on the authority of the decision of the
Privy Counc'il in Rajindra Narain Singh v. Sundara
Bibi(1).
This decision has caused all the defficulty
and has created a current of thought that even though
the property may not itself be liable to attachment, a
receiver can be appointed to take possession of the
same and to apply the income or proceeds in a particular manner including the payment of the debts of
the judgment-debtor.
It is necessary, therefore,
to
examine the facts of the case carefully and find out
whether the proposition sought to be deduced from it
can be justified as a principle of general application
apart from the particular circumstances. The original
decision of the Allahabad High Court from which the
appeal was
taken before the Judicial Committee is
reported in Sundar Bibi v. Raj Indranarai:n Singh(2).
In a suit between ,two brothers there was a compromise.
to
the effect
that the
judgment-debtor shall
possess and enjoy the
immoveable properties mentioned in the list and estimated to yield a net profit of
Rs. 8,000 a year without power of transfer during the
lifetime of his brother, Lal Bahadur Singh, he undertaking to pay certain public exactions and other dues
(1) (1925) 52 I.A. 262.
(2) (1921) 43 All. 617.
1952
The Union of
India
v.
Hira Devi
and Another.
Chandrasek hara·
Aiyar /.
1952
Tlte Union of
India
v.
Hjra Devi
oad Another.
Chandrasek_hara
Aiyar ].
770
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
to his brother, Lal Bahadur Singh, amounting in all to
Rs. 7,870-11-6, in four equal instalments
per annum,
each
oo be paid a month before the Government
revenue, falls due. The arrangement was stated to be
"in lieu of his maintenance". When the judgment
debtor's interest in the properties was sought to be
attached and sold, he raised the objection that ·they
were exempt from attachment and sale by · reason of
clause (n) of Section 60 of the Code which speaks of
"a right to future maintenance". The High Court
held that the words employed in sub-clause (n) contemplated a bare right of maintenance and nothing
more-a right enforceable by law and payable in the
future-and that inasmuch as in the case before them
the properties had been
assigned to the judgmentdebtor in lieu of his maintenance, it was not such a
right which alone was exempt from attachment and
sale. They thought that it was a fit case for the
appointment of a receiver and remitted the execution
petition to the subordinate judge for the appointment
of a receiver after determining the allowance payable
to the judgment-debtor for his maintenance.
With
this
conclusion of
the
High
Court
the
Judicial Committee concurred. But they also expressed the view that they did not agree with the High
Court on the subject of the actual legal position of the
right of
maintenance conferred upon the judgmentdebtor. Taking the prayer of the judgment creditor
to
be that the right of
maintenance
be proceeded
against, their
Lordships observed that the right was
in point of law not attachable and not saleable. If it
was an assignment of properties for maintenance, the
amount of which was not fixed, it was open to the
judgment-creditor to get a re.ceiver appointed subject
to the condition
that whatever may remain after
making provision for the maintenance of the judgmentdebtm should be made available for the satisfaction of
the decree debt. The right to maintenance could not
be attached or sold.
In so far as the decree-holder
sought oo attach this right and deprive the judgmentdebtor of his maintenance, he was not entitled to do
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
771
so, but where his application for the appointment of a
receiver was more comprehensive and sought to get at
any remaining income after satisfying the maintenance
claim, the appointment of a receiver for the purpose
was justified.
The decision of the Privy Council does
not appear to lay down anything beyond this. In our
opinion, it is not an authority for the general proposir
tion that even though there is statutory
prohibition
against
attachment
and
alienation
of a particular
species of property, it can be reached by another mode
of execution, viz., the appointment of a receiver.
On
the other hand, it was pointed out in the case of
Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad
v.
Karnani
Industrial Bank Limited (1) that as the Nawab had a disposing power over the rents and profits assigned to him
for the maintenance of his title and dignity without
any power of alienation of the properties, no question
of public policy arose and tl1at a receiver of the rents
and profits was rightly appointed. This line of reasoning indicates clearly that in cases where there is no
disposing power and the statute imposes an absolute
bar on alienation or attachment on grounds of public
policy, execution should not be levied.
Understood
as
mentioned
above,
Rajindra
Narain Singh's case creates no difficulty.
We shall
now refer to the decision that followed or distinguish -
ed the same. In The Secretary of State for India in
Council v. Bai Somi and Another(2), the maintenance of
Rs.
96 per annum was made urider a compromise
decree a charge on the house which was to belong to
the defendant. The court-fee due to Government was
sought to
be recovered
by attachment of the house.
The right to attach was negatived; the house could
not be attached as it belonged to the defendant; and
the
plaintiff's right to maintenance could not be
attached under section 60, clause (1). In cleating with
a prayer made by the Government for the first time in
the High Court for an order appointing a receiver of
the
plaintiff's
maintenance,
Beaumont C. J.
and
(1) (1931) 58 I.A. 215.
(') (1933) 57 Bom. 507.
1952
The Union of
India
v.
Hira Devi
and Another.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
1952
The Union of
India
v.
Hira Devi
and Another.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
772
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
another learned Judge held that even this could not be
done. The Chief Justice said "If these exempted payments can be reached in execution by the appointment
of a receiver by way of equitable execution, the protection afforded by the section is to a great extent lost".
They steered clear of Rajindra Narain Singh's case by
stating that there was in the judgment of
the Board no
clear expression of
opinion and there was
doubt
whether the allowance then in question was maintenance or not. The Madras High Court in The Secrt:·
tary
of State for
India in Council v. Sarvepalli Venkata Lakshmamma (') has dealt with a question similar
to the one in The Secretary of State for India in Council
v. Bai Somi and Another (') but it merely referred to
the ruling
in Rajindra Narain Singh's case without
dealing with the facts or the reasoning. It throws no
light.
The case in Janakinath v. Pramatha Nath(")
was a decision by a single Judge and stands on the
same footing as the Madras case. There is nothing
else on this subject in the judgment than the short
observation, "the Provident Funds Act does not in my
opinion prohibit the appointment of a receiver of the
sum lying to the credit of the deceased in the Provident Fund." Possibly the view was taken that on the
death of the employee and in the absence of any
dependent or nominee becoming entitled to the fund
under the rules, it became money payable to the heirs
of the deceased and lost its original nature of being a
compulsory deposit.
The case of Dominion of India,
representing E. I. Ry. Administration and another v.
Ashutosh Das and Others'(4 )
refers no doubt to Rajin-·
dra Narain Singh's case but does not discuss it in any
detail.
Roxburgh J. merely states "surely it is an
improper use of that equitable remedy to employ it ID
avoid a very definite bar created by statute law to
achieving the very object for which the receiver i•
appointed".
The decision in Ramprasad v. Motiram(')
related to the attachment and sale in execution of a
( 1) (1926) 49 Bad. 567.
( 2) (1933) 57 Born. 507.
( 3) (1940) 44 C.W.N. 266.
(4) (1950) 54 C.W.N. 254.
( 5) (1946) 25 Pat. 705
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
773
money decree of the interest of a khoposhdar in a
khorposh grant which was heritable and transferable.
It affords us no assistance.
The learned counsel for the respondents relied on
three decisions of the Privy Council as lending him
support.
One is
Nawab
Bahadur of Murshidabad's
case(1)
already
referred to.
Vibhudapriya
T hirtha
Swamiar
v.
Laksh.mindra Thirtha Swamiar(2)
and
Niladri Sahu v. Mahant Chaturbhuj Das and Others(3)
are the other two cases and they relate to maths and
alienations by way of mortgage of endowed properties
by the respective mahants for alleged necessity of the
institutions.
They bear no analogy to the present
case. The
mahants had a beneficial interest in the
properties after being provided with maintenance. A
receiver could be appointed in respect of such beneficial interest so that the decrees
obtained may be
satisfied.
With great respect to the learned
Judges of the
Court below, we are of the opinion that execution
cannot be sought against the Provident Fund money
by way of appointment of a receiver.
This conclusion does not, however, apply to the
arrears of salary and allowance due to the judgmentdebtor as they stand upon a different legal footing.
Salary is not attachable
to
the
extent
provided
in Section
60,
clause
(1), Civil
Procedure
Code,
but there is no such exemption as regards arrears of
salary.
The learned
Attorney-General conceded that
this portion of the amount can be proceeded against
in execution.
The Provident Fund
amount
was
not
paid
to
the subscriber after the date of his retirement 'in
January 1947.
This, however, does not make it any
. the less a compulsory deposit within the meaning of
the Act. Whatever doubt may have existed under
the earlier Act of 1897 the decisions cited for the respondent, Miller v. B. B. & C. I. Railway(4 )
and Raj
(1) (1931) 58 I.A. 215.
(8) (1926) 53 I.A. 253.
( 2) (1927) 54 I.A. 228,
( 4) (1903) 5 Bom. L.R. 454.
1952
The Union of
India
v.
Hira Devi
and Another.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
1952
The Union of
India
v.
Hira Devi
and Another.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
Kumar Mukharjee v. W. G. Godfrey(') are under that
Act, the meaning has now been made clear by the
definition in section 2 of the present Act; any deposit
"remaining to the credit of the subscriber or depositor
after the happening of any such contingency" is also
a compulsory deposit; .and the contingency may
be I
retirement from service.
In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of
the lower court dated 1st February, 1949, appointing a
receiver is set aside as regards the Provident Fund
amount
of
Rs.
1,563 lying to the credit of the
judgment-debtor. Under the condition granting
special leave, the Government will pay the 1st respondent's costs of this appeal.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant : P. A. Mehta.
Agent for the respondent No. 1 : Naunit Lal.
· Agent for the respondent No. 2 : P. K. Chatterjee.
(') A.LR. 1922 Cal. 196.
GIPN-S4-8 s.c.India/71-18-12-72-700,
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