# UNDAVILLI NAGARATHNAM & ANR v. REDDI SATYANARAYANA MURTHI & ORS

- **Citation:** [1976] 3 S.C.R. 983
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976
- **Bench:** H. R. Khanna, P. K. Goswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/undavilli-nagarathnam-anr-v-reddi-satyanarayana-murthi-ors-6858
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Transfer of Property Act 1882-Secs. 76 (a)(e), 105-Meaning of leaseDistinction between lease & settlement-Whether recital in a document conclugive-Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act 1956 Secs. 2(/)(e) 16, 17Meaning of Landlord and Tenant-Bar of ;urisdiction.
One Mr. Subbarayudu had no male issue. He had his wife, plaintiff No. 2,
and two daughters, one of whom is plaintiff No. 1 and another defendant No. 4.
The defendant No. 1 is the son of defendant No. 4.
Mr. SubbaraYudu and
plaintiff No. 2 made various gifts in favour of their daughters. Shri Subbarayudu
made a settlement in the year 1955 whereby he gave the properties in Schedules A and B to the first plaintiff. The properties were to be
enjoyed
by
Subbarayudu and plaintiff No. 2 during their life time and after the death of
Subbarayudu plainti:ffi No. 1 was to get property mentioned in Schedule A and
after the death of plaintiff No. 2 she was to get property mentioned in Sche-'
dule B.
In 1958, Subbarayudu was alleged to have executed 4 documents
including a Deed of Revocation revoking the settlement of 1955.
In 1958
Subbarayudu entered into a document with defendant No. 1 giVing him possession of the property in which he had life interest. The document provided that
defendant No. 1 should deliver 43 bags of paddy every year to Subbarayudu and
take a receipt.
After the death of Subbarayudu plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 basing
their claim on the settlement of 1955 called upon the defendant No. 1 to deiiver
the possession of the property. The two issues which now survive are whether
defendant No. 1 is entitled to any protection under the Andhra Tenancy Act
and secondly whether the deed executed by Subbarayudu in favour of first
defendant is a settlement deed or a lease. The Trial Court found that the
settlement deed of 1955 was valid and that the subsequent deed of revocation
was invalid. The High Court confirmed the said findings.
The same are not
under challenge. The Trial Court, however, held the document to be a settlement deed and not a lease and that. therefore, the first defendant was not
entitled to any protection under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy
Act, 1956.
Accordingly, the Trial Court decreed the suit of posses_sion in
favour of the plaintiffs.
A
B·
c
E
The High Court in appeal came to the conclusion that the document satisl
fied all the conditions of the definition of lease under section 105
of the
Transfer of Property Act and could not b~ treated as settlement,
The appellant-plaintiffs contended
( 1) That the High Court was wrong in holding the document to be· a lease
and not a settlement.
(2) Subbarayudu had re_served only life interest in Schedule A and B
(j
Properties and after he gifted the same to the plaintiff No. 2 he could not in
,
law imperil her right to possession of the same after his death by leasing out
"\
the same property .
. (3) In. any case it was .not. an act of pruden.t l!lanagement of the proper ..
ttes in .which he. had only hfe .interest and the pnnc1ples applicable to a mort ..
gagee m possession under section 76(a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property
Act would. b~ applicable in the present case- and the lease would not be binding
on the plambffs.
H
( 4) Plaintiffs are not landlords within the meaning of Section
~ct and the defendant No. 1 is not a cultivating tenant under
tiffs.
2(f) of the
the plain-
984
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 s.c.R.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : 1. The document is described as Settlement Deed but that recital
is not decisive of the real intent of the document. The document makes it
clear that the possession was handed over to defendant No. 1; that the defendant No. 1 was to give 43 bags of paddy every year and it further mentioDs
"without subjecting me to do any expense \.vhatsoever and obtaining proper
receipts from me". The document does not disclose the disposition of the pro~
'.B
perty by a grandfather to a grandson but a business-like instrument. [988C-E]
:n
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2. Subbarayudu was old and the

## Text

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983
UNDAVILLI NAGARATHNAM & ANR.
v.
REDDI SATYANARAYANA MURTHI & ORS.
April I, 1976
[H. R. KHANNA AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]
Transfer of Property Act 1882-Secs. 76 (a)(e), 105-Meaning of leaseDistinction between lease & settlement-Whether recital in a document conclugive-Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act 1956 Secs. 2(/)(e) 16, 17Meaning of Landlord and Tenant-Bar of ;urisdiction.
One Mr. Subbarayudu had no male issue. He had his wife, plaintiff No. 2,
and two daughters, one of whom is plaintiff No. 1 and another defendant No. 4.
The defendant No. 1 is the son of defendant No. 4.
Mr. SubbaraYudu and
plaintiff No. 2 made various gifts in favour of their daughters. Shri Subbarayudu
made a settlement in the year 1955 whereby he gave the properties in Schedules A and B to the first plaintiff. The properties were to be
enjoyed
by
Subbarayudu and plaintiff No. 2 during their life time and after the death of
Subbarayudu plainti:ffi No. 1 was to get property mentioned in Schedule A and
after the death of plaintiff No. 2 she was to get property mentioned in Sche-'
dule B.
In 1958, Subbarayudu was alleged to have executed 4 documents
including a Deed of Revocation revoking the settlement of 1955.
In 1958
Subbarayudu entered into a document with defendant No. 1 giVing him possession of the property in which he had life interest. The document provided that
defendant No. 1 should deliver 43 bags of paddy every year to Subbarayudu and
take a receipt.
After the death of Subbarayudu plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 basing
their claim on the settlement of 1955 called upon the defendant No. 1 to deiiver
the possession of the property. The two issues which now survive are whether
defendant No. 1 is entitled to any protection under the Andhra Tenancy Act
and secondly whether the deed executed by Subbarayudu in favour of first
defendant is a settlement deed or a lease. The Trial Court found that the
settlement deed of 1955 was valid and that the subsequent deed of revocation
was invalid. The High Court confirmed the said findings.
The same are not
under challenge. The Trial Court, however, held the document to be a settlement deed and not a lease and that. therefore, the first defendant was not
entitled to any protection under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy
Act, 1956.
Accordingly, the Trial Court decreed the suit of posses_sion in
favour of the plaintiffs.
A
B·
c
E
The High Court in appeal came to the conclusion that the document satisl
fied all the conditions of the definition of lease under section 105
of the
Transfer of Property Act and could not b~ treated as settlement,
The appellant-plaintiffs contended
( 1) That the High Court was wrong in holding the document to be· a lease
and not a settlement.
(2) Subbarayudu had re_served only life interest in Schedule A and B
(j
Properties and after he gifted the same to the plaintiff No. 2 he could not in
,
law imperil her right to possession of the same after his death by leasing out
"\
the same property .
. (3) In. any case it was .not. an act of pruden.t l!lanagement of the proper ..
ttes in .which he. had only hfe .interest and the pnnc1ples applicable to a mort ..
gagee m possession under section 76(a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property
Act would. b~ applicable in the present case- and the lease would not be binding
on the plambffs.
H
( 4) Plaintiffs are not landlords within the meaning of Section
~ct and the defendant No. 1 is not a cultivating tenant under
tiffs.
2(f) of the
the plain-
984
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 s.c.R.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : 1. The document is described as Settlement Deed but that recital
is not decisive of the real intent of the document. The document makes it
clear that the possession was handed over to defendant No. 1; that the defendant No. 1 was to give 43 bags of paddy every year and it further mentioDs
"without subjecting me to do any expense \.vhatsoever and obtaining proper
receipts from me". The document does not disclose the disposition of the pro~
'.B
perty by a grandfather to a grandson but a business-like instrument. [988C-E]
:n
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G
2. Subbarayudu was old and the Settlement Deed made it clear tltat during
his life time he would enjoy the produce of the land. and therefore, he was
keen to have at least some paddy from the land during his life time as a source
of income and perhaps thought that his grandson- would faithfully carry out
the conditions without creating any difficulties.
[699C·DJ
3. Assuming without deciding that the principles under section 76(a)
&
(e) of the Transfer of Property Act might be applicable, it cannot be said
that granting of the lease to defendant No. 1 in the entire circumstances of the
case was not a prudent act of management of the properties. In view of the
relationship of the parties that was a natural arrangement for cultivation of
the land.
[989E-FJ
4. When a person with fu11 knowledge of the Jaw, ignorance of which is
no excuse, enters upon a lawful transaction or executes a valid docnrnent, the
rights flowing from the ]a\v cannot be denied to those who are entitled to their
benefit on the supposed theory of estoppel or a plea of contracting out
by
implication. [990A-BJ
5. Section 2(f) defines a landlord to mean the owner of holdin1! or part
thereof who is entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from such holding and
includes the heirs and assigns, legal representatives of such owners. <tr per·
sons deriving rights through him. Section 2 ( c) defines cultivating tenant to
mean a person who cultivates by his own Jabour or by hired labonr under
his supervision and control any land belonging to anq_ther under a tenancy
agreement, express or implied. The High Court has found that defendant No. 1
was a cultivating tenant of the landlord. In view of the conclusion that the
instrument is of lease there is no difficulty in holding that Subbarayudu was
the, landlord and on the death of Subbarayudu plaintiffs are landlords. Section
16 of the Act provides for a special forum for adjudication of disputes under
the Act including eviction of cultivating tenants and under section 17 of the
Act the provisions of the act over·ride anything inconsistent there\vith contained in any pre·existing law, custom, usage, agreement or decree or order of a
Court.
[990C-F, 991E-FJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
1968.
Civil Appeal No. 1048 of
Appeal from the Judgment and Decree/Order dated the 26th
April 1967 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal No. 64
of 1962.
M. Natesan, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekar, for the Appelhnt.
B. V. Subramanyam, I. Balaiah and G. Narasimhulu, for Respondent No. 1.
Ex-parte for Respondents 2-4.
H
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GOSWAMI; J .-This is an appeal on certificate from the judgment
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
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u. NAGARATHNAM v. R. s. MURTH! (Goswami,!.)
98S.
The two plaintiffs in the original suit are the appellants.
They
brought a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry,
for evicting defendants. 1 to 3 from the properties in Schedule A,
B and C and for delivery of possession of A and C Schedule properties to the first plaintiff and of the B Schedule properties either
to the first plaintiff or to the second plaintiff. The suit properties
were
owned
and
possessed
by
Meenavalli.
Suhbarayudu
of
Vedurupaka (hereinafter to be described as Subbarayudu). Subbarayudu was the husband of the second plaintiff and .father of the first
plaintiff. He had no male issue. He had only two daughters, plaintiff No. I and defendant No. 4,, who was the older of the two.
Subbarayudu made various dispositions of his property by executing
several documents during his life time in favour of his daughters.
So did bis wife, the second plaintiff. While making such dispositions
he was careful enough to make provision for himself and for his wife
during their life time.
The fourth defendant was married in 1923
and defendant No. 1 is her son.
The first plaintiff was married in
1935.
After the marriage of the first plaintiff the mother executed
a deed of gift (Ex. B-6) on February 13, 1935 in her favour in respect of certain land.
On the same day her father also executed in
her favour of deed of gift (Ex. B-7) in respect of some other land.
On Jnne 7, 1935, Subbarayudu executed anothe.r deed of gift ii1
favour of his first daughter, defendant No. 4, giving her also some
land (Ex. B-8).
All the three documents were registered on the
same day, namely, on June 11, 1935.
After about nine years the
mother executed a settlement deed (Ex. B-5) dated Jnne 7, 1944,
in respect of her joint 1/3 share in certain properly in favour of her
two daughters to be shared by them equally reserving life interest for
herself.
Then followed a settlement deed (Ex. A-4) of Januarv 8,
1950, executed by Subbarayudu in favour of the first plaintiff gi'ving
her ten acres of pasture land as mentioned in C Schedule.
Subbarayudu further executed a registered deed dated January 23, 1950
<Ex. A-B), described as will, whereby he gave to his daughters all
the properties barring a few mentioned therein and stating that after
his own life time and after the life time of his wife all his movable
and immovable properties would be taken in equal shares by his
two daughters.
On April 14, 1955, he executed a settlement deed
(Ex. A-\) whereunder he gave A and B Schedule properties to the
first plaintiff, his second daughter. By this document the A Schedule
property was to be enjoyed by the first plaintiff after his life time
and B Schedule property after the life time of her parents.
Three
years later on August 4, 1958, Subbarayudu executed four more
documents including a deed of revocation. Ex. B-10 is the document
by which the earlier document Ex. A-1 was revoked stating that the
earlier one had been brought about by fraud and misrepresentation.
Ex. B-11 was exec';'ted P';'rporting to settle his property on both the
daughters to be en1oyed m equal shares after the life time of their
parents. Ex. B-12 was executed in favour of his wife and the elder
daughter giving them a certain extent of the land in Mellore village
?esides the house sites and houses in Vedurupaka. It was mentioned
m Ex. B-12 that after his life time his wife would be in possession
without powers of alianation and that thereafter the elder daughter
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986
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 3 S.C.R.
would be entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property as
an absolute owner.
Ex. B-13 was executed in favour of the first
defendant,
namely,
grandson of
Subbarayudu
through his first
daughter, giving him possession of the properties in which he had
life interest stipulating at the same time that he (the first defendant)
should deliver forty three bags of paddy and obtain receipt from him
every year during his life time.
The plaintiffs' case is that Subbarayudu had leased out A and B
Schedule properties mentioned in Ex. A-1 on August 16, 1958, to
the third defendant, the son of the second defendant and that both
these defendants were in possession of the properties as tenants from
that time.
Subbarayudu died on May 5, 1960.
After his death
plaintiffs 1 and 2 basing their claim on Ex. A-1 respectively gave
notice to the third defendant on June 14, 1960 and on July 11, 1960,
to deliver back the lands in their possession.
The third defendant
replied that he was only working as a farm servant under the first
defendant and the latter was the lessee under a deed dated August 4,
1958 and that the settlement deed in favour of the plaintiffs · had
been removed by late Subbarayudu.
The firs\ plaintiff also had
trouble with the first defendant when the latter drove
away
his
watchman and lodged a complaint with the police claiming that he
was in possession of the lands.
The first plaintiff thereupon sent a
notice on August 20, 1960, to the first defenc,lant who, on the other
hand, asserted his rights in the lands under a deed of settlement
(Ex. B-13) dated August 4, 1958. That led to the institution of the
present suit by the plaintiff out of which this appeal has arisen.
The first daughter of Subbarayudu was impleaded as defendant
No. 4 in the plaint.
The first and the fourth defendants filed separate written statements. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 filed a memo adopting the written
,statement filed by the first defendant.
All of them repudiated the
.plaintiffs' claim for possession of the lands.
Several issues were raised, but we are concerned in this. appeal
only with Issue No. 5 and the additional Issue No. 1 which are as
follows :-
"Issue No. 5.
Whether defendant No. 1 is entitled to any protection under the Andhra Tenancy Act ?
Addition"'! Issue No. 1 "Whether the deed dated 4-8-1958 executed by late Meenavalli Subarayudu in favour of the !st defendant is a settlement deed or a lease ?"
It may be mentioned that issue were raised regarding the validity
·Of Ex. A-1, Ex. B-10, Ex. B-11 and Ex. B-13. The trial court held
that Ex. A-1 on which the plaintiffs based their suit was a valid document.
The trial court further held that the deed of revocation
(Ex. B-10) and deed of settlement (Ex. B-11) were invalid.
The
High Court affirmed these findings of the trial court and that con-
·troveTsy is closed.
""
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u. NAGARATHNAM v. R. s. MURTHI (Goswami, J.)
987
With regard to Ex. B-13, the trial court held it to be a true
document and that it was a settlement deed and not a lease and that
the first defendant was not entitled to any protection under the Andhra
Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (briefly the Andhra
Act) and tha! defendants 2 and 3 were not tenants in possession of
the land at the time of institution of the suit. In the view it took the
trial court decreed the suit for possession of A and C Schedule properties in favour of the first plaintiff and directing that the future
profits, which would be payable. by the first defendant, were to be
determined in separate proceedings.
The suit was also decreed in
favour of the second plaintiff for possession of the B Schedule properties with similar orders regarding future profit>.
On appeal by the defendants the High Court, after hearing the
parties, remanded the matter for a finding under order 41, rule 25.
Civil Procedure Code, by framing the following issue :
"Whether the plaintiffs accepted the gift of A and B Schedule properties by late Subbarayudu before its revocation
on 4-8-1958 by late Subbarayudu"?
B
c
The subordinate judge returned a finding
that the gift had been
D
accepted prior to the execution of the deed of revocation (Ex. B-10) .
The High Court thereafter heard the appeal and partly allowed the
same.
The High Court, in disagreement with the trial court, came to the
conclusion that the document Ex. B-13 satisfied all the conditions
of the definition of lease under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act and could not be treated as a settlement. The High Court
further observed :
"The term of lease is co-terminus with the life of the lessor
with the result that as
soon as the life of Subbarayudu
ended, the term of lease automatically
expired.
On the
death of Subbarayudu the property would pass to the persons specified in Ex. A-1. That must be the normal incidents of the transaction under the ordinary Jaw. At the time
of the transaction of lease was entered into the Andhra
Tenancy Act had already come into force. Subbarayudu was
the landlord and the 1st defendant was the cultivating tenant
within the meaning of those terms in the Andhra Tenancy
Act.
On the death of Subbarayudu his heirs,
assignees
and successors would likewise be landlords and they are entitled to evict the cultivating tenants".
Repelling the contention of the plaintiffs that the first defendant
was not the tenant of Subbarayudu at all, but only a trespasser, the
High Court held, on the oral and documentary evidence as well
as
on the admissions of defendants 2 and 3 with regard to the possession
of defendant No. 1 as a lessee, that the defendant No. 1 was a cultivating tenant under the plaintiffs on the death of Subbarayudu. The
High Court having come to that conclusion further held that the
plaintiffs could evict the defendants only under the provisions of the
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A
B
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988
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 3 S.C.R.
Andhra Act by making an appropriate application to the Tehsildar
and not in the present s~it in the civil court. · The High Court, therefore, .gr~nted. all the reliefs prayed for by .the plaintiffs except that \., __ .,
of eviction from A and B Schedule properties which was directed to
be obtamed by due recourse to the provisions of the Andhra Act.
The High Court accordingly partly allowed the appeal refusing the
prayer for eviction from A ;μid B Schedule properties but at the same
~e declaring that. the plaintiffs were entitled to the suit properties
m terms of Ex. A-1. The C Schedule property was not the subject
matter of appeal before the High Court and the decree in relation
to that property was unaffected.
Mr. Natesan, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, submits that the High Court is wrong in holding that Ex. B-13
is a lease and not a settlement.
We have perused tl1e document (Ex. B-13). It is true that it is
described in the very opening words of the document as "settlement
deed". But that recital is not decisive of the real intent of the docu1'
ment.
Under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lease
of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property,
made for a certain time, express or inlplied, or in perpetuity,
m
consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of
crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically
or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who
accepts the transfer on such terms.
The necessary ingredients mentioned 1mder section 105 of the, Transfer of Propertv Act are found
in the document (Ex. B-13). It is clear from the recitals that possession of the land was handed over by Subbarayudu to the first defendant for enjoying the same during the life time of Subbarayudu in
consideration of "!ortythree weighed bags of paddy worth Rs. 800/-
.... every year commencing from 15-1-1959". The document does
not disclose a disposition of the property by a grandfather to a grandson
out of love and affection but is a business-like instrument. To illustrate,
the document refers to paddy to be delivered to Subbarayudu "without subjecting me to any expenses whatsoever and obtaining proper
receipts from me".
It goes on to say that "payment no,'. borne by
receipt need not be given credit to you". We are satisfied that the
document (Ex. B-13) fulfils the ingredients of a lease. under section
105 of the Transfer of Property Act.
The submission of Mr. Natesan,
therefore, cannot be accepted.
Mr. N atesan next contends that Subbarayudu reserving only "life
interest" in the Schedule A and B properties after he had gifted the
same to the plaintiffs by Ex. A-1 on April 14, 1955, could not in law
1
imperil their rights to possession of the same a1ter his death by
.,-
leasing out the same properties in 1958 in the manner done in view
/
of the provisions of the Andhra Act which had already come into
force in 1956. At any rate, says Mr. Natesan, it was not an act of
prudent management of the properties in which he
had only
life
interest and the principles applicable to a mortgagee in possession
under section 76(a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act would
be applicable in the present case and the lease will not be binding on
the plaintiffs.
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u. NAGARATHNAM v. R. s. MURTHI (Goswami, J.)
989
In Ex. A-1 itself, which is the sheet-anchor of plaintiffs' claim,
·A
there was reference, inier alia, to two things relevant for consideration
on this aspect of the matter.
Firstly, it is stated there :
"I and my wife, Bapanamma, who is your mother shall
during our life time, be in enjoyment of the A Schedule
mentioned property and B Schedule mentioned property respectively without powers of disposition by way of gift, sale,
B
etc., but only enjoying the produce got there by paying all
Government taxes".
Secondly, further :
"After my life time you take possession of the A Schedule mentioned property and after your mother's life-time
the B Schedule mentioned property".
C
In the first extract just set out, Subbarayudu made it clear that
during his life he would enjoy the produce of the land "got there by
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paying all Government taxes". Subbarayudu was a1ready an old man
in 1955 and was apparently unable personally to look after cultivation of the land. His wife and younger daughter were also, perhaps,
considered by him no better for the purpose. Besides, it appears
D
that he was keen to have at least some paddy to come to him from
the land during his life time as a source of income and perhaps thought
that his grandson, the -first defendant, would faithfully carry out the
conditions without creating difficulties. This position does not appear
to have been disapproved even by the plaintiffs during the life time
of Subbarayudu.
Assuming, but not deciding, that the
principles under section
76(a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act may even be applicable in this case, we are unable to hold that granting of the lease to
defendant No. 1 in the entire circumstances of the case was not a
prudent act of management of the properties.
In view of the relationship of the parties, that was a natural arrangement for cultivation
of the land.
Mr. Natesan drew our attention to several decisions of this Court
dealing with section 7 6 of the Transfer of Property Act and in particular to the decision in Prabhu v. Ramdev & Ors. (1), wherein this
Court held that-
"evcn in regard to tenants inducted into the laud by a
mortgagee cases may arise where the said tenants may
acquire rights of special character by virtue of statutory
provisions which may, in the meanwhile, come into operation. A permissible settlement by a mortgagee in possession
with a tenant in the course of prudent management and the
springing np of rights in the tenant conferred or created by
statute based on the nature of the land and possession for
the requisite period, it was observed, was a different matter
altogether".
(I) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 676.
I 3-725SCI/76
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990
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 S.C.R.
A
Counsel submits that the present case is clearly distinguishable
from the above case since prior to the execution of Ex. B-13 in 1958
the Andhra Act had already come into force and it was not a case
:- .
where certain special rights were created "in the meanwhile".
•"'
When a person with full knowledge of the law, ignorance of which
is no excuse, enters upon a lawful transaction or executes a valid
B
document, the rights flowing from the law cannot be denied to those
who are entitled to their benefit on the supposed theory of estoppel or
a plea of contracting out by implication. Prabhu's case (supra) is
not an authority for such a proposition which counsel seeks to spell
out. The provisions of the Andhra Act will, therefore, be attracted
to the tenancy created by Ex. B-13.
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It is further contended by Mr. Natesan that the plaintiffs are not
landlords within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Andhra Act.
He
also submits that defendant No. 1 is not a cultivating tenant under
the plaintiffs.
By section 2(f) of the Andhra Act, "'landlord' means, the owner
of a holding or part thereof who is entitled to evict the cultivating
tenant from such holding or part, and includes the heirs, assignees,
legal representatives of such owner, or person deriving right5 through
him".
By section 2(c) of the said Act, "'cultivating tenant' means a person who cultivates by his own labour or by that of any other member
of his family or by hired Jabour under his supe.rvision and control, any
land belonging to another under a tenancy agreement, express or
implied, but does not include a mere intermediary".
The High Court has found that defendant No. 1 was a cultivating
tenant of the landlord under Subbarayudu relying on Ex. B-13 and
also on admissions by the defendants 2 and 3 who conceded possession of the land by defendant No. 1 as a lessee under Subbarayudu
and their own possession as farm servants under the first defendant.
We have no reason to take a contrary view.
In view of our conclusion that Ex. B-13 is an instrument of lease,
there is no difficulty in holding that Subbarayudu was the quondam
landlord of the first defendant within the meaning of section 2 (f) of
the Andhra Ac,t.
Once tbat is established, section 10 of the Andhra
Act takes care of the tenancy that has been.created under Ex. B-13.
.
Section 10 of the Andhra Act at the relevant time reads as
under:-
"10(1) "The minimum period of every lease entered
into between a landlord and his cultivating tenant on or
after the commencement of this Act, shall be six years.
Every such lease shall be in writing and shall specify the
holding, its extent and the rent payable therefor, with such
other particulars, as may be prescribed. The stamp and
registration charges for every such lease shall be borne by
the landlord and the cultivating tenant in equal shares.
t
•
u. NAGARATHNAM v. R. s. MURTHI (Goswami, !.)
991
(2) Notwithstanding anythnig contained in sub-section
(1 ) all tenancies subsisting on the date of promulgation of
the Andhra Cultivating Tenants' Protection Ordinance, 1956
( Andhra Ordinance 1 of 19 5 6) , and protected by that
Ordinance, and all subsequent tenancy agreements entered
into up to the commencement of this Act, shall continue for
a period of five years from the 1st June 1956 or until the
expiry of the lease in the normal course, whichever is later,
on the same terms and conditions as before, bnt subject to
the determination of fair rent in case of dispute.
(3) After such termination, the landlord may resume
the land from the cultivating tenant without any notice, and
if the tenant does not surrender possession, the landlord may
A
B
by an application before the Tahsildar obtain an order for
C
delivery of possession in the prescribed manner".
Thus under section 10 ( 1) when Ex. B-13 was executed on August
f 4, 1958, the lease created would by statute continue upto August 4,
1964 and even for further periods by later amendments of the Act.
Taking the original section 10(1) itself, the landlord Subbarayudn
died in May 1960 and there is no question of the lease ceasing on his
D
death in view of the clear provision under section 10 ( 1) . As
assignees by gift the plaintiffs are landlords on the death of Subbarayudu.
Under section 11, the ownership thus being changed on the
death of the landlord, the tenancy, which subsists by operation of
law, will continue on the same terms and conditions for the unexpired
portion of the lease under the scheme of the ~ct as amended. The
expression "currency of the lease" in section 11
will include the
E
statutory extension of the lease under the provisions of the Andhra
,t
Act.
Termination of tenancy under the Andhra Act is provided for
under section 13. Under section 16, there is a special forum for
adjudication of disputes under the Act including eviction of cultivating
tenants.
Under section 17 the provisions of the Andhra Act overF
ride anything inconsistent th'erewith contained in any pre-existing law,
custom, usage, agreement or decree or order of a Court.
It is, therefore, clear that the civil litigation between the parties
having established their respective rights based on the two documents,
Ex. A-1 and Ex. B-13, and the plaintiffs being landlords and defendant No. 1 being a cultivating tenant, eviction will have to be sought
for in accordance with the provisions of the Andhra Act.
The High
Court is right in refusing eviction through the process of the civil
court.
In the result we are unable to interfere with the
decree of the High Court.
The appeal is dismissed.
however, no order as to costs.
judgment and
There .will be,
P.H.P.
Appeal dismissed.
G